MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: Report

11 April 1977

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Intelligence Information Special Report

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SUMMARY:

This report is a translation of a Polish document classified SECRET entitled "A Draft of a Critique of Exercise "SHIELD-76" by the Minister of National Defense." This document first discusses the ideological and political context within which Exercise "SHIELD-76" was conducted, then reviews the purposes, the conduct, and the results of the various operations carried out in the exercise. Constant comparison is made with NATO capabilities and emphasis is laid on efforts to counter anticipated NATO moves and advantages. The minister concludes that the exercise demonstrated the success of efforts to unify the Warsaw Pact armies and standardize their equipment.

END OF SUMMARY
Exercise "SHIELD-76" took place during an unusually eventful period. The socialist countries, guided by the immutable Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence, stubbornly persist in acting in favor of detente in international relations. However, these efforts are met by counter-action originating with influential militaristic and cold war circles of imperialism.

The form of the actual attitude of these circles toward detente and a peculiar type of negation of the European Conference for Security and Cooperation resolution is the demonstrably stepped up training activity of the armed forces of the NATO countries. The number and scope of the exercises, at the divisional level upward, has grown. The annual "AUTUMN FORGE" exercises, conducted, like last year, according to a unified strategic plan, range over large areas and put 260 thousand soldiers, about 1500 aircraft, and 400 ships in an active combat-training status.* There is actually no notification of their total scope. They are accompanied by a great propaganda uproar and an anti-communist and anti-Soviet psychosis.

* "AUTUMN FORGE-75" involved 200 thousand soldiers, about 1,000 aircraft, and 200 ships.
Noteworthy against this background is our own practice concerning the present "SHIELD-76" exercise, which is the first large coalition exercise of the Warsaw Pact forces since 1972. We have invited to it military observers from Finland, Sweden, Austria, and Denmark which is a NATO member nation. It is not, as the Western propaganda tries to insinuate, a "psychological and strategic counterbalance to the 'AUTUMN FORGE'". To the contrary, it is characterized by calmness and restraint. Its design and intention are in accord with the policy of peace and the security needs of the countries of the socialist commonwealth, and serve the idea of brotherhood of arms among our armed forces.

The aggressive imperialist forces, the military-industrial complexes, and the extreme rightist and "leftist" elements are emphatically opposed to peaceful coexistence. The adventurous, cynical, and degenerate activity of the Chinese leadership is in full agreement with them. This faces us with the consideration that, in addition to the basic line of class division between socialism and capitalism derived from irreconcilable ideological and socio-political differences, there is also another--and in today's world very real--stratum dividing the adherents of detente and peaceful coexistence from their opponents.

Historically significant in the struggle for peace were the conferences of the communist and workers' parties of the socialist commonwealth countries and also the Conference of the European Communist and Workers' Parties. They clearly affirmed the will to continue the Leninist policy of peace and designated new tasks so that: "detente would become a continuing, ever more viable, all-inclusive and general process."*

* From the Resolution of the Conference of the European Communist and Workers' Parties.
Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, comrade Leonid Brezhnev declared at the 25th Congress that the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries "do everything possible in order to guarantee conditions for peaceful construction, and for the peace and security of all nations. We will continue this policy--said comrade Brezhnev--with redoubled energy, determined to establish control over the forces of war and aggression, to consolidate universal peace, and to guarantee the rights of nations to freedom, independence, and social progress."

It is precisely these words from the lips of comrade Brezhnev--a leader of such a great international authority--that have a special weight. They are supported and affirmed by the whole might of the Soviet Union, the combat strength of its brave army, our great ally, performing the decisive role in the defense system of the socialist commonwealth.

The world constantly progresses; the objective development of humanity means development of socialism and social progress. The spheres of domination of imperialism and its capabilities to influence the shape and countenance of the contemporary world are irreversibly shrinking. An excellent example of this is the historic victory of the heroic Vietnamese people and, lately, the victory of progressive forces in Angola.

The crisis of the capitalist system has, however, not weakened its military potential and has not interrupted the tempo of the arms race. The capitalist countries continue to stimulate the anti-detente tendencies supported by NATO cold war circles. Seen in this light, the dragging out of the Vienna negotiations by the NATO member countries actually hurried the build-up of their armed forces.
The United States allocates tremendous means for the enlargement and extensive modernization of its strategic nuclear potential, particularly of a new generation of missiles. At the same time, the U.S. is building up its reserves and, specifically, not only those in Europe but also the dual-based forces planned for use in the European theater of war; the U.S. is improving the organization of its forces and is working energetically on new weapons and equipment.

The United States is strengthening its hegemony and is pressing its allies to increase their armaments effort, particularly the qualitative development of their armed forces. This coincides fully with the West German doctrine, the so-called low technological threshold, which counts and relies on attaining superiority over the Warsaw Pact countries in the field of designing and producing modern combat technology. This doctrine expresses the aspiration of the military circles of the Federal Republic of Germany and aims at further enhancement of the role of the Bundeswehr, which constitutes the conventional pillar of the NATO integrated military structure.

Other countries, too--particularly Great Britain and France--actively participate in the process of arming and qualitatively expanding their conventional forces while, at the same time, equipping them fully with modern combat technology.

Our exercise offered us still another opportunity to make an analysis and assess the capabilities and estimated intentions of our adversary in the Western theater of military operations.

