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SOVIET PROPAGANDA TREATMENT OF THE USSR'S STRATEGIC ROCKET CAPABILITY

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SOVIET PROPAGANDA TREATMENT OF USSR'S STRATEGIC ROCKET CAPABILITY

Summary

The traditional Soviet practice of withholding technical data on actual weapons in the national arsenal has been rigorously followed in discussions of military rocket technology, in the specialized military press as well as in mass propaganda.

Generalized statements by Soviet leaders and propagandists since August 1957, when the USSR announced a successful ICBM test, have ordinarily taken the form of boasts that the USSR has not only "long-range" rockets but a super-long-range one, the ICBM, capable of delivering a hydrogen warhead "to any point on the globe." Technical articles in the military press normally speak of the characteristics of rocket weapons in the abstract, without reference to actual Soviet weapons, or discuss foreign developments in the field.

Some indications, however, may be gleaned from Soviet propaganda as to the performance of Soviet strategic rockets, the timing of Soviet advances, the meaning of certain terms in standard usage, and the operational control of certain categories of Soviet weapons:

1. Range and Accuracy: In a single notable exception to the propaganda practice of secrecy, an article by an engineer captain in the May 1958 DOSAAF journal MILITARY KNOWLEDGE claimed for the Soviet ICBM tested in August 1957 a range of more than 8,000 kilometers and a maximum deviation of 10 to 20 kilometers from the target. Prior military press articles had specified the same accuracy in stating the minimum requirements for an ICBM, but had not explicitly related the data to a Soviet weapon.

In his 4 February 1959 speech to the 21st CPSU Congress, Marshal Malinovsky claimed for the first time in Soviet propaganda that the Soviet ICBM could deliver a hydrogen warhead "precisely" to any point on the globe--adding the word "precisely" to the previous standard formulation and thereby implying that the accuracy or reliability of the weapon had been improved.

2. Production: Khrushchev in November 1957 made the first public Soviet references to "production" of the ICBM in the USSR. A year later, in his November 1958 seven-year plan theses, he stated that the production of the weapon had been "successfully set up." In his 27 January 1959 CPSU Congress speech he announced that "serial" production had been "organized." And in a 13 February speech in Ryazan, he declared that "serial" production had been "mastered." His successive reformulations, suggesting progression to higher stages of production, were accompanied by a shift in the translation of the term serinovo from "serial" to "volume" by Sovinformburo, the official Soviet translation service.

3. Operational Control: References to "long-range" rockets and to the ICBM as additions to the arsenal of Soviet artillery have suggested that operational control of the weapons is centered in the artillery arm.
SOVIET PROPAGANDA TREATMENT OF THE USSR'S STRATEGIC ROCKET CAPABILITY

INTRODUCTION: Little Detailed Information Made Public

It has been traditional Soviet practice to keep specific data about actual weapons in the national arsenal out of the mass propaganda, and even to withhold such information from the pages of the military press. Such detailed discussions of rocket weapons as have appeared from time to time in open Soviet publications have generally been of a theoretical nature, without reference to existing Soviet weapons, or have dealt with published data about foreign weapons.

Sentence-level references to military rockets began to appear in mass broadcast and civilian press propaganda in 1953. Until 1957, such references were invariably in the context of appeals for disarmament or condemnations of "aggressive" U.S. military plans. It was in connection with nuclear disarmament that Khrushchev made the first high-level Soviet acknowledgement—and then only by implication—that the USSR was engaged in the "manufacture" of strategic rocket weapons. In his speech at Bangalore, India, on 26 November 1955, Khrushchev said:

"Because the Western powers do not want to ban the manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons and do not want to pledge not to use them, we find ourselves obliged to manufacture atomic and hydrogen bombs, rocket missiles, and other means of destruction."

