SOVIET REACTION TO THE PLAN
FOR STATIONING U.S. ATOMIC UNITS ABROAD

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SOVIET REACTION TO THE PLAN FOR STATIONING U.S. ATOMIC UNITS ABROAD

Summary

Moscow's Over-all Assessment: U.S. Seeks World Domination by Atomic War

Borovsky's Pravda article of 23 January, followed the same day by a TASS statement, conveyed the first authoritative Soviet assessment of the U.S. atomic-units plan: preparation to achieve world domination through atomic war, a war in which the countries harboring U.S. bases would share in the consequences of Soviet retaliation. The degree of Moscow's concern is mirrored in the amount of its propaganda. Comment built around analogous charges has only once before been as voluminous, in early 1955 during Moscow's campaign against the NATO decision to arm members with nuclear weapons.

Absence of Alarmist Propaganda to the Soviet Audience

The propaganda does not set out to alarm the Soviet people: The domestic audience heard a review of Borovsky's belligerent article and the text of the TASS statement, but not a single one of the many subsequent commentaries. Contrary to normal practice, there has been no editorial follow-up of the TASS statement in the central press.

Retaliatory Threat Placed Up to Prospective U.S. Partners

Almost all the comment is beamed to those countries Moscow sees as present or potential partners in U.S. aggression—most notably Turkey, Iran, Japan, Germany and Britain. It is patently calculated to arouse suspicions in those countries by brandishing a retaliation threat primarily against the areas where U.S. bases are located. The Germans, for example, are warned about the millions who would be killed or "affected by radiation sickness" in the first few days of atomic war; and the British about the danger of "paying with one's very existence" for a Pentagon venture.

Less Stress on Threat to the United States Itself

In seeking with the primary effort to undercut U.S. strategy by dissuading the United States' prospective allies, Moscow does not play up the threat of a Soviet counter-blow against the United States itself. North Americans have heard no comment at all on the atomic-units plan since the day after the TASS statement was issued.

Alleged U.S. "Lag" in Missiles Development Not Emphasized

Borovsky's claim of Soviet superiority in missiles development, the first such claim from a Soviet source, has been echoed in only a few commentaries. Missiles are not even mentioned in the TASS statement, Soviet propaganda has always been extremely circumspect in discussing missiles, though progressively less reluctant to allude to them since the beginning of last year.

Tab A: Moscow Comment on Western Nuclear Military Preparations

Tab B: Soviet Elite Statements on Nuclear Weapons
SOVIET REACTION TO THE PLAN FOR STATIONING U.S. ATOMIC UNITS ABROAD

Moscow has reacted sharply to the President's announcement that six atomic support commands will be created to bolster the defense forces of other free world nations. The reaction did not come immediately, but several days later after the U.S. press had begun discussing the new plan and speculating about which areas would be involved. Since 19 January, when the first Soviet comment appeared, almost 100 broadcasts have been devoted to charges that the United States is preparing an atomic war. There were 92 such broadcasts, six percent of Moscow's total commentary output, in the single week ending 27 January. In all of 1956, only 91 items were devoted to charges that the United States is preparing an atomic war. There were 92 such broadcasts, six percent of Moscow's total commentary output, in the single week ending 27 January. In all of 1956, only 91 items were devoted to charges that the United States is preparing an atomic war.

The U.S. plan is denounced as motivated not by defense purposes but by considerations involved in American strategy to achieve world domination through atomic war. The states that might allow U.S. atomic units on their territories, and so become partners in U.S. aggressive plans, are cautioned individually that they must themselves bear part of the consequences of the implementation of those plans.

