DEFEATS UNMASK THE OGRE-LIKE AMERICANS

Comment on Korean affairs other than the U.N. debates is concerned with developing the thesis that ogre-like America, facing inevitable defeat, is resorting to all manner of barbaric maneuvers—from wanton bombing of peaceful towns, hospitals, farms, and schools to use of the atom bomb. A further indication of this ogre-like character is the fact that the United States is pressuring its Allies—especially the Marshall-Plan nations—to secure "cannon fodder," (this term appears with increasing frequency) and that Wall Street is interested only in increasing its profits without regard for the feelings of the suffering people of Korea, of the United States, or of the nations which supply the cannon fodder.

Moscow continues to be silent on the question of the military strength of the Koreans and of the Americans. The successive victories of the North Korean forces are discussed not in terms of the material strength of those forces but in terms of the spiritual weakness of the Americans. The possibility that American pressure for cannon fodder will increase the strength of American forces is generally ignored; some broadcasts minimize the possibility by dwelling on the poor morale of American troops or on the strength of "the peoples'" opposition to the Korean war.

Pyongyang persists in contending that America wants to "enslave" first Korea and then the rest of Asia, and there are echoes of this contention in Soviet broadcasts. But there does not appear to be any attempt to characterize the Korean war in terms of white races against yellow.

Other, well-established themes are also exploited. These include the claim that "the people" of the world oppose American aggression in Korea; the American public, like that of other nations, is said to be violently opposed to it. The fact that certain countries are planning to send troops is said to be "insignificant" when juxtaposed with the indignation of "the people" in those countries. Pyongyang and Moscow revive the attempt to "prove" that America planned the intervention and report the finding of maps and U.N. documents detailing plans for intervention in the North. The certainty of the Korean victory is reiterated in Pyongyang broadcasts which claim that victory is not far off; but any possible let-down resulting from this claim is countered by reference to the increasing "cannibalism" of American troops.

General MacArthur's trip to Formosa has been the subject of light comment from Moscow, Pyongyang, and Peiping, all of whom consider it an attempt to disguise the completeness of the American defeat in Korea by expanding the scope of hostilities.

a. American Cannibalism: Pyongyang's broadcasts are highly emotional in tone when it comes to discussions of American cannibalism. They attribute the growing barbarism of American forces to their growing awareness of American defeat, and condemn all U.S. air attacks as wanton, ruthless, barbaric, criminal, etc. Moscow's less-emotional accounts find proof of
the heedlessness of these raids in the fact that some of them are conducted during rain storms. It asserts that American airmen drop bombs during downpours without regard for military targets. A Seoul broadcast of 7 August surpasses many others in its description of the crimes perpetrated by defeat-crazed American troops:

Having taken over the gallows and prisons from the Japanese imperialists, the human slaughterers have been perpetrating atrocity murders of patriotic people—tearing them to death, cutting out the breasts of innocent girls, dragging patriots to death, and letting hungry ferocious dogs devour bound patriots thrown into warehouses. Then, for having refused to write statements swearing a change of heart, they burned patriots to death. . . . Indeed their atrocities could not have been surpassed by Hitler or Tojo.

All these atrocities were instigated by the American aggressors, following in the footsteps of the Ku Klux Klan. It has been established that the massacre at Suwon was ordered by Muccio. Well, the order of Muccio is the order of MacArthur and the order of MacArthur is the order of Truman.

Foreign Minister Pak's protest to Trygve Lie is broadcast at length.

Pyongyang and Seoul cite, as further evidence of American cannibalism, the "murder in cold blood" of Kim Sam Nyong and Lee Chu Ha, both members of the Central Committee of the Korean Labor Party (Communist), and Moscow adds to the store of evidence by quoting President Nance of Temple University as advocating a return to "jungle law."

