MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSONS: Critique of the Plan of Operational Cover and Deployment of the Front's Troops and Their Occupation of the Departure Position for the Offensive

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on a collection of 29 lessons, classified TOP SECRET, prepared in 1977 for use in the Soviet General Staff Academy. The lessons are broken down into two parts: the first 19 lessons deal with the staff preparation of a front offensive operation with conventional and nuclear weapons; the remaining 10 lessons deal with the conduct of an offensive employing conventional weapons at first with a transition to the use of nuclear weapons. This report is a translation of the lesson dealing with the planning by a front chief of staff and chief of the operations directorate for the cover, disposition, and preparatory measures of Soviet forces for an offensive in the northern area of West Germany.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.
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COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF INFO. 1977

GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSON NO. 11: Critique of the Plan of Operational Cover and Deployment of the Front's Troops and Their Occupation of the Departure Position for the Offensive

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of a lesson, classified TOP SECRET, prepared for use at the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR. This lesson is for the instruction of students acting as chiefs of staff and chiefs of the operations directorate in organizing the operational cover, deployment, and preparatory measures of front troops for an offensive in northern West Germany. The main points covered are: assessment of NATO nuclear, ground, air, air defense, and naval forces; Warsaw Pact covering forces and their functions, role of the Combined Baltic Fleet, radioelectronic warfare, engineer preparation of the terrain, bridging, and roads; air, air defense and antitank forces and actions; movement and readiness time factors, camouflage measures, and force control measures.

Comment:
Although not specifically identified, the colors representing NATO countries in this lesson probably equate as follows:

Brown -- West Germany
Blue -- Great Britain
Green -- United States
Gray -- Denmark
Lesson No. 11

I. Lesson subject: "Critique of the plan of operational cover and deployment of the front's troops and their occupation of the departure position for the offensive."

II. Time for working out the lesson: Four hours (180 minutes) /sic/ for the group training period in classrooms and four hours for individual study by the students. Total, eight hours.

III. Training objectives:

-- teach the students to properly organize the operational cover of front troops, their deployment, and their occupation of the departure position for the offensive;

-- study with the students a plan for the operational cover and deployment of front troops, and their occupation of a departure position for the offensive and the explanatory memorandum for the plan;

-- teach the students to concisely, precisely, and clearly report the plan of operational cover and deployment of the front's troops and their occupation of the departure position for the offensive.

IV. Method of conducting the lesson is as a group exercise on maps.

V. Methodological recommendations on the preparation of the students for the lesson.

During the hours of the students' individual study for the lesson, the director of the study group will conduct a briefing at which he will explain the procedure for the study of the instructional material and recommend:

-- they examine the plan of operational cover and deployment of the front's troops and their occupation of the departure position for the offensive, with the explanatory memorandum;
they study the recommended literature in the assignment;

they work out the procedure of the report on the items of the plan of operational cover and deployment of the front's troops and their occupation of the departure position for the offensive.

VI. Procedure for conducting the lesson

A. In the course of 25 to 30 minutes, two to three theoretical questions are to be examined:

1. By whom and on the basis of which initial data will the plan of operational cover and deployment of the front's troops and their occupation of the departure position for the offensive be worked out?

2. The content of the explanatory memorandum for the plan of operational cover and deployment of the front's troops and their occupation of the departure position for the offensive.

3. Which forces and means shall be allocated for operational cover in the front zone?

Answer variants:

1. The plan of operational cover and deployment of the front's troops and their occupation of the departure position for the offensive will be worked out by the front's staff based on the directive of the General Staff and the decision and orders of the front commander.

In essence it involves, based on the tasks received from the General Staff and on the decision of the front commander, working out the plan of covering troop actions during the period of threat and when repelling a surprise attack of the enemy, and working out the comprehensive support and control of the troops so as to achieve with optimum effectiveness and minimum losses the aims of operational cover.

The plan of operational cover and deployment of the front's troops and their occupation of the departure position for the offensive is to be worked out in detail and formulated on a map with an explanatory memorandum.

The following are to be plotted graphically on the map when the plan is worked out: the grouping of the enemy's troops (the first operational
echelon) and the axes of his possible attacks; the position of the grouping of covering troops in their garrison posts and in the cover zone (in positions, lines, and in departure areas); the routes of advance; the firing position areas for artillery and air defense troops, the positions for electronic countermeasures and OSNAZ units, the disposition areas of antitank reserves and mobile obstacle detachments and their lines of deployment; the basing for aviation and separate fire support helicopter regiments; the areas and places for setting up engineer obstacles, demolition zones, and alternate crossings at river lines; and the disposition areas for the control posts. The departure areas for large units and formations of the first operational echelon and the sitting areas of rocket troops and artillery are to be plotted also.

The areas of nuclear minefields and demolitions must be precisely outlined on the map.

The decision concerning operational cover must be depicted simply, clearly, and graphically.

All calculations, tables, and textual explanations for the plan are attached in the form of an explanatory memorandum.

2. The explanatory memorandum for the plan of operational cover and deployment of the front's troops in the departure areas for the offensive will include the following sections:

-- the conclusions from an assessment of the enemy troop groupings and the possible nature of their actions;

-- the purpose and concept of operational cover. The main areas (axes) for concentrated efforts by the covering troops and for deployment of the front's main forces for the offensive. The strength and tasks of the troops allocated for cover;

-- the composition, tasks, and methods of action of the operational covering troops;

-- the order (priority) of deployment of the front's troops into the departure area for the offensive;

-- the basic measures for engineer preparation of the front cover zone;
the measures for operational camouflage;

-- the control over the forces and means of the covering troops and over the front's main forces during their deployment.

3. It is necessary to bring in the following forces and means for the organization of operational cover: the air defense troops of the country, front, armies, and large units and units allocated for cover; front and army aviation; the grouping of ground forces; the antitank artillery (antitank guided missiles) of the first-echelon divisions and armies and of the front; the reconnaissance (air, radiotechnical, and branch arm), electronic countermeasures, special monitoring, and engineer and chemical troop units and subunits. Forces and means of the navy, air defense troops, ground forces, and air army units will be allocated to repel enemy attacks from the sea.

