Summary.

It is the last of a three-part series on the theory and practice of Warsaw Pact operations. The report reconstructs narratively and through a simulated Southwestern Front Operations Order the day-by-day progress of the Southwestern Front attack against NATO forces in West Germany within the framework of the European theater of operations in a nuclear and conventional combat environment as planned up to at least mid-1968. A separate report on the probable role of Soviet Forces in Czechoslovakia within the Southwestern Front as believed to be in existence prior to July 1970 is being published. End of Summary.
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SECRE T

1. The information given below and in the attached figures and annexes reconstructs the essential features of Southwestern Front war plans as expressed in one of the six possible variants to the operational intent of Warsaw Pact Main Headquarters.

The pre-August 1968 variant described in this report presupposed hostilities being opened by a mass nuclear strike made with almost complete surprise by Warsaw Pact forces against NATO targets from the Alps to the North Sea. (Source Comment: This did not preclude strategic strikes made in other areas of which Source had no knowledge and which were not relevant to the variant involving the Southwestern Front.) A different variant would have to be substituted if almost complete surprise was not achieved. The switch of variants would have required about 24 hours, and only Warsaw Pact Main Headquarters could have ordered the change.

Pre-1968 Conventional Warfare Variant

2. All important documentary instructions concerned with the implementation of this variant would have been forwarded by officer courier from Warsaw Pact Main Headquarters to the commander of the Southwestern Front; routine messages would have been forwarded by coaxial high frequency cable. The use of the radio net was authorized only during operations. The signal for Southwestern Front troops to go into action would have been given by messenger or, in an emergency, by scrambler telephone; it would have included a variant code word and the time of attack which was to coincide with time of impact for missiles and rockets of the first mass nuclear strike.

3. The initial situation overlay, literally, initial situation sketch (scenario) basically showed the peacetime deployment of Warsaw Pact troops and headquarters and NATO forces. As the plan being described was a pre-August 1968 variant, the initial deployment of troops corresponded to the deployment of troops before the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. (See Figure 1, Annexes C, C1, and C2, for a simulated representation of an overlay from Warsaw Pact Main Headquarters with the scenario designed to represent an actual operation.) The NATO side of the overlay was to be maintained by officers of the Intelligence Directorate of the Czechoslovak General Staff, and the Warsaw Pact side was to be maintained by the deployment element of the that staff's Operations Directorate. The enemy situation was represented precisely with units located down to battalion level.

Comment: Source said that his presentation of the NATO side in the attached figures did not do justice to the specific information available to Czechoslovak planners. His location of NATO divisions is approximately as known to the Czechoslovak military but, unless otherwise indicated, the locations shown for lower level units are unreliable or even invented. Source considered the numbering of the NATO divisions in his reconstruction only remotely related to reality. On the Pact side, his reconstruction of deployment areas is correct as far as their general locations are concerned, but actual boundaries may be different than shown. When placing air units on the map for the Pact side, Source complained of an acute shortage of forward airfields in Czechoslovakia. He also commented that he would have probably heard had additional fields been constructed or had field landing strips been used.

4. (See Figure 1, Annexes C, C1, and C2, for the operations overlays.) The following are Source's comments on the Czechoslovak units appearing in his reconstruction of the variant:

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a. All divisions and lower units not specifically commented upon are considered by Source to be correctly located.

b. Source estimated the locations of all Front transportation battalions.

c. The locations given for field army surface-to-surface missiles are correct, but their specific army subordination may have been the reverse of that given.

d. The location given for the 1st Field Army's chemical regiment is only approximate.

e. The location of the signal regiment in Beroun is correct, but its exact subordination is not known to Source.

f. The location of the two air divisions is correct. However, one of them was an interceptor division and the other was a fighter-bomber division; Source did not recall which belonged to which category.

g. The Front's chemical regiment was known to Source at various times as either a regiment or a brigade.

h. The signal regiment in Pardubice was possibly under the 10th Air Army, but its exact subordination is not known to Source.

i. The chemical regiment at Cervena Voda is correctly located, but its subordination is only probably correct.

j. The 4th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Air Defense Brigade at Bucovice was known to Source to be at the location indicated in 1964 or 1965, but it has probably been moved elsewhere since that time. The barracks there were not large enough to house that unit and the signal regiment which Source knew was stationed there.

k. The special forces battalion (long range reconnaissance) at Holesov operated in peacetime under the Intelligence Directorate of the Czechoslovak General Staff; for operations, battalion headquarters and one company were detailed to the Southwestern Front and one company was assigned to the reconnaissance regiment in each field army.

l. Source was not sure whether the Presov division was a motorized rifle division (MRD) or a tank division. Although he had previously reported it as an MRD, he believed it was more probably a tank division because it was used as front reserve. He also seemed to recall that it had been played as a tank division in various CPX's, and he showed it as such in the operational overlays which accompany this report.

m. Source was not sure of the location of the Havlickuv Brod 2nd (M plus 3) Motorized Rifle Division. He recalled that it was supposed to have been organized in the general Moravian-Slovakian area but, because of his inability to provide an even approximate location, he arbitrarily chose Havlickuv Brod.

5. Source believed that the areas in which he remembered NATO divisions to be deployed were generally those known to the Czechoslovak military. (See Annex B (Intelligence) of the operations order for the deployment of NATO forces. The information does not appear in the overlay...
His comments on the NATO order of battle are given below.

a. Source was certain of the division numbers for the 1st Mountain Division (West German -- G) and the 4th Mechanized Infantry Division (G) only.

b. The area given for the 10th (?) Mechanized Infantry Division (G), is very approximate.

c. The areas given for the 10th (?) Armored Division (US) and the 24th (?) Mechanized Infantry Division (US) are very approximate and may have been reversed.

d. A German airborne division was located in the Worms area but was not expected to be used against the Southwestern Front.

e. The number of missile units, artillery groups, depots, and airfields listed corresponded to the number played in the development of the variant, but Source considered the locations to be uncertain.

f. The two nuclear warhead depots shown on the overlay were located in the Rhine Valley. One other nuclear warhead depot was located in the area between the 10th and 24th US divisions.

6. The Southwestern Front had a decoy and deception plan (See Annex B - Intelligence) which was to be used in conjunction with the actual operations plan and which was to be subordinate to it. Comment: Deception and decoys will be covered in detail in another report from this source.)

