Radio Propaganda Report

Marshal Zhukov on the Nature of a Future War

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MARSHAL ZHUKOV ON THE NATURE OF A FUTURE WAR

Summary

1. The role of nuclear weapons in a future war is given greater significance in Marshal Zhukov's 16 March speech to the All-Army Conference than in any previous pronouncement by a Soviet leader. Zhukov predicts that nuclear weapons will "inevitably" be brought into action as the "basic means of striking" in any major armed conflict, and he becomes the first authoritative Soviet spokesman to suggest publicly that the powers possessing nuclear weapons are fast approaching the point beyond which use of those weapons in war would be unavoidable.

2. Earlier statements by Soviet military men had attacked Western leaders for advancing views akin to those Zhukov has now put forward. Zhukov himself participated in those attacks. In February 1955 he took issue with British Air Marshal Slessor precisely for saying nuclear weapons would inevitably be used in a future war, and in May 1955 he reproved U.S. and British generals for forecasting wide use of such weapons. He seemed to abandon that approach at the CPSU Congress in February 1956, saying use of mass-destruction weapons including nuclear ones would characterize any new war; but in the following months he parried direct questions as to whether he thought it would be possible to wage war without nuclear weapons.

3. Until now Zhukov has been a leading exponent of the view, predominant in postwar Soviet military doctrine, that conventional weapons would be of "decisive significance" in a future war. He told Hanson Baldwin of the New York TIMES as recently as seven months ago that air forces equipped with nuclear weapons cannot be considered the "dominating force" of armed forces in a future war and cannot by themselves decide the outcome. Now he says nuclear weapons will be "regular weapons" in the event of war because they are replacing and "in the very near future" will increasingly supplant conventional arms. He does not balance that unprecedented prediction by any direct reference to the importance of conventional armaments.

4. Zhukov's public statements since 1954 have reflected growing confidence in Soviet capability to wage nuclear war. More cautious than Khrushchev, Mikoyan and other military leaders until early this year, he came out on 30 January with the statement that the USSR can deliver nuclear bombs "to the farthest corners of the globe." His 16 March speech boasts the Soviet air force's capability to "deal a crippling blow to any enemy, wherever he may be."

5. The weight carried by Zhukov's statements may be gauged in the light of his apparently enhanced position in the Soviet leadership since the CPSU Congress. He has enjoyed public honors more than commensurate with his Party standing as candidate member of the Central Committee Presidium.

6. Extracts of Zhukov's comments on nuclear war since mid-1954 are appended to this report, pages 8 through 13.
No top Soviet leader, civilian or military, has publicly attached as much significance to the role of nuclear weapons in a future war as Marshal Zhukov did in his 16 March speech at the All-Army Conference in Moscow (broadcast and published in the Soviet press on 20 March). The Soviet Defense Minister, also a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium, predicted that nuclear weapons would "inevitably" be put into service as the "basic means of striking" (gazovoye sredstvo porazheniya) should a "major armed conflict" break out. Rejecting the contention that nuclear weapons, in view of the destruction they would cause on both sides, would no more be employed than chemical weapons were in World War II, Zhukov became the first authoritative Soviet spokesman to suggest publicly that the powers possessing nuclear weapons are fast approaching the point beyond which use of those weapons in war would be unavoidable. He argued that while objectives could be gained in the past without recourse to chemical weapons, which merely supplemented conventional armaments, nuclear weapons are now replacing and—if not banned—will "in the very near future" increasingly replace conventional arms and be introduced on a wide scale as "regular" (gbitatno2/ weapons.

Contrast with Previous Statements about Future War

Zhukov's straightforward discussion, unencumbered by propagandistic condemnations of imperialist "atom-maniacs," contrasts with previous Soviet discussions of the nuclear war of the future. Views of Western military leaders akin to those now advanced by Zhukov had previously been subjected to blistering attack. On 4 December 1954, for example, PRAVDA published Marshal Vasilievsky's impassioned rejoinder to Field Marshal Montgomery, attacking him for proclaiming "the inevitability and even necessity to use atomic and hydrogen weapons in a future conflict." Vasilievsky professed anger at the statement, attributed to Montgomery, that "in the Allied Supreme Staff planning is based on the use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons." In an open letter published in NEW TIMES in February 1956, Soviet Air Marshal Skripko denounced British Air Marshal Slessor for making similar "cold-blooded" statements.

Zhukov himself participated in such attacks. Interviewed by the Hearst group in February 1955, he took issue with Slessor's statement that it would be impossible to avoid using nuclear weapons in any future war. At that time he cited the effective banning of chemical weapons in support of the contention that a ban on nuclear weapons could work—a line of argumentation which, in the light of his current remarks, suggests that he then regarded atomic weapons, like chemical ones, as only supplementary to conventional arms. In his V-E Day article in PRAVDA on 8 May 1955, Zhukov deplored the "irresponsible attitude toward the problem of atomic and hydrogen war" manifested in statements by U.S. and British generals that nuclear weapons would be used in the event of a new war.

Zhukov appeared to abandon this approach at the XX CPSU Congress in February 1956, when he said the Soviet armed forces were being built on the "basic
assumption* that the means and forms of a future war would differ in many respects from those of past wars:

The future war, if it is unleashed, will be characterized by the mass use of air power, various types of rocket weapons, and various means of mass destruction such as atomic, thermonuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons.*

But six months later, on 7 August, he parried a direct question by Hanson Baldwin of the New York TIMES as to whether he thought it possible to wage a small war, or any other war, without the use of nuclear weapons. Zhukov replied evasively that the USSR opposes both small and large wars and that any war is destructive, particularly if nuclear weapons are used. He dodged this question again during his recent tour of India. On 5 February 1957, PRESS TRUST OF INDIA quoted him as saying in Bombay that he had been asked "problematic questions" as to the character of future war—whether atomic and thermonuclear weapons would be used and what the role of the army, navy and air force would be:

Neither I nor anybody else can answer completely all these questions now because all wars, big and small, that are waged and finished under specific political, geographic and economic conditions. The availability of weapons and the technical means of war will influence their character.**

Zhukov's 16 March statement goes beyond what he said at the XX Party Congress in that he now speaks of the "inevitability" of use of nuclear weapons in a new war, though his specification of a "major armed conflict" leaves open the possibility that he believes small wars at least could be non-atomic.

