Mr. Chairman,

In this opening statement I will be focusing on the readiness of Warsaw Pact forces opposite the NATO Central Region—in what the Soviets call the Western Theater of Military Operations. This is the area outlined by the heavy dark line on the first map in your package of graphics. And I will be devoting particular attention to the forces in the shaded area in East Europe.

This is not to denigrate the importance of the forces in other regions—opposite NATO's flanks, for example.

But it is the area opposite the Central Region that contains the heaviest concentration of Warsaw Pact forces in direct confrontation with NATO. The importance which the Soviets attach to their forward deployed forces in this theater is evident in their peacetime manning levels and the priority they are given for equipment modernization and support structure. Soviet ground divisions in East Germany are in fact the standard against which the Soviets rate the readiness of all their other divisions.

I would like first to describe what forces they have, then examine how they plan to employ those forces in the event of war with NATO. I will then describe what it takes to get these forces ready to carry out this basic war plan, what we would expect to see of such preparations, and discuss our estimates of the warning this could afford.

I will than outline some potential variations from this basic plan—scenarios which would entail less preparation and perhaps less warning time.

I will conclude by addressing the Committee's question regarding what impact Gorbachev's policies have had on our view of these issues.

It is important to keep in mind as we go through this that there are many dimensions to readiness. One of course is the physical dimension—how much of the manpower and equipment necessary to implement the Pact war plan is...
Actually in place, and how much must be mobilized to bring the forces to their full, planned wartime strength. I will be devoting much of my statement to this aspect—in part because it is the dimension most accessible to measurement.

There is, nonetheless, a qualitative dimension—how prepared are those forces to carry out what is planned for them. This is far more difficult to measure, but I will describe for the Committee what we understand to be a Soviet approach to accounting for this dimension in evaluating their own readiness.

There is substantial agreement within the community on much of what I will be saying—particularly as regards the forces and Warsaw Pact plans. There are nonetheless some disagreements—both within the US community and among our allies—mainly on such issues as the speed with which the Soviets can carry out their war preparations, and the willingness of the Soviets to undertake offensive operations at less than full mobilization. I will point out these areas of disagreement as I go along.

Turning first to the Soviet forces in East Europe, we find that—by any standard of measurement—the wartime combat potential of these forces is far more formidable than was the case in the mid-1970’s.

In the past decade, the Soviets have enlarged their overall force structure, and introduced more—and more modern—weapons. In East Germany the typical Soviet maneuver division has 25 percent more combat power than in 1975, and Soviet tactical air regiments there are currently being equipped with the newest generation aircraft.
Since the mid-1970s, the Soviets also have augmented their forward-based logistic stockpiles and the transport and equipment to move them. The forces today are—when fully manned at wartime strength—less dependent on early resupply from USSR-based stocks.

Another important development has been the establishment—in the regular peacetime force—of the command structure—the theater-level command—necessary to direct the full preparations of all forces in the Western Theater of Military Operations. Previously, the Soviets relied on the activation of this command structure as part of the Pact's wartime mobilization. Establishing it and routinely exercising it as part of the permanent peacetime force structure will facilitate the expeditious implementation of war preparations.

But this expansion of the force structure has not been accompanied by a proportional increase in the number of active duty Soviet troops stationed in the forward area.

The tank and motorized divisions, while larger and equipped with more and newer weapons that substantially increase their combat power, have about 80 to 85 percent of their full, prescribed wartime personnel—that is, 80 to 85 percent of their wartime table of organization—or T/O—strength.