7. Source considered the balance between success of the Warsaw Pact attack and its failure to be very delicate. He believed that the attack would probably break down if the initial mass strike did not succeed. Such a failure might occur if NATO troops were removed from their garrisons shortly before the Pact nuclear strike was made and were thus not destroyed by the strike. Lack of success was not considered in planning the statement of operational intent.

8. All operations were to be strictly offensive in nature. Defensive posture was to be assumed tactically or locally; an operational defensive posture was not planned and would have to be authorized by Warsaw Pact Main Headquarters.

Principles Governing Conventional Variants of Southwestern Front Operational Plans

9. The principles listed below were observed before and after August 1968 by Warsaw Pact personnel in planning conventional, or non-nuclear, variants to the operational intent of the Pact's Main Headquarters.

   a. The initial deployment of troops, missiles, and supplies was to be identical to that made in a nuclear environment.

   b. All nuclear delivery means were to be set up and ready to fire. (Source Comment: The decision to use nuclear weapons was to be made by Warsaw Pact Main Headquarters. Once the decision was made,
the transition from conventional to total nuclear warfare was to be complete and immediate, and it was to include more than one front area.)

c. Surprise was to be the basic condition for attack.

d. Conventional hostilities were to be initiated by the crossing of the border by advance elements, i.e., one tank regiment per division. The task of these regiments would be to advance as rapidly as possible with air support and to wait if confronted by a division strength unit. In order to maintain secrecy, no preliminary reinforcements were to be attached to these regiments.

e. A division's main force was to be deployed in accordance with principles of attack from the march.

f. Reconnaissance elements were to catch up with the leading tank elements and to introduce themselves into available openings. The principal difference between these reconnaissance elements and the advance echelon tank regiments was that reconnaissance elements were to avoid combat while the tank regiments were to fight if necessary.

g. Advance elements were to move 30 to 50 kms ahead of the main force.

h. Among the advance and reconnaissance elements as they moved forward were to be other reconnaissance groups which were not to concern themselves with enemy activity and dispositions. They were to select and prepare areas for deployment of friendly troops; their main task was to reconnoiter the terrain.

i. The main force was to advance in march columns with artillery and engineers. The basic unit was to be the combat regiment which was to carry out attacks from the march over an individual axis of advance in operational coordination with other regiments. Divisions were not expected to fight as complete units in the opening stages of the war.

j. Lines of contact were to be chosen to make available favorable conditions for deployment and to deny the enemy this advantage. If possible, attacks were to be conducted from the flank.

k. To achieve a favorable line of contact which lay beyond the immediate reach of friendly units, the air force was to attack the enemy to prevent him from passing beyond the desired line of contact.

l. Groups for movement security--which consisted of engineer, armored vehicle, and other units--were to be used identically in nuclear and conventional variants.

m. Artillery was to deploy in batteries without waiting for the remainder of the battalion; liaison and coordination was to be arranged later. (Source Comment: No classic artillery preparatory fires were to be made, but in depth artillery support (zabezpečení boje hloubce) was to be granted on request.)
n. Rocket and missile units as well as the Mobile Rocket Technical Bases (PRTZ's) were to be fully loaded with charges and nuclear warheads, but they were to move near the rear of the main force. In a nuclear variant, the missile and rocket units were to be protected by detachments of infantry and tanks; in a conventional situation, a missile brigade was to have perhaps one tank battalion for protection. (Source Comment: In a nuclear variant, each firing position was routinely to be protected by a security company (rota ochrany) which included air defense. Reinforcement was to be given for transportation only, but not as much reinforcement was to be given in a nuclear as in a conventional environment.) Under conventional conditions, one security company was to be used for each missile brigade. The necessary augmentation of security troops was generally to be drawn from the front reserve or front units and within front boundaries. The field army commander was to be responsible for the protection of his missile and rocket units. (Source Comment: There was considerable controversy in the Soviet and Czechoslovak armies over the protection of rockets and missile units. All ground forces commanders were reluctant to give up troops to provide security for these units.)

o. The air force was not to furnish priority support to fighting troops but was to concentrate on operational matters and on combating enemy air forces.

p. The decisive factor in conventional combat was to be the clash of divisions. In the operational sphere under conventional conditions, friendly troops were to attempt to achieve a 3 to 1 ratio over the enemy; in the nuclear variant, enemy divisions were to be demolished by nuclear strikes and by rolling over the survivors. In conventional warfare, the battles were mostly to be battles of equipment and fire power, and success was to be achieved by quantitative superiority. The rate of advance was presumed to be lower in the non-nuclear variant than the 40- to 100-km-per-day rate expected in the nuclear variant. Large fluctuations in the rate of advance were expected. Tank divisions were to be deployed in armored points at the outset of a battle in order to exploit any breaks in enemy defenses and to strike out over independent axes of advance.

q. The Carpathian Front, under conventional conditions, was to be brought into action on the fifth or sixth day of the attack on a line east of that set for nuclear war, i.e., roughly on a Nuernberg-Munich line.

r. In a conventional type of war, all logistical matters were to be taken over by the USSR. Source had no other information on this point.

s. Troop losses in a conventional war, would not be significantly lighter than those incurred during nuclear war.

Czechoslovak Format for Preparing a Variant of the Operational Intent

10. In Czechoslovakia, every variant of the Warsaw Pact Main Headquarters' operational intent was prepared in a standard format which included the following points:

a. An introductory paragraph which contained the scenario and a few standard phrases about international tensions and the justification for the planned operation.
b. A section devoted to the enemy which listed in detail the peacetime deployment of NATO forces and provided coordinates for NATO units down to battalion level. This portion of the plan was prepared by members of the Intelligence Directorate of the Czechoslovak General Staff; its execution impressed Source as being detailed and definitive. A subparagraph provided the results of preliminary reconnaissance carried out against enemy forces. For example, it might have included a statement that the 4th Mechanized Infantry Division was receiving additional ammunition or a report on the movement of trains carrying war materials in West Germany.

c. A relatively short paragraph on friendly troops which provided information on the deployment of friendly units and their numerical designations and garrison areas.

d. A section on Front arms and services (Druhy vojsk) which contained subparagraphs on:

1. artillery (deployment of rockets and missiles and the basis for rocket/missile logistics deployment)
2. air force (strength levels in percentages and status of equipment)
3. signal units (the separate call signs for radio and for wire links to the various units; the numerical designations for important officers and functionaries—in peacetime, 03 for any commander; and a listing of active radio nets).

e. A voluminous section on logistics which provided information on all logistics, medical evacuation, maintenance, and medical services.