Shift in Assessment of the Role of Conventional Weapons

The view that conventional armaments would be of "decisive significance" in determining the outcome of a future war had been predominant in Soviet military doctrine since World War II, particularly in the period before Stalin's death and Mlenkov's August 1953 announcement of Soviet possession of the hydrogen bomb. It continued to be enunciated after August 1953, although diluted somewhat by acknowledgment of the tremendous destructive power of nuclear weapons. It was reiterated in the 10 May 1955 Soviet disarmament proposals and by Molotov at the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference in November 1955.

Zhukov has been a leading spokesman for this view among Soviet professional soldiers. In the February 1955 Hearst interview he said that "war cannot be won with atomic bombs alone." At the XX Party Congress a year later he said that even mass-destruction weapons "do not diminish the decisive significance of ground troops, the navy and aviation." Modern war, he told

* Zhukov even omitted the standard qualifier that if a new war were to be unleashed, it would be initiated by the West. But Admiral Gorshkov, who closely paraphrased Zhukov's Congress statement in an Armed Forces Day article in SOVIET FLEET five days later, reworded the opening conditional clause to read "the future war, if the imperialists unleash it..."

** These remarks were not carried by Soviet media.

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the Congress, cannot be waged successfully without "strong ground troops, without strategic, long-range and tactical aviation, and a modern navy." This formulation, drawing a curious distinction between weapons and the branches of the armed forces that would bring them to bear against an enemy, still left unclear whether or not, in Zhukov's view, nuclear weapons in combination with aerial delivery means had assumed "decisive significance." But seven months ago, when Baldwin posed precisely this question, Zhukov replied flatly that air forces equipped with nuclear weapons cannot be considered the "dominating form" of armed forces in a modern war, and cannot by themselves "decide the issue of a struggle." He expressly denied that Soviet troop reductions reflected any tendency toward downgrading the significance of great massed armies and surface naval fleets in modern warfare.

Zhukov did not explicitly deny in his 16 March speech that conventional arms would be of "decisive significance" in a future war, nor did he expressly affirm the decisive role of aerial-nuclear forces. But he implied the latter by stating that atomic weapons, increasingly replacing conventional arms and becoming "regular" weapons, would be the "basic means of striking" in a future major war—a statement not balanced by any positive reference to the future role of conventional arms.

Zhukov approached the question of conventional arms only indirectly, remarking that the outcome of a new war would depend upon "a number of factors" and that a new war "will be waged in extremely acute form on land and sea as well as in the air." The formulation is so phrased as to suggest that an acute air struggle in a future war is a foregone conclusion ("as well as in the air"); his analogous formulation at the XX Congress had drawn no distinction between land, naval and air operations.

Increased Stress on Nuclear Retaliatory Capability

The decline in Soviet emphasis on the importance of conventional armaments, reflected notably in the USSR's March 1956 decision to drop its demand for a ban on nuclear weapons prior to reduction in conventional arms and forces, would derive logically from increased Soviet capability to wage nuclear war. Marshal Zhukov's public utterances since 1954 have reflected growing confidence in that capability.

Zhukov's earliest public statements after his return to prominence as Deputy Defense Minister in Malenkov's Government were remarkable for their unusual acknowledgment of the destruction both sides would suffer in the event of a new war, and for their avoidance of extravagant claims of Soviet military prowess. It was largely on the basis of these statements that Zhukov began to be regarded in the West as moderate and favorably disposed toward a reasonable settlement with the West. In his first article during that period, in the 9 May 1954 PRAVDA, Zhukov referred twice to U.S. atomic and hydrogen bomb threats and intimidations, but failed even to acknowledge Soviet possession of these weapons in reply. Instead, he wrote only that attempts to intimidate the USSR had never succeeded in the past and that war is a "double-edged weapon" involving "grievous sacrifices" for both sides.

His first public reference to Soviet nuclear strength—in his interview with the Hearst group in February 1955—was still within the context of his emphasis on mutual losses: Replying to the assertion that the USSR, by virtue of its numerical superiority, would enjoy a considerable advantage in any
Future war if atomic weapons were not used, he said that "as regards atomic and hydrogen weapons, as you know, we also have them." He went on to specify that the atomic weapon is a "double-edged one" and that atomic warfare is "as equally dangerous for those who are attacked and for those who attack."

At the XX Party Congress, Zhukov for the first time intimated that the USSR could more than hold its own in trading nuclear blows with the West. "If one wants to deliver atomic blows on an enemy," he warned, "then he must be prepared to receive the same, and perhaps more powerful, blows on his part."

Claiming for the USSR the possession of "powerful rocket and jet armaments of various types, including long-range rockets," he did not join Mikoyan in specifying that the Soviet Union could deliver hydrogen bombs on American cities; but he implied such capability in directing his warning about "perhaps more powerful" retaliatory blows at the "crafty strategists" of the United States who count on sparing American industrial centers by stressing "tactical" employment of nuclear weapons.

During his recent tour of India and Burma, Zhukov finally bridged the gap between his own public statements and those of Khrushchev, Mikoyan and those military leaders, including Sokolovsky, who have boasted the USSR's capability to reach any point on earth with nuclear weapons. The 30 January RED STAR published his Delhi statement that "we can take atomic and hydrogen bombs to the farthest corners of the globe."

In Bombay, according to a 5 February PRESS TRUST OF INDIA report, Zhukov challenged the assumption that the United States continues to hold the edge over the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons. He said that "it is still an open question as to who has more."

In his 16 March speech in Moscow he called "too naive" the calculations of American imperialists on "sitting it out beyond the ocean and avoiding destructive and annihilating blows" in the event of war in Europe or Asia:

"Now there is no corner of the world where an aggressor can hide. The Soviet air force is capable of dealing a crippling blow to any enemy, wherever he may be, wherever he hides."

