MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: Report on Warsaw Pact Military Cooperation by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces to the Political Consultative Committee and Decision of the Committee

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is a translation of two TOP SECRET documents pertaining to the November 1978 meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee. The first contains a summary of the report to the Committee by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces in which he assesses the status of military cooperation in terms of the improvements in the training, equipping, and leadership of the forces since his 1976 report and makes recommendations for the next five-year period. His report is candid in indicating prevailing weaknesses, with particular emphasis on Romania's failure to participate in unified air defense planning and combined field exercises. The Committee's decision, which Ceausescu did not sign, approves the Commander's report and makes specific recommendations for military planning to include increasing production of standardized equipment in 1981-1985 and drawing up a statute to govern wartime activities for consideration in 1979.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

JOHN N. MCMAHON

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Report on Warsaw Pact Military Cooperation by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces to the Political Consultative Committee and Decision of the Committee

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of two TOP SECRET documents pertaining to the November 1978 meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee. The first contains a summary of the report to the Committee by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces in which he assesses the status of military cooperation in terms of the improvements in the training, equipping, and leadership of the forces since his 1976 report and makes recommendations for the next five-year period. The report briefly describes new equipment entering NATO and cites delays in producing comparable equipment in the Warsaw Pact countries. Particular reference is made to Romania's failure to participate in unified air defense planning and combined field exercises and the effect of this on the unity and proficiency of the forces. The Committee's decision, which Ceausescu did not sign, approves the Commander's report and makes specific recommendations for military planning to include increasing production of standardized equipment in 1981-1985 and drawing up a statute to govern wartime activities for consideration in 1979.

End of Summary

Comment:

Relevant documents from the 1976 meeting of the Political Consultative Committee were disseminated

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of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. KULIKOV, at the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, "The Status and Development of the Military Cooperation of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States"

(November 1978)

The introductory portion states that in the past two years the Warsaw Pact countries have continued their persistent struggle for peace, the furthering of detente, and the development of friendly relations among states and peoples.

At the same time the leading circles of the US and NATO have devoted their energies to slowing down detente and international cooperation, to increasing the momentum and scope of the arms race, and to ensuring their military superiority over the socialist countries. Most clearly defined was the dangerous course NATO took to further escalate military preparations that emerged at the May Session of the NATO Council in Washington, at which plans to build up the armed forces of the bloc were approved.

The first section of the report discusses the directions and scales of the military preparations of NATO.

The first direction -- the further development of strategic nuclear forces: improvement of land based ballistic missiles, the building of Trident atomic submarines, the development of a series of strategic cruise missiles, and research in the field of combat means based on new physical principles.
The second direction -- the buildup of general-purpose forces. The NATO leadership is now devoting primary attention to carrying out this task.

The content of two NATO programs -- a short-term program for the period 1979-1984 and long-range one to 1990 -- is covered below.

In the ground forces it is planned to strengthen the grouping of operational-tactical nuclear forces by equipping them with modern Lance, Pluton, and Pershing-2 missile systems.

In the next five or six years it is planned to introduce into the NATO troops up to 8,000 of the latest tanks (Abrams, Leopard-2, AMX-30, Chieftain), about 5,000 launchers for antitank guided missiles, and a considerable amount of other equipment.

Strike aviation will undergo further strengthening, primarily through the introduction of new aircraft such as the F-15, F-16, A-10, and Tornado, which will form the basis of the combat inventory. In all, it is planned to introduce about 3,300 aircraft.

The combat capabilities of the naval forces of the bloc will be increased substantially. In the Baltic and Black seas alone NATO will place 120 missile ships and boats, as well as 45 modern submarines.

Measures are planned for building up the groupings of armed forces of the bloc in wartime, to include transferring forces from the US.

Work to improve the organizational structure of the troops is being done at accelerated rates. In the US tests are being conducted on a 'heavy' division, whose combat capabilities have been increased by approximately 60 percent compared to the existing mechanized division.