The current propaganda effort seems primarily intended to intimidate those prospective participants in the U.S. plan: Most commentaries emphasize the damage that could be caused by the inevitable Soviet retaliatory blows on foreign bases in the event of war. Much less is said about the threat of a direct counter-blow against the United States, and Moscow has made no serious attempt to propagandize the danger of atomic war to the Soviet domestic audience. Both the TASS statement and Borovsky's 23 January article in Pravda, which conveyed Moscow's first assessment of the atomic-units plan, were read in full in the Home Service. But all the subsequent comment has been beamed to audiences abroad, primarily in countries that might harbor U.S. bases.

Borovsky's article made the first Soviet claim of supremacy in the missiles field--not a flat statement of Soviet preeminence, but a formulation like the one Molotov used in February 1955 when he said the United States "lagged" in thermonuclear-weapons development. The TASS statement did not mention missiles at all, and few of the subsequent commentaries have echoed Borovsky's claim.

Moscow's Over-all Assessment: U. S. Seeks World Domination by Atomic War

Moscow did not react immediately to the 16 January announcement of the atomic-units plan in the President's Budget Message. TASS's prompt review of the Message assessed it as a call for a stepped-up nuclear arms drive but ignored the announcement of the atomic commands. The first comment, a 19 January broadcast to Iran, noted that the American press specified the Far East, Europe and the Middle East, including Turkey and Iran, as the areas where...
atomic units would be stationed. It warned of the "grave dangers" to Turkey and Iran if the plan should be put into effect. The next day the Japanese audience heard that Japan and Okinawa were two of the areas involved; to that audience Moscow abstained from threats, appealing instead for moral indignation on the part of the Japanese people who know the horror of atomic bombs and are now fighting for their prohibition. To Japan in particular, Moscow pointed to the inconsistency of a U.S. policy that professes a desire for peace and disarmament while announcing a plan hardly conducive to "removing the danger of atomic war."

An article by Borovsky in the 23 January Pravda, transmitted in full by TASS and reviewed for Soviet, Japanese, Turkish, Persian, Arabic and Spanish listeners, offered the first authoritative comment on the atomic-units plan and the first over-all assessment of it as preparation for atomic war "aimed against the Soviet Union and other socialist states." The charge that the United States is planning an atomic war has been repeated in all the subsequent comment and in the widely distributed TASS statement of 23 January, issued several hours after Borovsky's article was transmitted. Borovsky also linked the atomic-units plan with the Eisenhower Doctrine, a linkage retained in comment especially to the Middle East but not made in the TASS statement.

The most extensively broadcast routine commentary on the issue, Shakhov's 25 January talk for foreign audiences, rejected the idea that a plan for atomic bases thousands of miles from U.S. borders could be dictated by U.S. defense needs. "Such so-called defense measures," he said, are reminiscent of Hitler's concept that Germany must conquer the whole world to insure her security. Several other broadcasts, while not drawing the parallel with Hitler, have similarly charged the United States with seeking world domination through atomic war.

Absence of Alarmist Propaganda to the Soviet Audience

Although Borovsky's belligerent article was reviewed for Moscow's domestic listeners and the TASS statement read to them some five times, not a single one of the many subsequent commentaries on the U.S. plan has been carried in the Home Service. Soviet official pronouncements like the TASS statement are ordinarily bolstered within a day or so by Pravda editorials, editorial articles or at least a comment by Pravda's Observer; there was no such authoritative follow-up this time. Only one supporting article has appeared in Pravda—an Orekhov dispatch which TASS reviewed but which Moscow did not voicecast. As summed up by TASS, it could in no way be regarded as contrived to alarm the domestic audience.

Only one top leader has mentioned the U.S. plan in a speech: Voroshilov was quoted by TASS on 29 January as having told the visiting Czech delegation the American decision "spells increased tension not only in the Middle East, but indeed throughout the world." The plan is not mentioned in the portion of the Czech-Soviet communique bearing on international affairs.