The NATO armed forces are seen as being almost at their full strength, receiving ever growing amounts of modern combat technology and possessing a high degree of alert and mobilization readiness. Deployment of troops with the idea
of a swift attack by strong groupings in selected directions, well developed infrastructure, a developed command system, and a high degree of professionalism, give the NATO armed forces the capability of initiating military action without a lengthy period of preparation.

The adversary is, therefore, strong; at the same time, he is expanding his military potential and will be able to introduce new technological advances quickly. He combines his calculations with the utilization of scientific findings, particularly in the field of electronics (including quantum electronics) and technical engineering; he is counting on this type of a technological surprise and what follows it--a change in the relationship of forces.

Taking the above into consideration, we can understand the threat not only as a state of real tension, but, primarily, as a true measure of today's and, above all, of tomorrow's military potential of our adversary. In this sense, we can assert once again that the danger is still actual and that it demands constant vigilance and the strengthening of our defense capability. This was taken up in the stewardship report at the IX Congress by the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party, comrade Erich Honecker: "Because of the unabated aggression of imperialism, the armaments race forced on us by the ruling imperialist circles, and the open and dangerous attempts to undermine the process of detente, the decisive guarantee of lasting assurance of peace is and continues to be...the unceasing strengthening of defense readiness."

Exercise "SHIELD-76" has, in my opinion, served this purpose well.
Comrades:

Exercise "SHIELD-76" has anticipated and enriched our coalitional training achievement under conditions closest possible to combat. We have taken a step along the path leading to enlarging and deepening our knowledge on possible circumstances which could result in outbreak of armed conflict, on the possible and plausible variety of situations under which this conflict could appear in its preliminary phase. We have gained here interesting materiel for new, both theoretical and practical, suggestions.

Situations pictured by the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, comrade Lt. Gen. Florian Siwicki compose one of the possible versions of contemporary military action. We have incorporated in this version our common experiences gained by all of our armies and particularly—as we always do—the richest, real and historical experiences of the Soviet Army to whom the leading role naturally belongs in the development of socialist military art and science.

The exercise was intended to improve the capability of the troops to repel enemy aggression which develops in stages. At first, it occurred in a conventional form. At that stage, the enemy counted on the success of an initial mass attack by air and tank forces of the advance large tactical units from the first echelon positions of the attacking force. When, however, as a result of resolute defensive and above all, offensive counter-activity of the exercise forces, the opponents' plan failed, the combat activity suddenly changed radically and entered the next, nuclear phase.

We have accepted one of the many probable variants on how the war and border engagements may have begun. They were characterized by considerable maneuvering on both sides.
Graphic illustration in the exercise of just this type of activities during the numerous episodes staged by the troops made it possible to clearly and realistically discern the outline of an initial battle and to deepen our understanding of contemporary operational and tactical problems.

The staged variant of the initial armed conflict clearly exposed that one of the primary and principal tasks of the commands, staffs and troops is to win the struggle for the initiative, for the free opportunity to use ones' own forces, from the enemy. The decision of the Front commander was aimed at the execution of this task which was decisive to the outcome of the border battle; this decision was based on the defensive concept of opposing the enemy precisely where he had the greatest advantage and simultaneously to initiate a vigorous offensive aimed at crushing the primary forces of the enemy.

During the days preceding the outbreak of the conflict, the exercise staffs had diligently observed the initiatives of the enemy being certain that they would be capable of determining his intentions in time and specifically of utilizing the various symptomatic indicators in order to arrive at the probable method of attack and the time when it would take place.

The result of the initial encounter depends largely on the state in which we will find ourselves at the time. For this reason, therefore, we lay such great stress on the attainment of full combat readiness of the troops and on their operational deployment in response to a growing threat. We have assumed that the enemy, in preparing for aggression, has managed under the cloak of exercises to gain a certain advantage in deploying his main forces. He did not, however, succeed in surprising us. This allowed our exercise forces to properly plan an offensive operation and to successfully play out its first phase in a border battle despite the fact that during the first days the situation on the left flank of the Front was critical.
The Air Army was the first of the operational large units of the Front to be committed to battle; from the start, it in substance committed its total forces to action within the framework of the air operation in the theater of military operations. It was possible to do this thanks to the attainment of full combat readiness before the outbreak of hostilities and the timely avoidance of enemy strikes by redeploying to alternate airfields and road sector airstrips. In the region of NOWE LASKI we observed the great usefulness of one such sector in practice and the skillful and daring method of its utilization. We became convinced that preparing highway sectors to serve as airfields constitutes an efficient means of raising the capacity of airfield facilities, decentralization, and concealing the air force.

Participation of the air army in the air operation of the theater of military operations was the first basic combat action aimed at gaining initiative in the air and air superiority. At that stage, the air force concentrated its effort chiefly on combatting the opponent's aviation and overwhelming his missile and antiaircraft weapons. At NADARZYCE the fighter-bomber and fighter-aviation of the Polish Armed Forces demonstrated the execution of an effective strike on an enemy airfield that simultaneously blocked further use of the airfield.

The extensive use of air cover and air support that is a characteristic of the modern battlefield was graphically demonstrated during the exercise "SHIELD-76".

