MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Report

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William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

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After a review of the threat to the socialist system of Western policy, in general, and NATO, in particular, the author critiques the "Jesien II-73" exercise which was designed to test the effectiveness of coordinated command of all Polish air defense forces by the National Air Defense Forces. In order to demonstrate where improvements can be made, he stresses certain organizational and operational shortcomings of the exercise and makes appropriate recommendations.

End of Summary.
The process of detente evolving lately in international affairs is undoubtedly a hopeful development. It lessens the danger of direct armed confrontation, particularly, in Europe. It is not stable enough as yet to judge whether it will endure. Despite efforts to relax international tensions, dangerous trouble spots continue to smolder, many problems remain unresolved, and many solutions are mere truces, therefore temporary in nature. It suffices to point to the Near East, the Indian peninsula, and, of course, to Indochina. The adventurous and divisive anti-Soviet policies of China further complicate these problems. Let us not deceive ourselves. Imperialism has not changed its expansionist nature and has not retreated from its determination to regain lost positions. It responds to force, and yields, as in the case of Vietnam, only where the alignment of forces is not to its advantage; and even while yielding, it continues to bide its time, awaiting the development of a favorable situation in order to launch a new attack aimed at weakening the socialist system and at preventing it from spreading to other countries and continents.
This goal, among others, is the objective of the present Nixon doctrine. In line with the doctrine, the United States is trying to strengthen the political-military and social-psychological cohesiveness of the West by shifting more military responsibilities to her allies in support of its own and of the global interests of capitalism, and, in effect, to organize and coordinate the opposition of the capitalist countries to the growing influence of the socialist system and ideology throughout the world.

An example of brutal activities in defense of the interests of the capitalist world, and of opposition to progress in third world countries, was the coup of the generals in Chile, the murder of President Salvadore Allende, and the overthrow of the government of the People's Unity Front. The Chilean military junta, supported by its American patrons, and taking advantage of a 47-thousand-man army, stopped the progressive social-political transformation process of a nation of over ten million people.

On the military plane, the Nixon doctrine, currently expressed by exponents of Western centers of strategic studies in terms of "Arms Superiority" and "The Strategy of Persuasion", has a particularly anti-detente character.

In accordance with this trend, an intensive process of modernization of NATO armed forces accompanied by a sharp increase in armament spending has taken place recently. In 1971, the NATO countries allocated approximately 104.3 billion dollars for armament, and, in 1972, close to 114.6 billion dollars. During the same time, the European NATO countries allocated 27.4 billion dollars and 32.9 billion dollars respectively, an effective increase of approximately 20 percent. Judging by their projected military budgets for this year, it appears that the Atlantic Pact countries will continue to maintain their high rate of spending for armaments.
The United States and the European NATO countries are allocating their entire military budget increases to the development of strategic weapons and equipment, and to the procurement of modern missiles, aircraft and armor, that is, to armaments of an offensive nature. These moves are made under the pretext of an allegedly increasing threat to the West from the Warsaw Pact countries. The threat of war psychosis, despite the reputed relaxation of tensions, has become a convenient tool in the hands of the Western governments to disguise their military policies.

The process of detente has not produced any changes in the principal component elements of the threat to Poland. As before, this threat comes from NATO strategic and operational-tactical nuclear forces and combined NATO air forces.

The territory of our country lies within range of American intercontinental missiles (1054), strategic aircraft (USA-470, UK-48, France-50), nuclear missile submarines (USA-41, UK-4, France-2), and French strategic missiles (18 launchers). During the last two years, the number of nuclear warheads that major NATO countries could launch in a single salvo increased from 4,800 at the beginning of 1971, to approximately 6,000 by the end of 1972.