Under the influence of the development of means of armed combat changes have occurred in the views on the possible nature of a war and the use in it of all branches of the armed forces. Without reducing efforts to prepare for a general nuclear war, the military leadership of the US and NATO has begun to devote greater attention to matters of conducting offensive combat actions in Europe with the employment of conventional weapons and tactical nuclear weapons.

In the training of troops and naval forces of the bloc preference is increasingly given to preemptive aggressive combat actions with decisive
objectives against the Warsaw Pact countries.

A well-balanced system for controlling troops and naval forces has been developed and worked out for both peacetime and wartime. There are the Supreme Commander of the Allied Armed Forces of NATO in Europe and his staff (more than 1,000 persons), and the commanders-in-chief and staffs in the theaters of military operations: Northern European Theater (about 700 persons), Central European (about 450 persons) and Southern European (more than 320 persons).

The Supreme Commander is given broad authority in commanding troops both in peacetime and in wartime. He is vested with complete power and responsibility for the building, training, equipping, and combat readiness of the NATO armed forces in Europe.

In conclusion the section states that the NATO leadership will pursue a steady course of intensifying the arms race and comprehensively preparing its armed forces for war.

The second section is devoted to matters of the status and development of military cooperation in the Combined Armed Forces. It is mentioned that this cooperation has a planned, purposeful nature and is directed toward further improving the combat and mobilization readiness of the troops and navies, improving their level of field, air, and naval training, and the organizational structure of large units, units, and organs of control, toward equipping them with new models of equipment and weapons, and toward strengthening the friendship and international solidarity of the personnel of the allied armies.

The further increase in the combat and mobilization readiness of the troops and navies has been one of the main directions of the cooperation of the allied armies in recent years.

The most important direction of military cooperation is the comprehensive training of the troops and naval forces of the allied armies for the combined accomplishment of combat tasks. Exercises within the framework of the Combined Armed Forces occupy a special place in this matter.

During 1977-1978 major operational-strategic command-staff exercises were conducted which promoted an increase in the preparation of operational organs of control and enabled important conclusions to be drawn for the further building of the military establishment and organization of the
leadership of the Combined Armed Forces.

A large role was played by combined troop exercises at which the field proficiency of command personnel, staffs, and troops was improved, and work was carried out to further strengthen the fraternal relations and solidarity of the personnel of the allied armies on the principles of socialist internationalism.

At the same time, since the Romanian Army does not participate in the combined troop and command-staff exercises on the terrain, it is deprived of the opportunity of acquiring advanced experience in the training and indoctrination of the troops.

The many years' experience of training troops, as well as the experience of the Great Patriotic War, has convinced us that only through exercises in the field with communications means can our troops and staffs, our commanders and soldiers, be trained in a contemporary fashion. Combined troop exercises promote the strengthening of friendship and socialist internationalism among the personnel of the allied armies.

Besides exercises, such forms of military cooperation as meetings and assemblies of command personnel of the branches of the armed forces, branch arms, and services, training practices for staffs, troops, and naval forces, field firings at the training grounds of the fraternal armies, and conferences are employed widely and beneficially. It has already become a tradition for the Combined Command to inform the political and military leadership of the allied countries about all major combined undertakings which are carried out.

Considerable attention has been devoted to deepening cooperation in the area of development of the troops and naval forces making up the Combined Armed Forces. This has been done in accordance with the legal obligations which are basically being fulfilled.

Thanks to the attention of the General (First) Secretaries of the Central Committees of the fraternal parties and governments of the allied countries additional means have been procured for establishing subunits (core units) in the latest models of tanks, aircraft and other types of combat equipment.

The Ground Forces have continued to be equipped with operational-tactical (K-17) and tactical missile systems (LUNA-M). In addition to T-55A tanks, which today form the basis of the tank inventory of the allied
armies, the very latest T-72 tanks, infantry combat vehicles, and self-propelled artillery have begun to be introduced.

The equipping of the ground forces with modern antitank means and field air defense surface-to-air missile systems (KRUG, KUB, STRELA) has increased.

