MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: Report HR70-14

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John N. McMahon

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Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY: Poland/Warsaw Pact

DATE OF INFO.: 1979

SUBJECT: Wartime Statute, Combat Readiness, Mobilization, Front Command, etc.

SOURCE: Documentary

Summary:

This report is a translation of a Polish SECRET document entitled "Problems for Discussion by the Chief of the General Staff, Polish Armed Forces and the Chief of Staff, Warsaw Pact Combined Armed Forces." Material includes a discussion on the draft of the wartime statute of the Warsaw Pact Combined Armed Forces (CAF), a CAF High Command directive on combat readiness, mobilization expansion of Polish Armed Forces, command structure, satellite reconnaissance, new equipment deliveries, and communications problems. The Poles ask whether their suggestions are considered in drafting the CAF directive on combat readiness. They also express a desire to be informed on Soviet legislation affecting mobilization, and request consideration of direct receipt of data from Soviet reconnaissance satellites in times of international tension and threat of war, and state they have received no Soviet offers to sell them equipment designed for this purpose. The Poles point out that present aerial photographic equipment is inadequate for missions assigned by the CAF High Command.

End of Summary

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Complying with the wishes of the High Command of the Combined Armed Forces (CAF) we presented at the end of February our proposals for the draft of the wartime statute of the Warsaw Pact CAF. In our report we treated somewhat more broadly problems connected with the creation and functioning of the CAF High Command and of mutual exchange of plenipotentiaries of high party and government rank, representatives between the national government leadership and the CAF High Command, as well as CAF commands in the theater of military operations (the structural framework of the statute sent us by the CAF High Command does not contain such suggestions). Taking up these questions, we assume that a more precise explanation of these matters in the statute may positively influence the effectiveness of international cooperation and direction of the CAF in wartime. This is also needed for operational direction and control of all elements of the defense system of the Warsaw Pact countries, including the nonmilitary elements.

We have, however, presented the problem of commanding the Combined Baltic Fleet in more general terms.

We would be interested in the opinion of CAF Headquarters regarding our proposals. Should it be positive, we could consider the possibility of including elements of some of the proposals already in the next training of General Staffs (Main Staff) of the Warsaw Pact Countries.

At the beginning of March 1979 we transmitted to CAF Headquarters our views and comments on the CAF High Command draft directive on combat readiness. We have accepted in full the principles contained in the draft concerning maintenance of constant combat readiness and attainment of its higher states, particularly in regard to the planned four-step system.

Our comments arose from the special situation of our armed forces and pertain chiefly to: maintenance of reserve ammunition in tanks (combat vehicles) and on transporters; gradual preparation of missiles (in order to preserve their operational life); time norms for attainment of higher states of combat readiness (because of the impossibility of shortening them under present conditions); accelerated deployment—in relation to the state of “war threat”—of certain elements of the defense system (e.g., forces and means of troop movement control); alert signals (envelopes are suggested; in our opinion, signal tables will provide better operational troop alerts).

It would be useful to get a clarification of the following questions:

- are our suggestions taken into consideration, and to what extent, in the effort of drafting the directive?

- when may we expect publication of this document?

- what deadline will be set for elaboration of plans for attainment of higher states of combat readiness and making corrections in the operational and mobilization planning documents (deadline for enforcing the new directive)?

The Combined Armed Forces (CAF) High Command directive on CAF combat readiness basically deals with mobilizational expansion of the armed forces. In our country matters pertaining to mobilization of the Armed Forces of the Polish Peoples Republic are regulated by:

a) the Polish Peoples Republic (PPR) Constitution which empowers the Council of State to proclaim partial or general mobilization and states that the Council of Ministers performs general direction of national defense and organization of PPR Armed Forces;

b) the Law on General Obligation to Defend the PPR, which empowers the National Defense Committee to establish principles for organization of the PPR Armed Forces and specifies civilian service duties for time of mobilization and war;

c) National Defense Committee Resolution on Defense Readiness of the State;

d) National Defense Committee resolutions which define the tasks of state administrative organs and ministries in regard to mobilization of the PPR Armed Forces;

e) Mobilization regulations entitled "Instruction on Mobilization Expansion of PPR Armed Forces" issued by the minister of National Defense, and mobilization guidelines issued by the Chief of General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, in the form of specialized publications pertaining to command at all levels, and also "Instruction on Mobilizational Expansion of Military Units Formed by Organizational Units of State Administration and Socialized Economy."
In the light of provisions of the new directive on combat readiness there will probably be a need for initiation of action aimed at updating certain state normative and legal acts regulating these problems.