There was also an increase in the strength of the primary instrumentality of the first phase of a possible attack, i.e., the NATO air forces. During 1971-1972 alone, outdated aircraft in the NATO air forces were replaced by approximately 440 F-111, F-4, "Phantom", "Buccaneer" and "Harrier" aircraft. This amounts to a basic modernization of approximately 30 percent of the main tactical air strike arm in the NATO air forces in the Central European Theater of Military Operations. The significant growth of the bomb- and rocket-carrying capacity of these new aircraft also deserves emphasis. During this same period, the salvo of fire delivered by tactical aircraft of the potential enemy rose by more than 30 percent.
Outer space is gaining increased importance as a potential, generally accepted theater of military operations. Even in peacetime it had become an area of confrontation, and will doubtlessly be exploited in time of war.

Despite the much publicized detente, the intensity of air and sea reconnaissance of NATO countries operating in the proximity of our territorial waters has not diminished. Aircraft of the American, British, and West German armed forces conduct regular daily flights along our coastal frontiers. Their on-deck equipment enables them to detect objectives along our coastal zone and our radar installations to a depth of 300-400 kilometers. This surveillance is supplemented by constant reconnaissance-type operations of West German ships carrying out information-gathering activities along the limits of our territorial waters.

Recently conducted exercises indicate that the enemy is preparing two basic military operational options in the event of an armed conflict: the start of a general nuclear war by surprise attack on a strategic scale, or, alternately, an easing into armed hostilities, beginning with local encounters, then expanding operations (which at first would be conducted without nuclear weapons), following this up with a selective use of mass destruction weapons under limited war conditions, and ultimately progressing to a general nuclear war.

We sincerely support the detente efforts by active participation in international conferences and through notable contributions to the processes of detente and are well aware that Poland's social-economic development program can be fully accomplished only under conditions of detente and sincere international cooperation.
At the same time, we realize that the defense needs of our country and of our community of nations cannot be controlled exclusively by any particular international arrangements. The need for defense flows from the very existence of a threat. For this reason we govern our defense efforts by the actual and anticipated enemy potential, and his capability to shift from peace to war.

Let us not forget that in terms of size Poland is the second force in our defense community. The Polish People's Armed Forces, being the bulwark of our own national defense system, simultaneously fulfill responsible tasks within the framework of joint socialist strategy, and actively participate in the operational, organizational, and training activities of the Combined Armed Forces.

Because of the support and concern of the party which has provided direction for the development of the people's army and has met its essential material and social needs, and because of the efforts of the entire nation, we have created armed forces which are to be reckoned with, and are seriously appraised in the international arena. For 30 years these forces have safeguarded the independent socialist existence of the nation and, at the same time, have contributed to the development of our national economy, science, culture, and the growth of discipline and social consciousness.

We accepted with pride and deep satisfaction the words of tribute which Comrade E. Gierek, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, expressed at the party conference of the Pomeranian Military District this year: "The Polish nation is proud of its Army, of the Army's patriotic and ideological attitudes, of its high level of training, and of its modern equipment".

The guiding principle governing the over-all form and development of our armed forces is to provide them with the capability to meet any attempt at surprise attack. Although
it is a fact that in the initial phase of a possible armed conflict we would be in the second strategic echelon of the socialist coalition of forces, it does not relieve us—in view of the state of readiness and of the offensive capabilities of enemy equipment—from the strictest daily application of the principles of constant vigilance and strength to thwart all aggressive designs of the enemy.

The territory of the Polish People's Republic is the transit zone and staging area for the conduct of operations by ground formations of the Combined Armed Forces. It is also a marshaling zone for the combined air and naval forces and is therefore, without a doubt, considered by the enemy to be a first-strike objective.

Consequently the main, unalterable requirement of our own security and the security of our allied forces is to prevent a surprise attack. This is the objective we are pursuing in the over-all peacetime development of all branches of the armed forces; in developing modern techniques of reconnaissance, cover, concealment, and deception of the enemy, and above all, in maintaining the National Air Defense Forces, designated elements of the air force, and antiaircraft weapons of the ground and sea forces in the highest state of development and readiness.