The general practice in the military press was well illustrated that same year in a series of articles apparently prompted by U.S. developments in the field of strategic rockets. More than a dozen articles throughout 1955 were devoted to detailed discussions of guided missiles, both actual weapons and hypothetical ones, but not a single item of information about Soviet weapons was offered.

The propaganda practice has remained essentially the same since the 26 August 1957 announcement of a successful Soviet ICBM test. References to the new Soviet weapons capability became frequent in Soviet radio and press propaganda and included detailed discussions of the characteristics of ICBMs—but within the limits of propaganda practice, citing only such textbook information as would apply to ICBMs in general.

A single notable exception in the specialised press was an article by Engineer Captain V. Zhukov in the May 1958 issue of MILITARY KNOWLEDGE, monthly journal of the mass paramilitary society DOSAAF. Zhukov claimed for the Soviet ICBM tested in August 1957 a range of more than 8,000 kilometers and a maximum deviation of 10 to 20 kilometers from the target. Earlier military press articles had specified the same accuracy in discussing the general characteristics of ICBMs, but had not explicitly related the data to an actual Soviet weapon.

Generalized claims by Soviet leaders and propagandists about Soviet rocket missiles since August 1957 have most often taken the form of
boasts that the USSR has not only "short-range" and "long-range" rockets, but a "super-long-range" ICBM capable of delivering a hydrogen warhead to any point on the globe.

Despite the dearth of detailed information in the press and broadcasts on Soviet rocket development, an examination of propaganda statements and technical articles in the military press does provide some indications regarding the timing of Soviet achievements, the meaning of terms such as "long-range" as used in the propaganda, the status of production of ICBMs, and the operational control of the weapons by the various branches of the armed services.

"LONG-RANGE" ROCKETS AND MISSILES

The claim that the Soviet armed forces possessed rockets and missiles capable of making strategic strikes beyond the confines of the battlefield was introduced in the propaganda early in 1956. Marshal Zhukov, in his speech at the 20th CPSU Congress in February of that year, announced that the Soviet armed forces were "now" equipped with "long-range" rockets. In a succession of articles that same month, Marshals Sokolovsky, Konev, and Vasilevsky corroborated Zhukov’s claim.

A "long-range rocket," according to Soviet usage at the time, was "intended for firing against strategic targets disposed in the deep rear of the enemy" (MILITARY KNOWLEDGE, No. 12, 1955), with a range of from "hundreds" to "even thousands" of kilometers. "Modern Military Technology," a book published by the USSR Defense Ministry in August 1956, cited as examples of "long-range rockets" the German V-2 and the American Redstone.

After the ICBM test announcement in August 1957 rocket specialist Major General Pokrovsky expanded the definition by spelling out the difference between the missions of "long-range" and the new "super-long-range rockets" (ICBMs) in the 31 August 1957 IZVESTIA:

Ordinary long-range rockets permit operation in the confines of a single continent or at least within continents that are close to each other—for instance, in the area of Europe, Asia Minor, and North Africa. Such rockets cannot cross oceans.

THE "SUPER-LONG-RANGE" ICBM

Less than two weeks before the 26 August 1957 TASS announcement that an ICBM—or "super-long-range rocket"—was successfully tested in the USSR, Marshal Vasilevsky in the 14 August RED STAR twice made reference to Soviet possession of "super-long-range" rockets. This appears to have been the first use of the term "super-long-range"—as distinct from "long-range"—rocket weapons in Soviet propaganda.

An earlier reference to "super-long-range" weapons by Marshal Zhukov, reported by REUTERS, was not carried in Soviet Media: On 29 January 1957 REUTERS quoted Zhukov as telling Indian military cadets in Delhi that the USSR possessed "super-long-range weapons capable of carrying nuclear missiles to the farthest point on the globe." The TASS version of his remarks (30 January) referred only to "long-distance rockets" and
"powerful long-range aviation." The TASS version was thus more in line with other ambiguous claims by Soviet military and political elite since the 20th CPSU Congress that the USSR could deliver nuclear blows anywhere on earth by both aircraft and rockets. The propaganda did not claim a worldwide delivery capability by rockets alone until the Vasilovsky article of 14 August 1957.

