STALIN AND NEHRU: PARTNERS IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE

Radio Moscow leaps upon the Stalin-Nehru-Acheson exchange and makes capital out of it as proof of the simple Soviet thesis that Stalin seeks peace and Acheson rejects it. In addition the episode is pressed into the service of two other current propaganda lines: that the U.S. imperialists want to destroy the United Nations, and that the "peoples" of the world (including India) condemn American "aggression" in Korea. Forgetting its earlier hostility to Nehru, and wholly ignoring Nehru's support of the U.N.'s condemnation of North Korean aggression, Moscow conveys the impression that the people and government of India, like the common people everywhere, accept U.S.-South Korean aggression as a self-evident fact and are sternly indignant about it. Nehru is not explicitly praised, however; the focus of attention is on Stalin and on the "epoch-making" character of his "brief, clearcut and calm" reply.

a. Stalin's Reply is "A Mighty Symbol Rallying the Partisans of Peace": The publicity given to Stalin's reply follows the usual simple pattern of Stalin-praise, and in the simplicity of its "we want peace" theme it also accords well with the "brief, clearcut and calm" character of Stalin's statement itself. The statement is endlessly repeated along with descriptions of the "resounding echo" which it has brought forth "in all the countries of the world." It is a "peaceful and principled" statement, a new expression of "the consistent and peaceful policy" of the USSR, and "all peace-loving men" support it. There is no attempt to defend the reiterated requirement that Communist China must be included in the Security Council. Similarly there is no discussion of what kind of settlement might be arrived at by the modified Security Council (whether, for instance, it would necessarily include the unification of Korea on Soviet terms), nor of the impasse which might result from a Soviet and Chinese veto of the action which the American "puppets" in the Security Council have already embarked upon. Instead, the appropriateness of possible Security Council action on the matter is treated as another of the self-evident facts on which the Soviet case is founded. Sergeeva, for instance, with seemingly transparent simplicity, asks: "Who, if not the Security Council, should discuss and settle such matters?"

b. Acheson's Embarrassment: He Does Not Want the Security Council to Resume Its Activity: There is also a fair amount of gloating over the predicament in which the State Department is said to have found itself. "The foreign bourgeois press, particularly the American, reacted with extreme nervousness and agitation" to Nehru's message. The British DAILY EXPRESS is said to have given expression to Acheson's underlying thought with "cynical frankness" when it declared the United Nations an "international impediment," while the EVENING STANDARD, realistically recognizing the probable repercussions in world public opinion, declares that "the Russian proposal ought to be accepted." The State Department, not wanting to be "unmasked
as an aggressor," he rewrote Acheson's message three times. But the camouflage was not successful. "Camouflaging his statement under hypocritical assurances, Acheson expressed the intention of the U.S. leading circles to stick to their policy, which consists primarily of maintaining the Security Council in the position of a branch of the State Department, and secondly of continuing their aggression in Korea." All of this shows that Acheson and his lackeys "do not want the Security Council to resume its activity on the basis of the U.N. Charter, that they fear a discussion of the Korean question in the Security Council in its legitimate composition."

TRUMAN'S MESSAGE: SHARP INCREASE IN ATTENTION TO U.S. MOBILIZATION

After a slow start, Soviet propagandists are giving a fair amount of attention to President Truman's speech, including his call for more troops and for an additional ten billion dollars. The volume of this discussion is markedly less than that of the discussion of two other current events: the failure of other countries to help the U.S. with troops, and the Stalin-Nehru exchange. Nevertheless, the amount is of interest as representing a departure from the previous general policy of not playing up developments which might suggest a large future increase in American strength. Such developments present the propagandist with a dilemma: he can use them to good advantage as illustrations of the enemy's "militarism," but to do so means to advertise the enemy's potential strength. Until this week Soviet propagandists seem to have assumed that the propaganda disadvantages in the strength frame-of-reference outweighed the advantages in the moral frame-of-reference. But this week--perhaps feeling forced to say something on a subject which had attracted world-wide attention--they have partially reversed their policy. (A possible additional reason for playing up the ten-billion increase is that it would be a face-saving device in case of eventual North-Korean defeat. The tendency has already been to play down the North-Korean superiority in equipment; the propaganda picture is one of North-Korean "heroism" pitted against U.S. troops which are at least their equals in equipment.)