"Classified by recorded reporting officer. Exempt from Declassification Schedule of E.O. 116-2 Exemption category 5B (2). Automatically declassified on approval of the Director."
Figure 1
Operation Order (OPORD) No. 1

SIMULATED

SOUTHWESTERN FRONT
JINCE, CSSR
Date: D-Day

OPORD 1


Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Local

Task Organization: Annex A, Task Organization

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces

(1) NATO preparedness in West Germany has reached a new low as a result of Warsaw Pact peace offensive. Due to economy measures, NATO forces no longer perform field exercises and training is limited to small units in garrison. NATO coordination appears to have been impaired due to disagreements among member countries concerning national contributions. Deeply disturbed by this unfavorable situation, militaristic circles in NATO countries plan provocations against the Warsaw Pact in order to justify their existence.

(2) Annex B, Intelligence

b. Friendly Forces

(1) Warsaw Pact Forces consisting of a Polish Operations Group in the North Sea coast area, the Western Front in the area HAVELBERG-MAGDEBURG to MUEHLHAUSEN-SUHL, the Southwestern Front in the area KARLOVY VARY to the Danube Valley, and the Italian Operations Group in Hungary are in garrison and in readiness for operations.

(2) Warsaw Pact second echelon fronts will maintain the cadence of attack of the first echelon and take over operations from the first echelon fronts on D-5 or D+6. The Byelorussian Front will form the second echelon of the Western Front; The Carpathian Front will form the second echelon of the Southwestern Front. (See para 3(c) for movement of Carpathian Front from D-Day to D+6.) Unidentified forces will back up the Polish and Italian Operations Groups.
(3) The CSSR 10th Air Army and the 7th Air Defense Army will furnish support to the Southwestern Front.

(4) Air support will be furnished by unidentified elements of the Carpathian Front as required.


2. MISSION

The Southwestern Front will attack, using nuclear weapons, to destroy NATO forces opposing it, deny NATO units access to the mountainous terrain near the Czechoslovak-West German borders, create confusion in its assigned area, tie up enemy forces to prevent counter-attacks against the Western Front and prevent mobilization in Southern Germany. Smooth passage of Southwest Front elements will be assured through the use of airborne and heliborne forces in the Danube Valley area. (Source Comment: Neutralization of the Austrian Army by surprise and nuclear ultimatum was considered a foregone conclusion).

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation. Annexes C, C₁, C₂ Operation Overlay

(1) Maneuver. Operation will be conducted in six phases. Daily rates of advance will range from 40 to 100km per day. (Comment: Only elements essential to the understanding of the operational intent are portrayed on the operation overlays.)

(a) Phase I (D-Day) All units will be in garrison as indicated in Operation Overlay Annex C.

1. Simultaneously with the impact of nuclear strikes, the Karlovy Vary (KV) MRD will attack in first echelon in the direction of CHEB-SALZBACH.

2. The Slany (SL) Tank Division will be brought into action from the line MÜNCHBERG-KEMNACH in the direction of BAYREUTH-BAMBERG.

3. The Milovice (MI) Tank Division will follow the Karlovy Vary MRD in the second echelon with the mission of destroying elements of the Northern US Armored Cavalry Regiment and elements of the German 4th Mech Infantry Division. The first day objective is the line BAYREUTH-PRESSACH-WEIDEN.

4. Attacks will be carried out by elements of the 1st and 4th Armies over the axis PLZEN-KARLSRUHE:

(1) The Plzen (PL) MRD will attack in first echelon in the direction of BOR-KEMNATH, with the mission of cooperating with the Karlovy Vary MRD to envelop and destroy elements of the 4th (G) Mech Infantry Division.
(2) The Susice (SU) MRD will advance in the direction of DOMAZLICE-HOHENFELS with the mission of destroying the 4th Mech Inf Div and the Southern US Armored Cav Regt.

(3) The Pisek (PI) Tank Div will form the second echelon moving into the KLATOVY area. By the end of D+1, remaining elements of the 1st and 4th Armies will arrive on the line TRAUSNITZ-FREIMD-NABBURG-SCHWARZENFELD-SCHWANDORF-TEUBLITZ-REGENSTAFF.

(4) The Ceske Budejovice (CB) MRD will attack in conjunction with the Havlickuv Brod (HB) Tank Div in the Danube Valley over the axis CESKE BUDEJOVICE-LINZ-LANDSCHUT, through VYSSI BROD, ZWETTEL, EFFERBING, SCHAERDING and STRAUBING. The (HB) Tank Div will move in the direction DOLNÍ DOVORISTE-KATSCHWANDORF-RELS-LANSHUT. At the end of D+1 these forces will reach the line VILSHAVEN-GOETTERSdorf-ARNSDorf-GANGOFEN-ERHARTING.

(5) The Kromeriz (KR) MRD will attack in second echelon in the direction ZNOJMO-ST.POELEN-LINZ in order to secure operational passage through the Danube Valley reaching PEUERBACH-RIED-WELS at the end of D+1.

(6) Rapid cadence of the attack will be insured by an air drop of the Front Airborne Brigade in the area PASSAU-SIMBACH and by landing Heliborne troops in the ASCHACH-PASCHING-MAUTHAUSEN and KREMS-TULIN areas with the mission of occupying and holding bridges across the INN and DANUBE rivers.

(b) Phase II (D+2)

1. Divisions of the first echelon will seize the initiative of operations. The Slany (SL) Tank Div will advance along the axis BAYREUTH-BAMBERG in coordination with the E.German MRD on its right flank with the mission of destroying units of the 10th (G) Mech Inf Div. and reaching the line STEIN-HESSEL-GASSELDOF (West of BURGRUB) by the end of D+2.

2. The Milovice Tank Division will fill the gap between the Slany and Karlovy Vary divisions from the line-PREussen-KIRCHENTHUMBACH with the mission of developing the attack in the direction ERLANGEN-ROTHENBURG-KARLSRUHE. At the close of D+2 the Milovice Tank Div. should reach the line GOESSWEINSTEIN-HUETTENBACH-PICH.