Most of the Soviet logistic and service support structure in the forward area is at even lower levels of peacetime Manning.
IN THE AGGREGATE, WE ESTIMATE—AND INsofar AS I AM AWARE THERE IS NO MAJOR DISAGREEMENT IN THE COMMUNITY ON THIS—that SOVIET FORCES IN EAST EUROPE ARE MANNED AT ABOUT 75 PERCENT OF THEIR FULL WARTIME T/O. BREAKING THIS DOWN INTO NUMBERS OF MEN:

— THE COMMUNITY ESTIMATES THAT THERE ARE SOME 525 THOUSAND MEN CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO SOVIET GROUND AND AIR FORCES BASED IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

— AN ADDITIONAL 170 THOUSAND TROOPS—a MAJOR PORTION OF WHICH WOULD BE PERSONNEL FOR SUPPORT COMPONENTS—WOULD BE REQUIRED TO BRING THESE FORCES TO THEIR FULL WARTIME T/O STRENGTH. SOME WOULD BE AVAILABLE FROM SOVIET ELEMENTS ALREADY IN EAST EUROPE, WHERE THEY ARE CARRYING OUT TASKS THAT ARE PECULIAR TO PEACETIME OPERATIONS (MAINTENANCE OF GROUNDS AND HOUSING INSTALLATIONS, FOR EXAMPLE) BUT THE VAST MAJORITY—SOME 150 THOUSAND—WOULD HAVE TO BE BROUGHT FROM THE USSR—BY PLANE AND RAIL.

I SHOULD NOTE, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT THESE ESTIMATES HAVE ON OCCASION BEEN MISINTERPRETED AS REFLECTING CONFLICTING INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES.

— ON THE ONE HAND, WE HAVE DESCRIBED A MAJOR STRENGTHENING OF SOVIET FORCES IN EAST EUROPE. WE ALL AGREE ON THIS.

— THIS DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY TRANSLATE INTO INCREASED READINESS. WE ALL ALSO AGREE, EVEN IF WE HAVE SOME MINOR DIFFERENCES ON THE PRECISE
FIGURES, THAT THE NUMBER OF MEN REQUIRED TO BRING THIS LARGER FORCE STRUCTURE TO ITS FULL WARTIME STRENGTH IS GREATER THAN IT WAS A DECADE AGO.

I MUST ALSO STRESS THAT THIS DOES NOT REFLECT ANY SLACKENING OF THE SOVIET POSTURE, BUT RATHER IS THE RESULT—WE THINK—OF PERFECTLY SOUND AND PRUDENT CALCULATIONS ON THE SOVIET PART, IN PREPARING FOR THE WAY THEY WOULD EXPECT TO HAVE TO CARRY OUT THEIR WARTIME PLANS. I WILL DESCRIBE THIS CALCULUS IN MORE DETAIL A BIT LATER, AFTER I HAVE FLESHED OUT THE CONTEXT.

COMPLETING THE PICTURE IN THE FORWARD AREA, NATIONAL MOBILIZATION IN EAST GERMANY, POLAND, AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA WOULD REQUIRE ROUGHLY DOUBLING THE PEACETIME MANPOWER OF THEIR FORCES.

IN SUM, BRINGING THE WARSAW PACT FORCES IN EAST EUROPE, OPPOSITE NATO'S CENTRAL REGION, TO THEIR PRESCRIBED WARTIME STRENGTH WOULD ENTAIL THE CALL UP OF NEARLY ONE MILLION MEN—170 THOUSAND FOR SOVIET FORCES PRESENTLY THERE, AND THE REST FOR THE EAST EUROPEANS. THE EAST EUROPEAN MOBILIZATION WOULD ALSO ENTAIL THE MOBILIZATION OF SIZEABLE AMOUNTS OF TRANSPORT AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT FROM THE CIVILIAN ECONOMY.

OUR DATA ON SOVIET FORCES IN THE WESTERN USSR ARE LESS PRECISE. FOR THE MOST PART, THE FORCES THERE ARE MANNED AT LESS THAN HALF STRENGTH. WE ESTIMATE THAT—AS A ROUGH ORDER OF MAGNITUDE—ABOUT HALF A MILLION MEN WOULD BE REQUIRED TO BRING JUST THE 97 DIVISIONS, AIR UNITS, AND HIGHER ECHELON SUPPORT ELEMENTS THERE TO FULL WARTIME STRENGTH, AND TOTAL MOBILIZATION IN THESE DISTRICTS IS LIKELY TO INVOLVE WELL OVER A MILLION.
What I have described so far, Mr. Chairman, is the call up of men and material that the Warsaw Pact would undertake to prepare for and launch offensive operations in a full scale war with NATO—a war which they envisage as likely to begin and be fought for perhaps many weeks—if not in its entirety—with only conventional forces.