Constant readiness and the reliability of the air defense of the nation will guarantee the defeat of any first strike and will permit the pursuit of missions for the overall defense of the nation. It will also assure, with the participation of other military and nonmilitary forces and resources, the successful redeployment, concentration, and commitment to battle of our own forces and allied formations, and their support. The principle upon which we base the development of readiness within the air defense system precludes any possibility of a surprise attack and can be expressed concisely by the slogan, "Win the war before it begins."
The National Air Defense Forces have a priority claim on our defense expenditures with the result that the value of the technical equipment per air defense soldier is almost twice as great as that for the whole of our armed forces.

Organizational policies also favor your branch of service.

In line with the conviction that the effectiveness of national air defense in the initial phase of an armed conflict is to be attained by the combined and coordinated effort of the National Air Defense Forces and all active antiaircraft defense forces stationed on our territory, command control over this great force was effectively placed in the hands of the Commander of the National Air Defense Forces. It is a great honor and also a great responsibility. This is particularly so because the air defense system of our country, on the basis of appropriate agreements, is an essential element in the unified air defense system of the member nations of the Warsaw Pact.

During the exercise which we have just concluded, we set out to test in practical operations the degree to which the headquarters and staffs of the National Air Defense Forces were prepared to effectively command their own forces and the subordinate antiaircraft defense forces of the military districts, the Air Force, and the Navy within a unified national air defense system, and also to test the level of training of the troops. At the same time, the exercise was used to examine the validity and utility of certain organizational approaches.
I can state with satisfaction that the assigned goals of the exercise were achieved, and that the attitude and contributions of the participating troops and civilian workers give us reason to believe that the tasks confronting the National Air Defense Forces would be accomplished.

One of those accomplishments, deserving first mention, was the rapid and efficient transition to a state of full combat readiness, which carried with it an implied assurance of the successful defeat of any eventual enemy attack. As evidenced by constantly raised standards of combat readiness, this problem is always the focus of attention of the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense. The directive of the Minister of National Defense on the combat readiness of the armed forces, which was issued this year, was prepared on the basis of many years of experience gained during numerous exercises and inspections, thereby buttressing the validity of the guidelines contained in it. However, it must be remembered that those guidelines concern the armed forces as a whole and, consequently, must be appropriately adapted by commands of specific branches of the armed forces, arms of troops, tactical large units, and even units and subunits to conform with their own actual situations and capabilities.

And yet, examination of combat readiness regulations of subordinate commands, made during the exercise, revealed that in some cases lengthy verbatim extracts taken bodily from the directive of the Minister of National Defense and applied to tactical large units, units, and even subunits of the National Air Defense Forces, had absolutely no application to that branch of the armed forces or to that command level. There is, therefore, an urgent need for another detailed analysis of the guidance documents on combat readiness at all levels of the National Air Defense Forces, and for tailoring them to the practical conditions and capabilities of specific elements, while retaining, of course, the requirements of the Minister's directive intact.
The need for such an analysis was confirmed by the exercise. The relatively long time limit set by the headquarters of the National Air Defense Forces resulted in maintaining a state of increased combat readiness for more than 16 hours and, therefore, proved unworkable, as did the intended deployment of individual command reliefs of these headquarters within 30 minutes after full combat readiness was ordered. In order to adjust to this long time space, it would have been necessary to maintain the personnel in garrison status during the entire period of increased combat readiness. The length of the time period began to create a series of difficulties for the command of the National Air Defense Forces (rations, sleeping facilities, etc.) and forced a changed in command reliefs earlier than scheduled in the plan of procedures.

On the other hand, it is gratifying to note that the alert system of the National Air Defense Forces fulfills the requirements of the directive, assuring that the forces are efficiently and promptly alerted (all the forces in eight minutes, combat elements in three minutes). In contrast to this, the alerting procedures employed by the headquarters of military districts, the Air Force and the Navy to alert those elements of forces subordinate to them which have been integrated into the operations of the uniform system of national air defense proved to be clearly unsatisfactory. For example, the time required to alert such units exceeded the established norms. This situation must be improved without delay.

