MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Soviet-Czechoslovak Relations in the Intelligence and Security Fields since the Invasion of Czechoslovakia

1. Enclosed is an Intelligence Information Special Report from a sensitive clandestine source which discusses the state of relations between the Soviet and Czechoslovak intelligence and security agencies in the post-invasion period. This report indicates that Moscow had not as of October been successful in gaining control of the Czechoslovak services. It further reveals Czechoslovakia's determination to keep them under indigenous direction and to prevent the Soviets from winning influence over them.

2. Because of the sensitivity of the source of this report, the document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

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Deputy Director for Plans

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Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY: Czechoslovakia/USSR

DATE OF INFO.: 25 November 1968

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Summary

During the invasion, Soviet, East German, Polish and possibly Bulgarian intelligence officers were active in Czechoslovakia. The officials from Moscow and Berlin had direct contact with the Czechoslovak Interior Ministry (MV). Collaborators with the Soviets included Czechoslovakia's former intelligence chief, Houska, who was ousted by Dubcek and is now said to be attached to a Soviet staff in Prague. Moscow has not pressured the Czechoslovaks for changes in the relationships of their services and appears to be waiting until the situation becomes more normal before making such moves. MV officers have been instructed to maintain the pre-invasion level of cooperation, although some are avoiding contacts with the Soviet advisers. The Soviets are receiving the MV's reporting as before, although they have provided the MV with very little useful intelligence. The Czechoslovak Party will continue to control the security service and to keep it from coming under Moscow's supervision. No purges have taken place in the MV, and pre-invasion plans for the establishment of the intelligence and counterintelligence services as an independent organization will probably be carried out. Most Czechoslovak intelligence officers support the Dubcek regime, although there are some who favor the Soviets for
opportunistic reasons. Such pro-Soviet sentiments are particularly prevalent in the Internal Security Service, and the Interior Minister has given some assurances with respect to job security in order to try to alleviate this problem. Nonetheless, some pro-Soviet officers are engaging in various actions directed against the liberals which, however, are helping to solidify the liberal forces in opposition to the hardliners. The USSR has not imposed any advisers on the government to supplement those already in the Defense and Interior ministries, and the liberal Czechoslovak regime is determined not to allow the Soviets to seize any measure of control.

1. During the invasion of Czechoslovakia on 20-21 August, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB), Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov, and a number of his department chiefs arrived in Prague where they set up offices in a building in the vicinity of Hradcany Castle. Representatives of the East German, Polish and possibly the Bulgarian intelligence services also entered the city at this time.

2. Willi Damm, a section chief of the East German security service and liaison officer to the Czechoslovak Interior Ministry (MV), is in Prague and has met twice with a senior MV official. Damm is the only member of a foreign intelligence service other than those of the KGB known to have met with a counterpart in Czechoslovakia.

3. KGB officers have been in contact with Josef Houska, who was chief of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate of the MV until 1 August when he was removed from office by the Dubcek regime. He allegedly has joined a Soviet staff in Prague and now has no official relationship with his former office.

4. During the invasion, members of the regional security office in Prague were on continuous duty, with only brief periods of rest, for over a week. They were assigned to "reconnaissance" of the city and filed reports on their findings. No other work was done by this office during that period. Soviet military forces occupied its premises at noon on 22 August and remained until early September. Initially, they only posted sentries at
the entrances to the building, but later they took over the entire office. Almost without exception the young officers, who comprised 25 percent of the Prague staff, supported Czecho-
lovak Communist Party (KSC) First Secretary Alexander Dubček. The older ones, who represented between 20 and 30 percent of the complement, favored the Soviet occupation. The remainder of the officers assumed a wait-and-see attitude.

5. On 8 October the new chief of the Prague regional security office called a meeting at which he supported the occupation and the Moscow agreements of 26 August and 4 October and added that he expected the other officers to do the same. He said that an investigation would be conducted to determine how certain classified reports of the Prague regional office were obtained by Czechoslovak radio broadcasters and that the culprits would be punished. Officers who attended the meeting were asked to report the names of those persons who had taken an active part against the Soviet occupation in August. From remarks made by this security chief it was clear that investiga-
gations of the Church, universities, etc., which had ceased in the post-January period, would be resumed. They will probably be conducted in a different manner than heretofore. 

Comment: the investiga-
gations would be different, but he presumably meant that they will more closely follow the letter of the law than was formerly the case.)

6. The deputy chief of the Prague regional security office, who prior to the invasion had been retired by former Interior Minister Josef Pavel, has returned, although he has not been officially reinstated. He receives only Soviet visitors and is actively cooperating with them.

7. As of mid-October, the Soviets had not exerted any pressure on the leadership of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate to change the established pattern of cooperation with the KGB which existed before the invasion. Early in September Soviet ad-
visers returned to routine duty at their offices in the MV, and it appears that for the time being Moscow will be satisfied with the type of liaison that existed before 21 August. The USSR has not asked the Czechoslovaks to make any substantial changes in the Foreign Intelligence Directorate. Moscow is apparently waiting until the situation in Czechoslovakia becomes more normal before moving openly to strengthen its position.