What I would like to do now is briefly outline the basic Warsaw Pact plan for conducting that war—at least in its non-nuclear phase—as a background for examining why they have postured their forces as they have—in other words, to look at what wartime requirements guide the Soviet peacetime force structure and readiness posture.

Pact planning for war in the Western Theater of Military Operations (TMO) envisions four major operational tasks in West Germany and the Low Countries for the first strategic echelon. These operational tasks are translated for planning purposes into the four operational axes shown on your map:

- North coastal operational axis,
- Ruhr valley operational axis,
- Frankfurt operational axis,
- Stuttgart operational axis.

In addition, Pact forces in the Western TMO would operate on a divergent Jutland operational axis into Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark, and a Danube valley operational axis in southern Germany and possibly northern Austria. These also are on your map.
WE BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE FOUR DISTINCT OPERATIONAL-STRATEGIC MISSIONS—
CORRESPONDING TO THE FOUR AXES MENTIONED—FOR THE FIRST STRATEGIC ECHELON.
WITH FOUR FRONTS—OR ARMY GROUPS—IN THE FIRST STRATEGIC ECHELON, MISSIONS
WOULD PROBABLY BE ASSIGNED AS FOLLOWS:

— ON THE JUTLAND AND NORTH COASTAL OPERATIONAL AXES, A POLISH-SOVET
FRONT WOULD ATTEMPT TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE BALTIC STRAITS—IN
ASSOCIATION WITH AIR- AND SEA-LANDINGS—AND ATTACK IN THE DIRECTION OF
BRUSSELS. OPERATIONS ON THESE AXES ARE INTENDED TO SUPPORT THE MAIN
THREAT OF Pact FORCES JUST TO THEIR SOUTH.

— ON THE RUHR VALLEY OPERATIONAL AXIS, A SOVIET-EAST GERMAN FRONT FORMED
FROM THE BEST PREPARED AND EQUIPPED FORCES IN THE THEATER (THE GROUP
OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY) WOULD BE TASKED WITH WHAT THE SOVIETS
CONSIDER THE MOST IMPORTANT MISSION. IT WOULD ATTEMPT TO BREAK
THROUGH NATO'S DEFENSES IN PORTIONS OF THE FIRST GERMAN, FIRST
BRITISH, AND FIRST BELGIAN CORPS, CROSS THE WESER RIVER AND ROLL
TOWARDS AND OVER THE RHINE RIVER. IF SUCCESSFUL, THIS FRONT WOULD CUT
AFCENT IN HALF, CUT OFF CENTAG'S SUPPORT FROM NATO'S SEAPORTS, AND
CAPTURE NATO'S CRITICAL AIRBASE AND SUPPORT STRUCTURE JUST WEST OF THE
RHINE.

— ON THE FRANKFURT OPERATIONAL AXIS, A SOVIET FRONT PROBABLY COMPOSED OF
AN ARMY RESUBORDED FROM THE GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY AND
REINFORCED BY FORCES FROM THE WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS OF THE USSR,
WOUlD ATTAck THE THIRD GERMAN CORPS, AND THE FIFTH AND PART OF THE
SEVENTH US CORPS. THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THIS FRONT IS TO DEFEAT, OR

SECRET
AT A MINIMUM TIE DOWN, THESE FORMIDABLE NATO FORCES. THE STRENGTH OF
NATO'S FORCES AND TERRAIN CONSIDERATIONS MAKE THIS OPERATIONAL AXIS AN
UNPROFITABLE ONE FROM THE SOVIET THEATER COMMANDERS POINT-OF-VIEW.
HOWEVER, PINNING DOWN NATO'S FORCES IS A VITAL TASK.