Retaliation Threat Played Up to Prospective U.S. Partners

The propaganda has been almost entirely aimed at the countries Moscow sees as present or potential partners in U.S. aggression. It is patently designed to intimidate those countries, to arouse misgivings about cooperation with the United States by brandishing a threat of retaliation not as much against the United States as against its U.S. bases. Borovsky specifically warned Turkey, Iran and Japan, pointing out that "blows inflicted by a given weapon in war are answered by counterblows with the same weapon"—
and those three countries have heard more comment on the atomic-units plan than they normally hear on an international topic. The TASS statement was more generalized, but in impact more inclusive: After listing Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Turkey, Iran, Japan and other countries as prospective hosts to U.S. atomic detachments, it cautioned that the responsibility for the consequences of the implementation of atomic-war plans will have to be borne not only by the U.S. Government but also by "all governments" that let their territory be used as military bases for the preparation of an atomic war.

To bolster this line, Moscow has cited a number of comments in the foreign press, most notably in Japanese and French papers, to the effect that the TASS statement constituted a "warning." One broadcast to Japan claimed that the Japanese public and political leaders had "paid attention" to the TASS warning that a country participating in the U.S. atomic war program must share responsibility for the consequences with the United States.

Borovsky's article, the TASS statement, and several subsequent items tailored for specific audiences--primarily Turkish, Iranian, Japanese and German listeners--constituted the U.S. strategy as seeking to divert the main retaliatory blow from the United States in the event of a U.S.-initiated war, thus placing the people of other countries under the threat of a first retaliatory blow.

Comment ascribing such strategy to the United States in the past had dismissed it as fruitless and explicitly warned the United States itself of a retaliatory attack. At the XX CPSU Congress Marshal Zhukov had characterized American strategy much as the current commentaries do, but he implied that the United States would bear the brunt of retaliatory blows: "It is not now possible to wage war and not suffer retaliatory blows. If one wants to deliver atomic blows on an enemy, then he must be prepared to receive the same, and perhaps more powerful, blows on his part." And Mikoyan, at the Congress, was more specific in describing the consequences to America in the event of U.S. aggression: He said it was true that in the past not a single bomb or single shell from another country had fallen on American soil, but that this was because technology had not been sufficiently advanced: "Now there is a real possibility of this. In the event of American aggression, hydrogen bombs can in return fall on American cities too."

The current comment, leaving the impression that the first retaliatory blows would fall on the countries where the U.S. bases are located, tells each country individually of the dangers it would court by aiding the United States. Typical appeals of this nature are summarized below. The most graphic warning is the one to the Germans:

**To Germany**

NATO has singled out West Germany as the chief theater of atomic war. The Commander of U.S. forces in Europe has predicted that the first few days of atomic war "would cost West Germany three million killed, about four million wounded and seven million affected by radiation sickness."

In the event of a war, the USSR would obviously be forced to use the same weapon that is used against her. One need not be a great strategist to understand "that those points where the most atomic weapons are concentrated are the first to be in danger."

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
30 JANUARY 1957

To the Netherlands
It is likely that U.S. atomic units will be stationed in the Netherlands. U.S. aggression will bring a Soviet counterattack, and for such a densely populated country as the Netherlands "an atomic war is an exceptionally deadly danger."

To Britain
States harboring U.S. atomic units face the danger of "paying with their very existence" for any ventures the Pentagon might plan.

To Japan
In defiance of the sentiments of a nation that has twice suffered from U.S. atom bombing, the U.S. ruling group has planned the stationing of atomic units in Japan. This could make Japan an atomic battlefield. Naturally, this has provoked indignation among the Japanese people.

To Brazil
It is obvious that the recent agreement to set up a U.S. guided-missile observation post on Fernando de Noronha Island imperils Brazil's security.

To Turkey, Iran and the Arab States
The United States' atomic war preparations have now spread to the territories of the countries of the Middle East, which is "a deadly danger to their security."