It is also difficult to accept, without criticism, the functioning of the support system designed to back up progressions to higher levels of combat readiness. In many instances the missions envisioned in the plans were not fulfilled even though their fulfilment was subject to no
restrictions at all or was only partially restricted. This applies particularly to the organization of direct antiaircraft defense of command posts. This action was delayed until the mobilized antiaircraft artillery subunits (of the central command post and 2nd National Air Defense Corps) were deployed. Such reasoning and behavior are mistaken; in peacetime, soldiers can be trained as gun crews for antiaircraft weapons while learning another military specialty; therefore, antiaircraft artillery forces can in fact fulfill this task with limited personnel even before the arrival of the mobilized groups.

Also, during periods of attaining higher levels of combat readiness, the security and ground defense of installations (of the 2nd National Air Defense Corps) were organized too formally, and individual antichemical protection was not fully achieved (soldiers had no equipment for individual protection).

Tasks related to camouflage and dispersal leave much to be desired. This was particularly evident in fighter aviation regiments of the 2nd and 3rd National Air Defense Corps, where virtually no camouflage measures were taken on their permanent airfields, and a number of aircraft were kept in their parking positions during the entire exercise for reasons of personal convenience.

Now, turning to a discussion of problems related to command, it is necessary to stress from the outset that the National Air Defense Forces have at their disposal a broadly developed system of command posts equipped, within the limits of our resources, with technical gear that, on comparison, can stand on its merits, and an extensive wire and radio communications system. The program of improvements projected for the coming years calls for further expansion of the communications system; for the automation of command,
particularly with regard to the collection and display of information; and for the construction of command posts more resistant to air strikes. In all, this should eliminate certain difficulties currently being encountered.

It appears, however, that the great financial outlays and the efforts invested in organizing the command system do not always pay off, and that the system is not always fully utilized to the best advantage. It is a matter of common knowledge that all wire communications are duplicated by radio. However, when wire communications are disrupted and it is necessary to switch to radio, it appears that neither the command post personnel nor the staff officers really know how to utilize this equipment. The effectiveness of command immediately diminishes, and frequently almost completely disappears. The lack of required skills and training becomes clearly evident. This raises the question of why we spend such sums of money on equipment which we are unable to utilize. The proof that communicating by radio is no worse than communicating by wire is exemplified by the effective and efficient use of radio in exercising command of aircraft in the air. Also, if one were to examine the relationship between operating in a large number of directions and using radio nets (especially for coordination), one would come up with more than one conclusion.

The next item which I wish to discuss is the difficult problem of directing forces and equipment of the National Air Defense when combating targets flying at low altitudes. We set aside for this exercise a relatively large number of appropriate targets (50 to 60 percent). The purpose of this was to examine our actual capabilities to deal with these difficult operations. However, meteorological conditions changed our plans to a certain extent, and, because of low cloud ceilings, we had to raise the altitude for many targets.
particularly in the area of the 2nd National Air Defense Corps. Nevertheless, in my opinion, the exercise produced several interesting conclusions.

We have known for a number of years that the National Air Defense Forces encounter their greatest difficulties when combating low altitude targets, and for many years we have been searching for solutions to this problem. Theoretically, the problem is relatively simple. If we cannot successfully destroy enemy aircraft at low altitudes, then we must "drive" them out of those altitudes to altitudes where they can be combated more effectively by fighter aircraft and by missile artillery. It was difficult to resolve the problem because of a lack of appropriate weapons. However, in recent years fundamental improvements in the quality of weapons have been introduced in the National Air Defense Forces and in the organic antiaircraft subunits of the ground forces (I have in mind ZSU-23, "SHILKA", "STRELA", etc., batteries).