Emphasis on the Role of Air Power

Zhukov's emphasis on the role of the Soviet air force dates from his speech at the XX Party Congress, when he intimated that a decision had been taken for priority development of the USSR's air power. He said that "the Central Committee and the Government devote special attention to the development of the air force as the most important Krashnheitheil means for guaranteeing the

* Moscow did not report that speech, but a 6 February Home Service commentary on the Soviet budget reiterated the marshal's statement without attributing it to him. Eight days later, a commentary beamed to Sweden and Norway said that "the whole world" was recently informed of Zhukov's speech "questioning the validity" of assertions of Western superiority in nuclear weapons. Zhukov's statement falls short of Molotov's 8 February 1955 claim that "in the production of the hydrogen weapon... it is not the Soviet Union but the United States which is in the position of a laggard" and Marshal Chukov's boast on 21 January 1956 that "in thermonuclear weapons the Soviet Union has surpassed the United States." Chukov's speech was printed in PRAVDA UKRAINY but not carried in the Soviet central press or broadcast by Moscow.

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security of the motherland." Acknowledgment of reliance on any single military arm above all others is extremely rare in Soviet military discussions, which almost invariably emphasize the need for a balanced and well-coordinated military establishment.

Zhukov himself has been a strong advocate of balanced forces and has criticized overestimation of one or another military arm in Western military science. In February 1955 he termed overestimation of the value of aircraft Hitler's greatest tactical error, calling the air force "a delicate arm... greatly dependent on weather and a number of other factors."

Yet at the XX Congress he announced that "the relative weight of the air force and antiaircraft defense troops in the composition of our armed forces has grown significantly." The significance of that announcement as a statement of military policy was underlined five days later when it was restated almost verbatim in Armed Forces Day articles by the three senior active marshals of the USSR after Zhukov-Konev (in RED STAR), Vasilevsky (in IZVESTIA), and Sokolovsky (in PRAVDA).*

Acknowledgment of U.S. Capability

Despite Zhukov's increasingly confident statements about Soviet nuclear capabilities, he has continued to acknowledge that the United States has the capability to inflict nuclear blows on the USSR. In his 16 March speech he stated that "in the training of our troops we must proceed from the fact that our likely enemies have a sufficient quantity of atomic and hydrogen weapons and means for conveying them to our country." He said the Soviet armed forces must be prepared for anti-atomic defense and that the USSR's antiaircraft defenses and air force must be "always ready to halt any attempt by an aggressor to make a sudden attack against our country."

He had raised the question of antiaircraft defense in his XX Congress speech more than a year earlier, when he announced that in view of the "real threat from the air," especially from the long-range rocket and jet aviation, "much work has been conducted on organizing the antiaircraft defense of the country." That speech also included a call—unprecedented in any speech by a top Soviet leader since World War II—for strengthened civil defense.

Zhukov's Standing in the Leadership

The weight carried by Zhukov's views on the nature of a future war may be gauged in the light of his apparently enhanced position in the Soviet leadership since the XX Congress. At the conclusion of the Congress, where he was the only military man to speak, he was elected to candidate membership in the Presidium of the Central Committee. While the full members of the

"The increase in the relative weight of the air force and antiaircraft defense had to be at the expense of some other branch or branches of the Soviet armed forces. Writing in SOVIET FLEET at the same time the Sokolovsky, Konev and Vasilevsky articles appeared, Admiral Gorshkov freely paraphrased Zhukov's XX Congress speech but offered a substitute for Zhukov's statement on the relative importance of the air force, perhaps in an effort to ward off a compensatory naval deemphasis: "The Party Central Committee and Soviet Government devote tremendous attention to the development and perfection of the navy, which plays an important role in the composition of our armed forces. In modern war the struggle in naval theaters acquires immeasurably greater significance than in the past."
Presidium were listed in alphabetical order, presumably in accordance with the rules of "collective leadership," Zhukov's name appeared out of order at the head of the list of six candidate members, implying that he was first in line for elevation to full membership. When Koslov was chosen as a candidate member by the February Central Committee plenum, his name was placed at the end of the list, reinforcing the conclusion that the order of listing denotes precedence.

Zhukov has enjoyed public honors more than commensurate with his recently acquired high position in the Party leadership. On his 60th birthday on 2 December 1956, he was accorded a tribute previously bestowed only on full members of the Party Presidium—a letter of greetings from the Central Committee and Council of Ministers, publication of his picture in all Soviet papers, and an award from the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.* That this publicity did not derive from Zhukov's rank as candidate member of the Presidium was confirmed less than three weeks later when Brezhnev, the second-ranking candidate member, was honored on his 50th birthday only with the Supreme Soviet award routinely bestowed on less than top-ranking Soviet leaders (PRAVDA, 19 December 1956).

* See FBIS Radio Propaganda Report CD.48, 5 December 1956, "Special Honors for Zhukov on His 60th Birthday."
Extracts of Zhukov's Statements on Nuclear War

V-E Day article in PRAVDA, 9 May 1954:

After the end of World War II, the ruling circles of the United States of America, pursuing an aggressive foreign policy, have set up large numbers of military bases and various military blocs directed against the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy, have been kindling an atmosphere of distrust between peoples and war hysteria, and have been threatening us with atomic and hydrogen bombs.

* * *

As far as direct threats and intimidation against the Soviet Union from U.S. imperialists are concerned, including intimidation with atomic and hydrogen bombs and various "massive blows," these gentlemen should be told that we cannot be intimidated by threats, we have long been acquainted with them and, as is known, they have never achieved any success.

Interview with Hearst, Smith and Conniff in Moscow, 7 February 1955:

Smith: The British Marshal of the Air Forces, John Slessor, noted in his latest book that in any future war it will be impossible to avoid using the nuclear weapon. What is your opinion?

Zhukov: It is a matter of regret that such an opinion is held not only by Marshal Slessor but also by several other prominent military leaders in Western Europe and the United States. We hold the completely opposite point of view. We are in favor of the complete banning of atomic warfare. If the atomic bomb is banned, humanity will only gain from this. I consider that the atomic weapon must be banned just as the chemical weapon was banned.

Smith: Many military specialists in the United States consider that, if in a future war the atomic weapon is not used, Russia would have a considerable advantage as a result of her numerical superiority.

Zhukov: I think that such talk is idle prattle, calculated to fool credulous people. I would like to emphasize that we do not strive and have not striven to unleash a war. As regards atomic and hydrogen weapons, as you know, we also have them.