Such a grouping of forces and means will make possible the successful fulfilment of the task of operational cover in repelling an invasion by the enemy and will ensure the development of conditions favoring his destruction.

B. Critique of the contents of the plan of operational cover and deployment of the front's troops and their occupation of the departure position for the offensive -- 140 minutes.

Students in the capacity of chief of staff of the Coastal Front or chief of the operations directorate are to report in the course of 140 minutes the contents of the plan of operational cover and deployment of the front's troops and their occupation of the departure position for the offensive in the following order:

-- the initial data used as the basis for development of the plan;

-- the conclusions from an assessment of the enemy's troop groupings and the possible nature of their actions;

-- the purpose and concept of operational cover;

-- the combat composition of the forces and means allocated for operational cover and their capabilities;

-- the methods of action of the troops allocated for operational cover and the procedure to be followed by them in fulfilling the combat tasks;
-- the order (priority) of deployment for front troops into the departure area for the offensive;

-- the basic measures for engineer preparation of the front cover zone;

-- the procedure for the organization of control over the forces and means of the covering troops and over the front's main forces during their deployment.

Report by the chief of staff of the Coastal Front of the plan of operational cover and deployment of the front's troops and their occupation of the departure position for the offensive -- 140 minutes (a variant).

The plan of operational cover and deployment of the front's troops and their occupation of the departure position for the offensive has been worked out in accordance with the directive of the General Staff and the decision of the front commander.

The main idea of the concept of the operational cover plan consists in precluding a surprise invasion by the enemy's combat-ready attack groupings and in having the first echelon inflict nuclear and fire destruction on them, developing favorable conditions for the transition of the main forces of the front to the offensive.

The basis of operational cover consists of: reliable air defense, antitank fire combined with engineer obstacles, strikes by supporting and army aviation, and artillery fire combined with the fire from all the fire means of the operational covering troops.

a) Conclusions from an assessment of the enemy troop groupings and the possible nature of their actions.

At the start of an invasion, the West may have in the area of the Coastal Front: troops of the Northern Army Group and of the Baltic Approaches area; an aviation grouping consisting of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, Brown and Gray combined air forces; a ground forces missile/nuclear grouping; naval forces; air defense means, and a well-prepared system of control over these groupings.

At the start of an invasion, the enemy missile/nuclear grouping may have approximately 800 nuclear warhead delivery means, of which: 74 are operational-tactical missile launchers; 60 to 68 are tactical missile
launchers; atomic artillery guns made up of approximately 200 203.2-mm howitzers and up to 160 155-mm howitzers, including up to 100 guns in the first echelon; 380 to 350 are tactical aviation delivery aircraft and 65 are carrier aviation delivery aircraft; 32 are Polaris A3 missiles and /sic for in/ two PEAR /nuclear ballistic missile submarines/.

In large units of the second operational echelon (reserve), the West may have: 64 launchers and 210 to 220 atomic artillery guns.

With these forces and means (excluding tactical missiles and atomic artillery guns), and with a combat readiness coefficient of 0.9, the enemy may employ in the initial nuclear strike approximately 450 to 512 nuclear warheads, of which 60 to 70 are for Pershing, Sergeant, and Lance operational-tactical missiles; approximately 350 are for delivery aircraft (including 50 carrier aviation aircraft), and 32 are for Polaris A3 missiles. Up to 300 nuclear warheads /may be used/ against the troops and rear services installations of the front and the remainder against targets in the depth of the theater of military operations.

The enemy can deliver a nuclear strike with on-alert forces and means within 25 to 30 minutes and with the remainder (aviation and operational-tactical missiles) within two to three hours. Along with the employment of nuclear weapons, there is the possibility that chemical weapons may be employed.

The enemy's ground grouping in the front zone may have up to 26 divisions, of which 16 to 17 will be in the first operational echelon. From this, the West can establish two attack groupings. On the HAMBURG-SZCZECIN and HAMBURG-BERLIN axes at a strength of 12 to 13 divisions and of these, up to nine may be in the first echelon. This attack grouping may have up to 46 operational-tactical and tactical missile launchers, approximately 120 atomic artillery guns, 2,350 tanks, 1,300 guns and mortars, and more than 1,200 antitank means.

The HANNOVER-BERLIN axis /may have/ a strength of 18 to 19 divisions and of these, seven to eight in the first echelon. This attack grouping may have up to 70 operational-tactical and tactical missile launchers, approximately 100 atomic artillery guns, more than 2,000 tanks, 950 guns and mortars, and up to 680 antitank means (antitank guns and antitank guided missiles).

The strongest and most combat effective grouping of the enemy's troops are the large units of the Brown 1st, 4th, and 6th army corps, of the Blue 1st Army Corps, and the Green 4th Mechanized Division.
The air forces grouping may have up to 1,200 combat aircraft, of which approximately 600 are aircraft of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, 260 are aircraft in the Baltic Approaches area, and up to 270 are aircraft of the Blue air command and the Green 49th Tactical Fighter Wing. Based on a combat readiness coefficient of 0.9, the grouping may have up to 1,100 aircraft, including nearly 410 delivery aircraft. In the initial massed strike, more than 800 combat aircraft (75 percent of those combat ready) may participate, of which up to 500 aircraft might do so on the HANNOVER-BERLIN axis.

The combat actions radius of the aircraft enables them to deliver strikes against the front's troops to the entire depth of the operational disposition.

The West grouping of air defense forces and means has: ten Hawk surface-to-air missile battalions (240 launchers), a Thunderbird regiment (12 launchers), a Bloodhound squadron (48 launchers), and eight Nike-Hercules battalions (288 launchers), which are disposed in two echelons. In the first echelon, the Hawk surface-to-air missile battalions are positioned at a distance of 60 to 120 kilometers from the state border, in the second echelon, Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missile battalions are positioned at a distance of 120 to 300 kilometers, and, in addition, the enemy can bring in up to 130 air defense aircraft, part of the tactical aviation forces, and the ZURD /surface-to-air guided missile weapon/ antiaircraft artillery units.

The radar reconnaissance system will allow air targets to be detected at low altitudes from the line: ROSTOCK, BRANDENBURG, LEIPZIG. The grouping of surface-to-air missile means and fighter aviation can destroy approximately 100 air targets in a single cycle (sortie) and up to 180 targets with the expenditure of a single unit of fire by the surface-to-air missile battalions.