Even now, of course, Moscow concentrates exclusively upon the moral frame-of-reference and does not speculate on how much or how soon American strength will be increased. Six points are made: (1) Truman rejects peace; he will continue the Korean aggression; (2) he admits extension of the aggression to the Philippines and Indochina; (3) he has embarked on a "mad armaments race"; (4) taxes and rising prices mean that the common people will pay, while arms-makers and speculators are "delighted"; (5) he has also asked for "dictatorial" powers; and (6) there is new pressure on Europe to supply "cannon fodder."
FAILURE TO SEND TROOPS REFLECTS WORLD-WIDE PROTEST AGAINST AGGRESSION

In sheer bulk, the most prominent Soviet theme with regard to Korea has been, from the outset, the "world-wide wave of protest" against U.S. aggression. As if to counteract the negative impression created by U.N. support of the American action, Moscow seizes every opportunity to convey the impression that "the peoples" of the world take a position which is the exact opposite of that taken at the U.N. The most tangible fact yet brought forward in support of this idea is the failure of countries other than the United States to supply troops. Other evidence adduced includes Indonesian neutrality, Nehru's initiative (which is treated as if it implied acceptance of the Soviet position), meetings of protest in all parts of the world, the small number of volunteers in the United States, statements by Communist sympathizers, and most of all, the hundreds of millions of signatures to the Stockholm Appeal (see below, section on the Peace Movement). Although the Stockholm Appeal says nothing whatever about which side is the aggressor in Korea (nor even about which side is at fault on the atomic issue), Soviet propagandists continue to link it very closely with the Korean aggression of atomic "cannibals."

Omission as well as positive statement is used to support the conception of "world-wide protest." The following facts are ignored: (1) The report of the U.N. investigating committee immediately after the attack. This was mentioned once last week (with the claim that the committee consisted of U.S. puppets), and not at all this week. (2) The overwhelming majority of U.N. members endorsing the Security Council decision. This has been almost wholly overlooked; it appears this week only once, and in a distorted form. It is said that the overwhelming majority contented themselves with "noting" the decisions of "a group of members of the Security Council," and "refused to give any practical support to American aggression." (3) The existence of other possible reasons for not sending troops. The existence of other military needs is not mentioned as a possible reason for not sending troops; it is assumed that the only possible reason is fear of popular indignation if any tangible help is given to U.S. "aggression." "These members have thus admitted willy-nilly by their stand that war in Korea represents an action started and carried on by the American imperialists themselves, and the United Nations has not and cannot have anything to do with it." (in Rumanien, 24 July 1950)

Other noteworthy omissions or avoidances in the Soviet treatment of Korea are:

(1) Facts on who started it. Both last week and this week there has been only a very meager and fragmentary effort to prove U.S. aggression; almost always it is treated as self-evident. It is of interest in this connection that even the alleged discovery of top-secret UNCOM documents,
abandoned at the time of the flight from Seoul, is not claimed to demonstrate South Korean or American aggressive plans. It is claimed only that the documents show UNCOK's subservience to the United States, and a U.S. directive to the Commission to hinder "peaceful unification" of Korea. (TASS; in English Morse to North America, 24 July 1950)

(2) The racial issue. Although white Americans are fighting in Asia against Mongolian Koreans, the racial aspect of the struggle has been scarcely mentioned by Moscow. The nearest thing to it, in available broadcasts, is Kornilov's quotation of a statement by (Mon Hak Tong?), former political adviser to Syngman Rhee: "It is only now that he openly admits that the Americans regard the Koreans as the lowest race on the globe, and have exploited them in testing their methods for the attainment of domination over that 'lowest race.'"

(3) Unification. The idea of unification of Korea is by no means absent from Soviet broadcasts, but there appears to be a distinct difference in this respect between Moscow and Pyongyang. Pyongyang is likely to say "the struggle for unification and independence, against the American aggressors," while Moscow is more likely to say simply "the struggle for independence, against the American aggressors." (To describe it often as a struggle for unification may, in Moscow's eyes, seem to come too close to an admission that the war is something more than the repelling of a South-Korean attack.)

(4) Possible Soviet or Chinese Military Support. While the rest of the world speculates about whether the Korean war may be transformed into a Third World War by Soviet or Chinese-Communist participation, Moscow remains strictly silent on both possibilities. There are abundant references to moral support and general friendliness (for instance, a Korean documentary film, "Song of Friendship," is said to be devoted to "the firm and invincible friendship" between Korea and the USSR), but the question of more tangible aid is not discussed.

The possibility of American use of the atomic bomb in Korea, which received a significant amount of attention last week, is mentioned this week only in a few scattered broadcasts. Moscow also notes that "even the reactionary American military observer (Hanson Baldwin?) declared that under no circumstances should the atomic bomb be used in Korea. Political, military, psychological and moral reasons should prevent the United States from using the atomic bomb."

