Conclusions and Experiences from the "Jesien" (Autumn) Integrated Maneuvers

Summary

The "Jesien" (Autumn) integrated, multilevel maneuvers of the Polish armed forces were conducted in September-October 1966. The maneuvers were designed to give a full picture of the functioning of the commands and forces of the Polish military system as a whole.

According to the scenario prepared by the General Staff, the "West" (NATO) forces were presumed to have provoked a crisis under the pretext of expanding their rights in West Berlin and to be planning an invasion of East Germany, coupled with large-scale landings of special forces in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. On the assumption that an outbreak of war was inevitable, the "East" began a series of mobilization measures on 17 September 1966. The "West" attacked on 2 October, initially using conventional weapons. The "East" counterattacked, and the "West" then launched a massive nuclear strike on 4 October. The "East" retaliated with its own nuclear strikes. The advance of the "West" was checked and the maneuvers ended on 5 October.

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Four special exercises were included in the maneuvers: "Malwa", "Ziemia Pomorska", "Wroz", and "Baza-66". In the "Malwa", troops were mobilized, the National Defense Committee assumed its wartime structure and Ministry of National Defense elements were deployed to their field command posts and readied to direct the armed forces. "Ziemia Pomorska" was a "skeleton" exercise of the territorial defense forces on the military district level. During this phase of the maneuvers, various headquarters and units were deployed and provincial and military staffs directed operations designed to provide territorial defense for their regions, including the combatting of air and sea landings. "Wroz" was an inter-district exercise involving the movement of troops to assembly areas, their deployment over large distances, and their commitment to battle from the march. It also included a tactical exercise on the theme "Attack of a mechanized regiment on a hastily organized enemy defense", in which live firing and bombing were employed. "Baza-66" involved the extensive deployment of rear service units and equipment and the first deployment of an Advanced Base of the Zone of Interior, which undertook various supply functions and the servicing of units.

The map exercises involved the northern and central strategic axes, while the field exercises were centered in seven provinces in northwestern and western Poland. The rear service units were moved to the maneuver area over a distance of 300 to 500 kilometers from southeastern and eastern Poland. In all, five operational groups undertook the role of two armies, a military district, an air defense corps, a Navy Main Staff, and the commands, staffs and forces of 14 tactical formations, nine regiments, 12 independent subunits, and five provincial and nine county military headquarters.

The latter two-thirds of the document are a critique of the maneuvers and a lengthy discussion of such factors as defense and mobilization planning, manpower preparations, equipment and systems for defense needs, defense training, and the conduct of operations. Considerable attention is devoted to problems of the organization and functioning of the rear services. Weaknesses revealed by the maneuvers are
described in some detail, and plans are discussed for strengthening and improving the Polish defense structure during the period 1966-70. Beginning with paragraph 222, there is a list of specific organizational changes, additions and improvements which were to be undertaken in 1967 in the armed forces. These include the forming, reforming, or buildup of various units, the streamlining of command systems, changes in the cadre structure, a new training system and streamlining the mobilization system.

The world political situation and the possibility of an outbreak of war are discussed in paragraphs 76-91. According to this Polish view, a parallel exists between the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations and the growing aggressiveness of U.S. imperialism, which is exemplified by the "barbaric" U.S. intervention in Vietnam. In the "Jesien" maneuvers it was assumed that the outbreak of hostilities in Europe had occurred as a result of a world crisis caused by the escalation of United States aggression in Vietnam. It is stated that imperialism undoubtedly will continue to exploit Sino-Soviet disunity. This will result in dangerous crises arising in the international power structure which will require considerable effort and a high state of readiness on the part of the USSR and the European socialist countries. Although there was no serious crisis in Europe in October 1966, West Germany is represented as a threat to European security. In the view of this document, war in Europe will eventually probably arise from a conflict provoked by West German imperialism, a conflict which may even be contrary to the desires of its allies and protectors.

End Summary

Comment

This report is a translation of a critique of the integrated, multilevel maneuvers conducted by the Polish Armed Forces in Poland during September-October 1966. The document was prepared by the General Staff in the Ministry of National Defense and was classified Secret.

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The first nine pages of the document were not received. Where the exact meaning of a term or phrase is uncertain, the original Polish is given in parentheses. For convenience, the paragraphs of the document have been numbered, although they were unnumbered in the original text. Interpolations are identified by brackets.

The following abbreviations have been used in the report.

KOK - National Defense Committee
MND - Ministry of National Defense
OPK - National Air Defense
OPL - antiaircraft defense
OTK - Territorial Defense
OW - military district
POW - Pomeranian Military District
SOW - Silesian Military District
WBOK - Advance Base of the Zone of Interior
CONCLUSIONS AND EXPERIENCES FROM THE "JESIEN" ("AUTUMN") INTEGRATED MANEUVERS

Warsaw

October 1966
1. [first nine pages missing.] Commmitting to action 21 diversionary-reconnaissance groups (each consisting of eight men on the average) as well as 15 intelligence groups.

2. At the start, the situation was marked by political actions, the aggressive incursion of U. S. ground forces into the interior of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and an obvious preparation for armed attack against East Germany as well as other socialist countries. In the wake of these actions -- under the pretext of maneuvers and of reinforcing the allegedly threatened NATO organization -- the "West" began making general preparations intended to improve the operational position of its forces in Europe in order to seize and sustain the operational and strategic initiative in the initial period of war. The "West" also relied on the fact that fear of expanding the conflict to include the unlimited use of weapons of mass destruction would enable it to achieve its political and military objectives and would cause the "East" to accept accomplished facts, mainly the conquest of East Germany.

3. The aggressive intentions and actions of the "West" forced the Warsaw Pact nations to take certain necessary steps. According to the decisions of the Political Consultative Committee, a state of increased national defense readiness was declared on 17 September of this year [1966] by resolution of the National Defense Committee (KOK), Polish People's Republic. At the same time the KOK ordered action to be initiated on various defense goals related to the organization-mobilization preparation of the armed forces and of the entire nation.

4. The strategic-operational objectives of both sides were based on the simulated situation.

5. The "West," by provoking a specific political situation, and under the pretext of expanding its rights in West Berlin, intended to bring its troops into East Germany, to crush the military forces of the "East" stationed there. This provocation would create favorable conditions for mounting further offensive operations.
The "West" planned to begin combat operations with conventional weapons; the use of weapons of mass destruction would depend on the development of the strategic-operational situation.

6. In order to cause disarray in the rear areas, the "West" planned to land large numbers of special forces in Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

7. The first strategic-operational echelon of the NATO ground forces was to be formed by the Northern and the Central Army Groups.