Hearst: In the United States many people consider that the existence of the atomic weapon on both sides is a guarantee of peace because neither side, fearing an atomic attack, would decide to start a war. What is your opinion?

Zhukov: The existence of the atomic weapon already represents a possibility of its use, and certain madmen, disregarding everything, may start using it. Our task is to struggle with all our energies for the banning of this weapon. I feel confident that the peoples of the whole world stand on our side in this question, and I also feel confident that in the end the people will have their decisive say. It is essential to remember that the atomic weapon is a double-edged one. Atomic warfare is equally dangerous for those who are attacked and for those who attack.
Conniff: The well-known American General MacArthur has recently stated that the existence of powerful atomic weapons on both sides would itself liquidate the danger of the outbreak of a new war.

Zhukov: I consider this to be an incorrect point of view. Furthermore, such a way of raising this question leads to a continuing arms race. Unfortunately, such irresponsible statements have been made by many prominent military leaders—for instance, Montgomery and Gruencher.

Smith: At the last meeting of the NATO Council, General Gruenther was entrusted with the task of drawing up a plan of defense based on the premise that in a future war the atomic weapon would be used. Are you preparing the defense of your country against an atomic attack?

Zhukov: We possess everything that is necessary for a reliable defense of our motherland, but we also are thinking of how to avoid war, basing ourselves on the principle that, as the Russian saying goes, a bad peace is better than a good quarrel. If a change were made from good words to good deeds, peace would be insured. Is it not time to get on with the good deeds?

Smith: When Europe and the United States were weak, our diplomats considered that defense against aggression was to be found in our possessing atomic bombs.

Zhukov: One should bear in mind that it is impossible to win a war with atom bombs alone. Furthermore, at that time you had very few of them—only about five or six, and they had no decisive importance whatever.

Conniff: You are apparently better informed in this matter than we are.

Zhukov: This was the initial period in the production of atomic bombs, and we know from our own experience how complicated it is.

Message to the American Overseas Press Club, 20 April 1955:

I think that politicians who call for the unleashing of a new war cannot enjoy the confidence of the people and are socially dangerous. The people have the right to treat such propagandists of war as their enemies. The common people of the world need no war. They do not want atomic, hydrogen and bacteriological weapons to be dropped on their homes—New York or Moscow, London or Paris—they do not want their children, mothers, and wives to perish.

How can one stop the armaments race and liquidate suspicion while brandishing the atomic bomb, building military bases around one's imaginary enemy, and threatening to erase him from the face of the earth?
V-E Day article in PRAVDA, 8 May 1955:

The military leaders of the United States and Britain state openly that, in case of a new war, they will make wide use not only of atomic, but also of hydrogen weapons. Military experts like Cruenther and Montgomery, as well as generals of slightly lower rank—those of the type of Stevenson—are brandishing atom and hydrogen bombs in a warlike manner, threatening the Soviet Union, China and the People's Democracies.

One has to be surprised at the fact that big military experts—and especially those of Britain—take such an irresponsible attitude toward the problem of atomic and hydrogen war. We, the military, realize more clearly than anyone else the extremely devastating nature of such a war. It would suffice to imagine what would happen to Europe and America if, in the course of a war, thousands of atom and hundreds of hydrogen bombs were to be used by each side.

It is known that atom and hydrogen weapons are especially dangerous for the states with the greatest density of population. Montgomery himself noted this fact in his lecture at the California Institute of Technology. How could this military figure propagate the use of atomic weapons which would bring such terrible hardships to his own compatriots and such enormous destruction to his own country?

* * *

Every sensible man understands that the U.S. military bases created around the USSR, China and the People's Democracies are absurd from the point of view of the defensive strategy of the United States because they are so far removed from the objective which they must defend and because they can, at any moment, be destroyed one after another.

It is a different matter to use these bases for the purpose of aggressive strategy and for inflicting blows with an atomic air force. They are being created precisely for this purpose.

Speech to XX CPSU Congress, 18 February 1956:

In recent times in the utterances of U.S. military and political figures, the thought appears that American strategy must be based on the use of atomic weapons, as it is stated, "for tactical purposes"—that is, within the framework of operations on the fields of battle in theaters of military action.

What is hidden behind such reasoning? Considering the geographic remoteness of America, these gentlemen are concerned that atomic weapons should find their chief application first of all on European territory and, naturally, far from the industrial centers of America.

The American monopolists apparently understand the effectiveness of retaliatory atomic blows and do not object if in the course of an armed struggle, millions of people and vast wealth in their allied countries—West Germany, Italy, France, England, and others—are destroyed by these death-dealing weapons.

Can the schemes of these "crafty strategists" be realized? No, they cannot. It is already impossible to wage war and not suffer retaliatory
blows. If one wants to deliver atomic blows on an enemy, then he must be prepared to receive the same, and perhaps more powerful, blows on his part.

* * *

In building the Soviet armed forces, we proceed from the fact that the ways and means of future wars will, in large measure, differ from all past wars. The future war, if it is unleashed, will be characterized by the mass use of air power, various types of rocket weapons, and various means of mass destruction such as atomic, thermonuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons. However, we proceed from the premise that the very latest weapons, including even the means of mass destruction, do not diminish the decisive significance of ground armies, the navy and aviation. Without strong ground troops, without strategic, long-range and tactical aviation and a modern navy, and without their well-organized coordination, it would be impossible to wage modern war.

* * *

In the composition of our armed forces the relative weight of the air forces and antiaircraft defense troops has grown significantly. Full mechanization and motorization of the army has been realized. The Soviet armed forces now have various models of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, and powerful rocket and jet [including reaktivnymi] armaments of various types, including long-range rockets.

* * *

The Party Central Committee and government are paying particular attention to developing air power as the most important means of ensuring the security of our homeland. We now have first-class jet aircraft capable of carrying out any tasks which they might have to face in the event of attack by an aggressor.

* * *

In view of the real threat from the air, particularly from long-range rockets, and of the development of strategic jet aviation, a considerable amount of work has been done to organize defense of the country against air attack. At present air defense includes modern supersonic fighters, high-quality antiaircraft artillery, antiaircraft rocket weapons and other means of defense against air attack.

