MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations

3. Report of the Commander-in-Chief on the Organizational Structure of the Combined Armed Forces Control Organs

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is a translation from Russian of three TOP-SECRET and SECRET documents pertaining to the Tenth Session of the Committee of Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact held in Budapest in November-December 1977. The Official Report of the session contains the agenda and resolutions of the Committee on the topics of the unified air defense system, the control organs of the ground forces, an improved structure of the control organs of the Combined Armed Forces, civil defense, and the standardization of weapons and equipment. The full report of the Commander of Air Defense Forces indicates the current status of the unified air defense system and plans for updating its weapons and equipment. The report of the Commander-in-Chief outlines the basic proposals for improving the organizational structure of the Staff and other control organs of the Combined Armed Forces and presents a detailed organization chart and manning table.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.
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COUNTRY USSR/WARSAW PACT

DATE OF INFO. 8 November - 2 December 1977

SOURCE Documentary

Summary: The following report is a translation from Russian of three TOP SECRET and SECRET documents pertaining to the Tenth Session of the Committee of Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact, held in Budapest on 29 November - 2 December 1977. The Official Report of the session contains the agenda and resolutions of the Committee on the topics of the unified air defense system, the control organs of the ground forces, an improved structure of the control organs of the Combined Armed Forces, civil defense, and the standardization of weapons and equipment. The full report of the Commander of Air Defense Forces indicates the obsolescence of some of the missiles and aircraft in the unified air defense system and plans for supplying more modern aircraft, weapons and control systems to the member countries up to 1990. The report of the Commander-in-Chief outlines the basic proposals for improving the organizational structure of the Staff and other control organs of the Combined Armed Forces, which includes establishing Deputy Commanders-in-Chief for the Air Forces and Navy and dividing their directorates into west and southwest divisions. The organization chart and manning table approved at the session are included.

Comment: The figures and diagrams mentioned in the documents, except for the organization chart of the Combined Armed Forces, are not available. According to the chart, Air Defense was made a directorate of the Staff, instead of the independent department proposed.

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TOP SECRET
COMMITTEE
OF DEFENSE MINISTERS
OF THE MEMBER STATES
OF THE WARSAW PACT

OFFICIAL REPORT No. 0010

Budapest -- 1977

TOP SECRET
The Tenth Session of the Committee of Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact Member States took place from 29 November to 2 December 1977.

The following Committee members participated in the Session of the Committee of Defense Ministers:

-- Minister of National Defense of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, General of the Army D. DZHUROV;

-- Minister of Defense of the Hungarian People's Republic, Colonel General L. CZINEGE;

-- Minister for National Defense of the German Democratic Republic, General of the Army H. HOFFMANN;

-- Minister of National Defense of the Polish People's Republic, General of the Army W. JARUZELESKI;

-- Minister of National Defense of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Colonel General I. COMAN;

-- Minister of Defense of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. USTINOV;

-- Minister of National Defense of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, General of the Army M. DZUR;
The session of the Committee of Defense Ministers was held under the chairmanship of Minister of Defense of the Hungarian People's Republic, Colonel General L. CZINEGE.

The Committee of Defense Ministers examined the following items:


   Reports:

   -- Chief of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Colonel General V. Z. YAKUSHIN;

   -- Chief Inspector of Training/Vice Minister of National Defense of the Polish People's Republic, General of Arms E. MOCZYK.

3. The Improvement of the Organizational Structure of the Control Organs of the Combined Armed Forces.

   Report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. KULIKOV.

Information Reports:

-- State Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of the Hungarian People's Republic, General-Leytenant K. CSEMI;

-- Chief Inspector of Territorial Defense, Chief of Civil Defense of the Polish People's Republic/Vice Minister of National Defense, General of Arms T. TUCZAPSKI.


Information Report of the Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed Forces, General of the Army A. I. GRIBKOV.

6. The Agenda and Convocation Date of the Eleventh Session of the Committee of Defense Ministers.

Information of the Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed Forces, General of the Army A. I. GRIBKOV.

The following spoke on the first item: Comrades D. DZBUROV, H. HOFFMANN, W. JARUZELSKI, M. DZUR, I. COMAN, D. F. USTINOV, I. OLAH, V. G. KULIKOV.

The following spoke on the second item: Comrades Kh. RADONOV, M. DZUR, H. STECHBARTH, I. COMAN, I. OLAH, W. JARUZELSKI, A. I. GRIBKOV.
The following spoke on the third item: Comrades H. HOFFMANN, D. DZHUROV, W. JARUZELSKI, M. DZUR, I. COMAN, D. F. USTINOV, L. CZINEGE.

The following spoke on the fourth item: Comrades B. ORMANOV, B. P. IVANOV, I. COMAN, V. G. KULIKOV, I. MARUSAK, F. PETER, W. JARUZELSKI.

The following spoke on the fifth item: Comrades B. TODOROV, W. FLEISNNER, W. JARUZELSKI, I. COMAN, F. HANZAL, I. OLAH, N. N. ALEKSEYEV.

During the discussion of the reports and an exchange of opinions on the above-mentioned items, the Committee of Defense Ministers made the following coordinated decisions:

The First Item

Having examined the report 'The Status of the Unified Air Defense System of the Warsaw Pact Member States and the Measures to Further Strengthen It' by Commander of the Air Defense Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States, Marshal of the Soviet Union P. F. BATITSKIY, the Committee of Defense Ministers notes that, on the whole, the status of the unified air defense system of the Warsaw Pact member states meets modern-day requirements. The combat effectiveness and the combat readiness of the air defense forces have increased somewhat. Measures are being taken to further increase the survivability of the battle formations and control organs of aviation, surface-to-air missile troops, and radiotechnical troops. Proper attention is being devoted to operational-tactical training. Exercises and field firing of the surface-to-air missile troops and aviation are being carried out regularly.

At the same time, in some member states of the Warsaw Pact the most important administrative-political and economic and military-industrial installations are not covered by mixed surface-to-air missile groupings, and along the borders with the capitalist countries and on the maritime axes a solid surface-to-air missile kill zone is lacking. At low altitudes the radar coverage of the radiotechnical troops has a low depth and is of a spotty nature.

Some of the radar sets, fighter aviation, and surface-to-air missile systems and their supply of missiles are becoming obsolete.

All of this requires that appropriate measures be taken, especially in the area of the timely updating of combat equipment.
In implementing the decision of the Warsaw Pact member states adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee on 26 November 1976, and taking into consideration the exchange of opinions on the report of Comrade P. F. BATITSKIY, the Committee of Defense Ministers RESOLVES:

1. To charge the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces and the Commander of the Air Defense Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States, together with the ministers of defense of the allied countries, with drawing up a long-range plan by the end of 1979 for the development of the unified air defense system up to the year 1990, having devoted special attention to its qualitative improvement, to the introduction of new combat equipment, and to the improvement of the organizational structure of the troops.

2. To improve surface-to-air missile defense on the basis of establishing mixed groupings and a reliable system of fire, with due regard to equipping the air defense forces with promising surface-to-air missile systems of the S-200V type and with others. To have mixed groupings of surface-to-air missile troops to cover all of the capitals and the most important economic centers (areas) of the Warsaw Pact member states in the next five-year plan (1981-1985).

3. To completely replace MIG-17 and MIG-21F-13 aircraft during the years 1981-1985 and to continue to replace MIG-21PF and MIG-21PFM aircraft, whose service life is expiring, with MIG-23MF and MIG-25P aircraft.

4. To improve low-altitude (100-200 meters) radar coverage by the radiotechnical troops and to increase its jamming resistance and the capabilities for reliably supporting the combat actions of fighter aviation and surface-to-air missile troops under complex situational conditions. To bring the inventory of new radars to approximately 60 percent in the current five-year period and, on the whole, to complete the replacement of the obsolete equipment of the radiotechnical troops with new models during the next five-year period.