Range and Accuracy

Since August 1957, a recurrent boast in the propaganda with respect to the USSR's nuclear delivery capability has been that the ICBM could carry a hydrogen warhead to any target on earth.

The most specific statement publicized in Soviet media about the worldwide delivery capability of the ICBM appeared in the May 1958 issue (No. 5) of the DOSAAF organ MILITARY KNOWLEDGE. The author, Engineer Captain V. Zhukov, wrote:

As a result of the successful resolution of the most complex scientific-technological tests, a missile capable of covering a distance exceeding 8,000 kilometers, with a speed of more than 20 to 25 thousand kilometers per hour, has been developed and tested...

The apparatus of the guidance system of the ballistic rocket allows for a very small deviation from the target of the strike, probably no more than 10 to 20 kilometers.

A 30 August 1957 SOVIET FLEET article discussing rockets in theoretical terms, without specific reference to a weapon actually tested or in Soviet possession, had stated that a maximum deviation of 20 kilometers from the target would constitute a direct hit for an ICBM with a hydrogen warhead. An article in SOVIET AVIATION on 26 August 1957 made the same statement. And two other articles in SOVIET AVIATION (31 August and 17 November 1957) stated that an accuracy of .002 of a given range would constitute a direct hit. The implication in all these articles that this data applied to the actual weapon tested by the USSR was not spelled out until the appearance of the May 1958 MILITARY KNOWLEDGE article, and there has been no restatement of MILITARY KNOWLEDGE's claims by Soviet media.

An intimation that the ICBM has since improved—or is at least more confident about—the accuracy of the ICBM may have been intended in Marshal Malinovsky's 4 February 1959 statement at the 21st CPSU Congress that the USSR's ICBMs are capable of delivering hydrogen warheads "precisely" to any point on the globe. Prior formulations about worldwide delivery capability had focused on the ability to strike targets outside the USSR, but Malinovsky's statement suggested an ability to strike targets anywhere on earth.

* The 16 January 1958 issue of the Halle, East Germany, daily newspaper FREIE DIESE claimed for the Soviet ICBM an accuracy of within 15-20 kilometers. Another GDR paper, the Neubrandenburg FREIE EDE, on 27 January 1959 attributed to a British scientist the statement that the Soviet ICBM can achieve an accuracy of within 1.5 kilometers of its target.
delivery capability had not used the word "precisely." Since the party congress, Marshal Sokolovsky has referred (in the 22 February PRAVDA) to Soviet capability to deal a "precise" blow at "any aggressor" anywhere.

Soviet propaganda media never publicized Khrushchev's statement to Senator Humphrey about an 8,000-mile (or 14,000-kilometer) range of a Soviet ICBM.

ICBM "Production"

As early as November 1957, within three months after the announced ICBM test in the USSR, Khrushchev used the phrase "production of ICBMs" twice in public statements. He told representatives of the Toronto TELEGRAM on 2 November 1957 that the "production of the ICBMs has solved the problem of delivery of a thermonuclear warhead to any point on the globe." And on 22 November, he informed Hearst that the fact that the USSR was the first to "produce" an ICBM "gives us the possibility to improve the production of rockets, to lead the United States in this respect, and accumulate the necessary stock of rockets if we do not come to terms in disarmament." Both Khrushchev interviews were broadcast by Radio Moscow and published in the central press.

One year later, in his seven-year-plan Theses of 14 November 1958, Khrushchev announced that the "production of ICBMs has been successfully set up (nalazheno)." On 4 January 1959, Khrushchev again mentioned ICBM "production" in his Belorussian Supreme Soviet speech, claiming without further explanation that the USSR now occupies first place in the world in both the "creation and production" of ICBMs.