We also observed with satisfaction the further development of tactical flying capabilities and pilotage technique. Pilots of the fraternal armies have properly utilized the combat advantages of the equipment; they operated at various altitudes, particularly at low and very low altitudes; they applied diverse types of maneuvering and attacking and combatting [air] targets.
In the aerial portion of the exercise the participation of helicopters was particularly massive. In this, we see the realization of resolutions accepted at a meeting of the Committee of Defense Ministers in Moscow. Specifically verified as valid was the use of assault helicopters in the execution of various tasks—direct support of a tank assault, direct support of infantry and of tactical landings, and as antitank reserves. Helicopters armed with antitank guided missiles were well represented among the fire support helicopters. The prospects for the future development of this type of combat were demonstrated by our Soviet comrades in Mi-24 helicopters armed with a new generation of guided antitank missiles. The exercise confirmed that by combining the good points of tanks and infantry combat vehicles with the good points of tactical and combat assault helicopters we can attain a highly maneuverable and very powerful air and land assault fire combination of high tactical significance. It should be stressed here that in almost every situation played out during the exercise many other noteworthy methods of using helicopters became apparent, for instance, for command and observation, mining for maneuver purposes, detection of contamination, evacuation of wounded personnel and damaged equipment. The use of helicopters in night operations should also be stressed. Doubtlessly, as additional existing possibilities for using helicopters, we could mention such examples as the elimination of obstacles by detonation, the laying of smoke screens, the delivery of specially significant ammunition to the battlefield, e.g., missiles, etc.

The widespread use of helicopters requires the training of the troops in a way that will guarantee the synchronization of this valuable means with the tanks and the infantry exactly as this is done with regard to other support means. At the same time, taking into consideration the fact that the NATO troops in Europe are equipped with large numbers of armed helicopters, we must emphasize the need for further training of our troops to effectively combat this dangerous means. Some methods of combatting the helicopters were demonstrated by units of our armies in the BIEDRUSKO, OKONEK, ZAGAN, and SWIETOSZOW training areas.

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One of the noteworthy characteristics of exercise "SHIELD-76" was the great number of assault landing operations, some of which were actually carried out. Almost every decision was related to the use of assault landings and we observed their execution both as a part of a battle—as in the case of the forced crossing of the Oder River, and as a part of an operation—as in the case of closing the encirclement ring at the SWIETOSZOW training area.

The tactical landing of an airborne regiment of the Soviet Army revealed the excellent training of the soldiers and the possibilities of the technique employed to execute and support the landing. A skillful landing followed by an equally skillful operation was carried out with an unusually high level of proficiency. A regiment with full combat equipment landed and then executed an active combat operation.

Air superiority which is a prerequisite for full utilization of aviation potential is impossible without prior neutralization of the antiaircraft defense of the enemy. This defense, which is closely incorporated into the theater of military operations infrastructure and groupings of troops thereby creating a uniform multilayer system of missile fire, antiaircraft guns, mounted and sharpshooter weapons that are equipped with radioelectronic means of detection and guidance and which is coordinated with fighter aviation operations, constitutes a massive barrier which is difficult to overcome. In the future, we can expect to be faced with a further increase in its power after the enemy has introduced a new generation of missile and artillery antiaircraft means.

As heretofore, the main burden of neutralizing enemy antiaircraft defense rests with the air forces, particularly deep within the enemy's defensive dispositions. But the seriousness of this problem raises it to the rank of a combined arms problem. It must not be treated as something casual,
incidental, as a consequence of the overall neutralization of the enemy's defense, or as defense in general. We can assert with satisfaction that our staffs and troops are devoting more and more attention to finding a solution to this unusually vital task. This found expression in the decisions of commanders, particularly at the operational level, which defined how to allocate national air defense targets for neutralization, designated the necessary means, and coordinated the operation of forces charged with creating some type of a breach in the antiaircraft defense system of the enemy. However, it appears that working out and mastering methods for clearing a path for aviation across the antiaircraft barriers by employment of firepower, raiding action by special tank and armored groups, reconnaissance-sabotage activity, and in other ways, has become one of the important training tasks for our armed forces.

Neutralization of a strong opponent in a conventional war assigned high importance to firepower. Therefore, there is a growing need for firepower, particularly with increased range, intensity, and effectiveness. And although there has been a tremendous increase of firepower since World War II there is frequently a feeling in operational calculations that there is a unique lack of it. This problem is being resolved both through the normal improvement in equipment and by raising the skill with which it is used and through the improvement of organizational solutions in the sphere of fire direction assuring its comprehensiveness and flexible concentration at a precisely given place and time. Excellent results of a "fire policy" such as this could be observed during our exercise. The cardinal principle of concentration of fire control in the hands of the combined arms commander, the real organizer of combat operations, was once again confirmed.

We should stress in this context that one of the specific characteristics of the "SHIELD-76" exercise was the exceptionally extensive firing of combat ammunition usually in connection
with fire strikes from the air. Their results testified to the generally high level of fire training of the soldiers and the skill of the commanders who directed the fire. We should specify at this time that the combat and material value of each rocket, missile, and bomb points to special responsibility for the proper selection of more productive and optimum methods of training, and, in time of combat, of the proper direction and economic "management" of fire.

The period requiring particular synchronization of various types of fire with the movement of ground forces is during a breakthrough.