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8. Officials of the Czechoslovak service have been instructed by the Prague government to cooperate with Soviet Bloc intelligence officers in accordance with the agreements which were in effect prior to the August invasion. A number of officials are, however, avoiding contact with the Soviet advisers and, as a result, they are receiving less information.

9. The Soviet advisers are now receiving the MV's reporting as before, and some Czechoslovak officials who are seeking to improve their positions by demonstrating their fidelity to the USSR are cooperating with the Soviets. But this has not helped very much to improve the position of the advisers. They are not invited to meetings in the MV, and some senior officers speak to the Soviets only when it is necessary or when the Czechoslovaks are visited by the Soviets. Although the advisers receive less information than they did before the invasion, they still have access to routine reports and to communications from abroad. The Soviets, on the other hand, have provided the MV with very little useful intelligence, and the reports which they gave the Czechoslovaks in October were of minimal value.

10. The KSC will continue to control the Internal Security Service. The Party does not want this function to slip out of its hands and into those of the Soviet advisers, although the Czechoslovaks will have to grant some concessions in this area. Prague wants to receive from Moscow all the available intelligence concerning hostile activities against Czechoslovakia, regardless of whether they are conducted by foreign or by Czechoslovak citizens, and act upon it themselves. Criminal proceedings, investigations and actions taken against all persons who are in Czechoslovakia are to be carried out only by the MV and in accordance with Czechoslovak law. The leadership of the KSC intends to insist on acceptance of these principles in its negotiations with the USSR.

11. To date, no steps have been taken to purge the Internal Security Service or the Foreign Intelligence Directorate. Changes have been made in the leadership of the former, and some top-level shifts are expected in the latter. No other action is, however, anticipated for the time being. Changes in the leadership of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate cannot be expected until its general status is resolved. A small working commission was to be established as a part of the secretariat of the newly appointed Deputy Interior Minister Frantisek Vasek, who is responsible for the Internal Security Service. It probably is composed of

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three officers from the Service and two from the Foreign Intelligence Directorate. The commission was expected to begin work on 15 October. Its main purpose is to study proposals for the reorganization of the Internal Security Service, for the separation of it and the Foreign Intelligence Directorate from the MV, and for legal changes in the status of security officials. The original proposal of the KSC, which was made in April, to combine the Foreign Intelligence Directorate and the Counterintelligence Service in an independent organization separate from the MV will probably be implemented.

12. Pelnar stated on 30 September that the action program of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate will require only minor changes. Its organization and activity will, however, be affected by the federalization. In determining intelligence objectives, emphasis is being placed on the acquisition of information concerning the "tactical intelligence plans" of hostile services and on detecting covert action operations against Czechoslovakia. The Directorate is to increase its efforts to prevent large-scale defections, and it will cooperate with the Internal Security Service in counterintelligence operations. No further discussion of the action program is expected.

13. A majority of the officers in the Foreign Intelligence Directorate supports a national policy against the intervention of foreign troops in Czechoslovak affairs and is for a democratization of life in Czechoslovakia. Some officials who are orthodox in their attitudes believe the USSR was justified in carrying out the invasion and that the actions taken by the post-January leadership of the KSC were wrong. Their opinions reflect to some degree the problems of individuals who are of an age and social background that would be disadvantageous should the status of the MV be changed. They need the help of the Soviets to retain their present positions in the Directorate.

14. The situation in the Internal Security Service is more complicated than that in the Foreign Intelligence Directorate. In the former there are more employees who believe the Soviet presence in Czechoslovakia will help them to secure their futures, and their number increased during October. Pelnar has attempted to stem this tide. He has said no one will be fired unless there is a valid reason for this, i.e., unless derogatory information on the individual is uncovered. In addition, an order
issued by Pelnar in early October said no MV officer would lose his job if he were over 50 years old and that any who resigns to take other employment will receive at least as large a salary as before.

15. Some "old officers" in the MV are beginning to engage in pro-Soviet activity. For example, anonymous letters containing threats against some senior officials are being sent in increasing numbers. Miloslav Cech, chief of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate, received a threat that he would be killed if he did not resign from his position within a week. Such actions are obviously an effort to frighten the senior officers and all liberal-minded employees. Comment: Since similar anonymous letters have been sent to officials in other government agencies, e.g., the Czechoslovak Television, it can be assumed that this is an organized activity sponsored by the USSR and not the individual act of a fanatical orthodox individual with pro-Soviet sentiments.) The MV and Party leaders have briefed their personnel on this matter. Although these actions are unpleasant, they are helping to solidify the liberal forces and may redound to the disadvantage of the hardliners.

16. There are no Soviets in Czechoslovak Government offices other than the advisers assigned to Czechoslovakia before the invasion. There are, however, allegedly several Soviets in the Central Administration for Communications, but their positions are not known. Unless the situation in Czechoslovakia changes, the Kremlin will have no control over any government office there except that exercised by the advisers in the MV and the Defense Ministry. At present no one, except the old pro-Soviet persons who have no influential positions at this time, want to give the USSR the opportunity to control anything in the country.

17. The Internal Security Service is becoming more active again against the foreign embassies in Prague. It is concentrating its efforts on the West Germans and the Americans as well as employees of other NATO missions.