In connection with the above we would welcome familiarization with USSR legislation in this field which is now in force, particularly in regard to conversion of the national economy and state administration from peacetime to wartime footing and attainment of full defense readiness of the state. And, if at all possible, we would also like to know:

- which regulations throughout the Soviet Union and Soviet Army provide the norms for problems concerning mobilization preparation and troop expansion?

- are the mobilizational instructions (guidelines) drafted separately for each command level (e.g., military districts, provincial military headquarters, and military replacement headquarters, tactical large units, other units) or in a specialized form dealing with individual mobilizational subjects (e.g., preparation and conduct of party-political work during the mobilization period, planning supply of mobilizational needs for officers, warrant officers, and officer cadets; material and technical support of mobilization, etc.) in separate publications issued for all command levels?

4. Recommendations on the Organizational Structure of the Front Command.

Recommendations of CAF High Command and Headquarters regarding chief policies on development of PPR ground and naval forces assigned to the CAF during the period 1981-1985 propose, among other things, introduction of a new organizational structure of front command. An important innovation in this structure is the introduction of the
position of front air force commander, who is a front deputy commander for aviation, together with an air force headquarters subordinate to him (headquarters personnel - about 200). At the same time, page 14 of the recommendation proposes terminating the formation of an aviation control system together with the established air army combat control organs (Fighter Aviation Combat Control Center, Air Army Combat Control Center, Combat Control Group, Target Guidance and Detection Post, Radar Guidance Post). A question arises in view of the above: Would all tactical large units and other units of front aviation be directly subordinate to the front air force headquarters or would there also be an intermediate air army level?

If there would not be an air army level the question of aviation control from the front command post, alternate command post and quartermaster command post is not clear, including the support for the command process, particularly from the standpoint of communications (up to now the air army command posts, alternate command posts and quartermaster command posts have provided support for the support regiments and the signal regiment). Similar doubts arise in regard to material and technical support for air operations.

The recommended organizational structure of the front command and headquarters is composed of a relatively high personnel strength of generals, officers, warrant officers and civilian employees (about 1,200-1,300 persons; at present our front headquarters has 499 persons and the air army command 358 persons).

In case there is formation of front air force command and headquarters in place of the present air force command and headquarters, the front command organs personnel strength would be at maximum 857.
5. **Satellite Reconnaissance.**

What is the possibility of direct Polish Armed Forces General Staff receipt of data from Soviet reconnaissance satellites, particularly in times of international tension and threat of outbreak of armed conflict in Europe?

Conclusions from the war game conducted with the Ministry of National Defense leadership cadre (February 1978) indicate the usefulness of such an apparatus within the Polish Armed Forces General Staff, and in the future also in the front headquarters.

We do not have a Soviet offer to sell us receiving apparatus designed for this purpose.

6. **Air Reconnaissance Technology.**

We are meeting serious difficulties in implementing tasks specified in Military Council recommendations of the Warsaw Pact Combined Armed Forces (Sofia, 20 October 1977) on improvement of air reconnaissance. Offers made by the Soviets to sell air reconnaissance technology do not facilitate a radical improvement of the present situation.

We are interested in receiving data on modern technology and aviation equipment of the photographic service, specifically on:

- technology and equipment for automatic film processing both in aircraft and on the ground;
- means for processing photographic negatives and their rapid duplication;
- devices for low-level photography;
- apparatus for spectral and thermal photography;
- devices for facsimile (data transmission) from aircraft;
- devices for automatic coordinate designation of reconnoitered targets.

Present aerial photographic service equipment does not ensure photography at low levels, under various atmospheric conditions at different times of the day, or of camouflaged targets; the equipment also does not ensure transmission of reconnaissance results in the time necessary to employ effective strike means. Time needed to process films, and to interpret, study and duplicate them is too long and does not satisfy requirements of a modern command system.

Also useful would be acquisition of information concerning onboard apparatus for reconnaissance of radar systems ensuring rapid and automatic, or as rapid as possible, evaluation of reconnoitered radiation sources.