3. The Karlovy Vary MRD will continue the destruction of the remaining elements of the 10th Mech Inf Div. on the line WILSECK-HIRSCH-WERNBERG by the end of D+2.

4. The Plizen (PI) MRD in coordination with the Karlovy Vary MRD will destroy the remnants of the 4th Mech Inf Div along the PLZEN-KARLSRUHE axis of advance and will reach the line ETTSDORF-HOHENBURG by the end of D+2.
5. The Susice MRD will develop its attack in the direction PARSBEG-WEISSENBURG and will conduct combat operations against the elements of the 24th US Mech Inf Div, and will reach the line HOERNSANDSFORD-HEMAU by the end of D+2.

6. In the Danube Valley the three committed divisions (CB, HB, and KR) will destroy the remnants of the Ist Mountain Division (German) and elements of the 24th Mech Inf Div (US).

7. The Ceske Budejovice (CB) MRD will attack over its original axis of advance and will engage elements of the 24th Mech Inf Div, arriving by the end of D+2 at the line STRAUBING-MAINNING.

8. The Kromeriz (KR) MRD will carry out the main attack along the axis NIEDERVIERBACH-NEUBURG in engagement with elements of the 24th Mech. Inf. Div. By the end of D+2 the division should reach the line WENG—AHAM.

9. The Havlickuv Brod (HD) Tank Div will continue to destroy remnants of the Ist Mountain Div. (G), and will reach the line GERZEN-AMPFING by the end of D+2.

10. The Presov (PR) Tank Div will transfer from Front reserve to the 4th Army. By the end of D+2 it should be advancing through the Danube Valley behind the main elements of the 4th Army reaching AMSTAETTEN (Austria) with its leading elements.

(c) Phase III (D+3)

1. No decisive engagement is foreseen for D+3. The positions of friendly forces are expected to be as follows: (See Annex C₁).

   Slany Div - Bamberg–Forchheim line.
   Milovice Div - Erlangen–Fuert.
   Plzen Div - Unchanged.
   Karlovy Vary Div - Essentially Unchanged.
   Susice Div - Unchanged.
   Ceske Budejovice - Pergheim–Weichshofen.
   Kromeriz Div - Ergoldsbach–Ergolding.
   Havlickuv Brod - Langshut–Lohkichen.

2. The Presov (PR) Tank Div will prepare to attack through the right flank of the Havlickuv Brod division along the axis Landshut–North of Augsburg reaching the line Haverskirchen–Massing by the end of D+3.

3. The Milovice M2 (M+3 Div) will be committed in the direction Fuert–Ansbach–Krailsheim; the Pribram MRD (M+3) in the direction Hannbach–Neumarkt; the Pisek (PI) Tk Div in the direction of Regen–Deuerling.
(d) Phase IV (D+4) See Annex C_2 Operation Overlay.

1. The Slany (SL) Tank Div will continue to advance along its axis of advance. By the end of D+4 the division will reach the line west of PRIESENDORF-MUEHLHAUSEN.

2. The Milovice (ML) Tank Div will reach the line WEISENDORF-CODOLZBURG by the end of D+4.

3. The Milovice (ML2)(M+3) Div will be committed through the left flank of the Milovice Tank Div with the mission of reaching the line LANDENZEN-CODOLZBURG in the direction of ANSBACH.

4. NATO counterattack may succeed in penetrating friendly lines. NATO will be stopped roughly on the line ETTSDORF-BODAMWÖHR. Comment: Superimpose Annex C_2 over C_1 for overview of ground lost in NATO counterattack).

5. Units of the Karlovy Vary (KV) MRD will withdraw no further east than NUEKIRCHEN-SCHNALTENBACH.

6. The Plzen (P1) MRD must hold on the line SCHNALTENBACH-ZANGENSTEIN regardless of losses.

7. The Susice (SU) MRD must hold the line NEUNBURG-UNTERZELL regardless of losses.

8. The Ceske Budejovice (CB) MRD will reach the Danube river near DONAUSTAUF-REGENSBURG, with its left flank units advancing in the direction of PAINTEN.

9. The Havlickuv Brod (HB2) M+3 MRD and the PISEK Tank Division will engage the enemy counter-attacking forces in close combat.

10. The Pribram (PR) MRD committed on its axis of advance will reach the line LAUTERSHOFEN-ENGELBERG by the end of D+4.

(e) Phase V (D+5)

1. All divisions will continue to advance along the axis KARLOVY VARY-KARLSRUHE: Slany Tk.Div to WUERZBURG-GIELBELSTADT; Milovice Tk Div to RIEDENHEIM-ROTHENBURG; the Milovice (M12) M+3 Div to AURACH-ARBERG.

2. The following divisions will liquidate enemy counter-attack by the end of D+5 along the PLZEN-KARLSRUHE axis. After closing the envelopment of enemy forces, units will be in the following positions: Pribram MRD at ECKERSMUEHLLEN-ALTERSHAUSEN; Havlickuv Brod (HB2) M+3 Div at BERRING-DIETFURTH; Ceske Budejovice MRD at THIERSTEIN-RIEDENBURG; Pisek Tk Div at NITTENAU-BETTENSDORF.
3. Remaining elements of the Karlovy Vary, Susice and Plzen divisions will close the gaps in the envelopment of enemy forces.

4. All units will advance at a rapid rate in the Danube Valley due to the disintegration of the Austrian defenders. The Kromeriz MRD will, by the end of D+5, reach the line: NOERDLINGEN-UNDERLIEDSHEIM; the Presov Tk Div - BALLMETS-HOFEN - OFFINGEN; the Havlickuv Brod Tk Div - BELDEN (north of Augsburg).

(f) Phase VI (D+6).

1. All units will participate in the liquidation of enemy units of the counterattacking force, which are still in action. The Pisek Tk Div will carry out the main attack.

2. Remnants of the Milovice Tk Div will regroup in the area of North ROTHENBURG. Remnants of the following will regroup as follows: The Karlovy Vary MRD at SULZBACH-ROSENBERG; Plzen MRD at SCHWANDORF; Susice MRD in the UNTERZELL area; Pisek Tk Div north of REGENSBURG; Ceske Budejovice MRD west of REGENSBURG; Havlickuv Brod Tk Div northwest of AUSGBURG. (Field Comment: This regroupment is not shown in Operations Overlays).