The defense of our potential adversary includes great firepower which is in depth and maneuverable; it is oriented toward active counteraction, particularly against tanks and against aviation. For instance, the antitank armorment of a West German mechanized division allows weapons density of 65 pieces per kilometer of the defense belt of a division. In addition, other means are utilized in antitank combat, among them the "Lars" tube rocket launchers. Further modernization of the antitank means of the NATO forces continues, particularly, their missilization. Even today the level to which the enemy forces are equipped with second generation antitank weapons is quite high and by the end of the seventies, third generation laser means ("Hellfire") and AIOA assault aircraft armed with guns firing antitank projectiles with uranium cores may be available.

All this makes the problem of a breakthrough in which neutralization of antitank defense becomes a basic condition of success even more critical. It is worth noting here that through the extensive introduction and particularly through the constant updating of antitank guided missiles, the qualitative improvement of antitank means from the standpoint of firing range and accuracy is progressing today at a relatively faster pace than the qualitative improvement of tank equipment. Our armies are heavily weighted with tanks.
and can attain their full offensive potential only when we
manage to break the antitank barrier which is put in their
path. This means that in the breakthrough sector we must
destroy or neutralize a much larger number of targets,
including armored targets and mobile fire means.

In their decisions and plans the commands and staffs
have shown proper understanding for this unusually important
aspect of a breakthrough.

During the exercise our troops smashed several defense
lines of the enemy which differed from each other mainly in
their degree or organization of the fire plan, engineer
preparation of the terrain and saturation with troops and
obstacles. This diversity of defense coupled with appropriate
methods of implementation--positional or mobile--was not
without influence on the determination of methods for breaking
through the defense, although this was not particularly
strongly in evidence. The basic method consisted of the
concentration of the attack from the march of tank and
mechanized units supported by strong artillery, aircraft,
and helicopter fire. However, we have failed to demonstrate--
chiefly of because of training area limitations--the broader
maneuver of bypassing strong points in conjunction with
short and violent strikes, particularly where the enemy
defense was characterized by improvised organization.

The whole complicated mechanism of operations aimed at
breaking through enemy defenses, their versatility in using
all arms of troops to support and provide security for the
tank strike groupings were clearly brought out by the 18th
Tank Division of the Czechoslovak People's Army in the
BORNE-SULINOWO training area and by the 30th Armored Division
of the Polish Armed Forces in the BUCIERZ area. But the
next phase of the war was dominated by meeting engagements.
On the last day of the exercise, we observed interesting operations
executed by units of the 40th Armored Division of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic, primarily, dynamic and powerful strikes by the 50th Armored Division of the Soviet Army which crushed the strong reserves of the enemy and created conditions for the final closing of the encirclement ring.

Even the best planned and prepared breakthroughs are always decided by the direct operations of the troops—both units and subunits, crews of combat vehicles and individual soldiers. In the final analysis, it is tactics and combat skill which are decisive in the implementation of operational plans. It is for this reason that we ascribe such importance to improvement of tactics at all contact points. The practical expression of this in the exercise was the significance which we ascribed to the strike method which culminated in this attack. An element worth our attention is the widespread utilization of infantry combat vehicles. They constitute a means of battle of unusually high tactical-technical merit. Their use doubtlessly enriches qualitative tactical capabilities. Experience gained in the exercise should be utilized for the improvement of the utilization of infantry combat vehicles, particularly, their coordination with tanks.

An unusually responsible role in the dynamic training operations was exercised by tank and combat vehicle mechanic-drivers and the drivers of transportation means. Their skills contributed to the high tempo of operational progress under various difficult terrain conditions or under limited or even minimal visibility. They deserve special recognition.

During certain portions of the exercise, great consideration was given to clearing a path for the troops, particularly, in neutralizing mine obstacles and in forced crossings of water obstacles. The troops in the exercise demonstrated skill in going through obstacles using various methods and means. There is, however, a need for further progress.

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in this field, particularly, because there has been rapid progress in means and methods of preparing obstacles. For instance, obstacles dropped by launchers and helicopters, can unexpectedly halt troop movement. This motivates us to make an effort to search for ways and means of enabling our combat vehicles, particularly tanks, through organic capabilities, to clear obstacles without calling for specialized assistance. This does not, of course, minimize the necessity of continuing the improvement of organizational, tactical, and technical capabilities of the special elements of groupings which are designed to clear a path. Methods of overcoming mine obstacles from the march were demonstrated very interestingly by the 18th Armored Division of the Czechoslovak People's Army. In an effective action, the 30th Armored Division of the Polish Armed Forces utilized path clearing units which were capable of overcoming all sorts of obstacles and ensuring the smooth movement of first echelon subunits.

Because of the operational and tactical significance of water obstacles and the large number of rivers and canals in the middle of the European theater of military operations, we ascribe great importance to the creation of conditions and acquisition of skills to overcome them. It is worth commenting from the sidelines that a "civilized management" of territory manifests itself currently, among other things, in increasing the number of water obstacles which present difficulty for a forced crossing. An example of the above is the newly-constructed navigable South-North canal in the Federal Republic of Germany--presently a water obstacle second in importance after the Elbe and located 30-70 km from the western border of the German Democratic Republic.

We can state with pleasure that commanders of the training operational and tactical large units properly resolved the problems of overcoming water obstacles. They tended to break up the enemy at approaches to the river, barred movement toward the river by his reserves, and organized the seizure of bridgeheads along the whole front by assault and separat
units; they assured the rapid commitment of main forces to the water obstacle, its prompt conquest, and decisive attack by troops through an appropriate maneuver on the opposite shore. For this purpose, they skillfully amalgamated an air operation, an assault landing, the engineer troops, artillery, and armored and mechanized units.