Atrocity stories continue to appear, including the protest of a group of newspaper correspondents against the allegedly deliberate bombing of a well-marked hospital in Wonsen. Their total volume, however, is only moderate.
NORTH KOREAN RADIOS: KOREA IS ONLY THE BEGINNING; GENEROUS STALIN

The North Korean radios continue their preoccupation with establishing the righteousness of their cause, the spiritual strength of their forces—which arises from the aforementioned righteousness—and the world-wide support enjoyed by their cause. They attack the United States for instituting aggression in Korea, for manipulating the United Nations to cover up that aggression, and for resorting to brutal bombings and other atrocities. And they also point out that even in those countries which have officially endorsed the U.S. action in Korea "the people" support the just Korean cause. The consequence of this support—inevitable in Soviet-Communist propaganda—is that those Governments are persecuting the people. Stalin's reply to Nehru's mediation offer is duly approved. American prisoners of war continue to be included in the ranks of those denouncing American aggression. The preparations for the 15 August elections of People's Committees in the "liberated" South are reported, and the land reform program is applauded.

a. America's Global Plans for Aggression: The general claim that American aggression in Korea is but the precursor of similar aggressive actions in other parts of the world, which has been implicit in much of Pyongyang's propaganda, is discussed with some specificity in a 20 July radio address by (Mun Hak Tong ?) who identifies himself as a former political adviser to the Americans and to Syngman Rhee. Much of his talk is devoted to exposing Rhee's corruption and his friction with the Democratic Party and Lee Bum Suk, but, in revealing Rhee's subservience to the Americans, the address describes the aggressive plans which Rhee helped implement. Mun insists that the U.S. warmongers assigned a "sacrifice" role to Korea; it was to be plunged into a sea of blood and all Koreans exterminated so as to "touch off a third World War." The plans were made in April last year and the aggression which was to be the spark for world-wide conflict was arranged for July so as to give the U.S. an excuse to send its forces to the Far East and thus frustrate the Chinese Communist forces who were known to be planning the invasion of Formosa in July.

Other broadcasts call on all Asian peoples to awaken to the realization that America's aggressive schemes are not confined to Korea. And President Truman's message to Congress is offered as another revelation of America's plan to expand hostilities. Pyongyang reasons that Truman is trying to conceal the U.S. defeat in Korea by expanding the scope of aggression and is using that defeat "as a chance to intensify his warmongering policy, exploitation of the people, and deprivation of all rights."

b. The Friendly Soviet Union and the Great Stalin: Radio Pyongyang has frequently acknowledged the USSR's generosity to the North Korean regime—such acknowledgements have been a standard component of Pyongyang's broadcasts—and this week the acknowledgement is related to the Korean war.
A 24 July broadcast emphasizes that the Soviet Government is striving for a fair settlement of the Korean issue and is "internationally defending us in our war against the American imperialists." The Soviet Union's traditional policy toward Korea, epitomized in Gromyko's urging that the United Nations discharge its peace mission in Korea, is said to be "diametrically" opposed to the aggressive policies of the United States.

In this same frame of reference, a 25 July broadcast is entitled "Generalissimo Stalin Is Our Saviour, Liberator, and Closest Friend." This commentary deals with Stalin's historical kindness to the North Koreans in the five years since "liberation" and with the current manifestation of that kindness--Stalin's reply to Nehru's mediation offer. In neither of these broadcasts does there appear to be any reference to material assistance from the USSR. Furthermore, in reports of the enthusiasm with which the people are contributing funds for the purchase of war planes there is no identification of the source of supply of those planes.

c. The Spiritual Strength of the Koreans: North Korean broadcasts appear to avoid any explicit comparison of the material strength of the Koreans with that of the Americans; they concentrate on recounting the moral and spiritual attributes which make heroes of Korean troops and which will ensure final victory in the righteous war. This pattern is departed from in one broadcast this week. In describing the encircling attack which led to the capture of Taejon a military observer claims that "relying on their numerical superiority, the enemies mobilized their air units to give cover to their ... batteries on the Kum river defense line and attempted to stop the advance of our tank units."

The future strength implications of Truman's speech are minimized and the additional strength gained by the U.S. from the support accorded by other nations is disregarded. By claiming that all peace-loving nations support the Korean cause Pyongyang adds to its claimed store of spiritual strength; and by claiming that "the people" are opposed to the American aggression even in those countries which have officially endorsed the action it implicitly subtracts from America's strength potential.