"Serial" Production

In his report to the 21st CPSU Congress on 27 January, Khrushchev went a step further: He said that in the USSR, the "serial production of intercontinental ballistic missiles has been organized." In addition to introducing the term "serial," Khrushchev supplanted the word he had used for "set up" in his seven-year-plan theses—nalazheno—with the term organizovano. Nalazheno denotes initial organization, the setting up of an operation. Organizovano simply means "organized." Khrushchev's shift to use of this term may imply a progression from an earlier stage at which organization was begun.

Khrushchev's reference to "serial" production was reiterated at the 21st Congress by Deputy Chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers Dmitri Ustinov—but the passage in which the reference appeared, as reported initially by TASS, appears to have been doctored in subsequent summaries and texts of the speech. The first TASS summary of his speech, transmitted shortly after it was delivered, quoted him as saying that more than one type of ICBM was involved: "Serial production of various types of ICBMs has already been organized in the USSR." Subsequent TASS summaries, as well as the purported text of the speech broadcast by Radio Moscow and published in PRAVDA, rendered this passage as: "At the present time the USSR has in serial production military rockets of all types and purposes."

Soviet media never carried remarks by a Soviet engineer visiting the United States, reported in the New York TIMES of 13 February 1959, that
proffered some clarification of the term "serial production." The TIMES quoted Prof. P.D. Lebedev, chief of the main administration for machine-building technical schools of the Soviet Ministry of Higher Education, as saying that "serial production" was an intermediate stage between "specimen or prototype" production and mass production of limited quantities.

A distinction between "serial" and "mass" production may be reflected in Kozlov's CPSU Congress speech on 4 February, which uses both terms in a discussion of production-line methods in industry:

The most successful production-line methods are being applied at automobile, tractor, LETVI, machine tool building, and other works having mass and large-scale-serial (krugproserbiny) production.

"Serial" Becomes "Volume"

In translating Khruschev's 27 January reference at the 21st Congress to ICBM production, the official Soviet translation service, Sovinformburo, rendered seriiinoye as "serial." But in all subsequent statements using the term in connection with ICBM production, seriiinoye was translated by Sovinformburo as "volume." Thus Khruschev's statement on ICBM production in his closing speech at the CPSU Congress on 5 February was rendered: "It is not at all idle boast that we have organized the volume production of ICBMs." (TASS, however, in an English-language summary of Khrushchev's 5 February speech, still translated the term as "serial."). And Sovinformburo gave the following translation of Khrushchev's comment in Rysan on 13 February:

When it was said in the report to the party congress that the Soviet Union had started the volume production of ICBMs, some Western leaders began by inertia to voice doubt. But they at once broke off, declaring that if the Russians had said so, then it was quite certain that the volume production of ICBMs had been started. And so it has in actual fact.

This time the Russian word that Sovinformburo translated as "started" was neither nalezhechnoy n osvoeny, but osvoyeno. The translation of this word as "started" does not jibe with the dictionary meaning:

The standard unabridged Usmanov Russian-to-Russian dictionary and the USSR's official Russian-to-English dictionary--both issued by the Soviet State Publishing House for Foreign and National Dictionaries--give "mastered" as the primary meaning of osvoyeno. Neither dictionary offers a definition that could be considered synonymous with "started."

A link between rocket production and the machine-building industry was suggested in the initial TASS version of Stalinov's 21st CPSU Congress speech--the same version that included the subsequently altered reference to serial production of "various types of ICBMs." TASS' initial summary quoted Stalinov as having said: "one of the most complicated branches of machine building (mashinostroeniy) is rocket construction."