3. Units advancing through the Danube Valley (the Kromeriz MRD and Presov Tk Div) will sweep up the remnants of the 1st Mountain Division and the 10th (US) Armored Division reaching the line ABENSBERG-GEISENFELD. The Presov Tk Div will reach the line KARLSKRON-MUEHLFRIED; the Havlickuv Brod Tk Div will reach the line ILLMUENSTER-ESCHING.

4. All Southwest Front operations will cease after passage of the Carpathian Front through Southwest Front lines and concurrent assumption of operational responsibilities by the Carpathian Front. (See paragraph 3c.)

(2) Fire.

(a) Nuclear and Chemical. Nuclear fires will be employed to neutralize enemy units. No operation will commence before the impact of nuclear strikes. (See ANNEX F (Nuclear Strikes) to OPORD 1.) Chemical fires will be carried out in accordance with operational directives. (See ANNEX G (Chemical) to OPORD 1.) Deployment of missile units during Phase I through VI is as follows: (See ANNEX C, C1, C2 to OPORD 1.)

Phase I - 1st CAA Missile Bde in the UTTERY NOVY DVUR area; 1st CAA PRTZ in the MLADOTICE-KRALOVICE area; Divisional PRTZ in the SOKOLOV area; Southwest Front Missile Bde in the DOBRIV-PADRT area; Southwest Front PRTZ in the MILIN area (south of ROZMITAL); 4th CAA Missile Bde in the KREMZE, CHVALSINY-PRACHATICE area with displacement on order to the area south of PASSAU, SCHAERDING and ANDORF; 4th CAA PRTZ in
the TYN NAD VLTAOU area with displacement on order to
WEIZKIRCHEN area; Divisional PRTZ in the VSEVTIN area with
displacement on order to KOESSLARN area.

Phase II - Movement of missile/rocket units as per
operation overlay.

Phase III - Movement of missile/rocket units
as per operation overlay.

Phase IV - No change in location of missile
units.

Phase V - Movement of missile/rocket units as
per operation overlay.

Phase VI - Changes in subordination as per
Phase VI of para. 3 OPORD 1.

b. Reserves

(1) PRESOV Tk Div. will act as Front Reserve and
move into the GOTTwaldov area.

(2) "15 unidentified bns of Peoples' Militia will be
used to secure occupied Austrian territory on order of South-
west Front Commander.

(3) In Phase II the PRESOV Tk Div. will be released
from its mission of Front Reserve and attached to 4th CAA.

(4) Front Reserve will be formed from three M+3 divisions
(HAVLICKUV BROD, PRIBRAM, and MILOVICE).

c. Coordination

(1) The following areas will be cleared by CSSR for
use of forces of the Carpathian Front:

- from D+1 BELSKO BELA-LUCENEC
- from D+2 VRCHLABI-VIENNA
- from D+4 AS-ZELEZNA RUDA-LAMBACH
- from D+5 SCHWEINFURT-MARKT ERLENBACH (20 km west of
  FUERTH)-NUERNBERG-ALTDORF (20 km east of
  NUERNBERG) as well as from the line EICHSTADT-NEUBURG-DACHAU

(2) The following airfields must be cleared effec-
tive D+1:

- HRADEC KRALOVE
- PRAHA-ROZYN
- PRAHA-KREL
- PRAHA-VODOCHODY
- MILOVICE
- PAROVICE
- BRNO-TURANY
- BRNO-SLATINA
- VYSKOV
- KJJOV
- PREROV
- PIESTAN
- UHERSKE HRADISTE
- POPRAD
- SLAG
- KOSICE
(3) Direct coordination with the Carpathian Front is authorized. Alternate coordination routing will be through Territorial Forces Headquarters, CSSR.

(4) In Phase II, measures will be taken to insure operational and tactical coordination of operations and nuclear strikes with the unidentified East German MRD on the Southwest Front right flank. Operational coordination will be the responsibility of the Commander, 1st CAA. Tactical coordination will be the responsibility of Commander, SLANY Tk Div. Axis of advance of East German MRD is BAUREUTH-BAMBERG.

(5) In Phase II, units of the Carpathian Front will arrive on the line DVUR KRALOVE-VIENNA. CSSR Territorial forces will render all assistance to units of the Carpathian Front, which will rest and resupply in place. Resumption of advance: D+4.

(6) During Phase V, Carpathian Front point units will reach the line HASSFURT (east of SCHWEINFURT)-DISSPECK-RDSSTAL (west of NUERNBERG)-NEUMARKT-BACH-MICHELSENFUNKIRCHENEICHSTETT-DACHAU.

(7) During Phases V and VI, Southwestern Front units will coordinate with units of the Carpathian Front to insure smooth passage of Carpathian Front units.

(8) Based on attrition rates with at least 40% of each division remaining in action, the following units will be assigned to Commander, Carpathian Front. For personnel replacements and attrition rates see para. 4 of this OPORD.

MILOVICE (2) M+3 Div
PRIBRAM MRD
Havlíčkuv Brod (2) M+3 Div
KROMERIZ MRD
PRESOV Tk Div

(9) Southwestern Front operations will cease on order after passage of the lines by units of the Carpathian Front.

4. REAR SERVICES (See ANNEX D Logistics)

a. Front units will be supported by all assets available to the Territorial Command, CSSR.

b. No resupply activities will be conducted during Phase I. During Phases II through VI supplies will be delivered by convoy from territorial depots to using units. Priority will be accorded ammunition and POL.

c. Truck convoys will be the primary means of supply. Vehicles will be interchanged between Front, armies and divisional transportation assets without regard to organizational assignment.

S-E-C-R-E-T
(1) No reliance will be placed in railroad transportation.

(2) Over long distances, tanks will be transported on tank transporters, if available.

