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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

THROUGH: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Current SAC List of Suspect ICBM Deployment Areas

1. This memorandum is for your information. It evaluates a new list of areas which SAC considers suspect of Soviet ICBM deployment.

2. The new list indicates a significant change in the SAC position. It contains only 25 locations in contrast with some 70 locations in the latest previous list of May 1962. Only 9 locations are common to both lists. We do not know what the current SAC view is concerning the number of ICBM launchers estimated at each of the locations.

3. The 25 areas currently held suspect by SAC have been analyzed by this Office and are evaluated with respect to ICBM deployment as follows:

   1. Negated by adequate coverage since June 1962
   3. Negated by adequate coverage since February and April 1962

TOP SECRET RUFF
Contain confirmed ICBM complexes, but have been
evated for additional complexities.

Listed as possible single point launchers are be-
lieved to be test stands associated with production or
research and development facilities and should not be
considered as part of the Soviet operational ICBM
force. There are several similar test stands in the
USSR not included in SAC list.

Coverage not adequate to confirm or deny. We also
consider these two (Nyandama and Penza) and a similar
third (near Gorrel, not on SAC list) as suspect.

Coverage not adequate to confirm or deny. We have no
evidence for suspecting this location as an ICBM deploy-
ment area.

Requires more study before assessment can be made.

OTTGE GUTHE
Assistant Director
Research and Reports

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