ON THE STUTTGART AND DANUBE VALLEY OPERATIONAL AXES, A CZECHOSLOVAK-
SOVIET FRONT WOULD THREATEN THE SEVENTH US AND SECOND GERMAN CORPS.
ROUGH TERRAIN AND THE FACT THAT THESE AXES DO NOT LEAD TOWARDS MAJOR
SOVIET THEATER OBJECTIVES MAKE THIS THRUST, IN THEIR VIEW, CLEARLY
SECONDARY.

THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THAT, EVEN IF THEY ARE SUCCESSFUL IN THEIR FIRST
OPERATIONS, SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS INTO FRANCE AND POSSIBLY INTO SPAIN WOULD BE
REQUIRED TO DEFEAT NATO DECISIVELY. THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THAT BY THE TIME THE
FRENCH BORDER WAS REACHED, IF NOT SOONER, THEIR FIRST STRATEGIC ECHELON COULD
BE LARGELY EXHAUSTED. THE PACT HAS TRADITIONALLY PLANNED TO COMMIT THE SECOND
STRATEGIC ECHELON—TYPICALLY TWO FRONTS FROM THE WESTERN USSR—AT THAT POINT
TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM AND FORESTALL A RECONSTITUTION OF NATO DEFENSES. SOVIET
PLANNERS FEAR THAT IF SECOND ECHELON FRONTS WERE UNAVAILABLE, THEY WOULD FACE
LOSS OF MOMENTUM AND AN INABILITY TO COMPLETE THE DEFEAT OF NATO ON THE
CONTINENT.

AGAINST THIS BACKDROP, MR. CHAIRMAN, I THINK THE LOGIC UNDERLYING THE
SOVIET READINESS POSTURE BEGINS TO BECOME APPARENT.
They have developed an operational strategy that they believe would give them the best chance of seizing the initiative and successfully prosecuting a full scale offensive campaign against NATO.

They have established the structure for the forces they believe they need to carry it out, and they have set up the peacetime readiness posture and wartime mobilization plan they believe appropriate to ensure that these forces can be brought to bear in time to provide them the force ratios they want for initiating offensive operations.

This posture is geared to what Soviet military planners—as is clearly indicated in their classified writings and exercise scenarios—envision as the most likely contingency for war with NATO—a conflict preceded by a period of tension during which both sides undertake mobilization.

At the same time, this peacetime manning level and readiness posture is sufficiently high to enable them to have confidence that they could easily defend against any short-warning NATO attack.

In sum, they have postured their readiness to provide the force structure and mobilization base for their most likely contingency, while ensuring against their "worst case."
Clearly, we could—and many studies do—postulate Pact military actions initiated with much less preparation. In selecting an attack option, the Pact would have to evaluate tradeoffs between the risks of less than full preparation and the relative levels of NATO and Warsaw Pact combat power.

— There is no evidence suggesting that the Pact might launch an attack on NATO from a peacetime posture, with no mobilization at all. They have never rehearsed this so-called "standing start" as and I know of no that rates this a plausible option.

— Soviet forces in Central Europe at their current strength and about half of the East European forces—mainly, the 6 active East German divisions and the Westernmost Polish and Czechoslovak divisions—could mount an attack within a few days. They would run the very high risk, however, that it could not be sustained, especially if they encountered determined resistance and took heavy casualties. The logistics system would be undeveloped and stocks would be undispersed and vulnerable to air attack. Even if an early success were achieved, forces would not be available to exploit it. Failure would leave Pact forces extremely vulnerable to a NATO counter attack and interdiction that would hamper bringing up additional forces for exploiting the initial gains.