Less Stress on Threat to the United States Itself
In keeping with the effort to undercut U.S. plans by dissuading the United States' partners, rather than by trying to induce the United States itself to back down from announced official policy, the current comment contains comparatively few direct emphatic warnings to Washington. Petrov did tell North American listeners, in a commentary broadcast twice on 24 January, that it is foolish of the American people to hope that in event of atomic war the counterblow will fall only on cities and villages outside of America. But since 24 January there has not been a single commentary on the atomic-units plan to North America.

Other statements about retaliation against the United States were to other audiences and could serve in some sense as an assurance that the United States may realize the consequences of aggression and be restrained: Viktorov told U.K. listeners there was "no doubt that if the bellicose elements in the Pentagon succeed in unleashing an atomic war America would feel the full impact of its consequences." Turov wrote in RED STAR (in an article broadcast in Russian to the Soviet Far East) that in preparing an atomic war against the mighty socialist camp the "trans-Atlantic aggressors" cannot fail to take into account the fact that at any moment they can get a "crushing retaliatory blow" with the same weapons.

But Moscow does not allude to the ultimate consequences of atomic war—either the destruction of capitalism, forecast by several of the XX Party Congress
speakers, or the discredited Malenkov thesis that world civilization would be destroyed.*

** Alleged U.S. "Lag" in Missiles Development Not Emphasized

Borovsky's PRAVDA article makes the first claim from any Soviet source of USSR supremacy in the field of "long-distance flying missiles." It says that the United States "lags behind" in this field— a formulation like the one Molotov used in February 1955 to assert U.S. "lagging" in thermonuclear-weapons development, stopping short of a flat statement of Soviet preeminence.** But the more authoritative TASS statement does not even mention missiles. Borovsky's claim of Soviet superiority in that field is echoed in only a few of the subsequent commentaries—one of them broadcast twice to Italy, where Moscow says a U.S. unit armed with atomic weapons already exists.

Soviet broadcast discussion of missiles development has been extremely circumspect in the past.*** The 21 December 1953 Soviet Government Statement, reacting to President Eisenhower's U.N. speech, implied Soviet possession of missiles in the remark that "there exist such modern types of armaments as rocket weapons which modern techniques make it possible to use over distances of thousands of kilometers, without aircraft." Actual Soviet activity in the missiles field was first announced by Khrushchev in his 26 November 1955 address in Bangalore, India. He said that because of Western refusal to ban the manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons, and because the West even refuses to promise not to use them, "we find ourselves obliged" to manufacture atomic and hydrogen bombs, "rocket missiles," and other means of destruction. Follow-up comment on the speech virtually ignored this remark.

Since the beginning of last year there has been somewhat less reluctance to mention missiles. In his 29 December 1955 report to the Supreme Soviet, Bulganin made an unprecedented call for "outlawing" rocket missiles along with other types of mass-annihilation weapons. His suggestion got wide publicity in rebroadcasts of his speech, though no Soviet commentator reiterated the proposal. Since then there have been frequent passing references to rocket weapons or missiles, generally grouped with atomic and hydrogen weapons as weapons of mass destruction. And Radio Moscow duly reported Khrushchev's remark, at a luncheon in Birmingham during the trip to Britain in April 1956, that "I think neither are we behind in the development of guided missiles."

* Marshal Zhukov is quoted by Moscow as having said during his current visit to India that "the third world war, if it is ever provoked by the enemies of peaceful coexistence and breaks out contrary to the will of the peoples, will be a war of unprecedented devastation threatening the mass annihilation of mankind and its economic and cultural achievements"—a formulation approaching the Malenkov thesis. But Zhukov did not mention the U.S. plan for atomic bases.

** Only the East Berlin radio had previously claimed Soviet superiority in the missiles field. Currently, the Peking PEOPLE'S DAILY Observer makes a broader statement than Moscow's: "Even public opinion in the United States admitted earlier that in atomic armament the United States was left behind." (26 January)

*** Tab B lists Soviet elite statements on nuclear weapons since September 1956. Previous statements are collated in 00/FBID reports of 5 July 1955 and 5 October 1956.
But the Soviet press and radio versions of that speech edited out Khrushchew's boast, reported in the Western press, that the USSR would soon have guided missiles with hydrogen warheads which can hit every point in the world.