The West grouping of naval forces may consist of two or three carrier striking groups made up of one Blue AVU /strike aircraft carrier/ of the first echelon of the strike fleet which may have on board up to 180 to 270 combat aircraft, including approximately 90 to 140 delivery aircraft.

For the troops and installations of the front, the main threat from the sea will be: part of the forces of the first echelon of the West strike fleet consisting of a Blue carrier and a Green carrier which can have on board up to 140 combat aircraft including up to 65 delivery aircraft; one or two arml /nuclear missile submarines/ which can deliver...
a nuclear strike against front installations with 32 nuclear warheads.

The assault landing means of the enemy are capable of lifting at one time a reinforced brigade of marines and of allocating four to six detachments of missile and gun ships (with two to three destroyers and an escort vessel in each), numbering in all 36 to 40 guns, for artillery support of the combat actions of the landing force.

For carrying out radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance and to produce jamming, in the complement of enemy ground forces there may be one Blue radioelectronic warfare regiment and two to three Brown radioelectronic warfare battalions. In the air force complement there can be one Brown /radioelectronic warfare/ regiment and two to three Blue squadrons. These units and subunits can establish nearly 800 radio intercept posts, eight to 12 radio direction-finding nets, and more than 100 electronic jamming posts, which will allow them to reconnoiter and observe 1,450 radio sets of the Coastal Front and determine the location of 320 to 480 operating radio sets in one hour. By radio jamming means, the enemy will be capable of neutralizing no less than 50 percent of the main communications nets of the front. A vulnerable point in the enemy's system of control is the use of radio communications at the start of war, which gives rise to conditions for its neutralization by radio jamming.

Overall conclusion. The enemy, with the given grouping, can unleash war by surprise with a massed nuclear strike and can go over to the offensive with combat-ready groupings of ground forces that have 16 to 17 divisions in the first operational echelon.

It is possible that the enemy will begin combat actions by a massed air strike with ground groupings simultaneously going over to the offensive.

Consequently, the operational cover of the front's troops must be prepared to repel an enemy invasion in any of its possible variants.

b) Purpose and concept of operational cover.

The purpose of operational cover is: to safeguard the conversion of front troops from peacetime to wartime status and their advance and occupation of the departure position for the offensive; to repel a surprise invasion by the enemy's combat-ready air and ground groupings when combat actions are initiated in various ways (with or without nuclear weapons).
The given purpose in the area of the Coastal Front is to be attained by organizing operational cover from the state border to the rear border (the Oder River) by forces and means of the front's ground troops, air defense troops, aviation, rocket troops and artillery, and special troops in close cooperation with the air defense forces of the country, border troops, and the forces and means of the Combined Baltic Fleet.

Concept of operational cover. By means of conventionally armed air and missile strikes, and by the fire of artillery, air defense troops, and all fire means of the operational covering troops, destruction by fire will be inflicted on the first-echelon troops of the enemy attack groupings, their invasion will be repulsed, and the organized transition of the main forces of the front to the offensive will be safeguarded. In the event of an enemy invasion with the simultaneous use of nuclear weapons, the covering force will support the timely and organized delivery of the initial nuclear strike by front troops. To disrupt a possible nuclear strike by the enemy with his on-alert means, the operational covering troops of the front, with their own on-alert nuclear means (aviation and rocket troops), will destroy the enemy's on-alert nuclear means and will inflict nuclear destruction on the first operational echelons of the enemy's attack groupings.

Operational cover will be accomplished by air defense forces of the country and of the front, by the ground grouping of the covering troops of the first operational echelon armies and the 2nd Army Corps, by front and army aviation, by front special troops, and by border troops in cooperation with the combat duty forces and means of the Combined Baltic Fleet.

Airborne (amphibious) landing forces and sabotage-reconnaissance groups will be combatted in the areas of responsibility of the armies, the 2nd Army Corps, and the 20th Tank Division.

For the deployment of the front's troops and their occupation of the departure position for the offensive, forces of engineer troops and of units and large units are to prepare departure areas by 5 September:

-- for the 4th Army in the area of (excluding) WISMAR, GREVESMUHLEN, LUDWIGSLUST, PERLEBERG, and GUSTROW;

-- for the 7th Army in the area of OSERBURG, MAHLSDORF, GARDELEGEN, and NEUSTADT;
for the 9th Army in the area of (excluding) GARDELEGEN, HALDENSLEBEN, GRONINGEN, and ZIESAR;

for the rocket troops and artillery and air defense troops, siting areas in accordance with the decision (see the plan of operational cover);

for army and front reserves of all types, in the areas of concentration.

To support the rapid occupation by front troops of the departure area for the offensive, in the cover zone of the front nine axial and three lateral routes will be prepared.

Based on the purpose of operational cover and the conditions for achieving it, the basic overall tasks of operational cover will be:

-- to counteract the enemy's reconnaissance and prevent his surprise invasion;

-- to support the conversion of troops from peacetime to wartime status and the bringing of them up to full combat readiness;

-- to provide conditions for the timely and organized delivery of the front's initial nuclear strike;

-- to support the advance and deployment of the main forces of the front in the departure areas for the offensive;

-- to disrupt an intrusion by the enemy's aviation grouping in the airspace of the front cover zone and repulse his strikes against troops and rear installations;

-- to repulse the attacks of the first operational echelon of the enemy's ground groupings;

-- to set up conditions favoring the transition to the offensive of the main forces of the armies and front;

-- to destroy the enemy's airborne (amphibious) landing forces and sabotage-reconnaissance groups.
Tasks of operational covering troops:

1. The 4th Army with the 1st, 2nd, 7th, and 8th border guard detachments, in cooperation with the air defense troops of the country and the front, the forces and means of the Combined Baltic Fleet and supporting aviation of the 1st Air Army, will cover the zone: to the right -- the Baltic seacoast from NITZ-DAMGARTEN /probably RIBNITZ-DAMGARTEN/ to (excluding) LUBECK; to the left -- JAGEL, PERLEBERG, and MIROW, and be prepared to repel a surprise enemy invasion and to destroy airborne and amphibious landing forces and sabotage-reconnaissance groups in the army's cover zone. The army's rear boundary is NITZ-DAMGARTEN, WAREN, MIROW.