(3) Supply vehicles will not attempt to pass through tactical units. Combat units will have right-of-way.

d. Each axis of advance will be served by a flexible POL pipeline by units of the Front Pipeline Construction Bde, with 1 bn assigned per axis of advance. The POL supply system will be responsible for the delivery of chemicals (kerosene) to rocket and missile units. Mobile Rocket Technical Bases (PRTZ) will use their organic supply facilities for all other materials.

e. No personnel or major equipment replacements will be provided. Anticipated attrition rates are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table of Expected Losses (through D+6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket Troops and Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KARLOVY VARY MRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLZEN MRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUSICE MRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLANY Tk Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILOVICE Tk Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CESKE BUDEJOVICE MRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAVLICKUV BROD Tk Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PISEK Tk Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILOVICE M+3 Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIBRAM M+3 MRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAVLICKUV BROD M+3 Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KROMERIZ MRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESOV Tk Div</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source Comment: These losses were scientifically computed. Governing principle when computing losses is loss of 15% of personnel per day of combat in a "seesaw-type" operation. This scale applies to both enemy and friendly forces.)

f. No major maintenance, except as performed by operating units, will be provided. Commanders may abandon major equipment at their discretion.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command:

(1) Southwestern Front Headquarters (MAIN) will be located 5 km northeast of STRASICE, at JINCE. Forward and Rear Headquarters at all levels will be established (Locations unknown).

(2) 1st Combined Arms Army Command Post (MAIN) will be located west of PLZEN in the approximate area of ULICE.

(3) 4th Combined Arms Army Command Post (MAIN) will be located about 10 km west of CESKE BUDEJOVICE.

(4) Combined headquarters for the following units will be located at the western edge of PRAGUE at PRAGUE-VYPICH.
   a 10th Air Army Hq
   b 7th Air Army (PVOS) Hq
   c U/i USSR Air Force Hq

(5) For movement of command posts see overlays C₁ and C₂

b. Signal: (See ANNEX E Signal)

(1) The Chief of Staff at all levels, acting through the Chief of Signals, will be responsible for communications and communications security.

(2) Communications security will be maintained at all times. There will be radio silence until after the impact of the initial nuclear strike. Communications duty officers at communication centers will monitor communications in order to insure that COMSEC is being maintained and will call violations to the attention of the offenders. Commanders will be responsible for any violations committed by their commands. The duty officers will, under no circumstances, interfere with communications in progress, even though a violation of security may be in progress.

(3) Scrambler telephone will be used over coaxial cable only. All radio communications will be in code with the exception of firing orders and items of information, which do not allow the enemy sufficient time for counter-measures in case of intercept.

(4) The following precedence will govern all communications:

   a 1st priority: Fire (relative only to nuclear fires, but not including conventional artillery)
   b 2nd priority: Air (relative to air warning and air defense only)
   c 3rd priority: Command (relative to Front, field army and divisional commanders by order of function and rank, with function/position being the final determining factor)
   d 4th priority: Routine
ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION) TO OPORD NO. 1

SOUTHWESTERN FRONT
JINCE, CSSR
Date: D-Day

SOUTHWESTERN FRONT
Front Hq and Service Bde
AAA Div
Abn Bde
SCUD B Missile Bde (8K14)
AT Arty Bde
Engr Bde
Sig Regts (2)
Cml Regts
Recon Regt
Rear Service Elements (See Logistics ANNEX D)
Pipeline Const Bde
Transportation Bns (3)

1ST COMBINED ARMS ARMY
MILOVICE Tk Div
SLANY Tk Div
PLZEN MRD
KARLOVY VARY MRD
Army Hq and Comd Service Regt
Recon Regt
SCUD A Missile Bde
Arty Bde (122 mm)
AAA Bde (57 mm)
Engr Bde
Sig Regt
Cml Bn
Topo Bn
Rear Service Elements
(ANNEX A continued)

In Phase IV.
MILOVICE (2) M+3 Tk Div
PRIBRAM M+3 MRD
HAVLICKUV BROD (? M+3 MRD

4TH COMBINED ARMS ARMY
SUSICE MRD
CESKE BUDEJOVICE MRD
KROMERIZ MRD
PISEK Tk Div
HAVLICKUV BROD Tk Div
Army Hq and Comd Service Regt
Recon Regt
SCUD A Missile Bde
Arty Bde (122 mm)
AAA Bde (57 mm)
Engr Bde
Sig Regt
Cml Bn
Topo Bn
Rear Service Elements

In Phase II.
PRESOV Tk Div

10TH AIR ARMY
Air Army Hq Staff
Comd Service Regt
Fighter Air Div
Fighter/Bomber Air Div
Recon Air Regt
Helicopter Regt (3)

S-E-C-R-E-T
Air Trans Regt
Sig Regt (?)

SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS
See Logistics ANNEX D

ATTACHMENTS

Phase I.
Border Gd Bde (7)
Peoples' Militia Bn (15)
PRESOV Tk Div to FRONT RESERVE

Phase III.
MILOVICE (?) M+3 Tk Div to FRONT RESERVE
PRIBRAM MRD M+3 to FRONT RESERVE
HAVLICKUV BROD (2) M+3 MRD to FRONT RESERVE

DETACHMENTS

Phase II. from FRONT RESERVE
PRESOV Tk Div to assigned 4th CAA

Phase IV
MILOVICE (2) Tk Div from FRONT RESERVE to assigned 1st CAA
PRIBRAM MRD from FRONT RESERVE to assigned 1st CAA
HAVLICKUV BROD (2) MRD from FRONT RESERVE to assigned 1st CAA

COORDINATION/SUPPORT

Territorial Comd
7th AD Army and supporting units
ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO OPERATION ORDER NO. 1


Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Local

SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

1. All NATO units are south of the line AS-FRANKFURT. Units of the Southwestern Front are faced by 2 US and 5 West German divisions in garrison. These units consist of:

24th Mechanized Inf Div (German) (Muenchen-Augsburg area)
10th Armored Div (US) (Augsburg-Ulm area)
1st Mountain Div (G) (Garmisch-Partenkirchen area)
4th Mechanized Inf Div (G) (Regensburg-Augsburg area)
10th Mechanized Inf Div (G) (Bamber-Erlangen area)
12th Mechanized Inf Div (G) (Freiburg area)
6th MRD (French) (Karlsruhe-Koblenz area)
1 Airborne Div (US or G) (Mannheim-Wiesbaden-Koblenz area) (Not expected to oppose SW Front).

2 Armored Cavalry Regiments (US) near Regensburg and Bayreuth, respectively on the northern and southern flank of the 4th Mechanized Infantry Division.

