MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: Draft Statute on the Warsaw Pact Combined Armed Forces and Combined Command for Wartime

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is a translation of a TOP SECRET document which provides an indication of high-level Warsaw Pact thinking regarding the preparation of a statute to govern the wartime activities of the Combined Armed Forces and Combined Command. The statute, in recognizing two theater high commands, would delineate the authority and responsibilities of the respective commanders-in-chief in centralizing military control and define their relationships with the national commands involved.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.
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Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY: USSR/WARSAW PACT

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SUBJECT: Draft Statute on the Warsaw Pact Combined Armed Forces and Combined Command for Wartime

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Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of a TOP SECRET document containing excerpts from a speech delivered by the Combined Armed Forces First Deputy Chief of Staff regarding the preparation of the draft of a statute to govern the wartime activities of the Combined Armed Forces and Combined Command. The statute, in recognizing two high commands, in the Western and Southwestern theaters, would delineate the authority and responsibilities of the respective commanders-in-chief and their staffs in centralizing control and define their relationships with the national commands involved. Provision would be made for coordination of troop control and staff work through the exchange of operations groups and representatives.

End of Summary

Comment:

A reliable source reported that General Semen Fedorovich Romanov, who was appointed First Deputy Chief of Staff as a colonel general in October 1977, prepared the presentation. His speech represents an extension of discussions on the reorganization of the Warsaw Pact military command structure approved at the Tenth Session of the Committee of Defense Ministers in 1977.

We have stated before that a future war will require maximum mobilization of all the military, economic, and spiritual forces of the socialist coalition. Objectively speaking, the direction of such a war will be possible only by an organ which is vested with complete political, state, and military authority, that is, the highest military-political leadership of the coalition.

In conformity with this, the command of the Combined Armed Forces in strategic operations in theaters of military operations must be centralized and must be exercised by a person directly subordinate to the highest military-political leadership. This person must have broad powers and bear personal responsibility for the command of the Combined Armed Forces and for the fulfillment of tasks assigned by the highest military-political leadership. This person, we believe, must be the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces for the Western and Southwestern theaters of military operations, respectively.

Considering the sociopolitical homogeneity of the Warsaw Pact member states, the existence in peacetime of the Combined Armed Forces and Combined Command, and the experience acquired in exercises, it apparently will be relatively simple for us to formulate the specific functional responsibilities of the High Commands in the theaters of military operations. When deciding these matters the examination of the experience of the combined combat actions of the Soviet Army and the armies of the socialist commonwealth in the final stage of the Great Patriotic War will be of distinct value.
In particular, it seems to us, we must utilize the available experience in controlling troops of a coalition complement both in the Western Theater of Military Operations, where Polish and Czechoslovak formations and large units operated successfully as part of the Belorussian and the Ukrainian fronts of the Soviet Army, as well as in the Southwestern Theater of Military Operations, where, on the very same basis, Romanian, Hungarian and Bulgarian formations, large units, and units successfully conducted combat actions shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet troops.

In the large-scale operational-strategic command-staff exercises conducted in recent years, the structure and the possible functional responsibilities of the high commands of the Combined Armed Forces in the theaters of military operations were repeatedly studied, and this makes it possible right now for us to answer for the most part the question as to the range of the most important tasks of the high commands in the theaters of military operations.

It seems to us that the most important function of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces in a theater of military operations will be to supervise the planning and conduct of combat actions in the theater. He will determine the specific groupings of the armed forces on each axis and the most effective methods of achieving operational and strategic objectives, and possible variants of operational and strategic cooperation; he will assign and precisely define tasks for the fronts, individual armies, and formations of the branches of the armed forces, in a word, for all troops and naval forces placed in subordination to him.

In addition, he will make decisions on the employment of operationally subordinate large units (formations of the branches of the armed forces), develop and coordinate with the national commands measures for the training of troops, the forwarding of reserves to the active army (front) and for the materiel-technical support of combat actions. Of course, there may be other tasks dictated by the specific situation which has developed.

To exercise control of the Combined Armed Forces in a strategic operation in a theater of military operations, an
efficient Combined Armed Forces staff and other control organs are necessary. A very large portion of the control activity will fall on the staff and it should become the main working organ of the commander-in-chief. When this staff is at the requisite strength in personnel and in technical means of control, it can be charged with the analysis and preparation of assessments of the military-political and strategic situation in the theater; with the planning and organization of control of the combat actions of the troops and naval forces; with the synthesis of the experience in conducting combat actions and, based on this, with the development of appropriate recommendations, etc.

When preparing for and in the course of a strategic operation a great variety of matters pertaining to the direction of the branches of armed forces in a theater of military operations will have to be resolved in a very competent manner.

