COMMENTS OF THE GMAIC WORKING GROUP ON PRODUCTION TO "CRITIQUE OF THE USIB REVIEW OF THE CINCSAC MEMO ON SOVIET ICBM STRENGTH".

The Production Working Group has reviewed the SAC "Critique of the USIB Review of the CINCSAC Memo on Soviet ICBM Strength", 10 October 1961. While there is community-wide agreement that the Soviet Union possesses a large modern industrial base which provides a gross Soviet capability to produce ICBMs, we find very little evidence that this capability has been used to produce large quantities of ICBMs through mid-1961. Furthermore, the production program of Category A missiles through 1960 strongly suggests that its production was limited, and the testing programs for the Category B and C missiles de-met indicate only limited production before 1961.

The Working Group has previously published its evaluations of the 10 locations listed in the SAC paper as possessing "ICBM associated floor-space". During the last week we have reviewed the evidence on each of these locations and we find the evidence indicates that ICBM production, i.e., missile airframe final assembly and checkout, has probably taken place in some degree and on different programs at Kaliningrad, Kujbyshev and Dnepropetrovsk. It should be pointed out, however, that the Kaliningrad plant is also a known missile/space developmental facility, that various aircraft programs were probably going on at the missile suspect facilities in Kujbyshev during 1959 and 1960 and that the evidence on DAZ does not indicate an ICBM association until late 1960. There is no evidence on the other locations mentioned in the SAC Critique to indicate that they have been involved in final assembly of ICBMs. The GMAIC Working Group on Production believes that some of the locations mentioned in the SAC Critique may be associated indirectly with aspects of the ICBM program other than final assembly. However, the nature of the current activity at most of these locations would seem to rule out a direct participation in missile assembly.

To date the evidence gives no clear picture on rate of production. In general, because of the limited nature of current evidence in this regard, this type of information must always be considered, not as an independent area, but in conjunction with information on other aspects of Soviet ICBM programs.