We would like to install such apparatus on subsonic aircraft. Implementation of this plan would fill the gap existing in the radioelectronic aerial reconnaissance for the ground forces, the air force and the navy.

Despite efforts we have received no offers to sell us this type of equipment.


Efforts are being made in our country aimed at fulfilling estimated annual plan requirements, to the greatest extent possible, by domestic production. Expected deliveries of the estimated annual plan for domestic production are 2 1/2 to 3 times larger than current deliveries.
Estimated annual plan requirements from import, amounting to about 2,300 million rubles (including 2,170 million rubles from USSR), are, however, confirmed only by 5.3 percent, or about 123 million rubles (including from USSR about 97 million rubles or 4.5 percent). Confirmed exports from the Polish Peoples Republic in the estimated annual plan amount to about 220 million rubles and, therefore, almost twice as much as imports in the estimated annual plan.

The value of confirmed deliveries from import within the framework of the estimated annual plan amounts to only about 32 percent of the value of ongoing deliveries confirmed for 1979 (about 400 million rubles).

In such a situation it is proposed that we consider the possibility of including CAF Headquarters in coordination of agreements on mutual deliveries of armaments and military equipment in the estimated annual plan.


We do not have sufficient tactical and technical data to plan for certain types of armaments and military equipment, such as, for instance, VEGA-E antiaircraft missile systems, TUNGUSKA 30-mm antiaircraft guns, and METIS man-portable antitank guided missile systems (recommended for introduction as equipment of our forces by CAF Headquarters of the Warsaw Pact countries during the period 1981-1985). Such a situation creates for us definite difficulties in preparation of detailed plans for 1981-1985. This specifically relates to VEGA antiaircraft missile systems. According to information on hand this is very complicated equipment and its introduction will be accompanied by major investment expenditures which cannot be planned without closer acquaintance with the systems.
In connection with this we request that detailed tactical and technical data on this equipment be transmitted to us.

9. Project to Construct Stationary Tropospheric Communications Lines and a Radiorelay Link along the Seacoast of the Polish Peoples Republic. (Problem to be discussed in case it is taken up by General of the Army GRIBKOV).

This project is the result of provisions of the Tenth Session of the Committee of Defense Ministers. As a result of correspondence and discussions which have taken place since then between CAF Headquarters and the Polish Armed Forces General Staff, the following tropospheric communications lines have been accepted for design on the territory of the Polish Peoples Republic: WARSAW-TORUN-GDYNIA, WARSAW-USART border, WARSAW-"installation." These lines are to be based on three stationary installations in the areas of OSTROLEKA (three tropospheric stations), TORUN (two tropospheric stations), and GDYNIA (one tropospheric station).

The tropospheric line along the seacoast, the construction of which was stipulated by CAF Headquarters, is to be replaced upon request of the Polish Armed Forces General Staff by a radiorelay activated on the basis of horizontal R-404 radiorelay sets. This proposal aroused no objections on the part of CAF Headquarters which informs us that the proposal is under study by the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and by the National Peoples Army Main Staff of the German Democratic Republic.

We have no interest in construction, stipulated by CAF Headquarters, of the southern tropospheric line which links the Polish-Soviet border, the "installation," and the Polish-German border.
The position of the Polish Armed Forces General Staff and the data connected with planning the construction of a tropospheric communications line on PPR territory was transmitted in the memorandum on 17 January 1979. Among other things, this memorandum:

- proposes to locate tropospheric stations in the vicinity of the cities of OSTROW MAZOWIECKA (OSTROLEKA), TORUN, and GDYNIA, and to organize the following tropospheric communications links: OSTROW MAZOWIECKA-PPR/USSR border; OSTROW MAZOWIECKA-TORUN-GDYNIA; OSTROW MAZOWIECKA-"installation;"

- stipulates construction of tropospheric lines utilizing 24-channel tropospheric stations and assigning 50 percent of the above-mentioned channel potential for the needs of the Polish Armed Forces;

- stipulates that the projected tropospheric communications lines should not limit the operation and development of television in our country;

- expresses interest in receiving the edited draft of the "Agreement on Construction in 1981-1985 of a Stationary Network of Tropospheric Communications Lines" and suggests signing this "Agreement" after approval of the general part of the technical draft of tropospheric communications lines.