* * *

The task of defending the country's home front has never been so urgent as it is under present-day circumstances. The security of the Soviet people demands further efforts to improve the organization of local defense against air attack and the proper training of the whole population through civilian organizations.

Replies to New York TIMES correspondent Hanson Baldwin, 8 August 1956:

Question: Being a traditionally great continental power, the Soviet Union attributes special importance at present to the air forces. Does that mean, in your opinion, that the air nuclear forces are now the dominating form of armed force in war?
Answer: No, it does not signify this. The air force and nuclear weapons cannot by themselves decide the issue of an armed struggle. Besides atomic and hydrogen weapons, and in spite of their tremendous destructive force, numerous armies and an enormous quantity of conventional arms will inevitably be drawn into military operations.

Question: In your opinion is it possible to wage a small or any other war without the use of nuclear weapons?

Answer: The Soviet Union is resolutely opposing big and small wars. Any war is destructive, and with the use of nuclear weapons it is most dangerous not only for the belligerent countries but also for the non-belligerent ones....

Question: Does not the demobilization of 1.84 million men announced by the USSR reflect a tendency in modern warfare? In other words, has not the power of nuclear weapons, together with aircraft and guided missiles, reduced the significance of great massed armies and a surface naval fleet? In the eyes of Americans, your demobilization does not touch upon the most important and apparently the most decisive type of armed forces--aerial nuclear forces. Is such an interpretation correct?

Answer: ...In adopting the decision to reduce its armed forces by 1.84 million men, the Soviet Government did not proceed on the basis of a supposed nature of conducting modern war or on the basis of those tendencies which you mention. On this issue we proceeded, above all, from the wish to strengthen peace all over the world and to reduce tension in mutual relations between states, and also from the interests of developing the peaceful economy of the Soviet Union and raising the well-being of the Soviet people.

Speech in Delhi, 28 January 1957:

We have an excellent defense industry and we have nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and long-range rockets. We can take atomic and hydrogen bombs to the farthest corners of the globe.

Speech in Bombay, as reported by PRESS TRUST OF INDIA in English Morse, 5 February 1957:

He said that very often he had been asked "problematic questions" as to what would be the character of future war--whether nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would be used and what the role of the army, navy and air forces would be. "Neither I nor anybody else can answer completely all these questions now because all wars, big and small, that arise are waged and finished under specific political, geographic and economic conditions," he said. "The availability of weapons and the technical means of war will influence their character." Zhukov said the Soviet Union was striving hard for the prohibition and destruction of all deadly nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. "We do this not because politicians of the United States try to prove that they have more atomic weapons than the Soviet Union. It is still an open question as to who has more."
Speech to the All-Army Conference in Moscow, 16 March 1957:

In the training of troops we must base ourselves on the nature of a war of the future. We consider that a future war will differ greatly from the past war. If it breaks out despite the wishes of the peace-loving people, it will be waged in an extremely acute form on land and sea as well as in the air. It will embrace not only the actual theater of military operations but the whole deep rear of combatant sides. Its success will depend on a number of factors, particularly the technical level and quality of the armed forces, the morale, military knowledge and skill of the troops.

In organizing their military bases in Europe and other parts of the world and supplying certain capitalist countries with atomic weapons, the American imperialists obviously reckon that in the event of war in Europe or Asia they will succeed, as formerly, in sitting it out beyond the ocean and avoiding destructive and annihilating blows. But these calculations are too naive.

Now there is no corner of the world where an aggressor could take cover. The Soviet air force is able to deal a crippling blow to any opponent, wherever he may be, wherever he hides.

During my trip to India, Burma and other countries, I was asked whether atomic and hydrogen weapons would be used in future wars. I even heard the following arguments: Inasmuch as these weapons, if used, can mutually destroy both sides, what is the sense of using them? Apparently, they say, in view of these circumstances, atomic weapons will no more be used than chemical weapons were during the last war.

I submit that such questions and arguments are incorrect. In the first place, atomic weapons at present and particularly in the very near future—if they are not banned—will be adopted more and more in place of conventional arms. In the event of a major armed conflict, atomic weapons will inevitably be brought into action as the basic means of striking.

Secondly, chemical weapons in the past served as weapons supplementary to conventional arms. Opponents could solve tasks by limiting themselves to conventional arms, without resorting to chemical ones. But atomic weapons, as I have said, will be introduced into armies on a wide scale as a regular weapon.

We consider that the Soviet armed forces must be perfectly prepared for the anti-atomic defense of our motherland and troops and for the effective use of atomic and hydrogen weapons and, in case of need, for immediately dealing the aggressor a destructive answering blow.

In the training of our troops we must proceed from the fact that our likely enemies have a sufficient quantity of these weapons and means for conveying them to our territory. This circumstance obliges our armed forces, especially the anti-aircraft defenses of the country and the air force, to be always ready to halt any attempt by an aggressor to make a sudden attack against our country.
GDR will not sanction the preservation of the occupation regime in West Berlin indefinitely, and are fully determined to take all necessary measures for an earliest elimination of the abnormal situation in West Berlin, which endangers the cause of peace in Europe.

Gromyko statement at Geneva foreign ministers conference, 19 June 1959:

Gromyko further stressed that the question of this agreement's duration was not the basic problem of principle. We proposed one year, he said, but now we must find some intermediate period and reach an agreement decision. We hold that we could reach an agreement on an 18-month time limit. We are convinced that if there was agreement on the basic questions of principle, the necessary time limits could be found without difficulty.

In case no solution of the questions related to the peaceful settlement with Germany and Germany's reunification is reached during the agreed period within the framework of the all-German committee—or through other channels—the parties to the Geneva foreign ministers conference of 1959 could take up the question of West Berlin once again. (As reported by TASS; Soviet media did not carry the full text)

Gromyko statement at Geneva foreign ministers conference, 12 June 1959:

Gromyko pointed out that the reason the Soviet Government had proposed the establishment of a provisional status for West Berlin was because the three Western powers were opposed to the occupation regime being ended in West Berlin now. The preservation of certain occupation rights of the Western powers for a specified period of time—for a term of one year—is justifiable in such conditions and facilitates the chances of agreement....