2. The 7th Army with the 3rd and 4th border guard detachments, in cooperation with supporting aviation of the 1st Air Army and the front's air defense troops, will cover the zone: (excluding) MIROW, (excluding) PERLEBERG, (excluding) JAGEL, BUCHHORST, GARDELEGEN, (excluding) PREMNITZ, (excluding) BRIESELANG, and they will be prepared to bar and repel a surprise enemy invasion and to destroy airborne landing forces and sabotage-reconnaissance groups in the army's cover zone. The rear boundary of the army is (excluding) MIROW, (excluding) BRIESELANG.

3. The 9th Army with the 5th Border Guard Detachment, in cooperation with supporting aviation of the 1st Air Army and air defense troops of the country and the front, will cover the zone: to the right -- BRIESELANG, PREMNITZ, (excluding) GARDELEGEN, (excluding) BUCHHORST; to the left -- the front boundary; and be prepared to bar and repel a surprise enemy invasion and to destroy airborne landing forces and sabotage-reconnaissance groups in the army's cover zone. The army's rear boundary is (excluding) BRIESELANG, BRANDENBURG, NIEMEGK.

4. The 6th Army, in cooperation with the air defense troops of the country and of the front, will cover the area: (excluding) SZCZEcin, (excluding) NEUBRANDENBURG, (excluding) WAREN, (excluding) MIROW, BRIESELANG, POTSDAM, LUDWIGSFELDE, KONIGS WUSTERHAUSEN, HALBE, EISENHUTTENSTADT, the ODER River, and be prepared to destroy airborne landing forces and sabotage-reconnaissance groups in the army's area of responsibility.

5. The 2nd Army Corps with the 9th Border Guard Detachment, in cooperation with the air defense troops of the country and the front and the combat duty forces and means of the Combined Baltic Fleet, will cover the area of the seacoast of the Baltic Sea from SZCZEcin to NITZ-DAMGARTEN, (excluding) WAREN, (excluding) MIROW, NEUBRANDENBURG, and SZCZEcin, and be...
prepared to destroy amphibious and airborne landing forces and sabotage-reconnaissance groups in the corps' area of responsibility.

b) Composition and methods of action of the operational covering troops:

For operational cover of the state border and the deployment of the front's troops, there will be allocated:

-- the 4th, 7th, and 9th Armies and the 2nd Army Corps, which will deploy, in the cover zone: five motorized rifle divisions, eight reinforced motorized rifle regiments, and nine border guard detachments;*

-- rocket troops and artillery: six operational-tactical missile battalions (28 launchers), 13 separate tactical missile battalions (52 launchers), 41 artillery battalions (16 artillery battalions of motorized rifle regiments, 15 artillery /battalions/ from five artillery regiments of motorized rifle divisions, five separate rocket launcher battalions, and nine rocket launcher artillery regiments (three x three);

-- antitank means: 13 antitank artillery battalions, three army antitank artillery regiments, two antitank artillery brigades, and three separate fire support helicopter regiments;

-- air defense troops: 28 antiaircraft batteries of motorized rifle and tank regiments; 36 surface-to-air missile batteries from divisions (excluding the 2nd Army Corps), seven surface-to-air missile battalions from surface-to-air missile brigades (regiments), and /an/ antiaircraft artillery regiment.

In the cover zones of the armies, the following are allocated to defend the cover zones:

-- in the 4th Army: the 8th Motorized Rifle Division; the 9th and the 11th motorized rifle regiments, three surface-to-air missile batteries of the 3rd Surface-to-Air Missile Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Artillery Regiment, the 3rd Antitank Artillery Battalion, the 1st Company of the 3rd Combat Engineer Battalion of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division; the 21st Motorized Rifle Regiment, the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Artillery Regiment, three surface-to-air missile batteries of the 7th Surface-to-Air Missile Regiment of the 7th Motorized Rifle Division; the 42nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, the 3rd Battalion of the 14th Artillery Regiment, two

* Each border guard detachment has three to four border guard outposts (companies); an outpost guards a border sector up to 10 kilometers /wide/.
antiaircraft artillery battalions of the 14th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment of the 14th Motorized Rifle Division; a missile battalion of the 4th Army Missile Brigade, a missile battalion of a front missile brigade, the 4th Army Antitank Artillery Regiment, a surface-to-air missile battalion of the 4th Surface-to-Air Missile Brigade, a surface-to-air missile battalion of the 13th Surface-to-Air Missile Brigade, the 4th OSNAZ-N /ground radio intercept/ Battalion, the 4th OSNAZ-S /aircraft radio intercept/ Battalion, the 4th Separate Fire Support Helicopter Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 4th Combat Engineer Regiment, a flight of electronic countermeasures helicopters of the 4th Separate Helicopter Squadron; the 1st, 2nd, and 8th border guard detachments;

-- in the 7th Army: the 1st Motorized Rifle Division, the 12th Motorized Rifle Regiment, the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Artillery Regiment, the 4th Antitank Artillery Battalion, three surface-to-air missile batteries of the 4th Surface-to-Air Missile Regiment, the 1st Company of the 4th Combat Engineer Battalion of the 4th Motorized Rifle Division; the 5th Motorized Rifle Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 5th Artillery Regiment, three surface-to-air missile batteries of the 5th Surface-to-Air Missile Regiment, the 1st Company of the 5th Combat Engineer Battalion of the 5th Tank Division; the 7th Army Antitank Artillery Regiment, the 4th Antitank Artillery Brigade, the 7th Army Rocket Launcher Artillery Regiment, a missile battalion of the 7th Army Missile Brigade, a missile battalion of the 2nd Corps Artillery Brigade and the 6th Army Missile Brigade, a surface-to-air missile battalion of the 7th Surface-to-Air Missile Brigade, the 4th Battalion of the 7th Combat Engineer Regiment, the 7th OSNAZ-N Battalion, the 7th OSNAZ-S Battalion, a flight of electronic countermeasures helicopters of the 7th Separate Helicopter Squadron, and the 3rd Border Guard Detachment;