MIG-23BN aircraft and MI-24D helicopters have begun to enter the service of the air forces, although the equipping of the air units and large units with the new equipment is proceeding extremely slowly.

The combat capabilities of the air defense forces of the Warsaw Pact member states have been increased with regard to the equipping of large units and units with MIG-23MF and MIG-21bis aircraft, VOLKHOV and NEVA surface-to-air missile systems with enhanced characteristics, as well as automated control systems (ALNAZ-2, VOZDUKH-1M, and also CYBER and DUNAEV of Polish manufacture).

New missile and torpedo boats, escort, antimine, and landing ships, as well as strike helicopters have entered the service of the navies. As a result the combat capabilities of the allied naval forces have increased somewhat.

Definite work has been done to further improve the rear services support of troops and fleets and to prepare theaters of military operations.

Unresolved matters and problems which relate to the area of the development of troops and naval forces, the planning of their utilization, the improvement of the rear services, and the preparation of the territory in the operational sense are set forth below.

These matters are:

1. In the Combined Armed Forces the replacement of obsolete weapons and combat equipment, which by the end of the current five-year period will still represent a considerable amount (up to 20 percent of the tanks, about 30 percent of the artillery, half of the combat aircraft) is being carried out slowly.

2. The matter of the organization of the air defense of the allied countries on the southwest axis has not been fully resolved.
At the present time a situation has developed here wherein the actions of the air defense forces of four countries (People's Republic of Bulgaria, Hungarian People's Republic, Socialist Republic of Romania, USSR) have not been organized according to a unified plan. The air defense plan for the Romanian side has not yet been revised, as has been done by the other countries, which naturally destroys the unity of the air defense system and reduces its effectiveness.

In connection with this the Combined Command is continuing work on coordinating the operational employment plan and the plans for cooperation of the air defense forces of the allied countries of the Southwestern Theater of Military Operations.

There are also difficulties with refining the plan for the operational employment of the troops allocated from the Army of the Socialist Republic of Romania for wartime.

3. In the armies of the allied countries, when establishing and stockpiling reserves of materiel, not enough attention is paid to their dispersal and shelter [concealment].

4. For the purpose of increasing the survivability of aviation and the navy the existing system of basing them needs further development. The construction of protected command posts and the development of standard integrated communications systems is proceeding slowly.

The main reasons for the unsatisfactory state of affairs in regard to the development of the Combined Armed Forces are: insufficient allocation of monetary resources, especially for supplying the armies with weapons and equipment, as well as the failure of the industry of certain allied countries to get the modern models of weapons and equipment into production on a timely basis.

This section of the report also gives the main directions of development of the troops and naval forces for 1981-1985, which include the following.

It is planned that the numerical strength of the troops and fleets allocated to the Combined Armed Forces for peacetime will be no lower than the level which is specified by the bilateral Protocols for the end of the current five-year plan. At the same time, it is considered advisable in each allied army to increase somewhat the number of contingents for wartime, which is necessary to ensure the buildup of efforts and the
replenishment of losses in the first month of a war and in the course of military operations.

It is proposed in the years 1981-1985 to considerably increase the scope of the rearmament of the troops and navies. For this purpose it is intended to expand the equipping of the ground forces with operational-tactical and tactical missile launchers, T-72 tanks, infantry combat vehicles, GVOZDIKA, AKATSIA, and DANA self-propelled artillery, rocket artillery, antitank guided missiles, KRUG, KUB, and STRIELA surface-to-air missile systems, and with other types of combat equipment and weapons.

We intend to accelerate the rearmament of fighter-bomber and reconnaissance aviation of the air forces with MIG-23BN, SU-25, SU-22M, and MIG-25RB aircraft.

It is planned to further strengthen the unified air defense system of the allied countries by improving existing groupings and forming new surface-to-air missile groupings of mixed complement on the basis of NEVA short-range, VOLKHOV medium-range, and VEGA long-range systems. Air defense fighter aviation will be equipped with MIG-23BF interceptor aircraft. It is intended to fully complete the establishment of a unified automated system of control of the air defense forces of the allied countries.