— Inssofar as I am aware, none of the U.S. Intelligence Community Agencies rates the likelihood of this option very high. Such differences of views as exist are principally how seriously it should be considered—that is, how heavily should it figure in NATO
CONTINGENCY PLANNING. WE AT CIA THINK THAT THE SOVIETS, FOR THE REASONS I JUST STATED, WOULD BE LOATH TO UNDERTAKE SUCH AN ENDEAVOR EXCEPT UNDER CONDITIONS OF EXTREME DURESS, WHICH FRANKLY I CANNOT ENVISAGE NATO IMPOSING ON THEM.

ALL US AGENCIES RATE THE FULL-FORCE, FOUR-FRONT SCENARIO I DESCRIBED EARLIER AS THE MOST LIKELY. THE DIFFERENCES OF VIEWS HERE ARE MAINLY OVER:

— HOW QUICKLY COULD THE FORCES BE BROUGHT TO THEIR FULL WARTIME STRENGTH AND DEPLOYED TO THEIR WARTIME POSITION, AND

— WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD BE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE A FULL SCALE OFFENSIVE AS SOON AS THIS IS ACHIEVED, WITH NO TIME DEVOTED TO AT LEAST MINIMAL TRAINING OF THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF RESERVISTS THAT HAVE BEEN CALLED UP, AND BEFORE THE REINFORCING SECOND ECHelon FORCES HAVE AT LEAST BEEN MOVED INTO EAST EUROPE.

AS REGARDS THE TIME NEEDED TO FLESH OUT THESE FORCES, WE BELIEVE, AND I THINK MOST US AGENCIES CONCUR, THAT ALL THE SOVIET FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE FORCES OF THEIR EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES COULD BE BROUGHT TO FULL STRENGTH AND DEPLOYED TO THEIR ASSIGNED POSITIONS IN ONE TO TWO WEEKS. WE ALSO THINK THAT AT LEAST TWO WEEKS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACTIVATE THE THEATER LOGISTICS SYSTEMS AND DISPERSE LOGISTICS STOCKS FROM DEPOTS THAT WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO NATO AIR ATTACKS. WE ALSO CALCULATE THAT WITHIN THIS SAME TWO WEEK TIME SPAN, FORCES IN THE WESTERN USSR COULD BE MOBILIZED AND PREPARED FOR MOVEMENT AND AT
LEAST SEVERAL ARMIES—ENOUGH TO FORM THE FOURTH FIRST-ECHelon FRONT—COULD BE TRANSPORTED FORWARD.

IN SUM, WE THINK ANY MAJOR OFFENSIVE MOUNTED IN LESS THAN TWO WEEKS WOULD BE SEEN BY THE SOVIETS AS ENTALLING UNNECESSARY RISKS—WITH THE LOGISTICS SYSTEM UNPREPARED AND THE FOURTH FRONT NOT YET IN PLACE. SOVIETS PLANNERS WOULD RATE CLOSING THESE VULNERABILITIES AS BEING FAR MORE ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESS THAN THE BENEFITS OF LAUNCHING THE ATTACK ONE WEEK EARLIER. BY THE END OF THE FIRST WEEK, FOR EXAMPLE, THE WEST GERMAN MOBILIZATION WOULD ALREADY HAVE TAKEN PLACE.

EVEN THEN, WE WOULD RANK THE TWO WEEK PREPARATION TIME AS THE LOW END OF THE SPECTRUM—A VIEW WITH WHICH I THINK THERE IS A GREATER AMOUNT OF DISAGREEMENT BOTH IN THE US AND IN THE NATO ASSESSMENTS. WE BASE THIS VIEW PRINCIPALLY ON TWO FACTORS.

ONE IS THE NEED FOR SOME MINIMAL TRAINING FOR THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF RESERVISTS CALLED UP—A SIZEABLE PROPORTION OF WHOM WOULD NOT HAVE SEEN ACTIVE DUTY TRAINING FOR SEVERAL YEARS.

— THIS GETS AT THE QUALITATIVE ASPECT OF READINESS I REFERRED TO AT THE BEGINNING OF MY STATEMENT, AND IT IS A DIFFICULT ISSUE TO GET A HANDLE ON.

— FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS HARD TO QUARREL WITH THOSE WHO ARGUE THAT, ONCE THE FORCES ARE FULLY READY AND IN PLACE, THE SOVIETS WON’T DELAY—AND PERMIT NATO MORE PREPARATION TIME—TO UNDERGO TRAINING. WE ARE NOT SURE HOW THE SOVIETS WOULD RATE THE TRADEOFFS, AND MUCH DEPENDS ON THEIR PERCEPTIONS OF NATO AT THAT POINT IN TIME.
But we think there is little doubt that the Soviet commanders would prefer to take an additional two to three weeks, because of the way they rate the qualitative improvements they could achieve.

For example, according to our information on how the Soviets access the combat potential of their forces, they would rate the combat potential of a division made up of 50 to 90 percent reservists—before any unit training—at only about 40 percent of that of one of their best divisions stationed in East Germany. About half of the total Soviet divisions mobilized in the first week would fall into this category. After three to four weeks of additional training, however, the combat potential of these divisions—measured by Soviet standards—approaches that of the Soviet divisions in East Germany—a sizeable boost to the overall combat power of the forces. Indeed, the effect on their calculations of total combat potential is equivalent to adding a substantial number of divisions to the force.

On the issue of whether the Soviets would launch the offensive before they had moved the second echelon armies at least into a rear position in East Europe—opinions also differ. Again, we think they would prefer to do this, because they count on these fronts to provide the sustaining force to complete their operational strategy. And, also again, whether they felt they could afford the time for such movement remains subject to their perceptions of the situation.

All of these uncertainties have an important impact on assessments of warning time. The Intelligence Community believes that indicators of preparations of the forces I just described would be observed, assessed, and reported to the highest policy level within about 24 hours after they had been initiated. Judgments on time available for such officials to react, however,
VARY ACCORDING TO VIEWS ON HOW SOON AFTER THAT THE PACT WOULD BE LIKELY TO INITIATE AN OFFENSIVE, AND WITH WHAT CAPABILITIES.

THE PRESENT SYSTEM FOR COLLECTING AND PROCESSING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FOR WARNING OF SOVIET PREPARATIONS FOR WAR WAS DESIGNED AFTER THE 1968 SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE SYSTEM CAPITALIZES ON ALL THE INFORMATION ON THE SOVIET PROCESS THAT WAS GAINED FROM BOTH THAT INVASION AND THE ONE INTO AFGHANISTAN, AS WELL AS FROM A LARGE BODY OF OTHER EVIDENCE-ON SOVIET PLANNING AND PLANNING FACTORS. AMONG THE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION SYSTEMS THAT WERE DEVELOPED AFTER AND INFLUENCED BY THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS OUR NEAR-REAL-TIME PHOTOGRAPHIC SATELLITE SYSTEM WHICH PROVIDES USABLE PHOTOGRAPHY WITHIN HOURS OF A TARGETTED EVENT ON THE GROUND. THIS HAS ALSO BEEN AUGMENTED BY OTHER COLLECTION SYSTEMS AND METHODS DEVELOPED SINCE THAT TIME.