8. The Northern Army Group was to launch a major attack in the direction of the coast and a secondary one in the area south of Berlin, while the Central Army group was supposed to launch a major attack on the Dresden-Warsaw axis.

9. The 1st Army (composed of forces of the Silesian Military District), which was in action on its northern flank, was supposed to launch a major attack toward Zagan, Poznan and Inowroclaw, and a secondary one toward Zielona Gora and Skwierzyna, with the primary mission of crushing enemy forces with the support of the adjacent covering troops, followed by the defeat of the main forces of the "East" 10th Army. The mission was also to include the capture of the Oder line by the third or fourth day of the operation. The 1st Army's secondary mission was to annihilate the approaching "East" reserves and capture the Vistula line and the bridgeheads on its east bank by the sixth or seventh day of the offensive.

10. Under protection of the covering echelon, the "East" planned to launch a decisive attack, with units regrouped in the rear, designed to annihilate the troops of the Northern and Central Army Groups in the border area, to carry combat operations to the opponent's territory, and to capture his main bases and strategic-operational as well as political-economic targets in the European Theater of Operations. Although its nuclear weapons delivery means were kept in a constant state of readiness, the "East" made the use of these weapons dependent on a concrete operational-strategic situation, especially on the "West's" level of preparation for the use of such weapons.
11. The Wielkopolski Front was supposed to crush from the march the attack grouping (zgrupowanie) of the "West" and to launch decisive offensive operations on the Zielona Gora-Leipzig-Kassel-Bonn axis.

12. The primary mission of the 10th Army (composed of forces from the Pomeranian Military District), operating in the Front's first echelon, was to annihilate the main forces of the "West" 1st Army. It was then to seize the Erfurt-Greifental line by the third or fourth day of the operation. The Army's secondary mission was to annihilate, with the support of adjacent forces, the approaching enemy reserves and to capture the region northeast of Frankfurt by the sixth or seventh day of the operation.

13. Actually participating in the maneuvers within the framework of the above objectives were the 3rd and 26th Tank Divisions; the 6th and 31st Artillery Brigades (which provided army-level operational support); and other units.

14. The 3rd Tank Division, which was in the second operational echelon of the 1st Army, was ordered into battle from the Wolsztyn-Kaszczor line, with the mission of enlarging the successful attack on the Zagan-Poznan axis.

15. The 26th Tank Division, which was located further inland, was ordered to move into the staging area and go into battle on D-day plus 3 from the Naumburg-Elsenberg line on the Erfurt-Frankenberg axis.

16. The purpose of defending the national territory of the "East," which ensued from the general political and strategic situation, was primarily intended to ensure inviolability of the country's maritime border and air space, to protect the movement of the country's operational troops as well as those of its allies, and especially to ensure the functioning of the country's socio-political and economic life and the protection of the nation's population and resources.

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17. The Pomeranian Military District, in fulfilling its mission of territorial defense in the area of the northern provinces (wojewodztwo), was supposed to ensure the freedom of movement of the operational troops, particularly those of the Wielkopolski Front, by maintaining the roads and transportation facilities and by constructing river crossings on the lower Vistula and the Oder. Also included in the District's mission was the defense of the seacoast and the principal rear areas from attack by the enemy's airborne, amphibious assault and special forces. In order to overcome the effects of nuclear strikes, the military district was to concentrate its efforts in the cities of Gdynia-Gdansk, Lodz, Szczecin and Bydgoszcz, and to reopen the transportation, communications and supply systems in the areas of destruction.

18. The "Jesien" maneuvers were preceded by a period of increased national defense readiness, during which the international situation became extremely tense. Everything pointed to an inevitable outbreak of hostilities in the very near future.

19. Between 17 and 27 September, the military department of the National Defense Committee (KOK) undertook a series of mobilization-operational measures. Operational troops were placed in a state of combat readiness; tactical formations (zwiazek) in constant combat readiness were brought up to full strength; and units were staffed with an appropriate number of specialists. These measures made possible the rapid departure of these units to mobilization areas. The collection of stocks of ammunition and fuel and their allocation to the armed forces and the issue of supplies to units from warehouses were also initiated. The provincial (wojewodztwo) and county (powiat) military staffs updated the organization-mobilization plans and the plans for dispersing the population, warehouses, hospitals, etc. A high level of combat readiness was achieved in the territorial air defense system. The other KOK departments also completed the necessary mobilization-operational work, thus permitting a transition to the wartime system of operations.

20. This was the situation in which the first part
of the "Jesien" maneuvers -- exercise "Malwa" -- began. At 1500 hours on 27 September, the Minister of National Defense -- head of the military department -- ordered the chiefs of the central institutions in the Ministry of National Defense (MND) to achieve a state of complete readiness for directing the deployment of the armed forces.

21. Following a worsening of the political-military situation, on 28 September, a state of instant combat readiness (stan ostrego pogotowia bojowego) of the armed forces was declared. The units which were being mobilized began to draw supplies from mobilization stocks. Rail transport loading of equipment earmarked for the Front's storage depots was also begun. Late on the 28th, the KOK ordered the state administrative organs to assume their field posts.

22. At 0001 hours on 29 September the MND central institutions were alerted; by 0700 hours they had moved to their field command posts and achieved readiness to lead the armed forces. Command Post Number 2 achieved the necessary readiness 30 minutes after the alert. In the course of this command post deployment, as well as in the next phase of the exercise, situations dealing with mobilization and deployment of the armed forces were played out.

23. The "Malwa" exercise ended at about 1200 hours on 29 September.

24. Some of the organs participating in the "Malwa" exercise then proceeded to direct the "Wrzos", "Ziemia Pomorska" and "Baza-66" exercises.

25. Command Post Number 1, which had been set up for the duration of the maneuvers, moved into a new area and started checking its capability for ensuring maintenance of control by the Defense Minister.

26. The second part of the "Jesien" maneuvers included the "Wrzos", "Ziemia Pomorska" and "Baza-66" exercises.

27. The first stage began with the announcement on 17 September of a state of increased national defense.
readiness; at this time only the initial elements of the "Baza-66" exercise were activated.

28. Between 26 and 30 September covert mobilization was ordered and the rear service units of the armies, the Front and the zone of interior which were to participate in the "Baza-66" exercise were formed. The formation of most of the units was preceded by mobilization alerts. This action proceeded efficiently in accordance with the training plans for mobilization.

29. In order for the rear service units to achieve readiness, they were moved to the areas of deployment. The average rate of movement was 20 to 25 kilometers per hour. The highest rate (35 kilometers per hour) was achieved by the 115th Motor Transport Battalion (formed on the basis of transport equipment from the national economy), which completed a march of 890 kilometers.