b. America Needs a New World Conflict: In addition to scattered hints that America is planning to expand the war—Asian nations are particularly warned of this plan—two commentaries exploit the ideological argument that capitalist nations need war to avert the impending crisis. RED STAR's reference to the capitalists' need for war is only incidental to a description of the intensified American war effort, but a Linetsky commentary develops the argument at greater length. Broadcast only to the Soviet Home audience, Linetsky's talk insists that "the road of war is the road of imperialist ruin." The commentator quotes American banking circles as admitting in April that a relaxation of international tensions would be a blow to U.S. capitalists; an official of the Bankers Trust Co. is said to have urged intensified preparations for war to avert this blow. BUSINESS WEEK is also quoted as predicting a fresh impetus to industry after the outbreak of war. Linetsky likens the "adventure" in Korea to the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Pact as revelations of the lengths to which capitalists will go to prolong their existence. But nowhere does he specifically claim that the Korean adventure is the war which the capitalists have sought nor does he suggest that this adventure will bring the ideologically-predicted downfall of capitalism.
c. General MacArthur's Visit to Formosa: The defeat America is suffering in Korea is the premise of the light comment on General MacArthur's trip to Formosa. LITERARY GAZETTE characterizes the visit and MacArthur's agreement with Chiang Kai-shek as a Trojan horse by means of which the United States hopes to occupy Formosa. Secretary Acheson's explanations of American policy regarding Formosa are dismissed and the State Department is said to be striving only to calm the nerves of those who are alarmed by "the blood-thirsty dictatorship of the United States aggressors in Asia." Ascribing these American efforts to the defeats being suffered in Korea, LITERARY GAZETTE describes the Greeks' use of a wooden horse in the Trojan war; it argues that President Truman is attempting the role of Ulysses:

"He built his propaganda model of a Trojan horse and hid General MacArthur within. But there can be no doubt that this maneuver will by no means ease the situation of the United States aggressor and will hardly postpone the date of the clean-up of Formosa which the Chinese People's Army of Liberation will undertake.

"It is not surprising that Truman's Trojan horse looks very dilapidated and that it, like the entire U.S. propaganda racing stable, is lame in all its legs." (in Czech and Rumanian, and four times in Serbo-Croat, 3 August)

Pyongyang's reaction to MacArthur's visit is epitomized in the opening paragraph of a 6 August commentary:

"Despite repeated miserable defeats, the American imperialists, who have launched the direct aggressive actions in Asia, are desperate to intensify their adventurous schemes. Such adventurous schemes of the American ruling classes are concretely expressed in the fact that MacArthur, who has met a tragic military defeat in Korea, visited Formosa on 31 July...."

e. Attlee is Washington's Tool: British participation in the Korean war is denounced in two commentaries. A broadcast to the United Kingdom insists that Attlee is but a tool of Wall Street and asks why Attlee is sounding the alarm when no one threatens Britain. The Prime Minister's failure to mention the Nehru mediation proposal in a recent broadcast is said to reflect America's rejection of the proposal.

Moscow is particularly scornful of Attlee's criticisms of Soviet disarmament proposals. The Prime Minister is said to slander the USSR and to "speak like a man of the most uncouth gutter sheet." (sic) The English-language broadcast detours into a defense of Soviet armament proposals which "everyone knows" are designed only to bring peace to the whole world.

The "cannon fodder" theme appears in this commentary also and Moscow sympathizes with the Britons who will be the cannon fodder for American aggressors and who will shoulder a heavy burden of taxation for militarization.
An English-language broadcast to Southeast Asia satirically claims that the Attlee Government has decided to participate in the Korean war because it believes that this "is the very thing to increase longevity among the natives." "In between salvoes" from warships and bombers Anglo-American diplomats "shamelessly keep muttering about doing something for the good of the people." This attempt to disparage Anglo-American motives in Korea involves a satirical description of conditions in colonial and semi-colonial areas, especially in Africa. But it does not include any reference to the Point Four program, which Soviet broadcasters occasionally describe as an ulterior-minded attempt to do "something for the good of the people."

f. American Difficulty Is British Opportunity: A Soviet Home Service broadcast rumormongers about Anglo-American differences in a quotation from the DAILY COMPASS correspondent Johannes Steel. Steel is quoted as reporting that "the British Foreign Office believes that the United States soon will be busy with events in Korea and will therefore considerably reduce its political and economic activities in the Near and Middle East. The foreign affairs experts believe that Britain in this way will have an opportunity to recover her former position in these countries. With this end in view the British authorities have no intention of giving any serious support to the United States in Korea."

g. Foreign-Language Broadcasts Concerning Korea: A statistical breakdown of titles of commentaries on Korea broadcast in selected languages in the past five weeks does not reveal any over-all pattern of emphasis. But it does indicate a pattern of de-emphasis in broadcasts in Serbo-Croat and Macedonian which would appear to reduce the possibility of scaremongering in those transmissions. The volume of comment on Korea broadcast in these languages consistently remained below the norm represented by the percentage of attention on all beams. In the Macedonian beam this attention declined steadily and markedly in the five week period, while in Serbo-Croat programs there was more variation but always less than the norm. Broadcasts in Mandarin, on the other hand, showed an increase in attention to Korea. Broadcasts in Iranian showed extreme variations; in one week there was considerably more attention than the average and in another considerably less. Attention to Korea in broadcasts in German varied from appreciably more than the average amount to somewhat less.