Speaking of the new features in the Soviet proposals, Gromyko said that the one-year term did not figure in them before and that the earlier Soviet proposals did not call for associating the solution of the Berlin question with the work of the all-German committee which was now suggested. (As reported by TASS; Soviet media did not carry the full text)

Gromyko statement at Geneva foreign ministers conference, 10 June 1959:

Taking into account the position of the Western powers, the Soviet Union is prepared not to insist on an immediate and complete abolition of the regime of occupation in West Berlin.
The Soviet Union could agree to a temporary preservation of certain occupation rights of the Western powers in West Berlin providing, however, that such a situation would exist for a strictly defined period, namely for one year.

During this time the two German states would implement the measures connected with establishing an all-German committee composed of representatives of the GDR and the FGDR, on a principle of parity....

In order to avoid endless delays in the conclusion of the German peace treaty, a definite time limit of one year should be established for the work of the all-German committee or another organ. During that time it must arrive at an agreed solution of the problems of a peace treaty and the reunification of Germany....

The Soviet delegation must state that should the Western states during the transition period of one year not agree to carry out the above-mentioned minimum measures concerning West Berlin, then the Soviet Union will refuse to confirm its consent to the continuation of the occupation regime in West Berlin.

Khrushchev at Kremlin press conference, 19 March 1959:

Fourteen years have already elapsed since the end of hostilities and those problems have not yet been solved, though we repeatedly made specific proposals aimed at their settlement. In such conditions we could not but fix a certain period adequate to reach a proper solution. For we know from past experience we might have to wait one or two years for a reply from our Western partners. That is, I tell you frankly, why we carefully took everything into consideration and drew the conclusion that six months were adequate. If nine months are needed to bring to the world a child, we think that the question of West Berlin can be settled in six months.

But since the note which contained our proposal for the normalization of the situation in Berlin was sent on November 27, 1958, the six months period expires on May 27, this year. But this is not an ultimatum, it is an approximate date. If we solved this problem not in six months but in one or two months, and it could really be solved in one month, everyone would sincerely welcome this. If it is believed that this problem is intricate and cannot be solved in six months, but can be solved, say, in seven months, we will not object. Such is the truth.
Khrushchev speech at a Leipzig luncheon, 5 March 1959:

We are told that we, the Soviet people, are intransigent, that we pursue a policy of ultimatums. This is not true. We are told that the time limit we have set—May 27—is an ultimatum. We have said and say again to the leaders of the Western countries: If you, gentlemen, are willing to speak with us reasonably we can postpone this date from May 27 to, say, June 27. Let us postpone it to July if you like. But the question of West Berlin and the question of a peace treaty with Germany must be solved.

Mikoyan at Kremlin press conference, 24 January 1959:

The American press shouts that six months will pass and the Russians will put their plan into operation. But the fact of fixing a date for the conclusion of the talks is not terrifying in itself. Talks cannot go on forever. The main thing in our proposal is not the date for ending the talks themselves, but the necessity of their being held.

If the talks take place in a spirit of reciprocal desire to find a correct solution of the problem, if we are convinced of good will on the part of the Western powers to negotiate with the object of ending the occupation regime in West Berlin, it would not be difficult, I believe, to extend the talks for two to three weeks or even for two to three months. We did not present our proposal to foster a conflict, but to put down a potential hotbed of danger.

Khrushchev at Kremlin press conference, 27 November 1958:

The Berlin question will take time to settle, and for this reason we fix a time limit of six months in which to think over every aspect of this question and to settle it radically and to liquidate this seat of danger.

Soviet note to Western Big Three, 27 November 1958:

The Soviet Government proposes to make no changes in the present procedure for military traffic of the United States, Great Britain, and France from West Berlin to the Federal Republic of Germany for half a year. It regards this period as quite adequate to find a sound foundation for a solution of the problems connected with the change of the position of Berlin and to prevent the possibility of any complications if, of course, the governments of the Western powers do not deliberately work for such complications.
During this period the sides will have the opportunity to prove by settling the Berlin issue their desire for a relaxation of international tension.

If the above period is not used for reaching a relevant agreement, the Soviet Union will effect the planned measures by agreement with the GDR.

It is envisaged that the GDR, like any other independent state, must fully control questions concerning its space—exercise its sovereignty on land, on water, and in the air. At the same time there will be an end to all contacts still maintained between representatives of the armed forces and other officials of the Soviet Union in Germany and corresponding representatives of the armed forces and other officials of the United States, Great Britain, and France on questions pertaining to Berlin.
KHRUSHCHEV'S WARNINGS OF RETALIATION AGAINST WEST GERMAN AGGRESSION

(All such warnings by Khrushchev since November 1958, in reverse chronological order)

Supreme Soviet speech, 14 January 1960:

One may assume that Adenauer cannot be attracted by the ultimate fate of Hitler. One must state most emphatically that should the upper hand be gained in West Germany by the rampant fascists who are now being admitted to power and command, to the creation of the Bundeswehr, and to the command of the NATO armed forces, should this foul creature want to crawl beyond its boundaries, not only would it fail to reach Moscow and Stalingrad, as happened at the time of Hitler's attack, but it would be squashed on its own territory.

Letter to Adenauer, 18 August, released 26 August 1959:

You are, of course, aware that the bulk of the forces spearheaded against the Soviet Union are located in West Germany, France, and Britain.

You also understand that under such conditions, in case of war, thermonuclear weapons would be exploded on the territory of West Germany, and this would result not in a mere catastrophe but in a wholesale destruction.

Speech at Dnepropetrovsk, 28 July 1959:

I also told him [Mr. Nixon] that if the West German militarists start a war, we could with our retaliatory actions in several hours wipe from the face of the earth West Germany and other countries with military bases directed against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Treaty countries.

Interview with SPD editors, 5 May, released 8 May 1959:

Khrushchev: At present only wild people can dream about revenge. What would happen, for instance, if West Germany with the support of its allies would start war against us?
It would surely be defeated in a brief time in the same manner as the whole grouping of enemy forces would be defeated. On what are such suppositions based? You probably have an idea how many nuclear bombs with a capacity of 3 to 5 million tons would have to be exploded over the territory of West Germany in order to put it out of action.