Considerable forced crossing skill was demonstrated by units of the 50th Armored Division of the Soviet Army. Particularly impressive were the tempo of the attack, excellent coordination and synchronization of all elements, and the abundance of water and river-crossing craft. Using equipment found at the site, subunits of the 40th Armored Division of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic skillfully accomplished a forced crossing of the river.

Forced crossings revealed once again the high combat readiness and moral and spiritual fiber of the tank and amphibious vehicle drivers. The dedicated work of the combat engineers has, as always, called for admiration.

The troops involved in the exercise operated under practically every type of terrain condition, although the nature of the training areas did not allow simulated combat in inhabited and urbanized areas which are so characteristic of the Western theater of military operations. Preparation of commands and staffs, and especially of the troops, for operation in just such areas continues to be a serious problem.

Considering the influence of urbanized regions on troop operations, I would like to call attention to the subject of the tempo of attack. In our exercise in addition, of course, to enemy resistance we have taken into consideration a whole series of factors which contribute negatively to the tempo,
namely--characteristics of the natural environment and results of the civilizing transformations of it together with possibilities of terrain deformation following nuclear blasts, etc. As a result, we attained a moderate and, actually thanks to it, a rather realistic tempo of troop activity.

To maintain the attack tempo requires the development of an operation basically without any interruption--during the night as well, primarily to gain control of favorable positions which then can be a jump-off place for further strong daytime operations. It is, therefore, necessary to consider night operations as completely natural even though they necessarily require the troops to have special knowledge of the situation, high maneuver and fire skills, and greater endurance and mental firmness. These abilities are useful in any case under conditions of limited visibility caused by overcast skies which is so frequent in our climate, by the haziness of the battlefield, and by the clouds of dust which are particularly troublesome and which are caused by the firing of the assault means and by the movement of combat equipment.

In considering the nighttime operations by units of the 30th Armored Division in the vicinity of GORA HETMANSKA, we became convinced of their effectiveness in providing new experiences for the further training of the troops. The problem of vital significance for frontline troops was transition to nuclear warfare and particularly the execution of a first nuclear strike. In our exercise we had assumed that the enemy would reach for the nuclear weapon only when the advantage factor was no longer in his favor and his first echelon forces were threatened with complete breakup while his reserves were still capable of actively exploiting the results of nuclear strikes.

The decision to resort to nuclear weapons found the Front and the army commanders and staffs well prepared. The plan for a first nuclear strike which was constantly being
updated, the constant search for symptoms of enemy readiness to use atomic weapons, additional reconnaissance of targets immediately prior to the strike, and the high readiness of missile units, aviation, and radioelectronic means assured the effectiveness of the first strike. As a result, the enemy suffered great losses and failed to achieve planned objectives, and the Front troops, although weakened, were still in condition to continue the offensive operation.

Offensive operations constituted the main part of the exercise. We, however, devoted equally as much effort to defense, planning and creating realistic exercise conditions which would combine these two basic types of operation. The forces and means at the disposal of our troops make possible the organization of a strong overall defense. Our defense is capable of offering strong resistance both to powerful attacks by the enemy's armored-mechanized groupings and to strikes by his air forces.*

* The efficiency of modern defense means, particularly against armor, is testified to by the well known example in the Israeli-Egyptian war, which illustrated the destruction in but a few minutes of 85 Israeli tanks in the battle of EL-FIRDAN in October 1973 (data from Soviet sources); it was accomplished by the use of "MALYUTKA" antitank guided missiles, RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers, SPG-9 recoilless guns, and armed helicopters.
We were able to observe types of defense in conjunction with obstacles involving a different degree of engineer preparation, but, in all instances, having at their disposal an organized system of fire by all means, particularly antitank fire, on the one hand, an example of perimeter defense conducted by a mechanized regiment of the 14th Mechanized Division of the Polish Armed Forces (a previously prepared defense), and on the other hand, in the form of support provided by a mechanized regiment of the 18th Armored Division of the Czechoslovak People's Army to the 30th Armored Division of the Polish Armed Forces during its commitment to battle. Another case observed was in the form of a positional defense against repeated counterattacks (a hastily organized defense). In our estimation, all these operations were correctly executed. Our troops are capable of organizing and implementing a resolute, active, and effective defense. Experiences gained in exercise "SHIELD-76" will doubtlessly aid in the further improvement of these skills.

Increasing significance must be attached under contemporary conditions to providing the troops with antiaircraft cover. During the last five years, the introduction into the arsenal of the NATO air forces of certain new, modernized types of aircraft has increased the conventional salvo power of tactical aviation in the mid- and north European theaters of military operations by 50 percent. This power will increase even more when new airplanes are introduced, as it is expected, in the next five years. But, such a simple calculation is today no longer satisfactory. Aviation salvo power must presently be measured by another yardstick. The result of equipping aircraft with electronic, including laser sights, "self-guided" bombs, aerial fuel bombs, pellet bombs, etc., will be that the accuracy and salvo power of the tactical aviation of our potential enemy will rise both in quality and efficiency.
Thus, the problem of air cover is growing more acute. The antiaircraft defense task, its organization, and its implementation became evident during the exercise very frequently, was presented soberly and resolved correctly and, in some instances, even ingeniously. This pertains, for example, to the organization of improvised antiaircraft defense units charged with the execution of tasks in specific situations; it also pertains to creation, at the army and front levels, of mobile rocket reserves transported by helicopters which made it possible to change the main antiaircraft defense effort without displacement of the launchers. First of all, however, we must stress the fact that it was thanks to Soviet deliveries made in the last several years that tremendous qualitative growth occurred in antiaircraft defense fire capabilities—due primarily to their considerable missilization. After the implementation of the provisions of the current five-year plan, these capabilities will again increase significantly in comparison with their current status. Experience gained and recommendations made on the basis of our exercise will doubtlessly aid in the correct utilization of this potential.

