SUBJECT: AREAS HIGHLY SUSPECTED TO CONTAIN SOVIET ICBM LAUNCHING FACILITIES

The Problem: To prepare an up-to-date list of areas in the USSR which are highly suspected to contain ICBM launching facilities, but in which we cannot at present confirm the existence of such facilities.*

Highly Suspected Areas

1. We conclude that five areas, other than those containing confirmed complexes, can be designated as highly suspected to contain ICBM launch facilities at this time. (See Map, Confirmed ICBM Launch Complexes and Highly Suspect Deployment Areas.) The highly suspect areas are listed in the Table, together with brief summaries of the evidence and criteria used in making our judgments.

* This report, prepared by a CIA/DIA Task Force, is a part of the continuous review of evidence from all sources by USIB agencies and presents the current status of suspect ICBM deployment areas. In preparing this report, we have reviewed previous GMAIC studies on deployment of ICBM complexes and have examined other areas suggested by new information, including those contained in lists supplied by SAC.
Two areas highly suspected to contain first generation ICBM launching facilities (Plesetsk and the Kola Pen) are in Northwestern USSR. One first generation area (Ufa), and two second generation areas (Perm and Omsk) are located in the broad region bounded generally by 54° to 60° North latitude and 40° to 90° East longitude, within which all six confirmed second generation ICBM launch complexes are located. We are able to designate a specific suspected installation in only two (Plesetsk and Omsk) of the five highly suspected areas.

TABLE

Areas Highly Suspected to Contain ICBM Launch Facilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Generation System</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Plesetsk</strong></td>
<td><strong>KEYHOLE photography reveals a large, secure SAM defended installation near Plesetsk. The function of this installation cannot be determined through existing photography.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kola Peninsula</strong></td>
<td><strong>The area extends along the railline connecting Murmansk, Olenya and Kandalaksha. Available KEYHOLE photography is not adequate either to confirm or negate ICBM launch facilities in this area.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 2 -
Available KEYHOLE photography is not adequate either to confirm or negate ICBM launch facilities in this area. Evidence in 1960, notably a missile sighting by a legal traveler, suggested an ICBM launch facility in the area north and east of Ufa.

**2nd Generation System**

**Perm**

Available KEYHOLE photography is not adequate to either confirm or negate ICBM launch facilities in this area.

**Omsk**

KEYHOLE photography does not reveal an identifiable ICBM complex. An installation about eight n.m. northeast of the city, detected in December 1961, may be an ICBM launch complex support facility in very early stages of construction.

2. The areas listed in the table are highly suspected on the basis of evidence available at this time. Each may contain one or more ICBM complexes. The highly suspected areas are designated as first or second generation according to the timing of the evidence leading to suspicion. Although construction of first generation complexes has probably been completed, second generation complexes are believed to be in various stages of construction, with launchers
at some of them likely to become operational in the first half of this year. Because the program for construction of second generation launching facilities is now under way, new starts can be expected throughout the coming months.

3. For these reasons and because of our past experience with lists of this type, we do not believe that the Table includes all areas where ICBM complexes will be found in the future, nor do we believe that all of those areas listed will in fact prove to contain ICBM launching facilities. Of the six second generation launch complexes which have been confirmed, only one was indicated by COMINT and collateral data prior to KEYHOLE confirmation, although two others are in areas which had previously been suspected to contain first generation complexes. Moreover, while the available COMINT and collateral evidence varies in quality, it is generally fragmentary and inconclusive, largely because of the tight security the Soviets are maintaining over the ICBM program. For these reasons, we cannot rely on non-photographic evidence to contribute substantially to the basic problem of locating ICBM complexes at this time.

4. Based on the location of confirmed ICBM complexes and other criteria, we regard the region between $54^\circ$ and $60^\circ$ North
latitude and 40° and 90° East longitude as the "prime," i.e., most likely, region of additional second generation deployment activity. (See Map) In addition, northwestern USSR is a highly suspect region for the deployment of the first generation ICBM. The fragmentary nature of the COMINT and collateral evidence makes it impossible at this time to pinpoint additional highly suspected deployment areas within these general regions. It is our judgment, however, that search of the regions described in this paragraph would be as likely to reveal additional ICBM complexes as would search of the highly suspected areas we have listed.
Areas Excluded from Table

6. The Dolon-Semipalatinsk area, listed as a suspected area in NIE 11-8/1-61 last September and considered by GMAIC as a possible ICBM deployment area last November, is not included in the Table. Recent KEYHOLE coverage leads us to believe that there is no ICBM launch complex within 50 miles of the Dolon airfield. Considerable

7. The Kamyshin area, listed as a suspect area in NIE 11-8/1-61 and considered by GMAIC as undetermined, has also been excluded from the Table. While the KEYHOLE coverage and COMINT evidence of the Kamyshin area does not warrant negating the area at this time, we believe the evidence is not sufficient to list Kamyshin as a highly suspect area.

8. The Svobodny-Vozhavka area, extending along the Trans-Siberian railroad between these two locations, has also been excluded.
from the Table. It was listed as a suspected area in NIE 11-8/1-61, but is now considered doubtful by GMAIC. KEYHOLE coverage is not adequate either to confirm or negate the presence of ICBM launch facilities in this area.

9. Aside from the changes indicated by this report and a few other minor adjustments of no consequence to the present problem, the GMAIC evaluations of specific areas attached to the USIB memorandum of 16 November 1961 remain valid. We have also examined additional areas suggested by SAC in a list transmitted to DIA on 29 January 1962, and have found none which we regard as highly suspect at this time.
Ratko

• CONFIRMED 2ND GENERATION ICBM LAUNCH COMPLEXES

HIGHLY SUSPECT DEPLOYMENT AREAS

PRIME REGION (MOST LIKELY) FOR 2ND GENERATION ICBM DEPLOYMENT

BEST SUITED REGIONS FOR ICBM DEPLOYMENT

5000 NM ICBM

7000 NM ICBM