30. In the second stage, which included the period from 0005 hours on 1 October to 2000 hours on 2 October, that is, up to the outbreak of war, operations were in progress in the "Wrzos", "Ziemia Pomorska" and "Baza-66" exercises.

31. At 0005 hours on 1 October, the KOK declared a state of national emergency. At the same time an alert was ordered in the armed forces. In the "Wrzos" exercise the following units were actually alerted:

32. The Pomeranian Military District Command, which was divided into the 10th Army Command and the wartime military district command; the 16th Tank Division [actual designation of the 26th Tank Division]; the 6th Artillery Brigade; the 4th Special Operations Battalion; and other units.

33. At the same time the army component (pion armijny) of the Silesian Military District Command was placed on alert. Later in the exercise the 3rd Tank Division, the 31st Artillery Brigade and the 1st Special Operations and Contamination Reconnaissance Battalion (1 Batalion Zabiegow Specjalnych i Rozpoznania Skazen) were placed on alert.
34. In general the alerts were conducted efficiently -- the POW (Pomeranian Military District) staff applied technically improved methods for alerting -- and for the most part [achieved it] within the prescribed time norms, but unfortunately sufficient attention was not paid to such matters as camouflage, secrecy and protection.

35. The departure to assembly areas and the deployment of the staffs and units participating in the "Ziemia Pomorska" exercise were also carried out efficiently.

36. At the time of announcing the alert, the commands of the "East" 10th Army and of the "West" 1st Army received extracts of a directive from the Front commander and the army group commander, and began to plan their initial operations. The plans prepared by the staffs of both armies may be considered generally correct and in conformity with the intentions of the senior commander. The schematic distribution of nuclear weapons, and also the establishment of a 30-kilometer wide breakthrough sector as a conventional variant for the 1st Army, represent the only unfavorable aspects of this planning. On 1 October units of the "East" 10th Army began to carry out the plan intended to improve the operational situation. Within the framework of this maneuver, at approximately 1600 hours the 26th Tank Division began to move to the staging area. Between 0400 hours and 0800 hours on 2 October the main forces of this division crossed the Vistula River at Solec Kujawski over a bridge which had been rapidly and carefully built by the 9th Ponton Bridge Brigade functioning in the traffic control and direction zone of the "Wisla" forces. The crossing of this bridge, however, was seriously delayed because of confusion in directing the crossing in this area.

37. In the above-mentioned period in the "Ziemia Pomorska" exercise, the staff of the Pomeranian Military District, the provincial and county military staffs, and the staffs of the units participating in the exercise began to pursue the objectives in the operational plans for territorial defense in their regions. The predominant emphasis in these objectives was placed on combatting air and sea landings, to the detriment of the other operational-defensive actions.
38. Within the framework of land defense of the POW region, the district staff set up traffic control and direction zones for the "Wisla" and the "Odra" forces. The 26th Tank Division, the 6th Artillery Brigade, and several rear service units participating in the "Baza-66" exercise actually moved through the "Wisla" zone. Up to the time of the movement through this zone, there was a precise and direct connection between the "Wrzos" and "Ziemia Pomorska" exercises. Following the departure of operational troops from the POW region, however, the exercises became divergent, a situation which was dictated by the simulated state border. Nevertheless, their connection to the strategic concept common to the "Jesien" maneuvers continued, and these exercises also remained as a connecting link, in some respects like the "Baza-66" exercise.

39. In the "Baza-66" exercise, at 1000 hours on 1 October the personnel and equipment of the Central Office of the Water Economy were employed to set up a ferry crossing at Gorsk, and the previously begun movement of units from mobilizing garrisons to designated deployment areas was continued. At the same time, fuel was supplied to the troops participating in the "Wrzos" exercise. The Front's transport facilities delivered over 400 tons of liquid fuel to the units of the "East" 10th Army and the "West" 1st Army.

40. With the help of the Traffic Control Zone Command (Komenda strefy kierowania), the rear service units efficiently crossed the Vistula line by means of ferries and a ponton bridge. The lack of accurate information on the movement of individual columns over the crossing should be listed among the deficiencies in this area. As the rear service units reached the dispersal areas, the Advanced Base of the Zone of Interior (Wysunieta baza obszaru kraju), a Front Hospital Base, and a Mobile Base of the 1st Army were established and included in the system of rear support for the troops.

41. The third stage included the period from the outbreak of war, that is, at 2000 hours on 2 October, to the conclusion of the maneuvers on 5 October.
42. The "West" started the war by launching a massive air and sea attack with conventional weapons against troops and other targets of the "East". At the same time offensive operations were mounted by the Northern and Central Army Groups which, after overcoming the opposition of the covering echelon, on 3 October penetrated the border to a depth of about 15 to 25 kilometers into "East" territory, and achieved the greatest success on the Dresden-Wroclaw axis. In the afternoon of 3 October the 1st Army, after committing part of the second operational echelon (5th Mechanized Division) to battle, penetrated about 70 kilometers in the main direction of attack.

43. In this situation the "East," which also staged a massive attack with conventional weapons, continued to bring up troops from the rear -- including the entire forces of the Wielkopolski Front and its 10th Army, fighting on the Front's southern flank -- and successively committed first-echelon divisions to battle. This resulted in heavy battles with the aggressor's attacking units.

44. In the evening of 2 October, the 26th Tank Division and the 6th Artillery Brigade, continued their movement from the area south of Bydgoszcz to their designated area of operation. At 0600 hours on 3 October the Division began to cross the Warta at Biedrusko on a bridge built with its own equipment. There it encountered low-altitude attacks by two ground-attack fighter regiments of the "West." Because of the controlled direction of flight along the river, and also because of the well-organized antiaircraft defense, the crossing was successfully carried out and the 26th Tank Division reached the halt area in Zbaszyn at 1600 hours on 3 October.

45. Continuing to move, the division's main forces crossed the Oder on a ponton bridge built at Pomorsko by the 3rd Army Ponton Regiment, and also on ferry and landing equipment and partly by tank along the river bottom, between 0900 hours and 1200 hours of 4 October. During the crossing the division units were attacked by the enemy's ground-attack fighters and bombers. The crossing of the
46. The 26th Tank Division covered a distance of over 600 kilometers in three days. The rate of movement for most of the units under day and night conditions was as follows: for the tracked vehicle echelon -- 11 kilometers per hour for the daily rate, 15 to 17 kilometers per hour for movement in daytime; for the wheeled vehicle echelon -- 20 and 25 kilometers per hour respectively. Of the 101 tanks, 13 were left behind on the march route, but five of these tanks were able to rejoin their parent units following necessary repairs.