5. To complete during the years 1981-1985 the automation of troop control of the unified air defense system of the Warsaw Pact countries so as:

a) to have the ALMAZ-2 automated control system in all the air defense central command posts of the allied countries by 1981, and to have the ALMAZ-2 system in the Hungarian People's Republic -- with the
completion of construction of the new air defense central command post (1983);

b) to equip all the command posts of air defense large units and units with automated control systems: divisions (corps), air regiments, and radiotechnical brigades (regiments) -- with VOZDUKH-IM equipment; and surface-to-air missile brigades (regiments) -- with VEKTOR-2V (ASURK-1ME) equipment.

6. To speed up engineer preparation of the battle formations of the troops. To pay particular attention to the construction of reinforced concrete shelters for aircraft on permanent basing airfields, as well as protected command posts for large units and units of the air defense branch arms.

7. To constantly raise the combat readiness of the Air Defense Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states, paying particular attention to further increasing the reliability of the performance of combat alert duty and the fulfillment of the combat task for the destruction of enemy aviation at low altitudes under conditions of radioelectronic jamming.

8. To have the combined and national commands study the capabilities of the air defense forces and means for combating the cruise missiles of the probable enemy and to develop the necessary proposals by the end of 1978.

The Minister of National Defense of the Socialist Republic of Romania concurs with the decision on the first item, with the clarification that the long-range plan for the development of the unified air defense system, as stipulated in Paragraph 1, as well as the tasks ensuing from Paragraphs 2 to 6, are being accepted as recommendations for the Army of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

'Views were expressed at the session.

The Second Item

Having heard the reports of Colonel General V. Z. YAKUSHIN and General of Arms E. MOLCZYK on "The Structure, Technical Equipping, and Methods of Work of the Control Organs of the Ground Forces", the Committee of Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states notes that in the allied armies definite work is being carried out to improve and bring closer together the peacetime and wartime tables of organization and equipment of the control organs of the units, large units, and formations, and to improve the level of technical equipping of control posts and field communications centers.

During exercises, stationary and mobile means of the automation and mechanization of control are beginning to be employed more extensively. Mobile computer centers (posts), equipped with small electronic computers, are being established in some armies.

More attention is being devoted to improving the work methods of formation commanders (commanders) and staffs.

Such large-scale exercises as SHCHIT-76 (Shield-76), ZAPAD-77 (West-77), SOYUZ-77 (Alliance-77), VAL-77 (Rampart-77), and TRANZIT-77 (Transit-77) have been very important for improving the control of troops of coalition composition.

At the same time, equipping the Ground Forces with new means of armed combat requires further improvement of troop control.
The Committee of Defense Ministers RESOLVES:

1. Not to slacken attention in the armies of the Warsaw Pact member states to the fulfilment of the measures directed at improving the structure, technical equipping, and methods of work of the control organs of the Ground Forces, stipulated by the decisions of the Committee of Defense Ministers and by the recommendations of the Military Council.

2. That the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces, together with the General (Main) Staffs of the allied armies, are:
   a) to work out the draft of the new organizational structure of the control organs of an army and front by the end of 1978, taking into account the experience of the Soviet Army and the other allied armies, and to verify it in 1979 in combined exercises and to prepare the recommendations for the transition to the new organization in the years 1981-1985;
   b) to complete the working out of the draft of the standard complement of the control organs of a regiment and division in the first quarter of 1978, to verify them during the year in exercises, and to prepare the recommendations for their introduction into the troops; to carry out the training of the standard complement of the control posts of an army and front simultaneously with the working out of the new organizational structure of the control organs of operational formations;
   c) to continue changing the control posts of regiments and divisions over to an armored vehicle base with unified communications means in the years 1981-1985;
   d) to prepare and introduce into all the allied armies uniform standards for the deployment of control posts and communications centers, and for the setting up of communications links during 1978-1979;
   e) on the basis of available experience to work out and recommend to the allied troops during 1978 exemplary methods of the work of formation commanders (commanders) and staffs in preparing and conducting an operation (battle);
   f) to complete the preparation of common formalized documents for troop control and to ensure their being put into effect in 1979.
3. To continue in the next five-year period to introduce field tropospheric stations as far as the army level and secure communications devices as far as regiments and missile battalions, inclusively.

4. To increase the reliability of the communications systems for the Combined Command and national commands in theaters of military operations by the end of the current five-year plan by conducting preparatory measures for the setting up of tropospheric links to support the communications of the General (Main) Staffs and the command posts of the Combined Command in a theater of military operations with the operational formations of the allied armies.

That the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces together with the General (Main) Staffs are to prepare prior to 1980 a draft Agreement on the Setting Up of Tropospheric Communications Links in 1981-1985.

5. That the Combined and national commands together with the Permanent Committee on Defense Industry of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance speed up the resolution of matters of organizing cooperation in the development and production of the technical means for the field automated troop control system so that their introduction into the troops will begin in 1981-1985.

* * *

The Minister of National Defense of the Socialist Republic of Romania concurs with the decision on this item with the following refinements:

-- Add to paragraph 2, subparagraph "c" -- "Control posts of regiments and divisions of the Army of the Socialist Republic of Romania will be equipped not with unified means of communications but with means of communications having coinciding frequency ranges";

-- Subparagraph "d" -- Standards for the deployment of command posts and communications centers, and the setting up of communications links will be considered "approximate";
Add to Paragraph 4. The Ministry of National Defense of the Socialist Republic of Romania will participate in those preparatory measures for the setting up of tropospheric links which apply to the support of communications between the General Staff and the Combined Command; the operational formations will have direct communications only with their own national command.

Views were expressed at the session.

The Third Item

Having heard the report "The Improvement of the Organizational Structure of the Control Organs of the Combined Armed Forces" by Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. KULIKOV, the Committee of Defense Ministers notes that the existing structure of these organs has played its own positive role.

In view of the increasing scope of activity of the control organs of the Combined Armed Forces for the coordination of the building and development of the troops and naval forces and their operational employment, and the constant increase in the requirements for the combat and mobilization readiness of troops and for the level of operational and combat training, the existing structure at present is no longer fully appropriate to the tasks charged to the Combined Command by the Political Consultative Committee.

Moreover, this structure does not ensure the expansion of the control organs to control the Combined Armed Forces in theaters of military operations in wartime.

Taking this into consideration, the Committee of Defense Ministers RESOLVES:

1. To concur with the proposals of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces on the organizational structure and the increase in the numerical strength of the Combined Command, the Staff and the other control organs of the Combined Armed Forces in accordance with the decision of the Warsaw Pact member states adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee on 26 November 1976, and with the decision of the Committee of Defense Ministers of 11 December 1976 (a diagram of the
organizational structure and the numerical strength of the control organs of the Combined Armed Forces is attached).

2. To charge the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces together with the Ministers of Defense of the allied countries with coordination in the first half of 1978 with the governments of the Warsaw Pact member states on introducing into the complement of the Combined Command and the Military Council of the Combined Armed Forces Deputy Commanders-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces for the Air Forces and for the Navy, and also, in connection with this, on making the necessary revisions in the appropriate articles of the "Statute on the Combined Armed Forces and the Combined Command of the Warsaw Pact Member States" (for peacetime)* and of the "Statute on the Military Council of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States" (for peacetime).**

3. To charge the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces together with the General (Main) Staffs of the allied armies with working out during 1978 a draft Statute on the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States and Their Command Organs (for wartime), with coordinating and approving it at the session of the Committee of Defense Ministers, and with preparing it for approval at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee.

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The Minister of National Defense of the Socialist Republic of Romania concurs with the decision on this item with the following notes:

-- To carry out all the proposed changes in the organizational structure of the Combined Command, the Staff, and the other control organs of the Combined Armed Forces without increasing the existing numerical strength;
-- Not to establish an Intelligence and Information Directorate as a separate organ;

-- To assign a Romanian general or admiral to one of these positions: Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces for the Air Forces or for the Navy, or Assistant for the Rear.