Exercise "SHIELD-76" constituted an important test of systems and methods of command in complicated situations—in confrontation with a powerful, active, and cunning enemy. The command-staff activity of the exercise participants showed at all levels those characteristics and traits which we recognize as attributes essential to the contemporary commander. I want particularly to single out the understanding shown by the exercise participants of the significance of the struggle for time, anticipation of the probable action of the enemy, and the attempt to force our own will on him. The search for variants of the most effective utilization of our own forces and means should also be stressed.

This resulted in making decisions that as a rule were bold and original and at the same time carefully adjusted to suit the reality of the situation. As an example, we may site the decision to close the ring around a sizeable enemy
grouping which was connected with a change of the operational direction of part of the force of the first echelon of the Front and the earlier commitment to battle of the second echelon. The decisions of the army commanders accurately implemented this decision of the Front commander which was reflected in the methods used for forming attacking groups and in their maneuver plan. Commanders of the tactical large units also effectively controlled the forces, thereby quite frequently revealing an imaginative application of regulation principles. Commanders whose troops actually participated in the operations showed a high degree of organizational maturity which was expressed in energetic command actions.

Our present system and the equipment of our command points insures continuous and effective command in various situations. Its main foundation is communications. The communications nets and circuits which were deployed during the exercise were based on a rich assortment of modern means. They assured multi-channel and, in certain instances, protected communications that fulfilled contemporary command requirements. Its efficient functioning was the result of the expert work of military signal personnel and civilian employees.

At tactical levels, the main base of command posts are sets of mobile armored combat and special vehicles and airborne means. I would like to stress, on this occasion, that airborne command elements are gradually becoming an indispensable component of command post function at tactical as well as operational levels; we are anticipating utilization on a broader scale of helicopters as airborne observation posts since they proved to be very effective, for instance, in controlling the combat of first echelon tank regiments of the 30th Armored Division by their commanders in the area of the town of BUCIERZ. At tactical levels, the situation may be considered to be completely satisfactory. Improvement of this system today is chiefly due to its being equipped with reliable protected communications. The situation at the operational level is not quite so clear. During our exercise, we observed several variations of the use of different mobile and stationary elements of command posts. Many initiatives and very interesting
solutions regarding command posts and forward command posts of the Front and command posts of the 21st and 22d Armies deserve to be mentioned. All this constitutes a significant step forward and evidences a creative and active approach of commands and staffs and scientific and technical workers to this unusually important problem. However, we are still faced with additional problems. I avail myself of the opinions of the comrade ministers of defense attending the exercise and wish to stress the necessity for further research. Its objective should be first, to broaden the scope of utilizing mobile and armored command means which would be built on a stronger basis than the current one, e.g., WTLB [expansion unknown], and, secondly: to further simplify and speed up staff work procedures, limit the size of staffs, and standardize their equipment.

All this simultaneously stresses the importance of the joint allied efforts the need for a systematic and operative interchange of experiences, and the strengthening of coordination. Our exercise served those particular purposes well, especially the strong emphasis on its command and staff aspects.

The combat work methods used by the staffs participating in the exercise accorded with the principle of operative and flexible command. Certain progress was made in the ability to evaluate and compare the qualitative relation of forces in staff proposals; the principle of parallelism of staff work was observed; an effort was made to allow subordinates maximum possible time; frequent personal contacts took place between the commanders and staff officers and their subordinate commanders and troops. The compiled combat documentation evidenced an appropriate level of training and a concise and precise content.

Also in evidence was a serious and advanced effort to combine traditional staff work with elements of the automated command system. The solutions utilized, the elements of which we had examined, at the command post of the 22d Army constitute in reality a step along the path to practical implementation.
of the field automated troop command system in accordance with suggestions made during meetings of the Defense Ministers Committee which took place in Sofia and Prague.

The "SHIELD-76" exercise revealed the profound extent of our coalitional cooperation. Troops of four allied armies, connected by a common goal with the framework of a larger operational large unit, jointly implemented complicated tasks. This demonstrated high coalitional maturity, particularly the uniformity of our operational art, our tactics, and our training methods.

Cooperation is classed as one of the highest among command and staff skills. Organization of cooperation is really a creation of our very own combat and operational scenarios. The cooperation itself is in effect a systematic, operative, and flexible implementation of those scenarios.

The exercises provide a good illustration of situations showing the multidimensionality of modern cooperation in its various aspects, between allies, between neighbors, between arms of troops and branches of the armed forces, between elements of groupings, etc.

The principles that were applied in practice and on a broad scale were defined in an instruction which was issued by the Combined Armed Forces staff on the organization and conduct of joint Combined Armed Forces exercises and provided for the training commands and staffs the requisite conditions for the correct and harmonious coordination and unification of the coalitional effort for the implementation of the training tasks.