But all subsequent versions of the speech removed the reference to machine building. The 5 February TASS's purported text of the speech rendered the passage as: "one of the most complex branches of technology (technologii) is rocket technique."
OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROCKET WEAPONS

Artillery Gets "Long-Range" Rockets

Possession of "long-range" rockets by the artillery arm of the Soviet forces was first announced in speeches and articles commemorating Artillery Day in 1956. According to Col Gen. of Artillery Fomin (in SOVIET RUSSIA, 18 November 1956) long-range rocket weapons, along with atomic weapons, constitute a "new type of artillery which considerably expands the field of its military application." The new strategic role for Soviet artillery was also underscored by Marshal of Artillery Chistyakov (in RED STAR, 18 November 1956):

Rocket artillery can be employed for firing atomic projectiles not only in the tactical zone of operations of the ground forces and in their interests, but also along with [not as part of] long-range aviation for strategic purposes.

Artillery Control of ICBM Intimated

There have been oblique indications in the propaganda that, in addition to "long-range" rockets, the Soviet artillery command also has control of ICBMs. The ICBM has been mentioned repeatedly as an addition to the arsenal of the artillery. For instance, a Kiev radio report of the May Day parade in that city took note of the "columns of rocket (reaktivnyy) artillery" that passed the reviewing stand. Recalling the "famous wartime katyshas," the announcer noted that "they are much improved now, and there is no place on earth that our present katyshas cannot reach."

More directly, the Belorussian regional service on 7 November 1958, in describing the parade through Minsk on the 41st anniversary of the October Revolution, reported: "Further in the parade armored carriers and motorized infantry units appear, followed by artillery. The latter has guns, heavy mortars, guided missiles, and intercontinental rockets."

A further intimation that the ICBM is operationally controlled by the artillery branch was given in military leaders' speeches and articles celebrating Artillery Day in 1957 and 1958. The construction and successful testing in the USSR of the world's first ICBM was cited repeatedly as evidence of the growing capabilities of Soviet rocket artillery.

Ambiguity about Navy Rockets

While Soviet military spokesmen have claimed for the navy the ability to make strategic strikes at inland targets, they have been ambiguous as to whether or not ships are equipped with long-range rockets and missiles. A standard phrase in the 1958 Navy Day articles was that "the Soviet army and navy have at their disposal all types of modern weapons, including rockets and the ICBM." At least one paper, SOVIETSKAYA MOLDAVIA, made explicit reference to Soviet naval rockets: "Our navy has been equipped with new, modern combat ships of every class, armed with all types of modern weapons, including rockets." But the article failed to specify the range or mission of the rockets.
Appendix

TAB A: Khrushchev Statements on ICBM Production

TAB B: Soviet Authoritative Statements on Delivery Capability of the Soviet ICBM

NOTE: Soviet propaganda treatment of the question of defense against the ICBM—a question on which, in keeping with general propaganda practice, very little has been said—is reviewed in Radio Propaganda Report CD.126 of 12 January 1959, "Recent Soviet Propaganda Claims of ICBM Invulnerability."

KHRUSHCHEV STATEMENTS ON ICBM PRODUCTION

Reproduced below, in chronological order, are all public statements made to date by Khrushchev on production of ICBMs in the USSR. No other Soviet Presidium member has addressed himself publicly to the subject.

Marshal Moskalenko, in a 22 February 1959 SOVIET RUSSIA article, quoted verbatim the statement made by Khrushchev on ICBM production in his 5 February 21st CPSU Congress speech. No other reference to the subject by a top Soviet military leader has appeared to date in the central civilian or military press.

Interview with Toronto TELEGRAM, 2 November 1957

The production of ICBMs has solved the problem of delivering a thermonuclear warhead to any point on the globe.

Interview with Hearst, 22 November 1957

The USSR was the first to produce an ICBM. This means we have priority, which gives us the possibility to improve the production of rockets, to lead the United States in this matter, and to accumulate the necessary stock of rockets if we do not come to terms on disarmament.

Preelection speech in Kalinin, 14 March 1958

An ICBM has been produced /in the USSR/.

Seven-year plan theses, 14 November 1958

The production of ICBMs has been successfully set up (nalazheno).