At the same time it is believed that to realize Article 28 of the "Statute on the Combined Armed Forces and the Combined Command", it is necessary to ensure that generals, admirals, and officers of the armies of the Warsaw Pact member states are assigned to senior positions in the control organs of the Combined Armed Forces on the basis of the principle of proportional representation.

Views were expressed at the session.

The Fourth Item

Having heard the reports of General-Leytenant K. CSEMI and General of Arms T. TUCZAPSKI on "The Fulfilment of the Decision of the Seventh Session of the Committee of Defense Ministers Concerning Civil Defense Matters and the Directions of Further Improvement of Joint Activity in This Area", the Committee of Defense Ministers notes that in the Warsaw Pact countries systematic work is being carried out which is directed at ensuring the fulfilment of the decision of the Seventh Session of the Committee of Defense Ministers concerning civil defense matters.

As a result of the efforts of the Combined Command and the national commands, contacts between the command organs and the civil defense specialists have become more extensive, and the mutual participation of the representatives of the allied countries has taken on a systematic nature in the exercises and combined undertakings that have been conducted.

The civil defense measures carried out in a number of Warsaw Pact countries in 1975-1977 have promoted a sharing of experience regarding the main problem questions of their development and improvement.
For the purpose of further intensifying the cooperation and increasing the readiness of the civil defense of the Warsaw Pact member states, the Committee of Defense Ministers RESOLVES:

1. That the national commands continue to improve and intensify the multilateral and bilateral contacts between the allied countries in the area of civil defense.

2. That the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces together with the General (Main) Staffs, while being guided by the decision of the Seventh Session of the Committee of Defense Ministers, continue to plan and carry out combined civil defense measures of mutual interest (in the organization of warning, in the cooperation of the armed forces and the civil defense of the allied countries, in the organization of the design and construction of protective, dual-purpose civil defense installations, and in the employment of the underground spaces of cities and mining excavations to protect the population, as well as in matters of the stable operation of the national economy during wartime, and in other matters).

3. To request the Ministry of Defense of the USSR:

   a) to study together with the Combined Command and national commands the possibility of establishing a unified system of warning the Warsaw Pact member states about nuclear strikes delivered by the enemy against the territory of the allied countries and, apropos of this matter, to prepare proposals for examination by the Committee of Defense Ministers in 1979;

   b) to prepare and conduct, in coordination with the ministers of defense of the allied countries, a combined civil defense exercise in the border areas of the USSR, the Polish People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and the Hungarian People's Republic for the purpose of determining the procedure for mutual informing on nuclear strikes, radioactive contamination, and also mutual assistance in carrying out rescue and urgent emergency restoration operations.

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   The Minister of National Defense of the Socialist Republic of Romania concurs with the decision on this item with the exception of Paragraph 2.
The Fifth Item

Having heard the information report "The Progress of the Fulfilment of the Decisions Adopted in 1976 at the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee on Military Matters and at the Ninth Session of the Committee of Defense Ministers on the Unification and Standardization of Weapons and Military Equipment by Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed Forces, General of the Army A. I. GRIBKOV, the Committee of Defense Ministers notes:

-- that definite work has been done by the Combined and national commands to establish in the armies of the Warsaw Pact member states subunits and units (core units) [yachevki - "cells"] equipped with modern types of weapons and military equipment;

-- that a wide range of measures has been prepared and is being carried out for the unification and standardization of weapons and military equipment;

-- that military standardization organs have been established and strengthened in the Combined and national commands;

-- that the preparation of proposals for equipping the troops and navies with new models of unified weapons and equipment in 1981-1985 is being completed.

At the same time, the Committee of Defense Ministers states that only the first steps have been taken in the troops to introduce individual modern types of weapons and that up to the present time the process of replacing old models with new ones is proceeding slowly.

In the interests of purposeful and effective work for the fulfilment of these decisions the Committee of Defense Ministers RESOLVES:

1. That the Combined and national commands take the necessary steps to ensure the complete fulfilment of the decisions of the Warsaw Pact member states adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in 1976 and at the Ninth Session of the Committee of Defense Ministers.
2. That the Combined and national commands speed up the activation of subunits and units (core units) equipped with modern types of weapons and military equipment and that, on the whole, this work be completed in 1978-1979.

3. That the Staff and Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces in coordination with the General (Main) Staffs complete in the second half of 1978 the preparation of the proposals for the technical equipping of the troops and navies in the years 1981-1985 and send the proposals to the allied armies.

4. To examine at the Eleventh Session of the Committee of Defense Ministers the views on the general directions of development of the troops and naval forces allocated to the complement of the Combined Armed Forces, as well as the equipping of them with weapons and combat equipment in the period 1981-1985.

The Sixth Item

The next (Eleventh) session of the Committee of Defense Ministers is to be conducted under the chairmanship of the Minister for National Defense of the German Democratic Republic in November-December 1978 in the city of Berlin.

The following main items are to be examined at the session:


Report of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR


Report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces.


Report of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces for Armament/Chief of the Technical Committee
Minister of National Defense
of the People's Republic of Bulgaria
General of the Army /s/ D. DZHUROV

Minister of Defense
of the Hungarian People's Republic
Colonel General /s/ L. CZINEGE

Minister for National Defense
of the German Democratic Republic
General of the Army /s/ H. HOFFMANN

Minister of National Defense
of the Polish People's Republic
General of the Army /s/ W. JARUZELSKI

Minister of National Defense
of the Socialist Republic of Romania
Colonel General /s/ I. COMAN

Minister of Defense
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Marshal of the Soviet Union /s/ D. USTINOV

Minister of National Defense
of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
General of the Army /s/ M. DZUR

Commander-in-Chief
of the Combined Armed Forces
Marshal of the Soviet Union /s/ V. KULIKOV

Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed Forces/First Deputy Commander-in-Chief
of the Combined Armed Forces
General of the Army /s/ A. GRIBKOV

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REPORT

of the Commander of the Air Defense Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries at the Tenth Session of the Committee of Defense Ministers Concerning the First Item on the Agenda: "The Status of the Unified Air Defense System of the Warsaw Pact Countries and Measures to Further Strengthen It"

Esteemed Comrade Chairman!

Esteemed Comrade Ministers of Defense!

Esteemed comrades!

The tasks of the building, arming, and comprehensive training of the forces of the unified air defense system of the Warsaw Pact member states have been defined by the decisions of the Political Consultative Committee (March 1969) and the Committee of Defense Ministers (February 1974).

Much has been done in implementing these decisions. There are, naturally, a number of deficiencies, but I can confidently report to you that the allied air defense forces are combat ready and able to fulfill the missions confronting them. This is confirmed by the missile firings at the firing ranges, by the exercises, and by the practice verifications of the combat readiness of the forces on alert and all troops of the unified air defense system.

At present the unified air defense system possesses a considerable amount of surface-to-air missile and air combat equipment, and radar sets with different frequency ranges. Groupings of surface-to-air missile troops with mixed complements have been established in the air defenses of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, German Democratic Republic, Polish People's Republic, USSR, and Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The structure of the low-altitude coverage on the key axes and along the borders adjoining the capitalist states has been improved.
The new Operations Plan for the utilization of the air defense forces of the Warsaw Pact countries and the Cooperation Plan that had been developed and put into effect were checked in actual practice last year in the GRANIT-76 exercise. Regrettably, up to now the Socialist Republic of Romania has not endorsed the plans, which naturally causes us anxiety. This anxiety is occasioned by the fact that the unresolved matter of endorsing the Operations Plan of the air defense of the Warsaw Pact countries affects our readiness for the coordinated air defense (within the framework of a unified air defense system) of both the Socialist Republic of Romania and also the other allied countries on the southwestern axis, i.e., the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Hungarian People's Republic, and the USSR.

The national commands of the German Democratic Republic and Polish People's Republic have carried out important work in strengthening the air defense of the Baltic Sea coastline by setting up a surface-to-air missile defense with brigades of mixed complement.