47. In the morning hours of 4 October a gap was created in the formation of both armies through which they moved their tank divisions from the second operational echelon. The converging lines of departure of the 3rd and 26th Divisions resulted in a meeting engagement. The lead units of these divisions engaged in battle at 1400 hours on 4 October. Due to active reconnaissance the 3rd Tank Division outmaneuvered the enemy in the deployment and advantageous grouping of its main forces, but the success gained initially was not effectively exploited in the next phase of battle.

48. During the battle the 6th Airborne Division of the "West" made an airborne landing at Krosno Odrzanksie and captured a crossing on the Oder, thus creating conditions which enabled the 3rd Tank Division to surmount the water obstacle from the march. Actually only the 16th Airborne Battalion was parachuted from a height of 550 to 700 meters, a height which required too much time for the descent of the airborne echelon; in addition, the landing was too dispersed. The action of the "West" forces in this area was aimed at expanding their success on the Zagan-Poznan axis while at the same time attacking the flank of the Berlin grouping. Finally, the forces were to link up with the tactical formations of the Northern Army Group and cut off the "East" forces in the Berlin area.

49. This intention, however, was paralyzed due to
the bringing up of reserve operational formations by the "East" and the transition of these units to decisive offensive operations on the maritime and Berlin axes. Under these circumstances, the "West," faced with the eventuality of losing the strategic initiative and then of meeting disaster, decided to employ weapons of mass destruction.

50. The first massive nuclear strike on a strategic level was mounted at 1800 hours on 4 October.

51. This nuclear attack definitely weakened the "East" 10th Army. The enemy, being the first to strike and inflicting extensive losses on the tactical formations -- especially on the 18th Mechanized Division -- assumed the initiative in this area of combat.

52. In this situation the 10th Army commander, in fulfilling the directive of the Wielkopolski Front commander, decided to mount a retaliatory nuclear strike, to hold the enemy on the lines occupied thus far, and, after moving the 45th Mechanized Division up from the Front's reserve, to change over to offensive operations.

53. The 10th Army, however, did not mount the nuclear strikes until 1920 hours; moreover, these strikes were comparatively weak, with a combined yield of 290 kilotons.

54. The 1st Army's decision to launch a nuclear strike should be evaluated in a similar manner. These strikes were mounted two hours and 15 minutes after receipt of the order from the Front.

55. Despite its possession of nuclear weapons, the 3rd Tank Division did not mount any nuclear strikes. On the other hand, the 26th Tank Division mounted three strikes, inflicting extensive losses on the 3rd Tank Division, thus creating a situation which was advantageous for subsequent operations.

56. On 5 October, the "West" attack toward Poznan was basically checked. Only at Krosno Odrzanskie was there
enemy tactical activity. The 6th Airborne Division was in action there, and the 8th Tank Regiment, as a detachment of the 3rd Tank Division, made a forced crossing along the bottom of the Oder River in approximately 38 minutes.

57. During the morning hours the "East" 10th Army commander -- after the 45th Mechanized Division had been placed under his jurisdiction from the Front reserves -- made a correct decision, which was assured by the planned nuclear strikes, and started to crush the northern flank of the 1st Army and to mount an attack on the previously ordered axis.

58. A separate incident of the "Wrzos" exercise was the tactical exercise demonstration involving live firing and bombing, held on 4 October at the Wedrzyn range. The theme of the exercise was entitled "Attack of a Mechanized Regiment (pz) Against a Hastily Organized Enemy Defense." The following participated in the exercise: the 48th Mechanized Regiment, the Seventh Bomber Brigade, the 51st Ground Attack Fighter Regiment, a 152-mm howitzer battalion (from the 31st Artillery Brigade), and 122-mm howitzer and BM-14 [rocket] battalions from the 11th Tank Division [actual designation of the 3rd Tank Division]. The exercise indicated an appropriate level of tactical and marksmanship training of the participating units; most of the units received a very good rating.

59. In the "Ziemia Pomorska" exercise the intensive action of the "West" in the country, particularly the action designed to delay the movement of "East" forces during the night of 3 to 4 October, was assumed -- based on the above described uniform operational-strategic background. Initially the "West" launched heavy air attacks on the ports, naval bases and transportation centers of the "East," particularly the crossings on the lower course of the Oder and the Vistula. At the same time, the "West" continued to move reconnaissance-diversionary groups into the interior of the country.

60. In order to protect the operational forces moving through the Pomeranian Military District area, to overcome
the effects of enemy air attacks and to combat the recon-
aissance-diversionary groups, the POW commander decided
to commit primarily the personnel and equipment of the
territorial [defense] system to carry out these assign-
ments, while the mobile forces were to eliminate the
airborne and amphibious forces.

51. At 1800 hours on 4 October the first nuclear
strikes were mounted against key centers in the Pomeranian
Military District. Up to 0445 on 5 October the enemy
mounted 41 nuclear strikes against the Pomeranian area,
including seven surface bursts and three nuclear mine
explosions with a combined yield of 7,280 kilotons.

52. The decisions to eliminate the effects of nuclear
strikes were made at all command levels and took into con-
sideration a determination of manpower and equipment,
their maneuverability and the methods of conducting
rescue and damage-removal work.

53. On 5 October, an amphibious force of about two
battalions was landed on the coast in the Kolobrzeg area
and, in conjunction with the above operation, a "West"
airborne force of about four battalions was landed at
Zlotow, Wyrzysk, Tuchola, north of Chojnice, and east of
Czarne. The POW commander assigned the 10th and 13th
Mobile Brigades (brygady manewrowe), the 15th WOP [Front-
tier Guard] Brigade, a tank company from the Ground
Forces Training Center in Drawsko, and two territorial
defense battalions to eliminate the enemy forces.

54. In the "Baza-55" exercise, in connection with
the destruction of the road and transportation network and
the bridges in the remote areas of the country, the 14th
Bridge Brigade began, after 2100 hours on 2 October, to
erect a portable bridge on permanent supports at Topolno
and to set up a ferry crossing on the Vistula at Dabrowka.
A company equipped with crossing pipeline (kompania
rurociagow przeprawowych) began to deploy along the fol-
lowing axis: Zamek Bierzeglowski CPN (Petroleum Products
Office) depot - Sierpice railroad station.
55. The headquarters of the Advanced Base of the Zone of Interior, with the close cooperation of the SKiKRW (Zone for Controlling and Directing Troop Movements) Command and the Provisional Transshipping Area Command (Komenda tymczasowego rejonu przeladunkowego), organized the transshipments of rail supply trains arriving from the zone of interior and earmarked for operational support of the Wielkopolski Front's units.