The development of the allied navies is planned to be carried out with regard to equipping them with missile ships and boats of modern designs, with new submarines, escort and antisubmarine ships, modern aircraft and helicopters of naval aviation, and RUBEZH coastal mobile missile systems.

In the development of the rear services the task has been assigned to increase the productivity, capacity, and technical equipping of the operational and tactical rear services; to bring the material reserves from a 1.5- to two-month up to a three-month wartime requirement of the troops and naval forces.

It is planned to carry out the preparation of the territories of the allied countries in the operational sense so as to support the movement forward and deployment of troop groupings in the theaters of military operations, expand the airfield network and improve the basing of fleets, and increase the reliability of control and the level of protection of the troops, fleets, rear services, and transportation lines.
After this matters of cooperation in other directions are examined. In particular, mutual ties in the area of the development of military theory on matters of operational art, troop training, and the improvement of training methods continue to be broadened. The exchange of subunits of branch arms is being carried out systematically among some allied armies.

Matters of coordinating the scientific research and experimental design work on weapons and military equipment are being resolved positively. This is being done on the basis of long-range planning which envisions the joint development of about 200 new standardized models of equipment and weapons.

Cooperation has continued to be developed with respect to political organs, military publishing houses, and editors of military journals and newspapers.

Cooperation in the training of command and technical cadres has undergone further development.

The conclusion is drawn that the development of comprehensive military cooperation promotes the further enhancement of the combat effectiveness of the Combined Armed Forces and the strengthening of the international solidarity of the personnel of the allied armies.

The third section of the report is devoted to the question of improving the leadership of the Combined Armed Forces. It is mentioned that as a result of the conversion of the Staff and other control organs of the Combined Armed Forces to a new organizational structure which occurred in 1977-1978, the effectiveness of their activity was raised and better foundations were laid for handling the matters of controlling the troops and naval forces in wartime.

At the same time, attention is directed to the fact that there still remain unresolved questions regarding the strategic leadership of the Combined Armed Forces in wartime, which merit the special attention of the Political Consultative Committee.

It states that on the basis of detailed research conducted in recent years in the course of operational training, definite views were formed regarding these matters, which are shared by the military leadership of the allied countries.
According to these views, the control of the Combined Armed Forces in wartime should be centralized and be exercised by a single Supreme High Command, which is given broad authority.

It is advisable to have in the Western and Southwestern theaters of military operations High Commands of the Combined Armed Forces with all the troops and naval forces designated for use in these theaters subordinated to them, and in the Baltic and Black seas -- Combined Fleets under a unified command.

It is proposed to reflect these views in the "Statute on the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States and Their Organs of Command for Wartime," as is stipulated in Article 3 of the Statute on the Combined Armed Forces which was approved at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in 1969. The development of this Statute should be charged to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces, the ministers of defense, and the general staffs of the allied armies.

Later the opinion is expressed that in view of the present complex military-political situation, prior to putting into effect the indicated Statute, the preparation and adoption of which will take some time, the leadership of the Combined Armed Forces could be charged to the Supreme High Command which will be established by decision of the Warsaw Pact member states, and to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

In the conclusion of the report it is mentioned that the draft decision submitted for consideration by the Political Consultative Committee on the matters reported above is directed toward the strengthening of the security of the Warsaw Pact member states, further expansion of military cooperation, and enhancement of the combat effectiveness and combat readiness of the Combined Armed Forces.
DECISION

of the Warsaw Pact Member States, Adopted at the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee on the Report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces

23 November 1978

The member states of the Warsaw Pact, having examined the report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces, note that during 1977-1978 military cooperation among the allied armies underwent further expansion and deepening; the decisions on military matters adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in November 1976 are being fulfilled.

At the same time the Warsaw Pact member states establish that the decisions of the May (1978) Session of the NATO Council and the subsequent practical steps taken by the leadership of the US and other countries of the North Atlantic Bloc to step up military preparations in Europe are intensifying the threat to the peace and security of the countries of the socialist commonwealth.