SPD editor Braune: Eight hydrogen bombs.

Khrushchev: Obviously not more. And what do you think, do we have eight hydrogen bombs?

Braune: Surely, even more.

Khrushchev: And how many more are needed for putting out of action other West European countries? Obviously not more.

Kremlin press conference, 19 March 1959:

Obersky of RUDE PRAVO: Chancellor Adenauer of the Federal Republic of Germany has of late made a number of statements opposing the Soviet proposals for a peaceful settlement with Germany and the liquidation of the occupation regime in West Berlin. What can you say concerning these statements by Adenauer?

Khrushchev: What can I say about Chancellor Adenauer? He is quarrelsome like a young fighting cock. Without estimating his strength and without properly thinking, he instigates his NATO allies to war. But if the Chancellor had even a small grasp of military matters and cared for his people, he would have known that the first country to perish in modern war would be West Germany, because it is converted into a springboard for nuclear weapons to be used against other countries....

Concluding speech at 21st CPSU Congress, 5 February 1959:

The imperialist rulers are blinded by their hatred of the peoples of the socialist countries who are successfully developing their economy and culture and are raising their living standard. The imperialist rulers want to make history stand still; they want to put it in reverse, relying primarily on the Germans. In the days of atomic and hydrogen weapons, in the days of rocketry, such attempts would be madness that would not only lead to the deaths of millions of people but of whole nations and states. Furthermore, West Germany's
participation in aggression against the socialist states would place her in such a position that the first blow and the explosion of a considerable part of the accumulated hydrogen weapons would take place on German soil.

Report to 21st CPSU Congress, 27 January 1959:

Adenauer is old and experienced. How can he fail to take into consideration that not only his allies but the Soviet Union as well possesses nuclear weapons? It must not be forgotten that it is a means which can bring about the destruction of many people, and inasmuch as West Germany is being transformed into an atomic base, its population will suffer first in the case of a military clash.

Speech at Polish-Soviet friendship rally in Moscow, 10 November 1958:

No speeches by Chancellor Adenauer or his Minister Strauss can change the correlation of forces to the advantage of imperialism. West Germany's drive to the East would be a drive to its death.

It is time to understand that the days when the imperialists could act with impunity from the position of strength have gone beyond recall. Whatever the military try, they are unable to change the correlation of forces to their advantage.

They cannot forget the geographical situation of West Germany which, with the present military techniques, would not last a day in a modern war.

We do not want another military conflict. It would be fatal to West Germany and would bring untold sufferings to the peoples of other countries.
EXAMPLES OF KHRUSHCHEV’S STRONG ATTACKS ON ADENAUER

(Selected statements, including Khrushchev’s harshest personal attacks on the Chancellor, from January 1959 through January 1960, in reverse chronological order)

Speech at Rheims luncheon, 29 March 1960:

I am very worried over a statement made by Chancellor Adenauer when he visited Rome recently. He said bluntly that the Lord had entrusted the German people with the mission to save Europe. We cannot reconcile ourselves to such statements because they smell of Hitler’s so-called “theory” that the Germans are the select race, the race of masters, and that all other peoples must be their servants.

It is worthwhile to reflect on why Chancellor Adenauer had to make such a speech—and he declared this while asking for the Pope’s blessings for some special role for the German nation. Let us think together while there is still time to think. If a tricky game is played in diplomacy, those who play it should bear in mind that others can play the same tricks on them.

Supreme Soviet speech, 14 January 1960:

We have heard Herr Adenauer’s assurances that he is not a revanchist and that he would not tolerate in his government any revanchist minister. The German people, indeed, do not want to have anything to do with revanchism. Yet how is one to reconcile such statements by Chancellor Adenauer with the efforts of the West German Government to reopen consideration of the state boundaries in Europe which were established after World War II, and with its opposition to any statement designed to eliminate the remnants of World War II, conclude a peace treaty with Germany, and establish lasting peace in Europe? Or take Adenauer’s latest trip to West Berlin and the provocative speech in which he stated that nothing would be left of the Soviet Union should there be an atomic war. All this makes one think that Adenauer has failed to draw a conclusion from the lesson given the German fascists and is embarking on their road.

One may assume that Adenauer cannot be attracted by the ultimate fate of Hitler.

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Kremlin press conference, 5 August 1959:

Chancellor Adenauer remains true to his senile prejudice. He is ill. He caught a cold in this hot weather and nevertheless he still wants to impose a positions-of-strength policy.

Speech at conclusion of visit of GDR delegation, 19 June 1959:

Particular zeal in the distortion of our peace-loving policy is being expressed, as is known, by West German Chancellor Adenauer. Lately he has completely lost his sense of proportion. Let us take, for instance, his recent interview with the president of the American UPI, Frank Bartholomew, in which Adenauer, by no means suffering from modesty, lectured the statesmen of the great powers on how they should conduct their affairs, thus ascribing to himself some kind of superhuman abilities.

With astonishing impudence, Adenauer talks about how he has picked himself for such a state post as would give him the means of pursuing the foreign policy of the FRG without any control, and of solving international problems in his own way. He claims nothing less than the role of a leader who has been called to lead the camp of the imperialist and militarist circles and therefore it is, so to speak, more convenient for him to fulfill this role by remaining in the post of West German chancellor....

If Mr. Chancellor so zealously arms himself with a bankrupt policy, then he is obviously hoping for something. However, it must be stated directly that such hopes are in vain. It is impossible to impose on the people the policy of the cold war, which they hate. Mr. Adenauer apparently considers that the Western world cannot now get along without his, Adenauer's, leadership. Can it be that Mr. Adenauer has a touch of megalomania? It looks very much as though just such a misfortune has befallen him, and the man endowed with great authority in West Germany is now mustering all his power to reverse the course of history.
Riga speech, 11 June 1959:

It has happened more than once in the past that when an approximation of the views of the great powers was in the offing, out came Adenauer, trying to throw a monkey wrench in the gears. This time, too, he remained true to himself. Although he is old enough—after all, he is 83 years old—he has mustered up his little strength and is dashes about like some evil genius, raising the political atmosphere of West Germany and the other Western countries to red heat.