56. Between 3 and 5 October the WBOK (Advance Base of the Zone of Interior) units in the provisional transshipping area transshipped 600 tons of ammunition and bombs, 500 tons of food, and 8,000 uniforms; in addition they transferred 1,000 tons of liquid fuel through the pipeline to the railroad tank cars and the 54th Field POL Depot.

67. Beginning at 0500 hours on 3 October, the Front medical units, which were a part of the Hospital Base, organized and conducted the evacuation of the wounded from the battlefield to the front hospital with the help of the 82d Medical Battalion. In all, 500 noncommissioned officers and privates were used to simulate the wounded.

68. At 1800 hours on 4 October, because of the atomic strikes and the shifting of the radioactive fallout in the direction of the base, the commandant rightly decided to evacuate the sick and wounded to areas free of contamination and to speed up the movement of the BSzF (Front Hospital Base) to the region of Dobiegniew.

69. The rear service units of the 1st Army's mobile base organized the supply of ammunition (in quantities required to support the live firing in the maneuvers) for the units, as well as the POL and food supplies.

70. At 0800 hours on 4 October, because of the napalm bomb attacks by enemy aircraft and the rapidly spreading fires in the WBOK and the RBA (Army Mobile Base) dispersal areas, an alert was sounded, followed by departure of the above units to alternate areas. The rear service units continued to fulfill their assigned duties until the end of the maneuvers.
71. Troop discipline during the maneuvers was basically good. A concrete expression of this discipline was the general and earnest effort of the personnel to carry out the difficult training assignments. However, several extraordinary accidents occurred, 15 of which caused particular concern. They resulted in the death of six persons, including three soldiers, two children and one adult civilian, and in serious bodily injury to 10 persons. They also caused the destruction of or serious damage to military equipment, including 10 vehicles of various kinds and one helicopter. Of the above six fatal accidents, three occurred in the 16th Tank Division, one in the Operational Air Force, and one in the 39th Mechanized Regiment (POW). In addition, during the return of the troops to their garrisons, there were two additional accidents in the 10th Signal Regiment of the SOW (Silesian Military District), in which one officer was killed, and one civilian and one soldier were seriously injured.

72. Despite these distressing accidents, which require a thorough and formal review, most of the participants in the maneuvers displayed a proper, dedicated attitude toward their duties. The "Jesien" maneuvers also provided a good opportunity to verify the political and ideological participation of personnel in the formation of overall defense readiness in the country. The idea behind these political principles was documented by the comprehension and sincere attitude of the civilian population and the local authorities. The meetings with civilians, arranged by the political organization in the maneuvers area, were very profitable politically.

73. With the integrated "Jesien" maneuvers, consisting of four topical parts under the code names "Malwa," "Ziemia Pomorska," "Wrzos," and "Baza-66," and encompassing a wide circle of important problems on defense preparedness in the military department structure, we have concluded another operational and tactical training year in the armed forces. At the same time, this was the first year of putting our long-range plan of training objectives into action. Because of their type, character and substance, the completed maneuvers formed a good basis for an overall summation of operational training results to date.
and for defining prospective training goals. Due to the increasingly better relationship between training projects and the problems of operational, organization-mobilization, and materiel planning, these maneuvers also provided much valuable information for improving conceptual principles, plans and practical activity in these areas.

74. Since the command element of the individual parts of the "Jesien" maneuvers has already held detailed discussions, the main stress in this report will therefore be on the above-mentioned matters.

75. For many years we have associated in increasing scope and in various aspects problems of operational level maneuvers with the basic guidelines of our strategy and the operational plans. We are also trying to take into account, insofar as is possible within the general background of maneuvers, a current and real international political and military situation as well as possible variations of its development during the conduct of maneuvers.

76. In the current maneuvers we assumed, among other things, that the outbreak of hostilities in Europe had occurred as a result of the general development of a severe crisis in the world situation, caused by the escalation of U. S. aggression in Vietnam. This problem prevails today in the international situation and casts an ominous shadow over it.

77. In a situation characterized by a lack of unity of action as well as a lack of political strategy by the socialist nations -- caused by China's persistent refusal to coordinate the counteraction -- the political and military leadership of the United States estimated that decisive counteractions by the socialist countries to acts of local aggression and intervention could not be strong... It is not by chance that a parallel exists between deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations -- resulting from China's refusal to cooperate in any way -- and the growing aggressiveness of the policy of U. S. imperialism, which was brought about and intensified by its barbarian intervention in Vietnam.
78. It is also not by chance that the United States selected Southeast Asia as the main area for aggressive penetration and tests of strength. It is a relatively unstable region where the situation threatened the development of anti-imperialistic changes, and where at the same time China's policy led to a rise in the instability of this situation to the advantage of U.S. imperialism. The events in Indonesia may serve as a glaring illustration of this.

79. Unity of action within the nations of the socialist camp is undoubtedly a prerequisite for putting an end to U.S. aggression in Vietnam as quickly as possible, and for expanding our aid to the heroic fighting Vietnamese nation to the level required to accomplish this task.

80. The prospects for achieving this unity are not good at present, however. In both domestic and international politics, the course selected and subsequently put into practice by the Chinese Party-government leadership does not permit one to count on an early restoration of unity of action of the socialist forces, or on a renewed consolidation, together with Communist China, of the front for fighting imperialism.

81. U.S. imperialism will undoubtedly attempt to continue exploiting these circumstances. Symptomatic of this is the recent U.S. statement of its readiness to employ nuclear weapons against the Vietnamese nation. In such a situation there is a very likely chance of dangerous crises arising in the international power structure, of periods of dangerous tension and conflict, the surmounting of which may require considerable effort by the USSR and the European socialist countries and the use of a large arsenal of varied resources. Of particular importance is flexibility of action combined with endurance and moderation, plus the required degree of activity and determination, which is based on the high state of readiness of the armed forces to repel aggression.

82. There is no sign of a serious crisis in the current situation in Europe. It is evident, however, that world peace is now more of an indivisible entity than
ever before. In addition, the danger of the revisional aggressive policies of West Germany, the principal ally and partner of the United States, is not in the least diminishing. West Germany, which is increasing its efforts to gain influence in nuclear strategy and joint possession of strategic nuclear weapons, represents today a threat to European security. One cannot discount West Germany's ability to attempt local provocations or even to provoke a critical development of events in circumstances favorable to itself.

83. It appears to us that an eventual war in Europe, especially in the event of a possibly generally disadvantageous development of the world situation, will probably arise from a conflict initiated and provoked by West German imperialism. Under certain conditions, this may even be contrary to the will of its allies and protectors.

