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(CONFIDENTIAL)
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Annex to the Report of DCI Ad Hoc Panel on Status of the Soviet ICBM Program

1. The Panel re-emphasizes the unique importance of TALENT photography. This resource represents the only reliable means for locating Soviet missile sites, and should be placed on the highest national priority. Specifically, we recommend the early coverage of rail lines in the POLYARNY Ural area as the most likely prototype operational deployment facility for Soviet ICBMs.

2. As an outstanding example of the significance of TALENT data, the continuing existence of only a single launch pad at TYURA TAM is noted in the recent TALENT photography. This fact, while completely unexpected, allows a judgement to be made that the extremely large fixed launching facility is not an essential part of their operational deployment system. Further, the single launch facility coupled with the relatively short periods between several launchings indicates a highly efficient approach to check-out and launch of large missiles.

3. Additionally, the TALENT aircraft possesses altitude capabilities which make it a unique platform for the reliable acquisition of high quality telemetry data prior to first stage burnout on TYURA TAM ICBM launchings. Such data is of extreme importance in determining ICBM characteristics.
We strongly recommend that peripheral flights of this aircraft to acquire such telemetry data be continued. We also recognize the importance of obtaining data on the terminal end of an ICBM flight. Such data should be acquired in addition to but not at the expense of the above telemetry data.

4. In view of the improving Soviet air defense effort, we believe that the utilization of the aircraft may soon be limited to peripheral operations. Therefore, we recommend that CIA:

a. Conduct additional high priority overflights as soon and as often as possible.

b. Make plans now for increased applications of this aircraft to peripheral operations.

c. Intensify present plans to provide a replacement, including improved vehicles and reconnaissance satellites.

SIGNED

L. A. NYLAND
Chairman
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Chairman