Broad coverage of our territory with ground-based antiaircraft weapons, particularly previous to the commitment of operational forces, facilitates the effectiveness of "driving" attacking aircraft from low altitudes. But we must stop treating these ground weapons as if they were the proverbial fifth wheel of the cart, which was demonstrated again in this exercise, and begin an honest study of methods for the proper integration of these weapons into the national air defense system. This is one of the more urgent problems which must be solved by the command of the National Air Defense Forces. Apparently, it will be necessary, at the same time, to review the validity of current rules for coordination of the National Air Defense Forces with antiaircraft defense troops, and to simplify these rules drastically.
Since the ground forces will be issued weapons to combat air targets operating at low altitudes, it might be expedient to introduce regulations prohibiting the operation of fighter aircraft, in areas manned by operational troops, at altitudes lower than 2,500-3,000 meters. Such limitations were periodically imposed during the exercise in the operations zone of the 3rd National Air Defense Corps.

A real problem was posed by the detailing of military district liaison personnel to command posts at various command levels of the National Air Defense Forces. Standing guidelines of the directives and plans for coordinated action, together with supplementary orders of the General Staff, require that the above-mentioned liaison personnel be sent to corps command posts in the event that a state of increased combat readiness is put into effect. Unfortunately, despite the fact that orders were issued, the exchange of liaison personnel was carried out after long delays. As a result of this, command posts of the National Air Defense Corps had no current information on the whereabouts of combined arms units and of tactical large units of interest to them.

The exercise again confirmed the rationality of basing control on joint command posts which assure more effective tactical control, and which are capable of independent command in the event that the higher command posts are neutralized or destroyed. The special role of this element of command of the National Air Defense Forces in assuring continuity of control, requires giving much thought to the style of command, to the scope of authority, and to the organization of communications.

Coordinated action among the several branches of the National Air Defense Forces was accomplished according to current standing rules. However, it was determined during
the exercise that those rules should be applied with flexibility. For example, in the seacoast area, the rule calls for coordinated action between fighter aviation and missile artillery of the National Air Defense Forces in a common zone. Computations made at joint command post GRYFICE, at the request of the mediators, indicate that, because of the depth of the radar field, the interception of targets, especially those operating at low altitudes, could occur in rear areas of the zone of fire of the missile battalions.

In such a situation, it would appear that coordinated action should be based on assigning the missile artillery priority to attack targets approaching the seacoast directly, while fighter aviation should go into action against targets which succeed in breaking through the zone of missile defense.

Arguing in support of this procedure, aside from considerations of economy of forces, is the fact that for missile artillery battalions having at their disposal independent early warning radar systems, even though they cover the same size radar area, the time required to transmit information to missile guidance stations is unquestionably shorter than the time required to transmit information from detection stations of the radar technical forces to the fighter aviation air control points.

Practical application of this rule by the commander of the 26th Missile Artillery Brigade of the National Air Defense Forces and the commander of the 26th Fighter Aviation Regiment did not complicate the conduct of missile artillery fire and eliminated occurrences of firing on our own aircraft during the exercise.

In the course of the exercise we studied the 26th Fighter Aviation Regiment, organized according to a new concept which created two air squadrons, each composed of 21 pilots and 18 tactical aircraft, and one regimental table of
organization instead of the present three. This concept also included the integration of the technical services in a manner analogous to that in national air defense operational-tactical large units and headquarters and unified the air and technical squadrons into one organic entity. The studies confirmed in principle that this new organizational structure of a fighter aviation regiment was correct and practical. This structure facilitates operations from two airfields and is better adapted to training and tactical tasks of the national air defense aviation elements. In addition, it eliminates the current operating anomalies occurring in the control and administration of regimental subunits (flight control battalion and supply battalion, which have lost their autonomy and have become organic subunits of the regiment). The new organization has increased the role and duties of squadron commanders who thereby advance from typical aviation commanders to full commanders of tactical aviation subunits and will be better prepared for future duties in subsequent assignments; e.g., as regimental deputy line commanders and higher.