The air defense forces of the allied countries have competent and trained command and engineer personnel. An ideology and uniform views on tactics and on the efficient utilization of the troops are being developed, and comradeship and friendship among the troops of our armies are being strengthened.

The repair organs that have been set up in the troops of the Air Defense of the Countries ensure the troop repair and medium repair of weapons and combat equipment are carried out.

All of this has been the result of the great amount of work done by all personnel of the troops of the unified air defense system.

However, some of the combat equipment that is in service with the troops of the unified air defense system is becoming obsolete. In the surface-to-air missile troops the service life of surface-to-air missile systems and missiles is beginning to expire. It has become necessary to replace obsolete interceptor aircraft with more modern aircraft.

All of this is dictated by the fact that from year to year the ability of enemy strike aircraft to operate at low and maximally low altitudes is growing, their flight range is being increased, and their weapons and onboard navigation equipment are being improved.
The qualitative state of the enemy's aircraft inventory is changing drastically. In this five-year period, and especially after 1980, the US and NATO air forces are to receive the F-14, F-15, F-16, and Tornado aircraft, i.e., aircraft of a new generation (Figure No. 1).

The NATO command has planned to re-equip its air forces over the next five to ten years. As a result, in Europe they will have approximately 400 F-15 and F-16 aircraft, up to 800 Tornado aircraft, i.e., almost 1,200 aircraft of the latest models. NATO air forces have already received 36 F-15 Eagle aircraft and 84 F-111E aircraft. Before the year's end the arrival of an additional 36 F-15 aircraft is expected.

At the present time the development of the strike aircraft of our probable enemies is proceeding by way of producing delivery aircraft for missiles with long, medium, and short radiuses of action with small equivalent radar echoing areas, with nuclear and conventional warheads, and with homing guidance against ground, naval and air targets.

Tactical and carrier-based aircraft are receiving into service air-to-surface strike missiles of the Maverick and Condor types with a range of action of from 40 to 100 kilometers. Work is continuing on the development of the multipurpose ASALM missile intended to destroy ground targets at a range of 1,200 to 1,300 kilometers. Work is proceeding on the production of the ALCM subsonic missile with a launching range on the order of 2,600 kilometers and the ability to negotiate an air defense system at altitudes of from 60 to 100 meters. A great deal of attention is being devoted to the production of cruise missiles to be launched from redesigned B-52's as well as from ground and seagoing platforms. Measures have been speeded up to equip strike aircraft with new active jamming generators, with devices for dropping chaff, dummy infrared targets, and other radioelectronic warfare means for the production of radioelectronic jamming against surface-to-air missile troops, radiotechnical troops, and the sights of fighter-interceptors.

Keeping in mind the enemy's efforts to base the actions of his aviation on the delivery of strikes by means of air-to-surface missiles, we must thoroughly prepare ourselves to reliably destroy missile-delivery aircraft on the distant approaches to the installations being defended beyond the line where they launch their missiles and to destroy the missiles themselves in flight.

To accomplish this task, these measures will play an essential role: increasing the depth of the zones of detection and guidance, shifting the...
combat action zones of surface-to-air missile troops and fighter aviation
to the distant approaches to the installations being defended, and
utilizing radio reconnaissance units and radar picket ships as a means of
detecting enemy missile-delivery aircraft.

All of this requires qualitative updating of the air defense means of
our countries with respect to surface-to-air missile troops, fighter
aviation, and radiotechnical troops. A number of urgent tasks have to be
accomplished for the troops of the unified air defense system and first of
all the task of re-equipping them.

In this connection, the 26 November 1976 decision of the Political
Consultative Committee obligates us to take steps to further strengthen and
develop the unified air defense system of our countries. About this
matter, allow me to submit a report with a view to the period from 1985 to
1990.

SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE TROOPS

At the present time the capitals and key military-industrial
installations of the allied states are covered by surface-to-air missile
regiments and brigades incorporating VOLKHOV and DVINA surface-to-air
missile battalions and NEVA low-altitude battalions. As is known, these
surface-to-air missile systems demonstrated superior combat qualities
during military events in Vietnam and the Near East (Figure No. 2).

Before 1980 we plan to reinforce existing groupings in the People's
Republic of Bulgaria, Hungarian People's Republic, German Democratic
Republic, Polish People's Republic, and Czechoslovak Socialist Republic by
using NEVA systems and some VOLKHOV systems. We are putting into service
seven sets of the VEKTOR-2V automated control system and three sets of the
ASURK-1ME automated control system, which will make it possible in this
five-year period to automate the fire control of approximately 40 percent
of the surface-to-air missile regiments and brigades.

We will continue modernizing the VOLKHOV surface-to-air missile system
by increasing its effectiveness in hitting small, high-speed, and
maneuvering targets, by improving its jamming resistance, and by
incorporating missile launching deception circuits. All of this is current
and useful work which has been and will be carried out, but I would like to
report a grave situation which will develop in the surface-to-air missile
troops as a result of the expiration of the service life of the DVINA and
VOLKHOV systems, which is 20 years, and of their missiles, which is 15
Thus, by 1983 the service life of all DVINA surface-to-air missile systems and of 80 percent of their missiles will expire. By the year 1985 the service life of 33 percent of the VOLKHOV surface-to-air missile systems will expire. Thus, based on the intake of equipment, by 1985, 50 percent of all the on-hand surface-to-air missile systems and up to 3,200 surface-to-air missiles are destined to be written off as their service life will have expired.

This situation requires that the necessary steps be taken to maintain the surface-to-air missile defense at the appropriate level, one that ensures the assigned combat tasks are fulfilled at the present time and in the future.

To this end, we propose accepting into service in the next five-year period and thence until the year 1990 as the long-range surface-to-air missile system the S-200 VEGA system with the V-880 missile. In proposing this system, we are keeping in mind both the appearance of qualitatively new means of air attack in NATO's air forces and also the special conditions of the allied countries. These conditions are characterized by the fact that the air defense forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, especially the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Hungarian People's Republic, German Democratic Republic, Polish People's Republic, and Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, do not have the necessary approach time for the timely destruction of the enemy. Therefore we need a surface-to-air missile system with good range. The S-200 system with a range of 180 to 240 kilometers is such a system, one reliably protected against radioelectronic jamming and able to destroy prospective air targets traveling at speeds on the order of 3,500 to 4,000 kilometers per hour and at altitudes of from 300 meters to 35 kilometers (Figure No. 3).

The S-200 surface-to-air missile system, as early as the next five-year period, together with the VOLKHOV and NEVA systems, will constitute the backbone of the surface-to-air missile troops and will be controlled by the VEKTOR-2 automated system, which is to be received by the air defense forces in the years 1978 to 1980 (Figure No. 4).

At the same time, I must report that at the present time technical proposals are being drawn up for the development of a new medium-range surface-to-air missile system based on modern components incorporating the latest achievements of science and technology.
FIGHTER AVIATION

At the present time, in the fighter aviation regiments of the air defenses of the Warsaw Pact countries 80 percent of the aircraft are various modifications of the MiG-21 supersonic interceptor equipped with missile weapons. Approximately 20 percent are obsolete MiG-17's and MiG-21F-13's.

As of yet there are no new MiG-23MF fighters in the air defense forces of the countries (excepting the USSR). The MiG-23MF, an aircraft with variable geometry wings, has a good thrust-weight ratio and high speed. It is able to destroy an enemy from the forward hemisphere, which is an important factor in combating an enemy, in the light of the short approach time. Its combat employment altitude is from 50 meters up to 24 kilometers. The radar equipment enables it to detect targets against the background of the earth and its weapons enable it to destroy them (Figure No. 5).

Pursuant to the 26 November 1976 decision of the Political Consultative Committee concerning the arming with new equipment, in the current five-year period we plan to have MiG-23MF aircraft in the following numbers: 24 in the Socialist Republic of Romania; 12 each in the air defense forces of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Hungarian People's Republic, German Democratic Republic, and Polish People's Republic; and 10 in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. In the light of these changes, in the air defense forces of the Warsaw Pact countries 154 obsolete aircraft (49 MiG-21F-13 and 105 MiG-17 aircraft) are to remain, and by the end of the next five-year period 268 MiG-21PF and PFM aircraft, which came into service in the years 1964 to 1965 and whose service life will expire, are to be written off.