-- in the 9th Army: the 21st Motorized Rifle Division, the 10th Motorized Rifle Regiment, three surface-to-air missile batteries of the 10th Surface-to-Air Missile Regiment, the 2nd Battalion of the 10th Artillery Regiment of the 10th Tank Division; the 54th Motorized Rifle Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 18th Artillery Regiment, the 18th Antitank Artillery Battalion, the 1st Company of the 18th Combat Engineer Battalion, three surface-to-air missile batteries of the 18th Surface-to-air Missile Regiment of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division; the 69th Motorized Rifle Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Artillery Regiment, the 1st Company of the 23rd Combat Engineer Battalion, the 23rd Antitank Artillery Battalion, three surface-to-air missile batteries of the 23rd Surface-to-Air Missile Regiment of the 23rd Motorized Rifle Division; a missile battalion of the 9th Army Missile Brigade, a missile battalion of
a front missile brigade, a surface-to-air missile battalion of the 9th Surface-to-Air Missile Brigade, a surface-to-air missile battalion of the 9th Surface-to-Air Missile Regiment, a surface-to-air missile battalion of the 15th Surface-to-Air Missile Brigade, the 9th Army Antitank Artillery Regiment, the 5th Antitank Artillery Brigade, the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Combat Engineer Regiment, the 9th OSNAZ-N Battalion, the 9th OSNAZ-S Battalion, the 8th Separate Fire Support Helicopter Regiment.

-- in the 2nd army corps: the 16th and the 24th motorized rifle divisions, and divisional and corps units.

It is planned that the following be used in the front cover zone to repel enemy strikes:

a) air defense forces of the country: the 6th Air Defense Corps (three surface-to-air missile brigades, four surface-to-air missile regiments, four fighter regiments); air defense troops of the front and armies: six surface-to-air missile brigades, five S-75 surface-to-air missile regiments, three S-125 surface-to-air missile regiments, 20 surface-to-air missile regiments of the divisions, five antiaircraft artillery regiments, one antiaircraft artillery division. From air army fighter aviation -- three fighter divisions.

b) aviation: three fighter-bomber divisions and one bomber division. With the arrival of the front forward cover units at their lines and positions, each regiment of the fighter-bomber divisions and bomber division will have on combat alert a flight of delivery aircraft with nuclear bombs (3 of 300 KT; 21 of 200 KT; 9 of 100 KT; 3 of 20 KT; and 5 of 10 KT). There are nine fighter squadrons (100 aircraft) of the 1st Air Army and five fighter squadrons (60 aircraft) of the 6th Air Defense Corps of the Country.

In all, 160 aircraft;

c) rocket troops: 90 operational-tactical missile launchers (four army missile brigades, one corps artillery brigade, and two front missile brigades);

d) electronic neutralization units: the 12th OSNAZ-N Battalion, the 1st Separate Electronic Countermeasures Helicopter Squadron, the 4th, 7th, and 9th OSNAZ-N battalions of the armies; eight flights of the separate helicopter squadrons and the 62nd OSNAZ-S Battalion; the 4th, 6th, 7th, and 9th OSNAZ-S battalions, the 23rd Separate Electronic Countermeasures Air

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Regiment, and one air squadron of the 6th Bomber Division;

e) engineer troops: subunits and units of the motorized rifle regiments and divisions allocated for defense of the forward cover zone (16 companies and three battalions), the 4th, 7th, and 9th combat engineer regiments of the armies. The following are allocated for construction and laying of crossings over the ELBE River: the 6th Engineer Road-Bridge Brigade, the 7th and 9th engineer road-bridge regiments, the 7th and 9th pontoon bridge regiments, and the 22nd Pontoon Bridge Regiment;

f) chemical troops: the 4th, 6th, 7th, 9th, 16th, and 18th obsk,* the 4th, 6th, 7th, 9th, and 18th separate decontamination battalions, the 3rd Chemical Defense Brigade, and also units and subunits of front troops in their cover zones (areas);

g) Combined Baltic Fleet forces and means: on combat duty in the North Sea there are: seven submarines (in two screens of three and four boats), two rkm /small missile ships/, two coastal antisubmarine vessels, two destroyers, four radiotechnical reconnaissance ships, and bmrts /?large refrigerated trawlers/ numbers 10 to 13 (each with 100 mines). In the Baltic Sea there are five submarines, one radiotechnical reconnaissance ship of the 46 dkrtr /radiotechnical reconnaissance division/, and two radar picket ships of the 50th bkovr /offshore defense brigade/. Antisubmarine defense forces from naval bases will conduct a search for West submarines and be in readiness to destroy them.

The presence of the above-reported forces and means which have been allocated for operational cover (excluding fire support helicopters) will allow establishing the following density per kilometer of front (refer to the tables in the explanatory memorandum). The overall density of antitank means per kilometer of front will amount to: 7.5 items throughout all the front cover zone; on the main axes: 15.7 in the 4th Army zone, 11.2 in the 7th Army zone, and 10.6 in the 9th Army zone. The data are given without taking account of the actions of the front antitank artillery brigades in the 7th and 9th Army zones. The given densities will make it possible to destroy 35 to 40 tanks per kilometer of front and to successfully repel an attack by invading tank groupings of the enemy.

* Translator's note: Expansion of this abbreviation is as yet unknown but from other text material it appears to pertain to front and army units that determine the coordinates and parameters of nuclear bursts.

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Methods of action of operational covering troops and their procedure for fulfilling the combat tasks

The operational cover, deployment, and occupation by front troops of the departure position for the offensive will be accomplished by the front troops within the sum total of assigned combat tasks and be carried out both in the cover zone itself and in the entire front zone up to its rear boundary (the ODER River) in close cooperation with Border troops, air defense forces of the country, the Combined Baltic Fleet, and the other large units and units disposed in the front zone.

In the event that combat actions begin the employment of nuclear weapons, in its initial nuclear strike the front will inflict nuclear destruction on the enemy invasion groupings while the forward units and large units of the covering troops, exploiting the results of nuclear strikes, will rapidly move deep into enemy territory and support the commitment to battle of the main forces of the armies of the first operational echelon. At the start of combat actions in which only conventional means of destruction are used, the covering troops' basic method of combat actions will be the systematic destruction of advancing enemy groupings in the cover zone by means of front and army aviation fire strikes, by conventionally armed missiles and artillery, and by tanks and antitank means, with the defensive combat actions of the first echelons of the covering troops developing into meeting attacks by the main forces of the army of the first operational echelon.