Under the conditions which have been established the Warsaw Pact member states, while persistently continuing efforts to strengthen peace and further detente, must take the necessary measures to ensure their own defensive capability and improve the Combined Armed Forces.

The member states of the Warsaw Pact RESOLVE:

1. To approve the practical activity of the Combined Command and control organs of the Combined Armed Forces in developing military cooperation and fulfilling the decision of the Warsaw Pact member states on military matters adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in November 1976.
2. Taking as a basis the principles of the Warsaw Pact on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, to continue to further deepen and broaden the military cooperation of the allied countries and armies on a comprehensive basis in the interests of strengthening the defensive capability of the Warsaw Pact member states.

That the Combined and national commands, taking into account the intensification of NATO military preparations, provide for the further increase of the combat readiness of the Combined Armed Forces, improve their field, air, and naval training, increase their equipping with new combat equipment and weapons, improve the control system and materiel-technical support, improve the preparation of the territories of the allied countries in the operational sense, and strengthen the bonds of friendship and international solidarity of the allied armies.

3. To regard their qualitative improvement as the main direction in the development of the Combined Armed Forces. In the plans for the development of the Combined Armed Forces for 1981-1985 to stipulate:

-- a combat and numerical strength of the allied troops and naval forces allocated by each state to the Combined Armed Forces which is no lower than the level specified by the Protocols for the end of the current five-year plan;

-- the additional formation for wartime in each allied army of the reserve large units and units needed for building up efforts and replenishing losses in the first month of a war and in the course of subsequent combat actions;

-- an increase in the amounts, compared with the current five-year period, of new standardized models of weapons and combat equipment with which the troops and naval forces allocated to the Combined Armed Forces are equipped. That standardization in the main types of armament reach 70 to 100 percent by 1985;

-- the establishment in each allied army of subunits (core units) equipped with prospective models of weapons and combat equipment to serve as the basis for the further rearmament of the troops and navies up to 1990.

That the plans for the development of the troops and fleets allocated to the Combined Armed Forces for the next five-year period be worked out during 1979-1980 and that they be formalized by bilateral Protocols prior
to the end of 1980.

4. To plan for the next five-year period an increase in the appropriations for the equipping of the troops and navies with new types of weapons and combat equipment in keeping with rates of rearmament.

To take steps to expand the production of modern models of weapons and combat equipment by the defense industry of the allied countries, and to fulfil the plans for their issue and reciprocal delivery on a timely basis.

5. To direct the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces together with the ministers of defense of the Warsaw Pact member states to work out a draft "Statute on the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States and Their Organs of Command for Wartime." In working out the indicated "Statute" to proceed from the following:

Leadership of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states in wartime is exercised by a single Supreme High Command.

For direct command of troops and naval forces in theaters of military operations High Commands of the Combined Armed Forces are established in the Western and Southwestern theaters of military operations with the appropriate control organs. Troops and naval forces of the allied countries allocated for combat use in theaters of military operations by coordinated plans are subordinate to the High Commands. Combined naval fleets are also established in the Baltic and Black seas for wartime.

The draft of the indicated "Statute" is to be considered at the 1979 session of the Committee of Defense Ministers and submitted to the Warsaw Pact member states for approval.

6. In the event of rapid deterioration of the military-political situation in Europe the leadership of the Combined Armed Forces prior to the approval of the "Statute on the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States and Their Organs of Command for Wartime", should be vested in a Supreme High Command which will be established by decision of the Warsaw Pact member states, and in the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR.
FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA

[signature]
Todor ZHIVKOV

First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party,
Chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria

FOR THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

[signature]
Janos KADAR

First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party

FOR THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

[signature]
Erich HONECKER

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany,
Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic

FOR THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

[signature]
Edward GIEREK

First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party
FOR THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA

[no signature]

Nicolae Ceausescu
General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party,
President of the Socialist Republic of Romania

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

[signature]

L. I. Brezhnev
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

FOR THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

[signature]

Gustav Husak
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia,
President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

Moscow, 23 November 1978