This will include coordinating the cooperation of the air defenses of the allied countries with the field air defense;

- planning and supporting the coordinated employment of the air forces in operations in the theater, exercising direct control of air operations, and coordinating with national military organs the matters of employing aviation in the theater of military operations;

- working out proposals on the employment of the forces of the Combined Fleet and organizing the cooperation of the fleet's forces with the other branches of the armed forces in the theater of military operations;

- planning the organization of the rear services in a strategic operation, resolving matters of rear services support of the operational formations, and monitoring the materiel-technical and medical support of the troops and naval forces;

- organizing the technical support of troops in operations and the repair and rehabilitation of equipment and weapons, replenishing losses, supplying the troops with spare parts, etc.

In the exercises we have conducted and in particular in exercise SOYUZ-78 (ALLIANCE-78) direct accomplishment of the tasks of preparing the control organs of the branches of the armed forces, as well as of preparing rear services and technical support, were assigned to the appropriate deputy directors of the exercise. Some of them were appointed from among the deputy
commanders-in-chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, the deputy defense ministers, or the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the armed forces. This practice has fully justified itself.

It is obvious that the draft Statute for wartime must provide for the appointment of the appropriate officials with competent control bodies for the skilled resolution of the matters of the combat employment of formations and large units of the branches of the armed forces as well as matters of materiel-technical support for strategic operations in the theaters of military operations. I would like to learn your views on this matter.

In theory we think that the control organs of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces in a theater of military operations must be established in advance so that they would be able in the critical period of conversion of the armed forces from peacetime to wartime status to assume control of troops and naval forces.

The training exercise with the participation of the general staffs held in April of this year showed how complicated it is to organize firm control of a large number of operational formations.

A system of control posts and a supporting communications network for the control of groupings of the Combined Armed Forces must be established during peacetime. It must be reliably tied in with the system for early warning of enemy missile attack, with the space monitoring system, and with the general (main) staffs of the allied armies. The high command of the Combined Armed Forces in a theater of military operations obviously will have to have both protected and mobile control posts.

In the draft "Statute" for wartime the matter of control of the Combined Armed Forces in the theaters of military operations must occupy a central position. Stated therein must be the relationships of the high command of the Combined Armed Forces in a theater of military operations with the national commands of the Warsaw Pact countries.
The principle of centralized control of the armed forces in a strategic operation presupposes that the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces in a theater of military operations has the authority, from the moment he assumes command, to issue orders, directives, instructions, and directions which must be carried out by the troops and naval forces allocated to the complement of the Combined Armed Forces in the theater; this means that the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces in the theater must exercise direct control of the fronts, fleets, individual armies, formations, and large units of the branches of the armed forces placed under his command regardless of which allied state allocated them to the Combined Armed Forces.

Despite the fact that there is no experience in this regard, there are a number of matters which the commander-in-chief in a theater of military operations will have to resolve jointly with the general staffs and other organs of military leadership of the allied countries.

It seems to us that the main activity of the national commands will be directed, first of all, toward ensuring the successful performance of the operational-strategic tasks assigned to the Combined Armed Forces in the theaters of military operations.

This may find concrete expression also in supporting the operational deployment of groupings of troops in the theaters of military operations, and in accomplishing the tasks of materiel-technical support and the timely restoration of the combat effectiveness of national large units and formations.

The resolution of these and other matters will require constant coordination of them between the high command of the Combined Armed Forces in a theater of military operations and the national commands.

For the adoption of realistic decisions the general (main) staffs of the allied armies will have to receive all the necessary information on the plans of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces in the theater of military operations, about the situation at the front, about the condition of the troops and naval forces allocated to the Combined Armed Forces, about the requirements for materiel-technical means, the
replacement resources in personnel and weapons, and other matters. In connection with this, it seems to us that the control organs of the Combined Armed Forces should have persons representing the respective national commands and the associated operations groups.

In the draft statute for wartime it would be advisable to define as concretely as possible the interrelationships of the high command of the Combined Armed Forces in a theater of military operations and the national commands based on the experience that the general (main) staffs have. At the present time there is a body of representatives of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states in each of the allied armies. These representatives are highly qualified and experienced generals, admirals, and officers. Upon the conversion of the Combined Armed Forces from peacetime to wartime status and in the course of combat actions, there apparently would be no justification for discontinuing their activities. In connection with this we should jointly determine their place and role in wartime.

The experience of the wars waged with the participation of coalition armed forces, as well as the experience of the combined exercises we have conducted, attest to the advisability of exchanging operations groups among the staffs. There must be such groups at all levels of control beginning with the high command of the Combined Armed Forces in the theater of military operations and the general (main) staffs and ending with the large unit, if this large unit is operating as part of a formation of a different national affiliation, or has adjacent to it a large unit of another allied army.

Of course, every one of these operations groups must be appropriately manned with trained generals, admirals, and officers, and it must have the necessary authority and communications means.