Readers of the attached report are requested to sign below.

Name	Date	Telephone Extension

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense  
(Special Operations)  

SUBJECT: The Soviet ICBM Program  

1. Enclosed is the first of the special series of CS reports which was mentioned at the 16 May USIB meeting. These reports, the product of a sensitive operation to which we wish to afford maximum security, will carry the and will be distributed on a MUST KNOW basis within the Arrangements for utilizing the material in finished intelligence studies either within or outside the must be made with the originating office.  

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:  

RICHARD HELMS  

Enclosure: Report on the Soviet ICBM Program  
CSDB-3/647,058  

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cc: Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Département of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports
NOTE: The designates material from a sensitive Clandestine Services operation which is being distributed on a MUST KNOW basis within the.

This material also carries the dissemination controls.

COUNTRY: USSR

SUBJECT: The Soviet ICBM Program

DATE OF INFO: Early 1961

SOURCE: A reliable senior Soviet official

When source was asked to comment on various statements by Khrushchev regarding Soviet ICBM tests, production, deployment, and threats, he replied that it was only a bluff on the part of Khrushchev. When asked to give the basis for this judgment, source made the following statement:

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1. "Khrushchev's basic idea in the entire matter is to be a jump ahead of and to impress the leaders of the Western powers -- to represent that which he does not have or that which he has in insignificant quantities as something which he has already in hand. There are tests of one nature or another which in many cases are successful, but he is already ranting as though this were an accomplished thing. Thus the whole idea of Khrushchev and of the Presidium is to demonstrate and to illustrate in one way or another such as by launching of an earth satellite, even of a man in space, in order to impress Western military leaders that the Soviet Union has everything. This is to force Western government leaders and military people to do their planning on the assumption that the Soviet Union already has a tremendous military potential when in reality it is only being developed."

2. Source then referred to Khrushchev's threats, and recalled that had told source in early 1961 that "We are only thinking about these things, only planning, even though we have had some successes here and there. But in order to get anywhere one has to increase production tremendously and to train cadres." Source went on to say: " has constantly said that there is an enormous amount of work to be done not only with cadres, but also with equipment, missile types, etc. while Khrushchev is shouting that we already have all this. " stated further that the Soviets have in their arsenal tactical missiles, and missiles that can reach South America, the United States, or Canada, but not accurately.

3. "These are test missiles which are still undergoing further tests and are not on bases. The USSR does not have the capability of even firing one or two -- there are not hundreds even in a testing status. There may be only tens in that category. Even in sending
up a satellite or a man in space all scientists are mobilized for the effort, and before a satellite is launched they have several failures. The main idea now of Khrushchev's statements is to create an effect on foreign ears, but the preparations are being carried out intensively. The objective is to attain mass production.

4. "Those missiles which have already been developed are being produced in great quantities, and they can be launched at any time to the extent of their operational ranges, but with respect to ICBM's the Soviets have had one failure after another. They continue to throw millions into the effort, and if they have one success it is used to impress the West by pretending that there are hundreds. But there are no such hundreds. That is only idle talk. However, one day they will be there, since the entire economy and policy are geared for such development. The basic problem is to develop a missile with a large warhead yield, but with a high-calorie fuel which requires little space. On paper the Soviets have had some success there, but when one considers that millions of men's efforts are directed to this work and that the entire economy of a nation is directed by a one-party system to which all is subordinate, they can do this. Eventually they will perfect such missiles and they will ultimately be mass-produced.

5. "Even now it may be possible that somewhere in the Far East or at Kapustin Yar there may be some missiles which could reach other continents and detonate with an atomic, even hydrogen explosion, but such launchings would be completely unplanned, uncontrolled, and certainly not of a mass variety. Of this I am entirely sure, but in two or three years there will be a different picture."

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