Bulganin's 5 November 1956 letters to Eden and Moliet, calling for a halt to the aggression in Egypt, contained the first allusion to Soviet use of rocket weapons in implying a possible Soviet rocket attack on England and France. However, that implicit threat was not echoed in follow-up comment, and the letters were rebroadcast only a few times in comparison with extensive publicity for Bulganin's less provocative letters of 15 November.

* A 29 January 1957 REUTERS report quotes Marshal Zhukov as telling Indian military cadets that the USSR possesses "super long-range weapons capable of carrying nuclear missiles to the farthest point of the globe." The TASS version (30 January) of Zhukov's remarks is that "...we have nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, we have long-distance rockets; we can carry atomic and hydrogen weapons to the remotest corners of the earth."
0 JANUARY 1957
PREPARATORY REPORT
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The following collation includes all public statements by members of the Party Presidium and Secretariat calling for the banning of nuclear weapons and for cessation of tests of those weapons, as well as all references to the consequences of atomic war.

Woroshilov in Moscow, at a Soviet-Indonesian Friendship meeting, 11 September 1956:

Not long ago the USSR Supreme Soviet and almost at the same time the Indonesian Parliament adopted decisions, identical in spirit and idea, demanding the banning of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, and the ending of their tests.

Bulganin letter to President Eisenhower, 11 September 1956:

The Soviet Government, proceeding from the principles of its peace-loving foreign policy, consistently advocates the termination of the arms race, the complete and unconditional banning of atomic weapons, and the termination of the nuclear weapon tests.

* * *

In your message of 4 August, Mr. President, an agreement on aerial inspection, or, as they say, on aerial photography, is again put forward as the first and foremost task. At the same time in this message you do not mention any ideas concerning the implementation of concrete steps either for the reduction of armaments and armed forces or for the banning of the atomic and hydrogen weapons, including the ban on their tests.

* * *

Frankly, Mr. President, a similar situation also exists on the subject of the ban on atomic and hydrogen weapons. As soon as the Soviet Union agreed to the time limits proposed by the Western Powers with regard to the coming into force of the ban on atomic and hydrogen weapons, these powers repudiated their own proposal. I do not even mention the fact that all the proposals for a ban on the application of atomic weapons are again being rejected, despite the demands by the peoples that nuclear weapons be banned and the danger of destructive atomic war averted.

As regards the question, touched upon in your message of 1 March 1956, about the ban on the production of nuclear weapons, as already pointed out by the Soviet Union, the ban on the production of nuclear weapons without a ban on their application, and without withdrawing them from the armaments of states, in no way solves the problem of averting the danger of an atomic war. What is more it would, in fact, amount to the
legalization of this mass destruction weapon, the absolute ban on which is being demanded with increasing insistency by millions and millions of people.

In this connection I should like, Mr. President, to call your attention to an important and topical question which constitutes part of the atomic problem—the question of the discontinuation of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests. It is known that in itself the discontinuation of the atomic and hydrogen weapon tests does not require any international agreement on control because the present state of science and engineering makes it possible to detect any explosion of an atomic or hydrogen bomb wherever it may have been carried out.

This circumstance, in our opinion, makes it possible to separate the question of discontinuing atomic and hydrogen weapon tests from the general problem of disarmament and solving it independently now, without linking an agreement on this question with an understanding (dogovorennost) on other questions of disarmament. We consider that an agreement between powers concerning the termination of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests would be the first important step in the unconditional prohibition of these types of mass destruction weapons, which is in full accordance with the hopes and desires of all mankind.

Bulganin letter to President Eisenhower, 17 October 1956:

I hope, Mr. President, that you will agree with me if I say that the problem of atomic weapons is still one of the most topical and urgent international problems.

