WARSAW PACT AND CEMA "SUMMITS" DELAYED

Despite sporadic efforts in recent months, Moscow has been unable to schedule "summit" meetings of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA). The complex substantive issues involved, particularly on the economic side, partly account for the delay, but Moscow's allies, notably the Rumanians, seem to be engaging in stalling tactics.

The Soviets probably had hoped originally to have both meetings take place in late 1968 or early 1969, a plan obviously gone awry. Various other dates have been mentioned subsequently, with the latest reports predicting a Warsaw Pact meeting sometime in March and a CEMA meeting possibly in April.

Apart from scheduling difficulties, Moscow's inability to set a date and make it stick results basically from the lack of consensus among member states on the proposals to be considered. There have been reports that Moscow would like to subordinate the national armies to the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact command. Bucharest would certainly oppose such proposals, and many of the other East Europeans probably share these doubts. The scheduling of pact exercises--particularly on Rumanian soil--also remains unresolved. The Rumanians reportedly discussed some of these issues with ranking Soviet visitors last week, but a meeting of the minds seems unlikely.

Any dates early this spring would be difficult to meet. A Polish official has commented that responsible Polish officials have not even been asked to prepare the necessary working papers for a Warsaw Pact "summit." The reluctant Rumanians can point to their national elections in early March and a projected visit to Turkey by party leader Ceausescu in late March as grounds for postponement. The Soviets themselves are likely to be preoccupied with the Berlin problem in early March. Soviet Defense Minister Grechko is scheduled to visit Pakistan in the first part of March, making a Warsaw Pact gathering at that time doubtful.

There is evident uncertainty about what can or should be done to make CEMA a more effective instrument. Although the Russians in general favor a tightening of economic ties for political reasons, their thinking about forms and methods is anything but firm. The East Europeans clearly are acting as though they have leeway to chart their own particular courses, suggesting that Moscow has yet to take a firm stand.

Moscow at this stage seems willing to let matters drift rather than risk a dispute that would prejudice chances for its long-cherished world Communist conference. Under these conditions, a decision to convene "summit" meetings before May, however unlikely, would probably represent more a formal demonstration of "unity" than a real reconciliation of differences.