84. We are developing our doctrinal views on the character and image of a possible future war in the European theater, in line with changes in the world power structures and with changes in the war doctrines and structure and armament of the armed forces of our potential enemies. The results of extensive studies of the various aspects of the problem several years ago led us to the general doctrinal conclusion that there is a certain likelihood -- which must be taken into account -- that a situation will develop in which hostilities will not, at the outset, assume the form of a general war. We have ascertained that in specific circumstances it is possible to have a state of war characterized by a longer or shorter initial period of conventional operations -- with limited objectives, area and resources employed, but conducted under the conditions of a constant threat of nuclear war. Moreover, the use of nuclear weapons, if it should come to that, can be expanded either gradually or precipitously.

85. The system of readied resources and defense actions should be sufficiently broad to meet the requirements arising from the outbreak of hostilities as described above. The system should further ensure to the political leadership the freedom to make decisions and to permit an appropriate selection of effective means and ways of action.

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In a critical trial of strength of this kind, our counter-
action must consist of a uniform complex of appropriately
graduated offensive political, psychological and military
options, skillfully combined, and employed to a degree
and in a manner corresponding to the character of the
aggression. These resources should be very closely sub-
ordinated to the political objectives of our action.

86. A precise determination of the possible duration
of this phase of operations is not feasible. It is not
excluded that the adversary, encountering determined op-
position, will understand the gravity of the situation
and in some manner will endeavor to desist from aggression.
It is also possible that the conflict will expand. An
analysis of the war doctrines of the imperialist nations,
the status and structure of their armed forces, their
training programs, and the essence of the non-nuclear
phase of war allows for a general appraisal indicating that
this phase will be of short duration. It is worth calling
attention to the fact that for the past few years we have
observed in the doctrinal views of our adversaries a
continuing tendency to reduce the duration of this
period.

87. An initially limited war may therefore either
be terminated comparatively quickly -- following a suc-
cessful course of events -- or it may develop into a
nuclear war. Waging a nuclear war in which weapons of
mass destruction would be used in a limited manner is
less probable. Rather, one must anticipate that such a
war will immediately assume the form of a general war.

88. The probability of an almost completely sudden
and surprise outbreak of war is slight, but we cannot
exclude it and we shall take it into account in our plans.
Much more probable is a slower or faster chain reaction
of events which will develop progressively and last for
a certain period of time, thus increasing the immediate
danger of war. According to our assumption, this period
should last a minimum of several days, but it may also be
of long duration.
89. From the various basic doctrinal guidelines set forth above, which have found expression in these maneuvers, follow specific deductions which are practicable for operational planning, the organization and armament of the armed forces, their state of preparedness, the mobilization system, operational deployment, training programs, etc. They will be presented in subsequent sections of the report.

90. In dealing with the various possibilities concerning the outbreak of war, the variants in its development and the ways of waging war, and in consideration of improving our defense system and its efficiency in line with the main doctrinal guidelines, we should realize clearly the basic truth that the prevention of war is the first and most important aim of the total complex of our defense efforts. Our high and all-around state of readiness for waging war must not be challenged by a potential aggressor and it must effectively deter him from attempting to arrive at extreme decisions.

91. A constant "war" between the two world systems takes place daily on this plane. A particular aspect of this "war" is the complex of psychological-propaganda undertakings called psychological warfare. We have many victories in this field, but we have also suffered setbacks and have left many opportunities unexploited. Of course the problem of psychological warfare lies considerably above the framework of the armed forces. Further, it cannot even be considered in its entirety within the scope of one nation, but rather it requires the coordination of activities with a clearly defined goal on the part of various organs and institutions within the coalition of socialist nations. The demand for coordinated efforts, both external and internal, is emerging with increasing insistency in the field of psychological warfare. The development and the objectives of psychological-propaganda actions require a transition from the concept of mainly repelling enemy attacks to one of offensive invasion of his area, to action against his forces of resistance, that is, against the broad masses of society in the capitalist countries. Concerning West Germany -- the country to which our political offensive is mainly ad-
dressed -- the objective is to overcome its revisional tendencies, to disperse any illusions of possible success in attempts at diversion and limited aggression, and to carry the conviction that these attempts hold but a single prospect for the aggressor -- catastrophe. In the immediate, active, offensive political struggle, the armed forces necessarily have limited capabilities for action. This problem, however, requires broader elucidation because the military element, as one aspect of our ability to repel aggression, should be one of the main factors in this struggle. Its skillfully developed propaganda presentation should produce a state in which our armed forces will in some measure be "fighting" the adversary now, in peacetime, effectively paralyzing his desire for aggressive action. Our active and broadest cooperation is required in this area.

*   *   *

92. The substance, kind and level of the imperialist threat of war, the envisaged possible manner of build-up for and the outbreak of war, and the main objectives which we intend to accomplish demand an unusually high level of efficiency of action, combat and alert readiness from all components of the nation's armed forces and defense system. We are presently at a stage of defense development characterized by significant progress in fulfilling the basic organizational guidelines of the complex defense concept, at a time when the arrangement of all parts of the multilevel structure of our defense system is almost completed. In these conditions, our principal task is to respond to the urgent need for skill in cooperation and coordination of actions. This must be based on the individual components' maximum possible attainment of readiness and efficiency of action. We are presently concentrating on these matters and we shall continue to do so in the future. These matters are coming to the foreground with full force, as is reflected in the content, forms and methods of defense training.

93. In its broad sense, defense activity includes three basic and correlative areas, those of military defense, economic defense, and political defense. The variety and, at the same time, the complexity and interdependence of duties in these areas impose the necessity of constant cooperation at all levels. Uniform centralized control of all undertakings and of solving problems in
similar tasks is a further requirement. At the central level, this control and cooperation should be reflected in the coordination within the individual defense areas and in their interconnection. This applies to defense and mobilization planning, the preparation of necessary manpower, equipment and systems for defense needs, defense training, and the conduct of operations.

94. The problem in question has already been taken up conceptually and organizationally by the National Defense Committee at the initiative of the Ministry of National Defense. It has been found necessary to establish an Office for Coordinating the Nation's Defense Planning (Urzad do spraw koordynacji planowani obrony panstwa), as an organ capable of coordinating and controlling all defense preparations in the functional and territorial systems, particularly current and future defense planning at the strategic and operational levels.