There is hardly any need for me to hold forth about the Soviet Government's invariable and unfailing advocacy of unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, since the situation prevailing today, when the ever-increasing race in the manufacture of these weapons is still going on, is incompatible with the task of achieving a further lessening of international tension and of relieving the peoples of the fear of atomic warfare.

It is a fact that there is growing apprehension in the United States of America, too, about the possible consequences of the continuing atomic arms race.

I cannot but deplore the fact that the Government of the United States does not still consider it possible to join efforts with many other nations in banning atomic weapons and concluding an appropriate international agreement to this end. But suppose no agreement on the prohibition of atomic weapons will yet be reached for some time to come.

Does this mean we should not make any efforts to find some piecemeal solution to this problem facilitating future agreement on the complete removal of atomic weapons from national armaments, so that atomic energy might be used for peaceful ends alone? I believe such efforts must be continued, and their results will depend in large measure on the positions of the United States and the USSR.

Until the necessary agreement on banning atomic weapons has been reached, it would be advisable, in our judgment, to agree (now?) at least on the first step toward the solution of the question of atomic weapons—that
is, or may have, atomic and hydrogen weapons, as was suggested 11 September.

I have no doubt that such agreement be reached on this matter, that the present state of science no atomic or hydrogen tests of nuclear weapons are impossible, and the present state of science is the most effective guarantee against any breach of such tests. Without being recorded in other countries.

I have the firm conviction that the powers with its participation. We have also noticed your statement that the problem of banning atomic tests can be solved only through agreement on an over-all disarmament program. It would certainly be a good thing if we could reach such a disarmament agreement in the near future. We know, however, that there is still no such agreement in prospect. This is indicated by the fact that the United States, as well as some other parties to the disarmament talks, go back on their own proposals as soon as the Soviet Union accepts these proposals. This is just what has happened, for instance to the proposals for fixing the limits to the strength of the armed forces of the Five Great Powers.

This being the situation, it is impossible, in our firm conviction, to make settlement on the question of atomic tests dependent on agreement on the disarmament problem as a whole.

As for the Soviet Government, it is prepared to conclude an agreement with the United States of America at once on ending atomic tests. We naturally act on the assumption that other nations possessing atomic weapons will accede to such an agreement.

Bulganin letter to Premier Mollet, 5 November 1956:

We are deeply convinced that the colonial war against Egypt goes counter to the fundamental interests of the peoples of Britain and the Soviet Union to preserve peace and to develop economic and cultural cooperation with other peoples.

What would be the position of France had she been attacked by other states which have at their disposal the modern terrible means of destruction?
Bulganin letter to Prime Minister Eden, 5 November 1956:

In what position would Britain have found herself had she been attacked by more powerful states possessing all types of modern weapons of destruction? Indeed, such countries, instead of sending their naval or air forces to the shores of Britain, could have used other means as, for instance, rocket equipment. If rocket weapons had been used against Britain and France you would have certainly called it a barbarian action. Yet, what is the difference between the inhuman attack perpetrated by the armed forces of Britain and France against almost unarmed Egypt.

Mikhail Zhukov in Moscow, at a parade in Red Square, 7 November 1956:

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is firmly based on the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, and with the great aim of preservation of peace throughout the world. The reduction of armed forces carried out by our Government, the measures for normalizing relations with Japan, and the consistent struggle by the Soviet Government against the arms race and for the complete and unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons confirm in deeds the peace-loving policy of our state.

Shepilov to the U.N. General Assembly, 22 November 1956:

On the contrary, where the principle of rivalry operates in the arms race in general and the nuclear weapons role in particular, the possibility of a stable balance of forces is precluded. There the balance is (constituted?) if we are to use a formula current in the United States, by “balancing on the brink of war.”

The Government of the Soviet Union further proposes that prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons be carried out within two years. The point in question is the discontinuation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the banning of their use, with the destruction of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their removal from national armaments.

