DCI BRIEFING

16 May 1961

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR LONG RANGE ATTACK

I. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

A. Since first Soviet ICBM launching from the Tyuratam Test range in August 1957, believe we have detected virtually all successful ICBM and space launchings--these include about 35 generally successful ICBMs.

B. Extensive data collected from ICBM test firing program has enabled us to establish basic characteristics of ICBM system.

1. Configuration--very large vehicle, 450,000-500,000 lbs. gross take-off weight --total thrust at take-off, about 750,000 lbs.

2. Guidance system employs radio and inertial components--estimate CEP of about 2 n.m. under operational conditions in mid-1961--actual figure could be considerably greater or somewhat less.

3. Range. Maximum range of ICBMs tested prior to 1960 estimated to be about 5,000 n.m.; 7,000 n.m. missile proof-tested in first half of 1960.

4. Improvement in range due to reduction in nosecone weight--other characteristics believed identical--both versions can deliver multi-megaton payload.

5. Reliability--good on the test range--Estimate that under operational conditions some 40-65% of ICBMs on launchers would get off within 15-30 minutes of scheduled times and arrive in vicinity of targets.

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C. Deployment Concept. Present Soviet ICBM system is extremely bulky and must be fairly difficult to handle—launching sites probably are large, soft, fixed installations, located near rail lines.

1. Operational launchers probably paired—several pairs of launchers probably grouped in a site.

D. Evidence is inconclusive as to precise timing of initial operational capability (IOC).

1. Majority in intelligence community estimates that as of about 1 January 1960, the first operational Soviet ICBM unit was trained and equipped with a few 5,000 n.m. missiles and launchers (7,000 ICBM available after about mid-1960)

2. Army and Navy doubt that IOC occurred in 1960—but believe that Soviets did have "emergency" capability.

E. In the estimate which the intelligence community completed last year, CIA estimated a Soviet program which would have given them 150 ICBMs on launcher in mid-1961. Other opinions in intelligence community ranged from Army-Navy view (50 in mid-1961) to Air Force view (200 in mid-1961)

1. CIA estimate for mid-1963 was 400. Army-Navy, 200; Air Force, 700.

F. Intelligence Community currently engaged in re-examination of evidence relating to Soviet ICBM production and deployment in preparing this year's estimate—review not yet completed, but may lead to some revision of previous estimates. Until this process completed, must stress that figures which follow represent CIA views—current views of other intelligence agencies may well vary considerably. 2-2

TOP SECRET
G. CIA now believes current Soviet strength in ICBMs on launchers smaller than previously estimated—while evidence indicates a large commitment of resources, program thus far appears to have been moderate in tempo.

1. As of mid-1961, we estimate that the USSR probably has 50-100 ICBMs on launchers.

2. We believe that 100-150 is the highest present force level which can be reconciled with the evidence—rigid interpretation of evidence could lead to estimate of less than 50.

H. CIA believes that Soviets probably are building toward a force of a few hundred launchers to be acquired at a moderate pace over the next two or three years. We estimate that this force will approximate 200-400 operational launchers by mid-1964. However, cannot exclude the possibility of as many as 450 by mid-1963.

II. Medium and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles.

A. Soviets now have available ballistic missiles of 700 (SS-3) and 1,100 n.m. (SS-4) range which provide overlapping coverage of targets on the Soviet periphery.

1. Last year we estimated a requirement of about 250 launchers for these missiles—150 for SS-3 and 100 for SS-4—to be attained in mid-1961. (Requirement for missile inventory set at 3 missiles per launcher; to be achieved by mid-1963.)

2. CIA now estimates the same requirements for launchers and missiles, but believes they will both be met by mid-1962.

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3. Mid-1961 strength estimated at 100 SS-3 launchers (300 missiles) and 125 SS-4 launchers (400 missiles)

B. CIA estimates now take account of new 2,000 n.m. missile.

1. Sees buildup to 50-100 launchers and 150-300 missiles of this type by mid-1965—by that time, reduction in medium range missile strength will probably have begun.

III. Long Range Bombers

A. Previous estimates of Soviet long range bomber force substantially unchanged.

1. Mid-1961 strength of Soviet Long-Range Aviation estimated at 150 jet and turboprop heavy bombers, (BISONS and BEARS) and 960 BADGER jet medium bombers.

2. BISON production has continued at a slow rate for the last year or so and has declined in recent months—we believe that it will stop entirely in the near future.

3. BLINDER, a new "supersonic dash" medium bomber is being produced at the rate of about 2 per month—30 produced to date.