Belorussian Supreme Soviet speech, 4 January 1959

/the USSR/ now occupies...first place in the world in the creation and production of ICBMs, the launching of artificial earth satellites, and many other scientific and engineering achievements.

Speech at the 21st CPSU Congress, 27 January 1959 (Sovinformburo translation)

In the USSR, serial production (seriiynoe proizvodstvo) of ICBMs has been organized (organizovano).
Speech at the 21st CPSU Congress, 5 February 1959 (Sovinformburo translation)

It is not an idle boast that we have organized the volume (seriiinoye) production of ICBMs.

Speech at Ryazan Machine-Building Works, 13 February 1959 (Sovinformburo translation)

When it was said in the report to the party congress that the Soviet Union had started (osvoyeno) the volume (seriiinoye) production of ICBMs, some Western leaders began by inertia to voice doubt. But they at once broke off, declaring that if the Russians had said so, then it was quite certain that the volume production of ICBMs had been started. And so it has in actual fact.
SOVIET AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENTS

O: NUCLEAR DELIVERY CAPABILITY OF THE ICBM

Reproduced below, in chronological order, are (1) all Khrushchev statements publicized by Soviet media and (2) selected statements by the Soviet military elite bearing on the range and accuracy of the Soviet ICBM.

No top-level Soviet political or military spokesman has publicly repeated the claims made in SOVIET AVIATION (17 November 1957) and MILITARY KNOWLEDGE (No 5, 1958)—in articles signed by lower-echelon military men—about the Soviet ICBM's accuracy of .002 of a given range or maximum deviation from the target of 20 kilometers. Moscow never publicized Khrushchev's December 1958 statement to Senator Humphrey about a 14,000-kilometer range of the Soviet ICBM. In May 1958 MILITARY KNOWLEDGE (No. 5, 1958) claimed a range of 8,000 kilometers for the weapon tested by the USSR in August 1957, but no Soviet elite spokesman has repeated that claim.

1. Khrushchev Statements

Interview with Toronto TELEGRAM, 2 November 1957

The production of ICBMs has solved the problem of delivering a thermonuclear warhead to any point on the globe. Distance is now no obstacle. As for the military bases in Europe, Africa, and Asia, missiles which can reach any part of these continents have already been in existence for a long time. I think it is no secret that there now exists a range of missiles with the aid of which it is possible to fulfill any assignment of operational and strategic importance.

Interview with Shapiro, 14 November 1957

Our designers have also developed rockets that can, in the event of an attack on our country, dispose of any base in Europe, Asia, and Africa. On the very first try our rocket hit the target.

Interview with Hearst, 22 November 1957

If a war is unleashed now by the aggressive circles of the United States, it will be waged not only in Europe, in Asia, or Africa. This war will immediately be carried onto the territory of the United States because intercontinental ballistic missiles now make it possible to hit a target in any area of the globe.
Foreign Policy Speech, 22 January 1958

Now we are capable of directing a rocket to any part of the earth and, if need be, with a hydrogen warhead.

Warsaw Pact Meeting Speech, 24 May 1958

One cannot help feeling surprise at the shortsightedness of the American ruling circles which hope to divert a retaliatory blow from themselves toward their allies in case the United States unleashes a nuclear war. One should not forget that now intercontinental ballistic rockets and other modern means of warfare can hit targets on any point of the globe.

Military Academy Speech, 14 November 1958

With the present ICBM, with the rockets of intermediate and close range, there is no country in the world—still more, there is no corner on earth—which could be safe should a third world war come.

21st CPSU Congress Speech, 27 January 1959

It is quite obvious that if the Soviet Union knows how to send a rocket over hundreds of thousands of kilometers into the cosmos, it can send powerful rockets to any spot in the world without fail.

21st CPSU Congress Speech, 5 February 1959

The USSR today has the means to deliver a crushing blow to the aggressor at any point of the globe. After all, it is not a mere figure of speech when we say that we have organized the serial production of ICBMs.

