USSR-Czechoslovakia: Dubcek has bought permission to pursue his domestic reform at the cost of giving up thoughts of independent economic, defense, and foreign policies.

In his speech to the nation yesterday, Dubcek naturally accentuated the positive side of the Bratislava and Cierna agreements, but he left no doubt that he had given up one of the political premises that had brought him to power, namely, that the capitalist world was no longer a threat to Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, the Soviets accepted—with reservations—Dubcek's other main premise: that the class struggle in Czechoslovakia was over and Communists could rule the country by consensus rather than by force.

The Bratislava declaration of 3 August indicates some of the specific Czechoslovak concessions, and loopholes in the language reflect the reservations of the other signatories about Czechoslovakia's future domestic course. Dubcek recognized an obligation to defend "socialist achievements," a phrase which provides justification for future intervention or demands for stricter Communist control by the other signers. The Czechoslovak delegation reversed itself and acknowledged that the leading role of Communist parties is under attack and that "extraordinary vigilance" is required in this regard, a proposition which could spell trouble for the Czechoslovak liberals. The promise of harmonization of Prague's economic, defense and foreign policies with those of the hard-line Warsaw Pact nations may have put the Czechoslovaks on a road from which they will have great difficulty in deviating, even if it adversely affects their domestic plans. Furthermore, in his speech, Dubcek mentioned promises on all sides to discontinue public polemics, a calming statement but one which also contains in it the seeds of censorship.

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Czechoslovak commitments to the Warsaw Pact, according to Premier Cernik, not only preclude reducing the Czechoslovak Army, but also will mean "increasing the state of its potential." Cernik spoke in the context of guarding the country's western frontiers, which suggests that Soviet demands at Cierna for stationing troops along the border had been deflected by the Czechoslovaks' promises to improve their defense capabilities, probably including the capabilities of reserve forces.

Yesterday's announcement of the appointment of Soviet General S. M. Shtemenko as the new chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact forces may be a signal that personnel and structural changes in the Pact are now in order. There is, however, no direct evidence that his assignment is in fact a result of the crisis.

The Bratislava declaration called for a meeting soon of top leaders on increased economic cooperation. Dubcek said that during the talks at Bratislava, it was also agreed to examine further, presumably at future meetings, such matters as Communist unity, the struggle against imperialism, and cooperation among Communist states. Such a series of meetings would also probably be designed to keep the pressure on the Czechoslovaks to conform.

No participant at Bratislava was completely satisfied. Hungarian party boss Kadar has been quoted as saying "certain differences...possibly may have remained." Kadar did not specify what the differences were, but he was probably reflecting the concern that he undoubtedly shares with the East German and Polish leaders over the political impact in their own countries of the Czechoslovak domestic reforms. Kadar is relatively secure because of his permissive leadership, but Ulbricht and Gomulka may be in for trouble.

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The East German regime is rigidly orthodox and has allowed little domestic political relaxation. It probably will continue the precautionary measures it has already taken to insulate the population from Czechoslovak political contamination and to reverse strong popular sympathy for Prague. In the long run, however, this probably will not suffice.

Poland's Gomulka faces more immediate problems. His formerly unchallenged authority was seriously weakened by riots last March which were fed by the democratization process in Czechoslovakia.

Obviously aware that the results of the crisis, as Ambassador Thompson comments, make the Soviets look "a little silly," Moscow's propagandists are putting the best possible gloss on the outcome. Soviet press and radio commentary uniformly praises the Cierna and Bratislava meetings as a victory for Communist unity and a frustration of imperialist hopes, with Pravda characterizing the talks as the kind of "wise, calm, thoughtful, and patient" diplomacy typical of relations between Communist states.

Czechoslovak news media announced on 3 August that the last Soviet army units left Czechoslovakia on that date.