Kremlin press conference, 19 March 1959:

What can I say about Chancellor Adenauer? He is quarrelsome like a young fighting cock. Without estimating his strength and without properly thinking, he instigates his NATO allies to war. But if the Chancellor had even a small grasp of military matters and cared for his people, he could have known that the first country to perish in modern war would be West Germany, because it is converted into a springboard for nuclear weapons to be used against other countries.

The Chancellor's post obligates him to have a sense of responsibility. He is a man belonging to a Christian party and it seems that he ought to have such qualities which would make him a peace-loving man. Yet he strives for war.

If priests of his religion would try to influence Mr Adenauer—for instance, excommunicate him—maybe this would have an effect? If even this would have no effect, it would mean he is beyond hope.

Report to 21st CPSU Congress, 27 January 1959:

Adenauer is the leader of the Christian Democratic Party. It would seem that he must be guided by the teaching of the Gospels about which his party likes so much to expatiate. In actual fact, however, this "Christian" holds the cross in one hand and wants to take an atomic bomb into the other, and, moreover, he reckons precisely with the bomb—though such views are in no way in accordance with either the preachings of the gospel or the solution of the national question of the German people....

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If Adenauer is really a believer, it would seem that in accordance with Christian teaching he must care for his future, so that his soul will enter paradise! However, if we look at the actual deeds of Adenauer, it must be stated openly that he has no prospects at all of getting into paradise! According to the Gospels, for those of his ilk quite another place has been prepared—in the fires of hell!
Khruzhchev's warnings about a war danger inherent in the German/Berlin situation

(All such warnings by Khruzhchev from November 1958 through March 1960, in reverse chronological order)

Speech at Press luncheon, Paris, 25 March 1960:

Our policy on the German issue is clear. We want to eliminate the remnants of World War II, to draw a line beneath it, to conclude a peace treaty. It is natural that the policy of those who do not want to conclude such a peace treaty arouses our suspicion. Indeed, no one can convince us that if we preserve the sparks that remain of World War II, this can serve better understanding between countries and the consolidation of peace. No, when sparks are smoldering and are not put out, it means that there are people who would like to use these sparks, when they find it necessary, for kindling the flames of another war.

Speech at Hungarian Party Congress, 1 December 1959:

The desire to preserve the occupation regime and forces in West Berlin means a desire to pursue a policy directed against the socialist states. This means to heat the atmosphere, to continue the positions-of-strength policy. But it is an open secret that every material has a heating limit. When it reaches it, it suddenly snaps, and this may produce a catastrophe!

NBC telecast at conclusion of U.S. tour, 27 September 1959:

Would it not be better to conclude a peace treaty with both German states without any further procrastination and thereby stamp out the sparks among the embers before they have a chance to kindle a new conflagration?

The conclusion of a peace treaty would also extinguish the sparks smoldering in West Berlin and would thereby create a normal atmosphere there.
Speech at United Nations, 18 September 1959:

Nor must it be forgotten that the "cold war" began and is continuing at the time when the aftermath of World War II has not yet been eliminated, when a peace treaty with Germany has not yet been concluded, when an occupation regime is still maintained in the heart of Germany in Berlin, on the territory of its Western sector. Eliminating this sort of tension in the center of Europe, in the potentially most dangerous area of the world, where major armed forces of the opposing military alignments are close to each other, would furnish the key to improving the entire international climate.

Speech at National Press Club, Washington, 16 September 1959:

Conclusion of a peace treaty would also settle such a problem, leading to constant friction between the powers, as the question of Berlin. It is sometimes said that the Berlin question allegedly did not exist a year ago and that the situation in Berlin was not bad. But need we wait until some seemingly insignificant incident in Berlin leads to war?

We are in favor of preventing conflicts by measures taken in good time.

Letter to Adenauer, 18 August 1959:

As long as there is no peace treaty, as long as the occupation regime is preserved and there are troops in West Berlin—in the center of the GDR—it is always easy to provoke developments which may lead to a catastrophe for Germany and for peace.

Kremlin press conference, 5 August 1959:

I should like to reemphasize that we will persistently work for a solution of the problem of a German peace treaty because we regard it as the principal, basic problem. It would be a contradiction if we declared that we fight for strengthening peace and at the same time stated that we do not want to liquidate the vestiges of World War II and do not want to sign a German peace treaty. If things are left as they are, this would mean leaving a burning fuse in a powder keg which could lead to sudden explosion. First of all one must put out the fuse ignited by World War II. This will be a great contribution to the strengthening of peace.
Speech at Soviet-Polish Friendship Meeting at Luzhniki stadium, 23 July 1959:

The Western powers oppose the adoption of these reasonable steps. They are striving to permanently consolidate the present abnormal situation in Germany and West Berlin. Of course, we cannot agree to this. The stand of the Western powers cannot be explained other than as a desire to continue to hold the burning fuse to the powder keg.

Speech at Berlin rally, 9 March 1959:

It is difficult to understand this stand of the leaders of the Western powers, hearing their protestation that they desire peace. After all, we propose to solve questions in which the danger of a new military conflict is inherent. The armed forces of the confronting military groupings meet in German territory, especially in Berlin, and the slightest carelessness on any side may produce the spark which starts a blaze over it and explodes the powder keg.

We want to separate the contacts so as not to cause the spark and so as not to confront the world with the danger of the greatest disaster: a third world war. Such is the position.

Concluding speech at 21st CPSU Congress, 5 February 1959:

Take the question of West Berlin. Dulles says that West Berlin must not be surrendered. Surrender it to whom, we may ask. Is there anything in the Soviet proposals that speaks of a surrender of West Berlin? If West Berlin were not a hotbed of disturbances and conflicts in the heart of the GDR, there would not be any Berlin question. But the situation in West Berlin today is such that anything unpleasant may be expected there. It may be compared with a burning fuse in a powder magazine or a delayed-action bomb whose mechanism may bring about an explosion at any moment.

Kremlin press conference, 27 November 1958:

To continue the existing situation in West Berlin means to preserve the danger of the cold war turning into a third world war with all the attending grave consequences for the peoples. Under these conditions no one can expect the Soviet Union to prop up the occupation regime in West Berlin with its own hands.