I specifically draw your attention to the fact that according to the Soviet Government’s proposals the immediate discontinuation of the tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons must be the first steps towards banning these weapons.

As the Soviet Government stated, the world has before it two roads: either the road ending the cold war, abandoning the “positivism-strength” policy, the road of disarmament and creation of allconditions for peaceful coexistence of states with different economic and social systems, or the continuation of the arms race, continuation of the cold war, the road which leads to an unprecedented bitter and destructive war. There is no third road.

Khrushchev in Tashkent, at a public meeting, 14 January 1956:

N. S. Khrushchev devoted the concluding part of his speech to the international situation. He said that the Soviet Government

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struggled and is still resolutely struggling for peace throughout the world. This is shown by the reduction in our armed forces, the frequent proposals of the Soviet Union on the prohibition of the atomic and hydrogen weapons, and other measures of the Soviet Government. However, the imperialist states, and in the first instance the United States, do not wish to accept this program. Moreover, they are carrying out a mad arms race. This demands from us increased vigilance and the strengthening of our armed forces. In addition, the Soviet Government will rigidly carry out in the future a policy of peace, because this policy corresponds to the basic interest of our people and of the whole of progressive humanity.

Marshal Zhukov, in Delhi, at a dinner given by the Indian Minister of Defense, 24 January 1956:

The third world war, if it is ever provoked by the enemies of peaceful co-existence and breaks out contrary to the will of the peoples, will be a war of unprecedented devastation threatening the mass annihilation of mankind and its economic and cultural achievements.

Knowing full well what such a war may bring to mankind, the entire Soviet people warmly support peaceful co-existence and are against war.

* * *

On 17 November 1956 the Soviet Union again issued a proposal for the reduction and the limitation of the armed forces of the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, France and other countries, and also for the prohibition and the liquidation of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

Marshal Zhukov, in Delhi, at a luncheon given by Premier Nehru, 25 January 1956:

The Soviet Government has carried out a series of measures, and has, among other things, twice reduced its armed forces by the total of 1,840,000, in the interest of peace between the peoples and with a view to removing international tension and dispelling mistrust and fear of the danger of a new war. On 17 November last year the Soviet Government put forward one more proposal for reducing the (armed forces). It is the Soviet people's conviction that their consistent and persistent proposals for reduced forces and banning atomic weapons will be supported by all peace-loving peoples, indeed by all those who have peace at heart. The Soviet Union does not want war. The peoples need peace to achieve higher standards of living.

Marshal Zhukov, in Delhi, at a dinner given by the head of the Dehra Dun Military College, 28 January 1957:

Our people's longing for peace is not dictated by military or economic backwardness. It springs from the desire of the Soviet people to insure their country's further industrial and cultural development--and we must have peace to achieve this. We are fighting for peace because we are strong. The Soviet Union is a powerful country. We have a powerful industry, and collective farming on a scale larger than anywhere else in the world. The Soviet people are true to the cause of peace and prepared to fight to the end for their country's interests. We have an excellent
defense industry and we have nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and long-range rockets. We have powerful long-distance aircraft. We can take atomic and hydrogen bombs to the farthest corners of the globe.

* * *

We are grateful to Mr. Nehru for his support and for his staunch efforts to preserve and maintain peace. We feel certain that efforts toward abolishing atomic and hydrogen weapons and limiting and reducing armaments will be crowned with success and that the road to aggression and war will be barred. We feel certain of this and will not give up our efforts for peace.

Voroshilov in Moscow, at a reception for the Czechoslovak delegation, 29 January 1957:

The Soviet Government has more than once put forward its proposals for reducing armed forces and armaments, banning atomic and hydrogen weapons and tests, establishing an effective collective security system in Europe, and other proposals clear and appealing to all peace-loving peoples. This country will continue its steadfast efforts for ending the arms race and insuring a durable peace throughout the world.