Consequently, the updating of the aircraft inventory is a task of the very highest necessity in order to avoid the threat of qualitatively lagging behind.

The MiG-23MF fighter, in conjunction with the MiG-21bis and MF aircraft, is to become the basic nucleus of the fighter aviation of the air defenses of our countries in the period 1981 to 1990.

In addition, in order to destroy on distant approaches the missile-delivery aircraft carrying air-to-surface missiles, it will be advisable in certain countries and on specially dangerous axes to have air regiments equipped with the MiG-25 fighter aircraft, which has great radius.
of action, a speed of approximately 3,000 kilometers per hour, and can shoot down targets when attacking from the forward hemisphere (Figure No. 6).

It is proposed that there be no change in the total number of air regiments and aircraft to be included in the unified air defense system of the Warsaw Pact countries by the year 1990. With respect to the airfield network, it is necessary to continue developing it in order to provide for the dispersed basing of fighter aviation. Every year from 1,000 to 1,200 air defense and air force pilots of the Warsaw Pact countries fly by 40 to 50 cooperation airfields.

A few words about the pilots.

Eighty percent of the fighter pilots have been trained for day and night actions and have undergone firing training in the employment of air-to-air missiles. They have been firing on a regular basis. Over the past few years their flying and firing skills have improved noticeably.

However, during the 1976 firings there were shortcomings in pilot training and in navigator firing support, which resulted in a perceptible decrease in firing effectiveness. We analyzed these shortcomings and gave the appropriate recommendations to the air defense and air forces commanders. As a result, the firings went better in the concluding phase.

RADIOTECHNICAL TROOPS

The grouping and numerical strength of radiotechnical troops on the whole support the combat actions of fighter aviation and surface-to-air missile troops. The radar coverage that has been established makes it possible to detect air targets:

-- in the border and coastal zone as well as in the zone of combat actions of surface-to-air missile troops, from altitudes of 300 to 500 meters;

-- over the remaining territory of the countries, from altitudes of 2,000 to 4,000 meters.

However, at maximally low altitudes (50 to 200 meters) radiotechnical troops are unable to fully support the combat actions of surface-to-air missile troops and aviation because the radar coverage at these altitudes is of a spotty nature.
A weakness of the radiotechnical troops is their inadequate jamming resistance against the effect of active radioelectronic jamming owing to the fact that approximately 65 percent of the sets in the radar inventory are of obsolete types.

The situation will be improved in the current five-year period by the delivery to the Warsaw Pact countries of more than 500 sets of the new types: the DUNAY, P-18, P-37, P-40, K-66, PRV-13, and PRV-16 sets with increased jamming resistance. This will increase the proportion of new type sets from 35 percent to 60 percent. By means of the VOZDUKH-1M automated control system, which is to be supplied until 1980, 30 percent of the radiotechnical troop units will be automated.

What are the main things we will have to do to improve the system of the radiotechnical troops?

1) Deploy new type sets at the sites. This will make it possible to increase the stability of the radar system and its jamming resistance.

2) By replacing the obsolete radar sets, bring the lower limit of continuous radar coverage in the border zone down to 200 to 300 meters and in the zones of the surface-to-air missile troops down to 100 meters.

3) Complete the work on the organizational structure of the radiotechnical troops and change over from a battalion structure to a regiment and brigade structure. This will make it possible to most effectively exploit the capabilities of the VOZDUKH-1M automated system which is designed for these levels.

COMBAT READINESS OF THE TROOPS AND STEPS TO INCREASE IT

By their nature, air defense troops are continuously at different levels of combat readiness. Forces on alert are at the very highest level of readiness, one that is reckoned in minutes. The combat crews of the command posts of regiments, brigades, divisions, corps, and the central command posts of the air defense forces of the countries are on 24-hour alert, as are surface-to-air missile battalions, fighter aircraft, and radar stations. The on-alert forces of the air defense troops include: 50 percent of the surface-to-air missile battalions, 14 percent of the fighters, and 60 percent of the radar companies.

In recent years, the time limits for the combat readiness of surface-to-air missile and radiotechnical units have been reduced in the air defense forces of a number of countries. The time limits for bringing the fighter aviation regiments of the air defenses of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, German Democratic Republic, and Polish People's Republic from constant readiness to full combat readiness have been reduced by 10 to 15 minutes.

The readiness norms for the crews of the fighters on alert have been improved. The most experienced pilots take off from Readiness No. 2 in four to five minutes instead of the prescribed eight minutes. The on-alert pilots of the air defense aviation of the Hungarian People's Republic confirmed this; in tests during exercise SOYUZ-77 in March this year they took off in four minutes 30 seconds. The on-alert crews of surface-to-air missile battalions can bring the systems to readiness for missile launching in four to six minutes.

Work is being done to have the housing of officers near their combat operating sites. The first matter being accomplished is that of moving the housing of subunit and unit commanders close in. This work is being done most purposefully in the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. In the People's Republic of Bulgaria, by order of the Minister of Defense, a plan has been developed to construct officer housing near the command posts, sites, and airfields. The command of the First and Second Air Defense Divisions and a considerable part of the senior officer personnel of the regiments and brigades have already moved into the new housing built near their command posts.

Also contributing to the increased combat readiness of surface-to-air missile battalions will be the planned modifications of the VOLKHov and NEVA surface-to-air missile systems, in particular by reducing from two minutes to 20 seconds the cycle involved in preparing missiles for launching and by stockpiling directly in the firing sites reserves of...
missiles of from 1.5 to two units of fire. This work is being carried out in the air defense forces of all the allied armies.

Practice verifications of the combat readiness of the forces on alert are being carried out on a regular basis on the scale of the entire unified air defense system. For these verifications we are now allocating practice targets which travel at an altitude of 20 kilometers at a speed on the order of 2,500 to 2,600 kilometers per hour. Approximately 50 percent of the practice targets are low-flying ones.

The verifications have shown that the combat readiness of forces on alert, despite a number of shortcomings, on the whole satisfies the requirements that have been imposed. The forces on alert are operating in an organized manner and handling the assigned tasks.

A substantial shortcoming in this matter has been the fact that we have not had an overall common document with rating criteria. As a result, in each country combat readiness ratings have been determined in different ways. We have now developed a draft "Guide on the Verification and Rating of the Combat Readiness of the On-Alert Forces of the Air Defense of the Warsaw Pact Member States". The draft Guide has been checked in actual practice in the troops, coordinated with the General (Main) Staffs of the allied armies, and upon the recommendation of the Military Council of the Combined Armed Forces, as of 1 January 1978 the "Guide" will be put into effect, which will make it possible to sharply raise the requirements levied on the troops and which constitutes a major step in enhancing the combat readiness of the air defense forces of our countries.

COMBAT AND OPERATIONAL TRAINING OF TROOPS

TRAINING OF OFFICERS, STAFFS, AND COMMAND PERSONNEL

The general trend in the training of troops is to improve their operational, firing, and tactical proficiency, and also to coordinate the large units and units, thereby ensuring combat tasks are fulfilled. The systematic training of both command and engineer personnel of the air defense forces of the allied countries is being carried out in the national higher educational institutions and higher educational institutions of the Soviet Army.
The enhancement of the level of operational and tactical training and the development of common views on combat actions with respect to formation commanders, chiefs of staff, chiefs of branch arms, and other senior command personnel is being done at special courses of instruction for branch arms and at courses of instruction conducted under the direction of the Commander of Air Defense of the Warsaw Pact Countries. In June this year, at courses of instruction for command personnel of the air defense forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, the commanders and chiefs of staff of the air defense forces of the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries personally presented reports on the most urgent matters.