5 HAWK Battalions
Unknown number of NIKE Battalions
5 Artillery Groups
2 MACE squadrons (roughly MAINZ area and SE of Munich)

1 Operational Ground Forces Headquarters
1 Air Force Headquarters (South) about 500 aircraft
1 Ground Forces Headquarters (Operational)

2. All NATO units must be considered ready for action without re-inforcement.

3. The following reaction times of NATO forces will be used for guidance:

   a. Warsaw Pact Forces theoretical time of movement out of garrison: 0001 hours
   Enemy intelligence alerted: 0100 hours
   Enemy Armored Cavalry Regt moving out: 0130 hours
   All NATO divisions move out: 0300-0400 hours
   Total time required for defensive deployment of NATO in task forces: 3 hours
b. Total estimated required time for NATO forces to prepare a completely effective defense system on unprepared ground: 7 days. Preparation of minimal dug-in positions, fields of fire, nuclear defense: 2 days.

c. NATO forces must react to WP actions with available forces.

4. NATO Counterattack

a. Up to D plus 3, the tactics of NATO forces opposing the Southwestern Front will be purely defensive. Through defense of the 2nd US armored cavalry regiments, 10th US Armored Division, 24th German Mechanized Inf Div and 24th US Mechanized Infantry, and remnants of the 1st Mountain Division, advancing WP forces will be hindered in preparation for a NATO counter-attack on D plus 3/D plus 4, using the 12th Mechanized Infantry Division and the 10th Armored Division on the axis of advance PARSBERG-CHEB and HEMAU-SMOLOV. Units of the 6th French Mechanized Infantry Division will be used to stop the advance of the WP units on the KARLOVY VARY-KARLSRUHE operational direction.

b. The mission of mobilized and reinforcement units will be to strike into the southern flank of the WP Western Front.
Deception Plan *

1. Available border guard brigades (7) form diversionary axes of advance in order to conceal as long as possible the true axes of advance. Border guard units equipped as motorized rifle battalions will advance over the following border crossings:
   a. STARA VODA-ROZVADOV
   b. HAMRY-STRAZNY
   c. LIPENSKA-PREHRADA
   d. HALANKY-CITORNICE

2. Border guard units will be subordinate to the CAA commanders in their particular area.

3. Border guard units will advance as far forward as possible in view of resistance offered. No specific objectives or rates of advance will be assigned.

4. All measures for the use of deception will be instituted, particularly for tactical missile units. Deception and Security Control Officers (Dustojnici pro rezim) will have the overall staff responsibility for the planning of use of deception and decoy assets. Deployment of these assets will be governed by the operational plan and will be subject to approval of the front and pertinent CAA commander.

   a. Unless instructions are issued to the contrary, the movement of decoy formations will be perpendicular to the movement of operating units.

   b. Final determination of decoy locations will be subject to approval of the combined arms commander.

   c. Operating units will be accorded road priority of movement over decoy units at all times.

   d. Spacing between units will be strictly adhered to in accordance with operational directives.

* A separate report on misinformation deception and decoys used by CSSR in peacetime and wartime will be published.
SOUTHERN FRONT
JINCE, CSSR
Date: D-Day

Comment: Source provided bulk figures for rear services elements of the Southwest Front, the 1st CAA and 4th CAA and each of its 10 subordinate divisions. His information on rear services, units, organization and equipment was negligible, however, he was familiar with those functions and services associated with rear services at each of the echelons and they are identified in this Annex. Whenever specific units were recollected, they were so identified by type, size and other data to the extent known by Source.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rear Services Function</th>
<th>FRONT</th>
<th>EACH ARMY</th>
<th>EACH DIVISION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pers 10,000</td>
<td>Pers 10,000</td>
<td>Pers 2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Veh 2,000</td>
<td>Veh 2,000</td>
<td>Veh 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbl Rkt Tech Base (PRTZ)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>*2</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Msl/Rkt Trans Bn (w/80 thrs ea - unk prime movers)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline Bde (POL)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT Bn</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**Fld Hosp</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fld Surgical Bde (Mbl)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med Bn</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graves Registration Element</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fld Post Office</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbl Printing Shops</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tracked &amp; Wheeled Veh Maint (Light Maint Only) Shops</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engr, Sig, Cml &amp; Opt Stor/Rep</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rats, Clothing &amp; Equip, Ammo, Ord &amp; Spare Parts Stor</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakery, Slaughterhouse, Laundry Services</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(ANNEX D continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rear Services Function</th>
<th>FRONT</th>
<th>EACH ARMY</th>
<th>EACH DIVISION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Captured Enemy Equip</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coll/Exploitation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Purification/Sup &amp; Gen Power Sup</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Part of Engr Elm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Regulators</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1 Army PRTZ supports 1 Army SCUD A (8K11) Bde and 1 PRTZ supports Divisional FROG Bns.
**FRONT will man and use civilian hospital facilities.
***Detailed from Hq Element at each level. No separate units existed.
ANNEX E (SIGNAL) TO OPERATION ORDER NO. 1

1. COMMUNICATIONS NETS.
   a. For communications with Warsaw Pact Forces headquarters see appendix 1.
   b. Command Net. The command net will include all commanders, including those of lateral fronts and the Chief of Rear Services.
   c. Staff Communication Net No. 1. The staff communication net no. 1 will include:
      (1) Chief of Staff, Front (Main)
      (2) Chief of Staff, 1st CAA
      (3) Chief of Staff, 4th CAA
      (4) Chief of Staff, Front Rear
      (5) Chief of Staff, 10th Air Army
      (6) Command Post (Front)
   d. Staff Communications Net No. 2. The staff communications net no. 2 will include all major front units as designated by order of the Front Commander:
      (1) Front Combined Arms Reserve Units
      (2) Front Anti-Tank Reserve Units
      (3) Front Engineer Brigade
      (4) Front Engineer Reserve Units
      (5) All other units that the commander may so direct.
   e. Coordination Net.
      (1) A Front coordination net will be established for communications between neighboring Fronts. The number of stations will be held to a minimum.
         (a) Chief of Staff, Carpathian Front
         (b) Chief of Staff, Southwestern Front
         (c) Chief of Staff, Western (Berlin) Front
         (d) Unidentified USSR fighter-bomber units
         (e) All units authorized to provide nuclear strikes on request.
(2) All communications with Warsaw Pact strategic forces will be maintained by the front commander through the Warsaw Pact Forces Main Headquarters.

f. Rocket Troops and Artillery Commander's Net.