THE COMBINATION OF NEW SYSTEMS AND METHODS SYSTEMATICALLY AND CONTINUOUSLY USED BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY GIVE US HIGH CONFIDENCE THAT WE WOULD PROVIDE WARNING TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN 24 HOURS OF THE WIDE-SCALE MOBILIZATION NECESSARY FOR THE WARSAW PACT FORCES TO PREPARE FOR WAR. BASED ON OUR EXPERIENCE WITH WARNING IN THE PAST, WE BELIEVE THE EVIDENCE WOULD BE OVERWHELMINGLY PERSUASIVE OF SOVIET WAR PREPARATIONS BUT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY PROVIDE INFORMATION PREDICTIVE OF THE PRECISE DATE OF ATTACK. NONETHELESS, AS DESCRIBED ABOVE, BECAUSE THE SOVIETS AND THEIR WARSAW PACT ALLIES WOULD NEED SEVERAL WEEKS TO BRING THEIR FORCES TO THEIR FULL COMBAT POTENTIAL—A FORCE MORE CONSISTENT WITH WHAT THEY BELIEVE IS NECESSARY TO DEFEAT NATO—WE BELIEVE WE WOULD HAVE SOME 30 DAYS OF WARNING TIME PRIOR TO AN ATTACK. THE MOST IMPORTANT POINT WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE AND WARNING, HOWEVER, IS THAT NO MATTER HOW LONG THE SOVIETS CHOOSE TO TAKE IN PREPARATION WE FIRMLY BELIEVE WE WILL IDENTIFY THE PROCESS FOR WHAT IT IS WITHIN 24 HOURS.
One thing I think all this illustrates, Mr. Chairman, is the offensive nature of Soviet operational strategy. We have heard much of late about the "defensive" nature of Soviet doctrine. Soviet exercises have increasingly portrayed NATO as initiating offensive operations before the Pact is fully ready to go on the offensive. This trend predates Gorbachev, however, and we tend to interpret it as greater focus on "worst case scenarios" on the part of Soviet planners.

The more typical pattern in earlier scenarios was a portrayal of mobilization on both sides, after which the Pact—having received warning of NATO intent to attack—launched its own full scale offensive, either preemptively or after only a very brief defensive phase.

More recently, NATO has frequently been portrayed as launching the major attack; the Pact defends while completing preparations of its forces, and then the strategic counteroffensive is launched.
But this is still the strategic offensive; it is merely undertaken under more stressful circumstances.

And it is noteworthy that while senior Soviet military officials have been emphasizing the defensive aims of Soviet military doctrine, all of them have at one time or another rebutted the "defensive defense" arguments of civilian academicians in the USSR by asserting that while defense can stop the enemy, ultimately it is the offense that is needed to defeat the enemy.

As to the question of what impact Gorbachev has had on our view of these issues, we would say that on the operational strategy and force posture—not much so far.

We do think, however, that we may see some effects in the coming years, but not quite of the sort some Soviets have been seeking to portray.

The leadership's domestic economic plight and industrial modernization programs are, we think, generating great pressures to reduce the defense burden on resources. And it is the massive Soviet conventional forces that draw the largest share of defense resources and therefore offer the biggest single source for resource savings. Some reductions in manpower, material, and weapons and equipment production may well be in the cards.

But it would be a mistake, we think, to expect these economic considerations by themselves to lead to changes in the equipment or readiness of the forward deployed forces. There are massive elements of the Soviet forces stationed inside the USSR which could bear the brunt of cutbacks. The forces opposite China, for example, are substantially larger than we think are needed to defend against any plausible Chinese military action, yet still far short of what would be required for a strategic offensive into China itself.

The effect of Gorbachev's agenda on the Soviet forces directly opposite NATO, if there is one, is likely to take a different form. If Gorbachev is to
HAVE THE NECESSARY LATITUDE TO PURSUE A CUTBACK ON DEFENSE SPENDING, HE NEEDS TO BE ABLE TO CREATE A MORE BENIGN EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT. HE MAY, THEREFORE, UNDERTAKE SOME CUTBACKS IN THE FORWARD AREA. BUT ANY ECONOMIC SAVINGS FROM THIS WOULD BE INCIDENTAL TO HIS LARGER POLITICAL OBJECTIVE. HE WOULD BE SEEKING TO DISSUADE NATO PUBLICS AND PARLIAMENTS FROM BUDGETARY SUPPORT FOR NATO MODERNIZATION. HE COULD, WE THINK, RIGHTLY CALCULATE THAT REDUCTIONS—FOR EXAMPLE, A PULLOUT FROM HUNGARY—WOULD HAVE AT MOST A MARGINAL EFFECT ON OVERALL PACT MILITARY CAPABILITIES, BUT—BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL IMPACT—ACTUALLY STRENGTHEN THE PACT SECURITY RELATIVE TO NATO.