The air enemy will be repelled by all forces and means of the air defense troops of the country and the front in cooperation with the 1st Air Army's fighter aviation and the Combined Baltic Fleet's means.

The destruction of airborne and amphibious landing forces and sabotage-reconnaissance groups of the enemy will be carried out by the forces and means of the armies and the 2nd Army Corps in their zones of responsibility in close cooperation with air defense troops of the country and the front, front and army aviation, and also by the forces and means of the Combined Baltic Fleet.

Rocket troops and artillery, when conducting combat actions without employing nuclear weapons, will inflict fire destruction on enemy groupings which have gone over to the offensive by means of massed strikes with cluster-armed missiles and artillery in close cooperation with army and supporting aviation. In doing so, primary attention will be concentrated on the destruction of enemy nuclear means, air defense means, and tanks.
To deliver fire destruction on the enemy, covering troops have 1,134 guns and mortars and 52 tactical missile launchers. Thirteen separate missile battalions of the first-echelon divisions will be deployed in sitting areas. In addition, 1,350 guns and mortars of the main forces will participate in repelling an enemy invasion.

If combat actions are initiated with the employment of nuclear weapons, the front's rocket troops will use 176 missiles in the initial nuclear strike.

Antitank artillery and antitank guided missiles will destroy the enemy's tanks from positions prepared in advance. For this purpose, covering troops have 1,269 items of antitank means and 120 combat helicopters which can conduct four to five combat sorties a day to deliver fire strikes against armored targets of invading enemy groupings (120 helicopters, each with four antitank guided missiles, equals 480 missiles times four sorties equals 1,920 missiles; 480 missiles times five sorties equals 2,400 missiles).

In each motorized rifle regiment located in the cover zone, an antitank reserve and a mobile obstacle detachment will be established made up of an antitank battery and a platoon of a combat engineer company; in the divisions, the antitank reserves and mobile obstacle detachments will be made up of an antitank artillery battalion and a mine obstacles platoon; in the armies, antitank reserves and mobile obstacle detachments will be made up of an army antitank artillery regiment and an engineer obstacle company (battalion). For each antitank reserve and mobile obstacle detachment, two to three firing lines for deployment and minelaying will be readied in advance.

Air army forces and means will carry out the following measures:

-- up to the start of combat actions, reconnaissance aviation will conduct air reconnaissance by flights along the state border for the purpose of discovering enemy groupings and their intentions (the 20th Reconnaissance Air Regiment);

-- in cooperation with the air defense troops of the country and of the front, they will cover against surprise enemy air strikes and enemy air reconnaissance the troops of the armies and the main grouping of front troops during their deployment and occupation of the departure position for the offensive. For this purpose, each fighter regiment will place on combat alert one squadron in Readiness No. 1 or No. 2;
-- on-alert forces with nuclear bombs (one flight of delivery aircraft per regiment from each fighter-bomber division and bomber division) are allocated for disruption of a possible enemy strike, for the destruction of the enemy's on-alert nuclear means, and for destruction of his ground forces attack groupings. The total is 41 delivery aircraft and 41 nuclear bombs, of which there are: 3 of 300 KT; 21 of 200 KT; 9 of 100 KT; 3 of 20 KT; and 5 of 10 KT. Aviation will deliver a strike with 200 nuclear bombs in the initial nuclear strike of the front:

-- each fighter-bomber regiment will allocate one air squadron for air support of the combat actions of the covering troop units. In all, there will be ten air squadrons which will be based at forward airfields;

-- enemy airborne and amphibious landing forces and sabotage-reconnaissance groups will be destroyed in flight (in sea transit) and in landing (drop) areas by the allocated forces of fighter and fighter-bomber aviation in cooperation with air defense troops and ground forces units in the areas of responsibility of the armies and 2nd Army Corps.

Air defense, during the repulse of an enemy invasion, will be carried out by the subunits, units, and large units of air defense troops of the divisions, the armies, and the front in close cooperation with troops of the 6th Corps of Air Defense of the Country, fighter aviation of the 1st Army, and the air defense forces and means of the Combined Baltic Fleet. For this purpose, there will be deployed in temporary positions one surface-to-air missile battalion per surface-to-air missile brigade and surface-to-air missile regiment, three batteries in each surface-to-air missile regiment and two batteries per antiaircraft artillery regiment in each first-echelon division, and the air defense means of the units and large units.

Engineer troops, before the start of combat actions, will set up engineer obstacles in front of the forward edge of the positions of the cover zone with the following density on the main axes of tank approach:

-- 0.6 in the 4th Army zone; 0.7 in the 7th and 9th army zones; and they will prepare centers of obstacles on these axes at a depth up to the departure areas of the first-echelon divisions of the armies. During repulse of an enemy invasion, the forces of the mobile obstacle detachments of regiments, divisions, and armies will increase obstacle density in the zones of the 7th and 9th Armies and the front on the discovered axes of enemy attack as follows: up to 1.3 in the 4th Army zone and to 1.5 in the
7th and 9th army zones.

To fulfill radioelectronic warfare tasks in the period of operational cover and deployment of the front's troops and their occupation of the departure position for the offensive, electronic neutralization units will cover the main grouping of the troops of the front and armies against airborne radar reconnaissance and, in cooperation with radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance units, discover the enemy's radioelectronic systems of troop and weapons control. In the event combat actions are initiated, the forces of the 12th OSNAZ-N Battalion, the 11th Separate Electronic Countermeasures Helicopter Squadron of the front, and the 4th, 7th, and 9th army OSNAZ-N battalions, will neutralize the key radio contacts of four army corps (the Brown 1st, 4th, and 6th army corps and the Blue 1st Army Corps) and six divisions (the Brown 16th, 3rd, and 7th tank divisions and the Blue 1st, 2nd, and 4th armored divisions); the radio contacts controlling nuclear weapons units, and the primary radio contacts of the Northern Army Group with the Brown army corps, the Blue 1st Army Corps, and the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force.