95. The problem of skill and the necessity of complex cooperation appear with equal sharpness at all levels. For example, let us consider the military defense duties with which we have been involved, though not to the fullest extent, in the present maneuvers. The concern here is the problem of ensuring freedom of movement for forces and equipment throughout the country. Here it is necessary to ensure coordination of action between the moving of allied and Polish operational forces and the OTK (Territorial Defense) forces and militarized units providing support to the movement. It is further necessary to coordinate the movement of the population dispersed in cities and areas in which a possible simultaneous movement of units poses the greatest danger. The fulfillment of this function will be the responsibility of the military forces (operational and OTK, combined arms and technical -- under central, military district, provincial and county jurisdiction) and of the forces in the functional system, comprising the transportation, internal order, civil guard and supply sections. All these forces and their functions must be coordinated to fulfill the complex task.

96. A basic condition for the attainment of Poland's defense aims in a period of international crisis is efficiency in heightening the state of readiness and the
deployment of defense forces, equipment and systems, so as to ensure a suitable advantage over the adversary's actions. Taking into consideration the high combat readiness of the NATO armed forces, and considering the possibility that a rapidly developing and short-lived crisis may change into an armed conflict in Europe -- precedence over the adversary and seizure of the initiative are conditioned by the constantly maintained ability to employ almost immediately that part of the defense potential which in peacetime is maintained at full or almost full combat readiness. A further condition is the ability to mobilize efficiently the remaining defense potential which should be able to reach a state of combat readiness as quickly as possible.

97. This postulate is in force in all defense areas, but primarily in the main elements of the defense command, in the operational armed forces, and in those elements of the other sections and systems which directly support the deployment of the operational forces.

98. This is the reason we attach such great importance to the constant improvement of all alert and warning systems, to the constant and high combat readiness of a specific part of the military forces, and to the readiness, flexibility and efficiency of the mobilization system.

99. We must perfect the mobilization system because even though the most essential elements of the armed forces reach and maintain a peacetime level of "constant readiness," a level which ensures these forces the ability to carry out assigned missions almost immediately, the difference between a peacetime and a wartime footing for the whole of the armed forces, to say nothing of the entire defense system, is necessarily comparatively great.

100. The projected attainment of a high state of efficiency for the entire defense system requires the concentration of extensive efforts on mobilization problems, for without a proper solution to questions of defense mobilization both in the armed forces and in all the defense systems, the next phase -- effective defensive action -- is out of the question. It is necessary to develop and to put into effect a general mobilization system and plan which
would comprise in a modified manner -- observing the principles of an appropriate hierarchy and with an accurate balance of manpower and materiel resources -- all forces and equipment of both defense fronts, from the operational forces down to the self-defense units (oddzialy samoobrony), and all elements of command and control, from the National Defense Committee down to the local defense committees.

101. We have begun the next phase of strengthening and improving our defense structure during the period from 1966 to 1970 with an ambitious but realistic program of action, based on cognizant needs, specific aims and valid possibilities. This program corresponds to the established concept of the defense of Poland, and its practical implementation will constitute a significant step forward.

102. In activating all components of the unified defense system in the years 1966 to 1970, we intend above all to make a considerable adjustment for the better in the defense readiness level of the formations and components in this system, to make a basic improvement in the areas of cooperation and coordination, and to improve the methods and reliability of a centralized command and control structure.

103. Improvement of the operational troops and the OTK forces, representing the two basic echelons of the armed forces, will continue.

104. As for the operational forces, we plan to intensify their present trend of development by adapting their organization, armaments and training to operations involving the use of both nuclear and conventional weapons, and by ensuring to them the ability to shift from one type of operation to the other.

105. Regarding the OTK forces, three basic undertakings are in preparation:

1) improvement of the striking power and combat readiness of the National Air Defense Forces;
2) structural development of the Internal Troops (wojska wewnętrzne) according to the needs for operational defense of the nation's territory and the duties of protecting KOK control posts and KOK sections;

3) development of the Territorial Defense Troops, including their improvement at provincial and county levels.

106. The defense projects of the functional system are designed to perfect the concept of organization and the functioning of the individual KOK sections as well as to coordinate their activities, to expand defense planning, organization-mobilization activity and defense training which is coordinated in all three defense areas as well as between each of the areas, and to make significant progress in the area of readying militarized units.

107. Included among the major problems of defense growth in the territorial system are the further development and strengthening of territorial defense committees and their military staffs, the expansion of defense planning, the quantitative and qualitative development of self-defense units, and the mass defense training of the population. An intricate, organization-mobilization conception of all manpower and resources contemplated for use at the province, county, large industrial establishment, and township levels, and the further activation of the public in the defense area will be necessary.

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108. The requirements of a comprehensive view and a solution of defense problems, of cooperation among the components, systems and formations, and the need to approach questions on mobilization, alerting and achieving combat readiness closely connected with questions of operational and tactical action -- all relate directly to the system, methods and substance of defense training. At the present stage of development of the defense structure, defense training has had to extend beyond the bounds of the military system and gradually begin embracing all systems to the extent of their organizational development.
At the same time, with the multilateral and multilevel development of intra-structural problems, with the inclusion of increasingly higher elements of command and leadership, it has had to transform itself into a coordinator of the various elements of individual systems taking part in joint exercises. This is an unending process which will continue to develop and expand in a controlled manner in the years to come. It is reflected in the prospective long-range plan of defense training. The necessity of improving cooperation between systems, the need for the most rational possible use of the sizeable financial outlays which training requires, the vast quantity of manpower and resources involved in training, and the necessity of ensuring an orderly preparation of the defense system through training -- have justified the determination to establish a long-range plan of defense training. The necessity of improving cooperation between systems, the need for the most rational possible use of the sizeable financial outlays which training requires, the vast quantity of manpower and resources involved in training, and the necessity of ensuring an orderly preparation of the defense system through training -- have justified the determination to establish long-range principles of methodology in training and to present this training in precise cycles common to all systems. The same applies to training within each individual system. Possession of a long-range plan enables a uniform and regular distribution of assignments, thereby equalizing the accumulation of training undertakings in particular years; further, it facilitates the determination of optimum organization-mobilization solutions as well as the rational use of funds and equipment.

109. In order to ensure a fuller implementation and a precise evaluation of training assignments and to incorporate adjustments into the general plan, provisions were made to divide the plan into two-year periods. This will permit a closer connection between training and other goals than has been possible heretofore and will ensure greater effectiveness of action in all planning, organizing and coordinating elements.

110. Training undertakings in the National Ministry of Defense during the last two years represent an important...
first stage in the fulfillment of the new defense training guidelines. These guidelines were particularly apparent in such large-scale maneuvers of 1965 as the "Narew," "Wrzesien," "Przesok," and "Zenit" maneuvers, and in 1966 -- the "Bajkal," "Mazury," and "Jesienne Niebo," and especially in the integrated "Jesien" maneuvers.