(1) Front Missile Brigade
(2) Front Rocket Technical Support Base (PRTZ)
(3) Commander, Rocket Troops and Artillery, 1st CAA
(4) Commander, Rocket Troops and Artillery, 4th CAA
(5) 1st CAA Missile Brigade
(6) 4th CAA Missile Brigade
(7) Artillery Armaments Officer, Front (Rear)

g. The following nets will be established as needed:

(1) Rear Services Net
(2) Air Force Net

2. MEANS OF COMMUNICATION.

a. All nets will be provided with alternate routing by coaxial cable and radio. Rocket Troops and Artillery Commander's net will be by radio only. (Source Comment: Cable communications means were eliminated in the 1960s.)

b. Wire nets will be used in regimental communications only.

c. All wire communications must be routed through combined arms command posts and must be established using the checkerboard principle.

3. COMMUNICATION CENTERS.

All communication centers serving command posts will be no less than 20-30 k.ms distant from the command posts that they service.

4. FACSIMILE EQUIPMENT.

The use of facsimile equipment is not authorized in forward areas.
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX E (SIGNAL) OF OPERATION ORDER NO. 1

* All station designators are imaginary
1. The initial nuclear strike will consist of two salvos (minimum one, maximum three). Date-time group indicating prescribed time of impact will be given by scrambler telephone. Strikes to be executed on D-Day and D+1 will be directed against targets and in numbers prescribed in Appendix 1.

2. The mission of the strikes will be:
   a. Cripple the enemy's air defense system with particular attention to HAWK units and radar systems.
   b. Destroy nuclear delivery means, independent heavy artillery groups, MACE and LACROSSE units, as well as nuclear warhead depots.
   c. Cripple the Command and Control system by destroying ground forces command posts and the Air Force Tactical Headquarters, South.
   d. Create conditions for the achievement of air superiority by destroying enemy air force units on the ground.
   e. Cripple the combat potential of enemy major units with particular stress on the two US armored cavalry regiments, the 4th Mechanized Infantry Division (G), and the 1st Mountain Division (G).

3. Front nuclear strikes will be simultaneously supported by intermediate ballistic missiles of 3000 km range with targets on the PARIS-LYON line.

4. Air nuclear strikes will be used exclusively north of the 4th CAA boundary; missiles south of the boundary. All means of attack and advance will be used simultaneously.

5. Allotment of warheads for the initial nuclear strikes will be provided above the normal front allotment.

6. On D+2, nuclear strikes will be directed against new targets of air defense systems, NATO Command and Control facilities, nuclear launchers, and air forces. NATO divisions of operational reserve will be closely monitored.
   a. Nuclear strikes will be carried out against targets and in numbers prescribed in Appendix 1.
   b. Southwestern Front organic forces will strike at any concentration of enemy forces.
c. Southwestern Front will levy requirements on the Warsaw Pact Forces Main Headquarters to prevent reinforcement of forces within the operational area of the Southwestern Front, particularly from France.

d. Nuclear strike reserve will be maintained at the 20 to 30 strike level. It may be used against NATO operational reserves only when such forces move out of their positions, deploying for a counterattack or moving to reinforce first echelon divisions.

e. Strikes may also be made against possible mobilization concentrations in Southern Germany.

7. On D+3, nuclear strikes will be carried out against enemy weapons of mass destruction brought up to support the counterattack, as well as against the 10th Armored and 12th Mechanized Infantry Divisions with the mission of weakening the punch of the counterattack.

8. On D+4, nuclear strikes will be concentrated against air defense systems, nuclear launch vehicles, command posts, and air support committed to the expected NATO counterattack. Counterattacking divisions must be hit by a group of nuclear strikes the moment they move out to attack. A total of 30 strikes will be carried out against targets listed in Appendix 1.

9. On D+5, 20 nuclear strikes will be carried out as prescribed in Appendix 1. Three strikes against the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division (US) and four strikes against the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division (F) will be aimed to accelerate the rates of advance, while one nuclear strike directed against the 10th Armored Division (US) and one against the 12th Mechanized Infantry Division (G) will complete the liquidation of counterattacking units.

10. On D+6, in order to secure the commitment of the Carpathian Front, 12 nuclear strikes will be carried out as prescribed in Appendix 1, eight of which will be directed against eventual enemy reserves enroute to the combat zone.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGETS</th>
<th>INITIAL</th>
<th>D+1</th>
<th>D+2</th>
<th>D+3</th>
<th>D+4</th>
<th>D+5</th>
<th>D+6</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense Systems</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>* Eight strikes against unidentifiable arriving reinforcements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Armd Cav Regt (South)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Armd Cav Regt (North)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Mech Inf Div (G)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Mountain Div (G)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Mech Inf Div (G)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th Mech Inf Div (US)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Armd Div (US)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Mech Inf Div (F)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Mech Inf Div (G)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Five Artillery Groups</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Warhead Depots</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>180</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX G (CHEMICAL) TO OPERATION ORDER NO. 1

1. Chemical support for the Southwestern Front will be rendered by the organic chemical regiment.

2. Two chemical officers will be represented at the Front Operations Special Group for the protection against the effects of weapons of mass destruction.

3. Chemical troops in operational environments will be equipped with heavy protective uniforms. Rocket and artillery troops will be equipped with light protective suits; tactical units will be equipped with protective masks, protective sleeves, and fisherman-type rubber aprons.

4. Chemical officers at various levels will insure that all command posts are equipped with filters and that slight over-pressure is maintained at the command posts at all times.

5. Chemical officers at all levels will be responsible for protection against secondary nuclear radiation in cooperation with units involved.

6. Units under the authority of the chemical regiment will be distributed among other front units as the Front Commander may direct.
MULATED OPORD I - SW FRONT VARIANT

SOURCE ESTIMATE OF SW FRONT ORGANIZATION PRE (1968)

NOTE: SEE RC-3535 (US MHR 72) FOR TEC'S

WROCLAW

KRAKOW

USSR

HUNGARY

BUDAPEST
FIGURE I
SIMULATED OPORD I-SW FRONT VARIANT
PHASE I, II, III

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

AUSTRIA

SECRET

PLZEN

GESK

BUD

Linz

PRAGUE

SECRET