The forces of the 62nd OSNAZ-S Battalion of the front, the 4th, 6th, 7th, and 9th army OSNAZ-S battalions, the 1st OSNAZ-S Battalion, the 23rd Separate Electronic Countermeasures Air Regiment, and one aviation squadron of the 6th Bomber Division of the 1st Air Army, will cover against airborne radar reconnaissance and aimed strikes the 2nd and 3rd front missile brigades, the 4th, 6th, 7th, and 9th army missile brigades, the control posts of the front and armies, eight ELBE River crossings along the sector from WITTENBERGE to SCHONEBECK, and up to 50 percent of the 1st Air Army's airfields. They will simulate six dummy airfields and neutralize up to 100 ultra-shortwave /VHF/ radio contacts that guide the tactical aviation of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force against ground targets and guide fighters against aircraft of the 1st Air Army. They will impede the guidance, handled through the TACAN system, of up to 400 to 500 tactical and carrier-based enemy aircraft against ground target areas. They will support 1st Air Army large units and units in overcoming the enemy's air defense on the main axes of flight.

Chemical troops, during the arrival of the covering units, will occupy positions and concentration areas in readiness to fulfill the entire array of tasks of chemical support and of supporting the defense of the troops and rear against weapons of mass destruction. They will accomplish the following tasks:
-- obtain and process data concerning the nuclear, radiation, chemical, and biological situation;

-- eliminate the aftereffects of the enemy's employment of means of mass destruction.

To neutralize the enemy's optical-electronic means of reconnaissance and weapons guidance, aerosol smoke screens will be prepared using means of the 4th, 7th, 9th, and 18th separate decontamination battalions at the eight ELBE River crossings in the WITTENBERGE, SCHONEBECK sector.

The order (priority) for the deployment of the front's troops in the departure area for the offensive.

The advance of the covering units and large units to the state border and to siting areas, and of the attack groupings to the departure areas for the offensive, will be carried out under the guise of a training exercise with the most stringent camouflage measures.

Starting the night of 1 to 2 September (by 0500 hours 2 September) the first to occupy their positions and lines will be the covering troops (units and large units with reinforcement means, rocket troops and artillery, air defense troops, air forces, and special troops) and the control posts (alternate command posts and command posts). Their advance to the assigned areas will be done following the signal PEREKAT-345 /leapfrog-345/. Three to five hours will be needed for their move to the assigned areas and occupation of their positions. Simultaneously with the covering units, the following will advance to prepare the departure areas: engineer equipment and one-third of the personnel from each motorized rifle regiment (tank regiment) of the divisions, 10 percent to 15 percent of the rocket troop and surface-to-air missile troop personnel, and one-third of the artillery personnel. The engineer subunits of the units, divisions (brigades), armies, and front (/will advance/ in accordance with the plan of the engineer preparation of the departure area). By 2000 hours 1 September, the front's troops will be brought to full combat readiness on moving out into the concentration areas.

Two nights will be required to deploy front troops into the departure areas for the offensive:

-- the first night, (from 5 to 6 September), the main forces of the armies, the rocket troops and artillery, the air defense troops, the reinforcement means, and the command posts of the armies and front will be
brought up. The 4th Army by 0400 hours 6 September, the 9th Army by 0500 hours 6 September, and the 7th Army by 0100 hours 6 September. The missile brigades of the armies and of the front, the surface-to-air missile brigades (excluding the on-alert battalions), and reinforcement artillery will be brought up between 0300 hours and 0400 hours 6 September;

-- the second night (from 6 to 7 September by 0430 hours 7 September) the rear services of the armies and rear units and facilities of the front will occupy the departure position.

From 0500 hours 6 and 7 September, helicopter flights will be conducted to check troop camouflage.

The readiness of front troops to go over to the offensive to deliver the initial nuclear strike will be characterized by the following indices:

-- front rocket troops and artillery will be able to deliver the nuclear strike from a constant combat readiness status within eight to ten hours; from a full combat readiness status in 30 to 45 minutes;

-- front aviation, from a constant combat readiness status, will be able to become airborne and deliver the initial strike within two hours and 20 minutes to two hours and 40 minutes; from an increased combat readiness status (with nuclear bombs suspended) in 30 to 40 minutes;

-- troops of the front first echelon will be able to go over quickly to the offensive from the march from permanent garrison posts within four to five hours; and from departure areas within one and one-half to two hours.

The given values have been confirmed by the timetable of the troops' movement forward and occupation of the departure position for the offensive and also by the calculations on the deployment of Coastal Front troops.

Basic measures for engineer preparation of the front's cover zone.

Engineer preparation of the departure area for the operational deployment of the attack groupings of front troops will be carried out under the guise of preparation for a front defensive operation from 1 September through 8 September.

Fortifying of the defense sectors and zones of the motorized rifle regiments and divisions in the cover zone (4th Army: five motorized rifle
regiments, one motorized rifle division; 7th Army: two motorized rifle
regiments, one motorized rifle division; 9th Army: three motorized rifle
regiments, one motorized rifle division) will be carried out by the troop
forces allocated for cover from the morning of 1 September in the sequence
and extent specified for the first and second priority jobs. By the close
of 4 September the cover zone will be 100 percent prepared.

The morning of 1 September all engineer equipment of the divisions and
one motorized rifle regiment (tank regiment) from each large unit will move
out to the designated areas together with the covering troops and become
involved in preparing the departure areas for the divisions of the
first-echelon armies and the concentration areas of the front reserves.
Upon occupying the departure position, all personnel of the units and large
units will involve themselves in final preparation of the areas. By the
close of 5 September, the departure areas and concentration areas of the
divisions will be 65 to 75 percent prepared, and with the involvement of
all personnel from the mornings of 6 and 7 September, the areas will be 100
percent prepared by the close of 7 September.

The departure areas for the divisions of the first-echelon armies on
the following axes will be prepared as zones of defense: HAMBURG, SZCZECIN
(the 3rd, 7th, and 14th motorized rifle divisions); LUNEBURG, STENDAL (the
1st and 4th motorized rifle divisions); HANNOVER, MAGDEBURG (the 18th and
23rd motorized rifle divisions).