In summing up we can assert that all of the commands and staffs of the coalition pact participating in the exercise were capable of correctly resolving the problems of cooperation and revealed much original thinking and initiative in this field.
An important role played in our exercise, although it was not so clearly evident in the practical episodes, was that of reconnaissance. We can state with satisfaction that the training effort and the improved and more modern equipment brought us clear gains, and the results of reconnaissance provided an ever better basis for the making of proper decisions. The use of better methods of camouflage, disinformation, and electronic countermeasures and the fluidity which is so characteristic of the situation on a contemporary battlefield all require a continuing, penetrating, and aggressive reconnaissance to determine enemy initiatives and intent, a constant "watching of his hands". This categorical requirement was basically met by the command and staffs participating in the exercise. A whole system of reconnaissance means was set in motion including radioelectronic reconnaissance which is being recognized as one of the most important elements in contemporary reconnaissance. As a result, the wealth of reconnaissance information gathered by the various levels of command made possible an accurate estimate of the forces and forecast the intent of the enemy.

The abundance, and at the same time fluidity, fragmentation, and frequent contradiction of data from reconnaissance pushes to the forefront the matter of teaching the skill of data selection and data evaluation. It would also be very useful if reconnaissance information were channeled into the decision centers in a verified form, most closely related to reality. We have presented one possible methodology for teaching this skill to our comrades by a special demonstration.

While ascribing great importance to our own reconnaissance, we also appreciate the problem of combating enemy reconnaissance. It has at its disposal great capabilities, particularly technical ones, which assure the procurement of many diverse types of information both during the day and at night. The enemy is conducting work on the development of reconnaissance means particularly electronic, including laser, night vision...
photographic reconnaissance means mounted either on the ground or on aircraft.* Therefore, we must be well aware of the intentions and capabilities of the enemy in this regard and must counteract them appropriately. An important element of this counteraction is operational concealment, the undertaking of which was included in the plan worked out by the Front staff. Among actions actually implemented, I wish to stress the successful construction of a make-believe Front command post and an imaginatively camouflaged highway landing strip.

Radioelectronic warfare is beginning to occupy an ever more important position in the operational and combat support of military action. The electronic battlefield created in the "SHIELD-76" exercise enabled the commanders and corresponding staff units participating in the exercise to demonstrate their rather impressive skills. The attempt to subordinate radioelectronic warfare to the goal of the operation and its integration and coordination with the physical destruction of enemy targets deserves a positive mention; this was particularly true with regard to air operations in the theater of military operations and during the first nuclear strike which occupied over 70 percent of the radioelectronic warfare forces and means. A less important matter is, of course, to avoid enemy destruction of our own means. Also worth mentioning is the capability of the enemy to mount deception operations. Mass "radioelectronic strikes" can create a dilemma with regard to making crucial political and strategic decisions and subsequent initiation of operational decisions to repulse aggression. In the exercise we staged one of the possible variants of radioelectronic strikes as an element which precedes aggressive enemy action by several hours. Its essence was to start mass jamming and provocative

* For example, the reconnaissance system on the "F4L" aircraft importantly broadens reconnaissance capabilities under conditions of limited visibility.
flights by aircraft in the direction of the border, the objective of which was to cause premature commitment of the air army so that it would not be capable of handling the actual first air strike. The assessments, decisions, and activity of the Front command and staff were proper and correct in this situation.

In the simulated exercise situations, appropriate regard was also given to tasks of defense against weapons of mass destruction. Operational combat and emergency-rescue activities were treated as a single undertaking. This expressed itself, on one hand, in a consistent drive toward implementation of the main goal of the operation and, on the other hand, in the actual rescuing of people, the recovery of combat equipment and evacuation. It is known that under conditions of mutual employment of nuclear weapons victory will to to the one who is better prepared, who is first to take advantage of the results of his own nuclear strikes, who recovers more rapidly from a nuclear strike and who, at the same, displays greater initiative in restoring the combat capabilities of his own forces. High organizational proficiency in liquidating the results of nuclear strikes was demonstrated by a tank battalion of the 40th Armored Division of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic. Thanks to a many-sided and well-planned procedure which resulted in a unique rescue operation, the tank battalion regained combat readiness through utilization, among other things, of part of a divisional reserve battalion.

The work of a medical battalion and of divisional mobile maintenance workshops was also demonstrated in an interesting way.

The force and vigor shown in the exercise clearly demonstrated the tremendous scope and complexity of requirements to "feed" the battlefield of today. Satisfaction of these requirements is all the more difficult under conditions of
coalitional operations when we have to deal with not only operational but also tactical large units composed of different nationalities. In 1974, the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces introduced organizational principles on rear services supply of the allied forces during the conduct of joint operations. The size of the problem is illustrated by the estimated preparatory need of the exercise for daily utilization of 20-25 thousand tons of supplies, the provision of medical assistance under conventional conditions to 8 thousand and, after the use of nuclear weapons, to 26 thousand wounded, and the current maintenance of mechanized vehicles of all types amounting to 5 thousand and 3 1/2 thousand, respectively. A thousand tons of supplies were actually delivered to the exercising forces daily and transport, the system of feeding the troops, and the necessary inspection and maintenance of equipment functioned properly. The above quoted figures delimit the effort of rear services support during present-day military operations. For this reason, it appears indicated for us to refer to the principle--applicable both in peacetime and in wartime--of rational administration of supplies, particularly and specifically of ammunition which is costly and in short supply.