The exercise also confirmed the usefulness of the accepted practice of training pilot-graduates of the Higher School of Aviation Officers in three selected national air defense fighter aviation regiments (the LASK 10th Fighter Aviation Regiment of the 1st National Air Defense Corps; the ZEKRZE POMORSKIE 26th Fighter Aviation Regiment of the 2nd National Air Defense Corps; and the POZNAN-KRZESINY 62nd Fighter Aviation Regiment of the 3rd National Air Defense Corps). The training-combat squadrons of these regiments, flying LIM-5 aircraft, were successfully used against air targets.

Conclusions drawn from the operational-tactical situations created during the exercise, also fully confirm the necessity of the General Staff solution to the problem
of wartime repairs of airfields situated in our home territory; i.e., by forming three airfield repair battalions (one for each National Air Defense Corps), using as a basis selected engineer-construction elements of the military districts.

The potential enemy attaches much importance to radio-electronic warfare. He believes that the neutralization of radioelectronic equipment and systems by jamming can create conditions capable of defeating an air defense system. He has significant capabilities in this field. For example, he is capable of neutralizing shortwave radio communications at all command levels of the National Air Defense Forces.

During the "JESIEN II-73" exercise radioelectronic warfare was conducted in order to neutralize, on a sample scale, shortwave ground radio communications of the National Air Defense Forces. Accordingly, selected links of radio control, warning, and reporting were jammed, and there was a simultaneous blackout of backup telephone trunk circuits. In order to assure operational security, we deliberately did not create conditions for a comprehensive testing of overall survivability of the communications system, or of the resistance of radio communications to jamming. Dissemination of information via jammed radio links became difficult and, in some instances, even impossible.

It should be noted that consideration has been given to possible enemy jamming in the structuring of the communications of the National Air Defense Forces.

Crews of communications centers are prepared to operate under active radio-jamming conditions. Among other things, they know how to utilize frequency changes and, in the event of a breakdown of telephone trunk circuits, how to establish communications via bypass circuits.
However, considering the great capabilities which the enemy possesses in this area, it is necessary to conduct more aggressive exercises and training of the National Air Defense Forces under conditions of severe neutralization of the control system.

The exercise also confirmed the need to continue issuing ultra-short-wave and tropospheric radio sets to national air defense troops in order to assure a jamming-resistant radio communications system.

It should be stated that as compared to the "GRANIT-72" exercise, there was evidence of some improvement in the organization of work at various headquarters and staffs of the National Air Defense Forces. They were more capable of fulfilling their assigned tasks within deadlines. This is, no doubt, the result of skillful and correct redivision and redistribution of basic elements of the national air defense headquarters within the command posts; of direct contact and close cooperation among them; and also of their capabilities to exert influence on subordinate elements. Nevertheless, some staff officers did not develop a feel for what was essential in the training situation, and for what could be called "operational imagination" (the ability to anticipate events). This was particularly evident during simulated combat operations.

For this reason they failed to recognize mounting problems and difficulties requiring energetic action (making clear-cut decisions).

During the evaluation of various situations by observing leadership personnel of headquarters and staffs, and from their recommendations, it became evident that there was a tendency to present dry facts without deeper analysis; on occasion, proposals were made on the basis of superficial calculations and the use of unconfirmed data. For this
reason, some of the reporting was devoid of either summations or conclusions drawn from the estimates of the initial phase of the war; it did not contain proposals based on operational forecasts and thus, did not provide a basis for either elementary moves or optional decisions. This is true of many reports, including reports submitted after the first enemy nuclear strikes. This was the final phase of the exercise, and a time when one had the right to expect participants to show a fuller appreciation of the existing situation and demonstrate improved performance grounded on deeper insights into problems gained from the point of view of their specific situations.

Skill in estimating the enemy situation improved somewhat in comparison with the "GRANIT-72" exercise, but, even here, much remains to be done. It seems that it would be useful to initiate cooperation between reconnaissance elements of the National Air Defense Forces and reconnaissance elements of neighboring national air defense systems.