2. Statements by Soviet Military Leaders

Major General G. Pokrovsky, SOVIET AVIATION, 28 August 1957

As pointed out by the TASS report of 26 August 1957, it is now possible to launch super-long-range missiles to any part of the globe.

Major General of Tank Force P. Pinchuk, SOVIET RUSSIA, 8 September 1957

A 'super-long-range intercontinental multistage ballistic rocket...capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to any given point on the globe...has been successfully tested in the USSR.'
Marshal Malinovsky in a speech on the 40th Armed Forces Day, 22 February 1958

The Soviet Armed Forces have rockets of short, intermediate, long, and super-long range action capable of carrying hydrogen charges to any point in the world.

Marshal Budenniy, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 23 February 1958

Our army is equipped with everything necessary, including long-range rockets and hydrogen bombs, and is able to defeat any aggressor. If there is a lunatic who wants to unleash a new war, there is now no spot on the globe where he could hide from justified retaliation.

Lieutenant General of the Engineer and Technical Service V. Orlovsky, SELSKOE KHOZYAISTVO, 14 September 1958

We now possess various atomic and thermonuclear weapons and powerful jet and rocket armaments, including ballistic rockets capable of carrying destruction against the enemy to any given spot on the globe.

Marshal Sokolovsky at the USSR Supreme Soviet, 26 December 1958

The Soviet armed forces possess such a powerful weapon as the ICBM which is capable of transporting a thermonuclear warhead to any target, wherever it may be.

Marshal Malinovsky at the CPSU Congress, 4 February 1959

If a war should be imposed on us, we consider jet-propelled weapons (reaktivnoye oruzhie) precisely the best answer to the present-day demands of combat, making it possible to accomplish effectively strategic, operative, and tactical tasks on land, air, and sea.

There are most terrible and newer means. They are the intercontinental ballistic rockets. They indeed cannot be stopped by any antiaircraft means of defense. They are capable of delivering without fail a hydrogen warhead (zaryad) of colossal power to any point on the globe — precisely to any point. They are exceedingly accurate. No need to doubt this, for the first rocket of this kind has experimentally risen into the cosmos and is now proudly carrying the Soviet pennant around the sun. What other proof is needed of the rocket might of the Soviet power?

Marshal A. Yeremenko, NARODNA ARMIYA, 22 February 1959

The contemporary Soviet army is equipped with all kinds of the most up-to-date technical equipment, with atomic, thermonuclear, jet, and rocket arms. It also possesses rockets able to deliver powerful warheads to any given spot on the globe.
In his speech to the 21st Congress of the CPSU, the Minister of Defense, Comrade Malinovsky, Marshal of the Soviet Union, declared that our armed forces have awesome rocket weapons, capable of inflicting destruction on the battlefield, as well as on any spot of the globe.

Our army is equipped with the most powerful and modern arms, such as ICBMs capable of carrying a hydrogen warhead to any part of the world. We now have a whole series of military ballistic missiles—intercontinental, long-range, medium-range, and short-range and a whole group of rockets for tactical purposes.

The USSR armed forces are equipped with first-rate military technology and weapons. They have received various military ballistic rockets—intercontinental and continental, long, medium, and close-range—and a whole group of rockets for tactical purposes. The Soviet Army and Navy have an excellent jet technology capable of striking on the battlefields as well as on any point of the globe.

It is perfectly evident, as pointed out by Khrushchev at the 21st Congress of our party, that if the Soviet Union knows how to send rockets hundreds of thousands of kilometers into outer space, it can unerringly send mighty rockets to any spot on the globe.

The Soviet Army and Navy is at present equipped with all types of modern weapons and technology, fully mechanized and motorized. It has atomic and hydrogen weapons, ballistic rockets of various ranges of action and for various purposes, including ICBMs. These rockets are invulnerable carriers of thermonuclear warheads of colossal might; they allow us to deal a precise, smashing blow against the aggressor wherever he may be.