In summing up, we consider that both the preparatory and the actual work of the rear services during the exercise fulfilled the requirements and was generally efficient.

I have already referred today to the high quality of armaments and equipment which was so well utilized during the exercise. The most modern armament consisted chiefly of SU-20, MiG-23, IL-76 airplanes; Mi-24 helicopters; KUB missile systems; "STRELA-1M", "STRELA-2M"; "GVOZDIKA" self-propelled artillery; infantry combat vehicles; and many other types of combat and supporting equipment. The outstanding characteristic of this equipment is its mobility and capability to support troops with constant and effective fire.
From this point of view, exercise "SHIELD-76" presents an excellent illustration of the period of serious qualitative changes which has taken place in the last 5-year period in our armed forces. We can expect other changes to occur, particularly in the direction of reliability and effectiveness of the equipment, among other things, through further automation of its usage.

The technical up-to-dateness of the Warsaw Pact armies is consistently maintained at the required high level and is definitely the result of the work of scientists, designers, technicians, and workers of the Soviet defense industry and a consequence of the fraternal and internationalistic attitude of the Soviet Union toward our defense needs. It is also, to an appropriate extent, the result of growing scientific cooperation and coordination of the defense industries of the individual Warsaw Pact countries and of common decisions regarding the standardization of armaments and their mutual deliveries within the CEMA framework.

Speaking about the modern character of our armies, I wish to mention the distinguished participation by the USSR Minister of National Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov now present among us, during the war and then in peacetime in creating the material basis for the power of the Soviet Army. Moreover, there is no way how we can enlarge on his personal role in the extension of fraternal aid given by the Land of the Soviets to the People's Polish Armed Forces and to the other people's armies.

COMRADES;

Troops of four armies participated in the "SHIELD-76" exercise, but they were bound by one ideology, followed one and the same art of war, and carried one and the same kind of weapons--and herein lies our strength.
The exercise was a real examination of the political and combat maturity of our commanders, staff teams, and the soldier collectives of our fraternal armies. The attitude displayed by the participants in the exercise allows us to assert with full confidence and satisfaction that they have satisfactorily passed this difficult examination.

"The basis of unity and cooperation of the states of the socialist commonwealth", as was stressed by Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, comrade Gustav Husak at the XV Congress of the Czechoslovak Communists, "is the firm combat alliance of the Marxist-Leninist parties of those countries." The internationalistic line of our parties was the political basis of the exercise.

The party political work done among the participating troops created an atmosphere of discipline and combat commitment. The contents of the work propagated above all the idea of brotherhood of arms, friendship, and internationalism.

The Interallied Political Team assured an efficient unification of efforts of party-political organs in numerous organizational and propaganda ventures in a good visual propaganda form.

Soldier meetings, friendship rallies, and meetings with the population will result in a strengthened brotherhood of arms among the soldiers of the Warsaw Pact and in the consolidation of internationalistic bonds between our nations.

The interest and help of the provincial party and administrative organization in implementing political programs undertaken during the exercise was clearly evident. The ceremony of renaming three schools--"Hero of the Soviet Union, Guards Major Anatoliy Malikhov"; "Polish-Czechoslovak Friendship"; and "German Antifascist Fighters"--was symbolic.
Direct contact of soldiers participating in the exercise with the numerous reminders of heroic battles of Soviet and Polish soldiers with Hitlerite fascism allowed them to personalize the sacrifices which were once made. This reinforced the historical consciousness of our young comrades and at the same time created the basis for the need for vigilance and stressed the significance of efforts on behalf of combat readiness of the armed forces of the socialist commonwealth which serves peace and security of the nations. "The future in Europe", asserted the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, comrade Edward Gierek at the VII Congress of our Party, "belongs to the forces of peace. The nations of our continent reject a return to the times of hate, conflicts, and wars. This demands constant vigilance and a refusal to compromise with the forces of reaction, cold war, and militarism".

Thus, the just concluded exercise, in the existing politico-military situation, is an indispensable stage in our defense efforts. We will fulfill our patriotic and internationalist obligation and will continue to strengthen the power and unity of the member states of the Warsaw Pact.

COMRADES;

On behalf of the defense ministers who are present here I affirm that we have attained the goals which we set out to attain in exercise "SHIELD-76" that this exercise will be for our armies a source of valuable inspiration, and that it will help us in strengthening our combat readiness and in perfecting interallied cooperation.

In conclusion I wish to extend hearty thanks to the exercise directors, the staff, umpire officers, and the simulation teams for their constructive efforts in the preparation and conduct of the exercise.
My hearty thanks go also to the participating commanders and staffs of the Soviet Army, the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic, the Czechoslovak People's Army, and the Polish Armed Forces for their energetic efforts, their proper performance, and for their imaginative handling of assigned tasks.

I wish to direct my particularly warm thanks to all the soldiers who participated in the exercise for their painstaking dedication, their exemplary attitude, and their praiseworthy representation of the socialist armies.

My heartfelt thanks go also to all the organizations and supporting workshops which accounted for their conscientious, unusually concrete, and useful contribution to the creation of appropriate conditions for the conduct of the exercise.

In the name of the directors of exercise "SHIELD-76", dear comrades, I extend most hearty wishes for continued fruitful efforts on behalf of the security of our nations for the good of peace and socialism.