This exercise once more confirmed the need for the extensive use of mobility by all arms of troops of the National Air Defense Forces in order to close gaps in the defense system. These forces suffered relatively heavy losses from the first enemy air strikes. A particularly difficult situation developed among the radiotechnical troops where practically every radar set is utilized in the system and the reserve is minimal. The need for expanding the secure radar field of coverage was reconfirmed. Our plans in this area are valid, and we should give them special attention. However, financial limitations will not permit their complete realization in the immediate future. It is, therefore, necessary for us to find adequate solutions to the problems of replacing losses within the framework of the forces and equipment on hand. The search must go on in two directions. First, we must reassess the existing situation.
for possibilities of creating the essential reserve without, of course, disturbing the basic parameters of the detection and control system. Second, we must reorganize the maintenance service to assure prompt repair of equipment and its return to service. The National Air Defense Forces should be responsible for performing routine maintenance on schedule and, possibly, even for intermediate maintenance service. They should also be more concerned both with equipment sent to repair shops, and with shortening shop time needed for repairs. The peacetime practice of allowing repairs to take several months is absolutely unacceptable in time of emergency or war. In addition, the feasibility of forming mobile repair groups, established at maintenance bases of military elements or at civilian electronic equipment factories, should be studied as one of the options. These groups, having specialists, an adequate supply of appropriate spare parts, and complete crews with tools and transportation, should be in a position to provide prompt repairs of damaged equipment. At the same time, we should look into organizing the repair of equipment using parts obtained from depots damaged beyond repair.

This exercise, now concluded, revealed once more that the National Air Defense Forces are not capable, on their own, of overcoming the results of enemy air strikes, particularly nuclear strikes, in order to restore the damaged air defense system.

Thus, it is necessary for the military districts to assist the National Air Defense Forces. To meet this obligation on the military district level, we could make maximum use of engineer-construction elements, which can be organized into appropriate technical recovery groups and used to restore national air defense installation to an operating condition; e.g., to restore emplacements, to restore and repair runways, etc.
Removal of mines from airfields mined by the enemy is a separate problem. We all know that the military districts currently have no specialized forces and equipment for this purpose.

Because there are presently no existing regulations governing the use of engineer and construction elements for the above-mentioned tasks, appropriate regulations dealing with this matter should be formulated and put into effect immediately.

The problem of assistance to the National Air Defense Forces by the military districts should be included in all joint exercises.

The results of actual flight operations, simulating enemy air strikes, have been discussed by General Swiatowiec, Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff.

For my part, I merely wish to express the conviction of the positive effects attained resulted, without doubt, from good training and honest efforts put forth by the pilots, the missile teams, the radar operators, and all personnel of the command posts on all levels; and for this I thank them.

Comrades:

In my presentation I have focused your attention primarily on the shortcomings because their elimination will enrich and further advance your present quite significant achievements.
It would appear, that our joint efforts to improve the National Air Defense Forces should be concentrated and exerted in the following directions:

- Further automation of information dissemination and the exercise of control not only on the tactical and operational-tactical level but also on the operational level;

- Further development of the radiotechnical troops, based on modernization of radar equipment and the organization of a secure radar field of coverage.

- Improvement of the capability and reliability of missile forces by organizing mixed groupings consisting of elements equipped with long-range missile system and mobile elements;

- Increasing the capability of fighter aviation by replacing worn-out, older models of aircraft with new aircraft which meet current requirements and improve the operational conditions of the aviation regiments;

- Improving reconnaissance and electronic countermeasures systems;

- Improving procedures for coordination with subordinate air defense forces and means of operational forces;

- Further training and coordination of staffs at various command levels.

Comrades!

Concluding my remarks, I wish to thank all the participants in the exercise, including the forces from fraternal armies, for their efforts and the exemplary fulfilment of their assigned tasks in the "JESIEN II-73" exercise.