The troops and command personnel are obtaining excellent practice and valuable experience in the exercises for the troops of the unified air defense system and in the tactical exercises for divisions and corps with field firing by surface-to-air missile troops and fighter aviation at a firing range in the USSR.

For the past ten years we have been conducting at regular intervals major exercises of the ZENIT (Zenith) and GRANIT (Granite) types for the troops of the unified air defense system. We can judge their nature and scale by last year's GRANIT-76 exercise. The task assigned for this exercise was to check in action the new Operations Plan and Cooperation Plan. For this purpose, all of the troops and control organs of the unified air defense system were brought into the exercise. The concept of the exercise was based on the actual grouping of both sides and the possible variants of actions of the US and NATO air forces.

To represent the air enemy, 860 aircraft were brought in from Long Range Aviation and the front aviation of the allied armies.

The fighter aviation of the air defense forces of the countries performed 2,670 fighter aircraft sorties. The surface-to-air missile troops made 2,270 training firings. The radiotechnical troops supported the combat actions of the surface-to-air missile troops and fighter aviation and during the exercise they moved 175 radar stations to alternate positions.

In addition to these exercises, practices are systematically being carried out between adjacent air defense large units of the allied countries to work out matters of tactical cooperation.

Beginning in 1971, tactical exercises with field firing have been conducted for divisions and corps of the air defenses of the countries of
the Warsaw Pact (excepting the air defense forces of the Socialist Republic
of Romania) under the direction of the air defense commanders at a firing
range in the Soviet Union.

These exercises are, as it were, the culmination of combat training
and make it possible to check the readiness of air defense large units to
repel an air enemy in a situation approaching combat conditions.

In recent years over 350 surface-to-air missile battalions and more
than 1,500 pilots have fired at the firing range. Officers and personnel
of the air defenses of allied armies are not only trained in field firing,
but also develop cooperation between surface-to-air missile troops and
fighter aviation in actual practice, which is very important.

We will henceforth devote most thorough attention to this, because the
matter of cooperation, especially when repulsing massed attacks, has not
been fully resolved. In the interests of accomplishing the tasks of
tactical cooperation among the air defenses of the ground forces, air
forces, and navies, it is worthwhile to examine the problem of improving
the identification system.

It is well known that the enemy is devoting a great deal of attention
to the development of radioelectronic warfare means in order to overcome
the air defense system, not only by neutralizing it by fire, but also by
radioelectronic neutralization. We are training our troops in line with
this. For this purpose we are utilizing jammer aircraft,
trainer-simulation equipment, means of active radio countermeasures, and
other devices to train the troops to tune out jamming, to make it difficult
for the enemy to control his aircraft and guide them to strike targets, and
to reduce the effectiveness of the weapons he is using.

Organizationally, we plan to have, or already have, radioelectronic
warfare battalions in the air defense forces of the allied countries. We
also have larger units, i.e., regiments, in the air defense forces of the
Polish People's Republic and the USSR, specifically.

Combat drill is of positive value to all personnel, especially to
officers. But there are a number of deficiencies which primarily amount to
the following:
a) in the surface-to-air missile troops:

-- inadequate practical skill of combat crews in destroying low-altitude targets and in detecting and tracking high-altitude, high-speed targets that have a small radar echoing area;

-- inadequate preparedness to operate under conditions of strong radioelectronic jamming;

b) in fighter aviation:

-- a number of the pilots are inadequately trained to hit air targets with missiles at low altitudes and in the stratosphere;

c) in the radiotechnical troops:

-- an inferior state of training to operate under active and passive jamming when repulsing massed enemy air attacks.

The deficiencies in combat drill are analyzed and investigated in detail with the commanders of the air defenses of the countries when reviews are conducted, and steps are being taken to remedy them. Nevertheless, the sophisticated nature of the combat against the air enemy requires us to devote even greater attention to the training of the air defense troops.

ENGINEER PREPARATION OF BATTLE FORMATIONS

In recent years a considerable amount of work has been carried out in the air defense forces of the Warsaw Pact countries in the engineer preparation of battle formations for the purpose of protecting personnel and combat equipment.

The greatest amount of work has been done in the People's Republic of Bulgaria, German Democratic Republic, Polish People's Republic, and the USSR.

The central command posts of the air defenses of the countries are for the most part located in underground installations, but certain ones are located right in the cities (Hungarian People's Republic and Czechoslovak Socialist Republic). In the current five-year period new protected air defense central command posts will be built in the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.
In the air defense divisions and corps 55 percent of the command posts are protected. Also protected are 70 percent of the regiment and brigade command posts, 80 percent of the surface-to-air missile battalion launching sites, and approximately 70 percent of the radiotechnical subunit sites.

The arched reinforced concrete shelters for aircraft are being constructed irregularly. Thus, in the air defenses of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, shelters have been constructed for 75 percent of the aircraft and in the German Democratic Republic for 50 percent of them. Work on the construction of reinforced concrete shelters is proceeding more slowly in the Polish People's Republic. Here shelters have been constructed for 12 percent of the aircraft. Up to 1980 it is planned to construct an additional 150 arched shelters, including 36 arched shelters in the Hungarian People's Republic. For the time being, there are no plans to construct reinforced concrete shelters in the Socialist Republic of Romania.

Thus, not all is well in the construction of reinforced concrete shelters, although we all know how important it is to provide our aircraft with shelters so as to protect them against destruction.

CONTROL AND AUTOMATION

At the present time one of the key tasks of the forces of the unified air defense system is the task of improving control on the basis of automated systems.

We have the "Recommendations for the Establishment of an Automated System of Control for the Air Defense Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States (ASU PVO SVD-7)".

The recommendations have been coordinated with the General (Main) Staffs, approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces, and put into effect.

For the purpose of implementing the decisions of the Eighth Session of the Committee of Defense Ministers and the recommendations of the Military Council of the Combined Armed Forces, we have developed measures, including organizational and technical matters, pertaining to the rendering of technical assistance to the air defense forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, the supplying of automated systems, their installation and adjustment, the training of specialists, and the preparation and publishing of the necessary documents on operating and combat employment matters.
This work is proceeding according to plan.

The entire leadership of the air defense forces of the Warsaw Pact countries was shown the ALMAZ-2, ALMAZ-3, and VOZDUKH-1M automated control systems in action.

A few words about the ALMAZ-2. The ALMAZ-2 automated control system is meant for the central command post of the air defense of a country or for an air defense army and can have switched into it up to six major subscribers, including the central command posts of the air defenses of adjacent countries. This makes it possible to automatically and immediately receive information about the location of enemy aircraft in the air, not only in front of us but also from the adjacent forces on the left and right. It can simultaneously process and display up to 80 targets. Reports on the air situation and on the combat readiness and combat actions of the troops automatically enter an electronic computer and after processing are displayed on the screen of the commander of the air defense of the country, which is very important when conducting combat actions.

The command post of the 2nd Separate Air Defense Army of the USSR has been equipped with the ALMAZ-2 system and since last year the automated control system has been placed on combat alert status. Last year the ALMAZ-2 at the command post of the 2nd Separate Army was shown to the commanders of the air defenses of the German Democratic Republic, Polish People's Republic, and Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, who had asked to be familiarized with our experience with it and its technology.

The ALMAZ-2 automated control system has already been set up at the Central Command Post of the Air Defense in the People's Republic of Bulgaria. The equipment is being installed at the central command posts of the German Democratic Republic and Polish People's Republic. In these countries the automation of the central command posts with the ALMAZ-2 system will be completed in 1978 and 1979, respectively.

In the Socialist Republic of Romania and Czechoslovak Socialist Republic plans are to introduce ALMAZ-2 equipment by the end of 1980 in view of the fact that new protected air defense central command posts will be built in these countries. The Hungarian People's Republic has not yet made a decision on equipping its air defense central command post with the ALMAZ-2 system.
As concerns the automation of the tactical level, by the end of this five-year period approximately 40 percent of the surface-to-air missile, fighter, and radiotechnical regiments and brigades will be automated.