The siting areas and firing positions of the rocket troops, artillery,
and surface-to-air missile troops of the armies and the front will be
prepared by their own forces from the morning of 1 September with the
involvement of all organic engineer equipment and 10 to 15 percent of the
personnel of the rocket troops and surface-to-air missile troops and
one-third of the artillery personnel. In the armies, in addition, the
engineer position preparation subunits of the army combat engineer
regiments /will become involved/. The main siting areas for the missile
and surface-to-air missile brigades of the armies and the front and the
deployment areas of the army and front mobile missile technical bases will
be 80 to 90 percent prepared by the close of 5 September. Full preparation
will be completed by the close of 6 September and for the surface-to-air
missile regiments, this will be done by the close of 7 September. The
alternate siting areas will be prepared by the close of 7 September (the
surface-to-air missile regiments by the close of 8 September).

On the axes of a probable enemy invasion, the engineer troop forces of
the armies will prepare mixed minefields and demolitions in front of the
cover zone with the following density of antitank obstacles on the tank-favorable axes: 0.6 in the 4th Army; 0.7 in the 7th and 9th armies, and 0.2 in the depth of the departure areas for the first-echelon divisions. The overall density of the obstacles will be, respectively: 0.8 in the 4th Army and 0.9 in the 7th and 9th armies. To repel an enemy invasion, parallel with the placing of demolitions in the centers of obstacles, plans are made for the actions of regimental, division, and army mobile obstacle detachments, and in the cover zones of the 7th and 9th armies, for the front's mobile obstacle detachment Number 1 -- the 1st Battalion of the 20th Combat Engineer Regiment -- and Number 2 -- the 12th Engineer Obstacle Battalion.

The overall density of the obstacles on the axes of an enemy invasion, based on the actions of the mobile obstacle detachments, will be: 1.3 on the HAMBURG, SZCZECIN axis; 1.5 on the LUNEBURG, STENDAL and HANNOVER, MAGDEBURG axes.

On the night of 2 September, the covering troops and the units allocated for the preparation of the departure, concentration, and siting areas will make provisions with their own forces and means for movement forward on the prepared routes.

The ELBE River will be crossed over existing bridges in the 7th Army zone in the areas of WITTENBERGE and TANGERMUNDE, and in the 9th Army zone with HOHENWARTE and SCHONEBECK areas.

For the movement forward and deployment of the front troops, by the close of 5 September, nine axial routes will be prepared and maintained: Numbers 1 and 2 by the 20th Combat Engineer Regiment; Numbers 3 through 8 by the 6th Engineer Road-Bridge Brigade; Number 9 by an engineer road company of the 20th Combat Engineer Regiment. In addition, the forces of the armies and divisions will prepare the necessary number of routes (no less than two for each division) for their movement forward and occupation of the departure areas. By the close of 5 September, an additional four composite bridges will be constructed on the axial routes for crossing the ELBE River: in the 7th Army zone in the areas of ROBEL and ARNEBURG; in the 9th Army zone in the FERCHLAND and KEHNERT areas. The bridges will be constructed by the forces of the 7th and 9th army engineer road-bridge regiments and the 7th and 9th pontoon bridge regiments. In case the bridge crossings are destroyed, plans are to have forces of the 7th Pontoon Bridge Regiment, the 6th Engineer Road-Bridge Brigade, and the 7th and 9th engineer road-bridge regiments construct alternate bridges which could be readied within three to five hours from the moment a signal is received in.
these areas: in the 7th Army zone at WAHRENBERG, GNEVSDORF, SANDAU, and JERICHOW; in the 9th Army zone at SANDFURTH, ROGATZ, NIEGRIPP, and SALBKE. In addition, the 7th and 9th pontoon bridge regiments and the 20th Pontoon Bridge Regiment will be in reserve in the sectors WAHRENBERG, WITIENBERGE; GNEVSDORF, SANDAU; JERICHOW, ROGATZ; NIEGRIPP, (excluding) MAGDEBURG, BARBY, and AKEN in 30- to 50-minute readiness to lay floating bridges or construct composite bridges from the moment a signal is received.

Front lateral roads numbers 1 through 3 will be readied through the sectors between routes 1 through 9 by the forces of the 6th Engineer Road-Bridge Brigade and the 20th Combat Engineer Regiment.

The 20th Combat Engineer Regiment (minus the 1st and 4th /battalions/) and the 11th and 12th engineer obstacle clearing battalions, will be in reserve for the front and armies for the clearing of obstacles and demolitions on the routes while the troops are moving forward and occupying the departure position for the offensive.

Operational camouflage measures.

By wide use of camouflage measures and simulation of dummy positions, sitting areas, and airfields, the enemy is to be deceived as to the strength of the forces and means of the forward covering units and of the main groupings of the first operational echelon armies, their disposition, and the concept of the combat actions.

Control of the forces and means of the forward units of the covering troops and the front main forces during their deployment.

Control over the combat actions of the covering troops of the front (armies) will be exercised from fixed and protected command posts and forward control posts (FPF /field control posts/). The divisions occupying the cover zones (the 1st, 8th, and 23rd motorized rifle divisions) are to establish field control posts. The divisions which are to put regiments forward for cover are to establish forward command posts.

Control over the deployment of the main forces of the front and their occupation of the departure area for the offensive will be carried out from fixed protected command posts and field control posts. Control over air defense forces of the country will be accomplished from the fixed command post of the 6th Air Defense Corps, and of the front's air defense forces and means from fixed and protected command posts and field control posts. Control over front aviation will be accomplished from the air army's
command post, its combat control center, and control groups.

A front and Combined Baltic Fleet auxiliary control post will be established in the 4th Army zone to organize cooperation with the forces and means of the Combined Baltic Fleet. Operations groups of the Combined Baltic Fleet and 6th Corps of Air Defense of the Country will be at the front's command post.

VII. Critique of the lesson -- 10 minutes.

The director of the training group will announce the subject and the training objectives of the lesson and conduct a thorough analysis of the students' reports. He will mark the positive aspects and analyze the deficiencies. He will determine the degree of preparedness of the students for the lessons and the quality of the reports.