MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director, Research and Reports

THROUGH: Chief, Economic Research, ORR

THROUGH: Acting Chief, Industrial Division, ORB

FROM: Chief, Guided Missile Branch, D/I

SUBJECT: Status of DD/P -- DD/I Guided Missile Task Force

1. During the two years the Guided Missile Task Force has been in existence, there has been a significant improvement in the quantity and quality of covert reporting on the Soviet guided missile program, particularly with respect to surface to air missile production and deployment. Much of this improvement has occurred in the past six months. While it is difficult to judge the extent to which this would have occurred without the Task Force, we suspect that it is largely attributable to joint DD/P -- DD/I activities conducted under the aegis of the Task Force and that these activities have provided most of the impetus for the improvement.

2. Specifically, the Task Force has: (a) fostered closer working relations and better mutual understanding between the clandestine collection and intelligence assessor elements of the Agency, which undoubtedly contributed to the recent effective and timely joint action to collect against Soviet SAM sites; (b) promoted the production and widespread dissemination to collectors of a number of valuable collection planning and support aids; (c) established a systematic substantive briefing program to orient and motivate both Field and Headquarters collection personnel; (d) encouraged collection through substantive briefings; (e) enabled DD/P to focus its operations more intensively and directly on the Soviet missile program; and (f) fostered the creation of an ad hoc sub-group called "Special Missile Operations Group (SMOG)" designed to provide a closer and more detailed working-level interchange of information relating to missile collection operations.
3. Although these activities have already paid some dividends and will presumably yield additional benefits in the future, the fact remains that the important intelligence objectives, which engendered the formation of the Task Force, have not yet been attained. After two years of Task Force operation, for example, we still have little more information on the scope and nature of Soviet ICBM and IRBM production and deployment programs than we did when the Task Force was formed. During this time, however, both missile systems are believed to have entered series production and both may already be deployed to operational units. With respect to the Soviet ICBM, the Hyland Panel found the lack of positive evidence on production facilities and operational deployment sites "alarming", particularly in view of the fact that similar information was still lacking on other Soviet offensive missile systems, some of which are believed to have been operational for several years. The Panel strongly recommended that "all collection concepts capable of providing data on the status of Soviet ICBM accuracy, deployment and production be vigorously pursued" and, specifically, that "more active covert activities be directed toward acquiring data concerning ICBM deployment, production rates and goals, and future ICBM design concepts".

4. We feel strongly that the activities of the Task Force and its sub-group SMOG should not only be continued but also expanded and intensified. In addition to their continuing briefing and general guidance activities, it has been agreed by the DD/P, on a number of occasions that the DD/I representatives would also "participate fully in the planning and development of DD/P operations against Soviet missile targets". To date, however, there has been virtually no use of the DD/I representatives in this capacity. Because we have not had access to such operational information, we are unable to gauge the extent to which we might effectively influence the direct exploitation of existing collection opportunities, or the planning of future operations. Inasmuch as we have always understood that development of this type of DD/P -- DD/I cooperation was a main objective of the Task Force, we strongly recommend that the Task Force be continued and re-oriented toward this goal.*

* While we would prefer to have continued OSI participation in the Task Force, it must be recognized that much of the scientific and technical information required by OSI can be and is being collected by other means. There is little or no prospect, however, that urgently needed information on Soviet production and deployment programs will be forthcoming from other sources. Consequently, even if OSI withdraws from the Task Force, we consider that OPR must continue to have this mechanism for orienting, guiding and (let's face it) pressuring DD/P into more effective and timely collection operations against the missile production and deployment programs of the USSR.
5. We are only now entering the critical phase of intelligence on Soviet ICBM-IREM capabilities and programs. Faced with admittedly limited resources in both the DD/I and DD/P, and an unsolved intelligence problem of this importance, it would seem axiomatic that even closer coordination than in the past could not fail to improve the focus of guidance from the DD/I and collection from the DD/P.