* * *

Esteemed Comrade Ministers:

I have reported to you the status and problem questions of the forces of the unified air defense system.

In conclusion, allow me to report to you the main proposals and undertakings directed toward implementing the 26 November 1976 decision of the Political Consultative Committee on the further development and strengthening of the unified air defense system of the Warsaw Pact member states for the period up to the years 1985 to 1990.

1. To draw up a long-range plan for the development of the unified air defense system of the Warsaw Pact member states for the period up to 1985-1990, having devoted special attention to the introduction of new combat equipment and to the training of personnel. The plan developed must serve as the basis of planning for the years 1981 to 1985 and provide the orientation for the prospective development of the air defense forces of the Warsaw Pact member states up to the year 1990.

2. To continue improving the surface-to-air missile defense on the basis of mixed groupings including the S-75M VOLKHOV and S-125M NEVA systems and the S-200V long-range system.

The S-200V long-range surface-to-air missile system will make it possible to more successfully accomplish the task of destroying enemy aviation even before it approaches the state borders and while it is over a considerable part of the water area of the Baltic and Black seas and of the straits zones, and also the task of covering naval bases. The S-200V system will considerably increase the stability and reliability of the unified air defense system of our countries.

3. To replace in the fighter aviation of the air defenses the obsolete MIG-17 and MIG-21F-13 aircraft, and subsequently the MIG-21PF and PFM aircraft, whose service life will expire. The basic nucleus of air
defense fighter aviation must be made up of MIG-23MF aircraft in conjunction with MIG-21bis and MIG-21MF aircraft.

With regard to the future, to have MIG-25P aircraft on the most dangerous axes for combat against enemy aircraft on the distant approaches.

To keep the number of air regiments and aircraft in the air inventory at the current level until the years 1985 to 1990.

4. By updating the radar inventory, to increase the jamming resistance of radiotechnical troops and reduce the lower limits of radar coverage down to 200 to 300 meters in the border and coastal zones and down to 100 meters in the zones of the surface-to-air missile troops.

5. To have radioelectronic warfare units in the air defense forces of all the countries and to also consider the feasibility of improving the identification system of the air defense forces of the Warsaw Pact countries.

6. To continue introducing means of automation at the operational and tactical levels so that by 1980-1981 all the central command posts of the air defenses of the allied countries will have been equipped with the ALMAZ-2 automated control system and the regiments and brigades of the branch arms which are covering the key installations and dangerous axes will have been automated. To complete the full automation of the unified air defense system of the Warsaw Pact countries in the years 1981 to 1985.

7. To speed up the engineer preparation of the battle formations of the troops. To devote special attention to the construction of arched reinforced concrete shelters for fighter aircraft.

8. To continuously seek out opportunities to enhance the combat readiness of air defense troops. To strengthen in every way possible the friendship and fraternity among the troops of the unified air defense system of the Warsaw Pact member states.
With this allow me to conclude my report.

Thank you for your attention.

MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION

/s/ P. BAIITSKY

8 November 1977
REPORT

of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces
at the Tenth Session of the Committee of Defense Ministers
Concerning the Third Item on the Agenda: "Improving
the Organizational Structure of the Control Organs of the
Combined Armed Forces"

Esteemed Comrade Ministers!

Esteemed comrade generals, admirals, and officers!

In accordance with the decision of the member states of the Warsaw
Pact adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in
November 1976, and in accordance with the instructions of the Ninth Session
of the Committee of Defense Ministers, I am reporting on the proposals for
the further improvement of the organizational structure of the control
organs of the Combined Armed Forces.

While carrying out this task, we have been taking into consideration
the present-day international situation, the conditions of conducting armed
combat in European theaters of military operations, the modern-day level of
development of our armed forces and that of the potential enemy, and the
continuously increasing requirements for the control of troops and naval
forces.

Definite progress in confirming the principles of peaceful coexistence
between states of different social systems has been achieved in recent
years by the efforts of the communist and workers' parties of the socialist
commonwealth.

"But international relations," as General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR Leonid Ilich BREZHNEV remarked in a speech dedicated to the
60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, "are now as
though at a crossroads leading either to an increase of trust and
cooperation, or to an increase of mutual fears, suspicions, and an arms
buildup -- at a crossroads leading, in the final analysis, either to a lasting peace or, at best, to a balancing on the brink of war."

From year to year in the imperialist countries, the military budgets are growing and the arms race is continuing, taking on ever more dangerous forms. As in the past, the main danger to peace is the aggressive NATO bloc, in which the material preparation for war is proceeding at full speed.

An analysis of the military preparations of NATO attests to the fact that the leadership of this aggressive bloc is laying great stress on preparing for a surprise attack on the countries of the Warsaw Pact with the employment of both nuclear and conventional weapons. For this purpose, strategic and operational-tactical nuclear means, combat-ready attack groupings of ground forces, aviation, and navies, and a fully deployed control system are maintained at a high degree of combat readiness in the troops of the bloc.

Under these conditions, if a war is unleashed by the aggressive NATO bloc, it will from the very first hours be conducted with firm goals and with the employment of all the available means of armed combat.

Taking this into consideration, the Combined Armed Forces and their entire system of control must be prepared to immediately repulse aggression and to decisively rout the enemy. A serious reorganization of the control organs at the beginning of a war is virtually impossible.

We believe that the military actions of the allied troops and navies in the European theaters will be conducted within the framework of strategic operations through the combined efforts of all branches of the armed forces of different national affiliations with the strict observance of one of the most important principles of military art -- precise and continuous cooperation among them.

But to command coalition groupings of troops is not a simple matter. The experience of past strategic exercises has shown how many complex problems arise in ensuring the coordinated combat employment of allied troops and naval forces, in organizing control and communications, and in utilizing transport means and the materiel-technical support of operations. Without a thorough study and a timely resolution of these matters in peacetime, it is difficult to count on firm and continuous command of the Combined Armed Forces in time of war. Therefore, we think that the command organs of the Combined Armed Forces should be set up in advance and trained.
in an appropriate manner for performing tasks both in peacetime and in wartime.

In recent years our military-theoretical thinking has drawn important conclusions concerning the command of coalition groupings of troops in theaters of military operations. In particular, there is an opinion on the advisability of setting up high commands during wartime on the most important strategic axes. These high commands, designated for the accomplishment of operational-strategic tasks in theaters of military operations, could be in charge of controlling the troops of fronts (separate armies) and naval forces.

This position has been fully corroborated in such large-scale exercises as ZAPAD-77, which was carried out under the command of Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. USTINOV, as well as in the exercises SOYUZ-77, VAL-77, and TRANZIT-77.

The functioning control organs of the Combined Armed Forces, although they did undergo some changes after their establishment in 1969, do not now meet stated requirements.

The measures carried out in the years 1972-1976 for the improvement of the organizational structure of the Staff and other organs of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces improved the structure of only their individual echelons. The main problem remained unresolved: the structure of the control organs of the Combined Armed Forces does not permit the efficient accomplishment of the ever increasing number of peacetime tasks and it does not meet the requirements for the support of the command of the troops and naval forces in wartime.

Therefore, while following the decisions adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in 1976, and while preparing proposals on the further improvement of the control organs of the Combined Armed Forces, we proceeded from an essentially new approach to this problem -- how to improve the structure of the combined control organs in such a manner that it can meet not only the requirements of peacetime, but also mainly those of wartime.

Comrade Ministers of Defense, before reporting our observations on improving the control organs of the Combined Armed Forces, we would like to stress that our potential enemies have for some time now been taking energetic measures for the development and improvement of the system of control of the armed forces of the North Atlantic Alliance. In NATO,
numerous organs of military control are deployed and are operating in all of the theaters of military operations.

The Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the NATO Air Forces in Europe (numbering more than 1,000 men), and the staffs of the commanders-in-chief in the Central European Theater of Military Operations (454 men) and in the Southern European Theater of Military Operations (324 men) do exist and they are functioning. There are also staffs in the other theaters (See diagram numbers ). All control organs and communications systems are at a high combat readiness that is attained by the maintenance of a 24-hour alert, by the systematic implementation of combat readiness verifications, and by their participation in various command-staff, staff, and field exercises and practices.

In resolving the task of improving the structure of the control organs of the Combined Armed Forces, it is evident that we are not required to go the way of NATO.

In this phase we are proposing the qualitative improvement of the existing structure of the control organs of the Combined Armed Forces by means of a slight increase in personnel. In doing so, it is to be borne in mind that the structure would at least ensure the minimum requirements of control of the Combined Armed Forces are met and would correspond to the structure of the national organs of military control which has evolved.

The draft of the proposed structure of the control organs of the Combined Armed Forces is presented in diagram number . It was discussed with you in advance, Comrade Ministers. We have endeavored to take your remarks and suggestions into consideration. In connection with this, allow me to state the essence of our proposals.

We propose to establish the posts of Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces for the Air Forces and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces for the Navy and to bring them into the complement of the Combined Command and the Military Council of the Combined Armed Forces. To support their work, a Directorate of the Air Forces is to be established under the Deputy Commander-in-Chief for the Air Forces, and a Directorate of the Navy under the Deputy Commander-in-Chief for the Navy.

In each directorate we propose having two main divisions (napravleniya): one for the Western Theater and a second for the Southwestern Theater of Military Operations.
The Deputy Commanders-in-Chief for the Air Forces and Navy, who are to be an experienced and highly trained general and admiral, will be able in peacetime to participate in the working out of plans for the development and operational employment of these branches of the armed forces, in the preparation and conduct of combined exercises, courses of instruction, and other measures, and also to coordinate the training of the aviation and naval forces for combined actions.

In wartime they will participate in the development of plans for the employment of their own branches of the armed forces in operations in theaters of military operations and they will exercise control over combat actions.

We propose to establish the post of Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces for the Rear. In his work he will be guided by the existing Directorate of the Operational Rear, in which we also plan to have two divisions -- the West and Southwest.

The Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces for the Rear should be given tasks connected with analyzing the status and prospects for the development of the operational rear services, participating in the working out and support of the conduct of combined measures of operational and combat training, and in the working out of the difficult problems of rear services support of troop groupings of coalition composition. In wartime he may participate in coordinating matters of rear services support of allied troops in combined operations.

In the control organs of the Combined Armed Forces we believe it advisable to have the chiefs of the branch arms: motorized rifle troops and tank troops, rocket troops and artillery, air defense troops of the ground forces, and engineer and chemical troops. This will allow the apparatus of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces to more completely decide the matters of the development, operational-tactical training and special training of the branch arms. In wartime the chiefs of the branch arms will be able to perform the tasks involved in the combat employment of their respective branch arms in operations. We suggest abolishing the Inspectorate of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces, since all the generals, admirals, and officers of the Staff and other organs of the Combined Armed Forces actually do participate in the verifications and inspections of the troops and naval forces.

We believe that it is necessary to refine the organizational structure of the main directorates of the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces.
The Operations Directorate should be made stronger and better able to carry out on a full scale and in a highly capable manner both the peacetime and wartime tasks assigned to it. According to its functional duties it is now already fulfilling a wide range of tasks in working out the plans for the development of the Combined Armed Forces and in preparing proposals directed at improving the combat and mobilization readiness of the troops and the control of troops and naval forces, and it is participating in the development and conduct of large-scale exercises and other measures.

Based on the existing Information Division of the Operations Directorate it is planned to establish the Intelligence and Information Directorate of the Staff, made up of the West and Southwest Divisions. This will increase our capabilities for studying the measures being carried out in the system of NATO in the theaters of military operations and will make it possible to carry out a comprehensive strategic evaluation of the probable enemy.

No special changes should be made in the Directorate of Operational and Combat Training.

There should be organization and mobilization departments in the Organization and Mobilization Directorate and, in addition, a group for keeping account of weapons and materiel-technical support should be established.

The post of Chief of Communications of the Combined Armed Forces -- a Deputy Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed Forces -- should be established for the purpose of increasing responsibility for the organization and state of the communications of the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces and the cooperation communications among the General (Main) Staffs of the allied armies.

The Directorate of Communications, Command Posts, and Automation of Troop Control should be renamed the Directorate of Communications and Automation. In this directorate there should be communications departments for the West and Southwest Divisions, a department of radio frequency service, and a department of automation of troop control.

The Department of Air Defense, which is part of the presently existing Directorate of Air Defense and Air Forces, should be an independent department of the Staff. It will be the connecting link between the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces and the Commander of the Air Defense Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries.
These are the basic proposals for the improvement of the organizational structure of the Staff and other control organs of the Combined Armed Forces. In our opinion, the structure being proposed will correspond to a greater degree to the scope and nature of the peacetime tasks being accomplished and it will serve as a necessary base for the rapid expansion of these control organs in wartime.

To carry out the measures reported above will require increasing the number of personnel by a minimum of approximately 60 military and 50 civilians.

I request the members of the Committee of Defense Ministers to approve the proposed organizational structure of the control organs of the Combined Armed Forces and to allocate the required number of personnel for this.

Upon approval by you of the stated proposals, I believe it advisable to:

-- Charge the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces with coordination during 1978 with the governments of the Warsaw Pact member states on introducing into the complement of the Combined Command and the Military Council of the Combined Armed Forces the Deputy Commanders-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces for the Air Forces and for the Navy, and also, in connection with this, on making the necessary revisions in the appropriate articles of the Statute on the Combined Armed Forces and the Combined Command of the Warsaw Pact Member States and the Statute on the Military Council of the Combined Armed Forces for Peacetime.

-- Charge the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces together with the General (Main) Staffs of the allied armies with working out in 1978 a draft of the Statute on the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States and Their Command Organs for Wartime, with coordinating it with all the members of the Committee of Defense Ministers, and with preparing it for approval at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee.

The new tables of organization of the Staff and directorates of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces will be worked out by the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces and they will be approved prior to 1 March 1978.
In conclusion I would like to emphasize that, upon adopting the decision on the improvement of the organizational structure of the control organs of the Combined Armed Forces and on the working out of the Statute for Wartime, the Committee of Defense Ministers will be taking another step forward in further strengthening the military mechanism of the Warsaw Pact Organization.

At the same time, we are taking into consideration the fact that further improvement of the control of the Combined Armed Forces must not be limited to organizational measures alone. The proposed organizational measures will provide their own positive results only if they are combined with the simultaneous improvement of the style and methods of our work and with an increase in the quality of tasks being accomplished.

With this, permit me to conclude the report.

Thank you for your attention.
NOTE:
The Chiefs of the Southwest Divisions are at the same time:
- Chiefs of the following Directorates: Intelligence and Information, Directories of the Combined Armed Forces, and the Army Forces, and the Navy.
### Numerical Strength of the Control Organs of the Combined Armed Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Existing Numerical Strength</th>
<th>Proposed Numerical Strength</th>
<th>Increase</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff of the Combined Armed Forces</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directorates and Departments of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
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COORDINATED AND APPROVED:

Minister of National Defense
of the People's Republic of Bulgaria
General of the Army /s/ D. DZHurov

Minister of Defense
of the Hungarian People's Republic
Colonel General /s/ L. Czinege

Minister for National Defense
of the German Democratic Republic
General of the Army /s/ H. Hoffmann

Minister of National Defense
of the Polish People's Republic
General of the Army /s/ W. Jaruzelski

Minister of National Defense
of the Socialist Republic of Romania
Colonel General /s/ I. Coman

Minister of Defense of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics
Marshal of the Soviet Union /s/ D. Ustinov

Minister of National Defense
of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
General of the Army /s/ M. Dzur

Commander-in-Chief
of the Combined Armed Forces
Marshal of the Soviet Union /s/ V. Kulikov

Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed Forces/First Deputy Commander-in-Chief
of the Combined Armed Forces
General of the Army /s/ A. Gribkov

"01" December 1977