111. Along with the clearly tactical and operational problems of the various components of the armed forces, these maneuvers involved problems of alert readiness, mobilization, support for the deployment and movement of units, and materiel and technical supply.

112. In the "Narew" maneuvers we had our first experience of cooperation between the national territorial defense system and the operational forces on the level of the OTK military district and the combined arms army. One of the main problems in these maneuvers involved the detachment of the combined arms army command from the structure of the peacetime district and the formation of a "W" [wartime] district. There was a new control element in the maneuvers -- a verification of the alert efficiency of the commands and forces from the level of a military district and some central institutions down to [word illegible]. The alert action also included the provincial military staffs (wojewodzkie sztaby wojskowe). The maneuvers provided our first experiences with respect to the state of the command elements in the OTK system and their basis of organization and operation, thus indicating many defects in the system of alerting commands and units, while simultaneously finding ways to overcome these difficulties.

113. In the "Wrzesien" and "Przesok" maneuvers we took up to a much greater extent the problems of alerting and mobilization, and for the first time we checked out theories on the organization and functioning of the zone for directing and controlling troop movements. Elements of other sections of our defense system also participated in these maneuvers. In a practical manner we checked the operation of the mobilization system in these maneuvers, we examined all phases of the mobilization procedure, as well as the operation of individual mobilization elements.

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from the moment the signal was given until the conclusion of the mobilization action. We discovered weak elements in our mobilization system and we obtained a great deal of valuable information relative to the general combat readiness of units and the principles of their deployment. This information served as a basis for the preparation of a plan to streamline mobilization undertakings and an order on the combat readiness of troops.

114. The "Zenit-65" maneuvers, which were conducted by the combined Armed Forces Command in July of last year, represented the largest training maneuvers of the OPK (National Air Defense) troops. In these maneuvers a situation was created which approached as closely as possible the expected intensity of enemy air raids at the very onset of war. Massive air raids were carried out from different directions and at different altitudes, with extensive interference of the radar and radio communications systems. These integrated maneuvers for the entire air defense system of the Warsaw Pact nations -- of which our OPK system represents an important element -- indicated that the combat readiness of the OPK troops and equipment, as well as their level of preparedness and their ability to conduct combat operations under difficult conditions in the initial period of a war, had increased.

115. The maneuvers also disclosed certain deficiencies in the training of our OPK troops, especially with respect to their resistance to fatigue during combat actions, the effective exercise of command and teamwork, and control of the situation under complicated conditions in the initial period of war.

116. In the "Mazury" maneuvers we assembled a cadre mechanized division on an alert basis. This exercise clearly confirmed and expanded our earlier conclusions concerning the distribution and training of reservists, the principles of their mobilization assignment, and their call-up system. It primarily indicated the need for a systematic call-up of reservists to units according to their mobilization designation, and for conducting additional training of reservists in these units. This training can be limited to a period of several days. At the
same time, basic service personnel who are to receive mobilization assignments to specific units should be sent to these units shortly before their discharge. Reservist mobilization assignments to a particular unit cannot be arbitrarily changed; they should be permanent not only with respect to the unit but also to the subunit (pododdzial) and to the position and should remain in force for several years. This procedure of mobilization assignment and of call-up and training reservists is designed to reduce considerably the time which elapses from the assembly of a mobilizing unit to its achievement of combat readiness; this is achieved through prior coordination of the strengths of individual subunits and the whole unit, including reservists. Moreover, it is desirable to mobilize units possibly once a year and to assemble them at full strength for a period of several days. The conclusions from the maneuvers will serve to define the principles for reservist training and for drawing up on this basis an appropriate plan for training reserves and for the assembly of mobilized units. This plan should be put into effect next year.

117. For the first time the total combat strength of an air army, the air army's support units and some cooperating elements of the OPK, the OPL (antiaircraft defense) and the military districts were deployed on an alert basis this year [1966] in the "Jesienne Niebo" maneuvers. The air army was placed in a very difficult position, since it functioned in great depth in a rapidly developing operational situation. The maneuvers disclosed an urgent need for dealing comprehensively with the command system, the organizational structure of the air army command, the problem of operational support (especially in the redeployment of an air army), the problem of the air army's cooperation with ground forces and the OPL system, and the tactical and combat training of the operational air units with particular consideration given to experiences acquired from air operations in Vietnam. These matters, and also the more general question of the air force command system, must quickly become the subject of studies of the institutions concerned -- studies which are intended to offer positive solutions to the problems of making an air army a fully efficient combat body.
alerts were conducted (20 per cent more than last year), 500 of which involved the departure of units beyond their garrisons. In 1965, alerts involving the departure of units and staffs beyond their garrisons constituted a third of the total number of alerts; this year, for example, in the Silesian Military District and in the Navy, they are already at the 50 per cent mark.

122. The "Venus" ("Wenus") system for checking communications and duty-officer service introduced in 1965 is yielding good results.

123. In the course of the maneuvers which we have organized during the past years, the main actions of the Party and political organs of the armed forces have assumed a definite form. They have been especially directed towards the following:

-- attention to the maintenance of a high morale-combat level and psychological resistance of friendly forces;

-- adaptation of the structure and principles of political action to the specifics of the basic types of combat operations;

-- streamlining the political information system; and

-- expansion of various forms of cooperation with local Party units and official elements concerning the defense consciousness of the public, and understanding the need for each citizen's personal contribution in molding the defense potential.

124. At the same time, the maneuvers provided a great deal of valuable information on the further improvement of broadly conceived political activity.

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125. The adequate development of our commands and staffs in directing and participating in maneuvers -- the substance of which is associated with operations not only
within the military system but also with other defense systems, and whose scope involves all echelons of the armed forces and their functional elements -- has enabled us to hold a training exercise like the "Jesien" maneuvers. These maneuvers may be described as initiating a new stage in the improvement of the armed forces as a whole.

126. Each of the four basic elements of the "Jesien" maneuvers was intended to solve specific operational-tactical problems within the individual echelons or functional elements of the armed forces. In this connection, all elements were based on one of the more likely variants of the build-up for and outbreak of hostilities in our theater of operations.

127. Because of its multilateral and multilevel aspects and complexities, the "Jesien" maneuvers enabled us to picture a strategic-operational situation characteristic of the period of immediate threat of hostilities, and then of the initial period of war -- in which combat operations evolve from conventional to nuclear action. In this situation the successive defense actions permitted in turn the complexity of the decisive problems, the mutual connection and conditioning of these actions, and the determination of those elements which would decide the success of all undertakings.

128. Thus in the initial part of the "Jesien" maneuvers, under the code name "Malwa," the problem of deploying the Ministry of National Defense command posts was played out for the first time on such a large scale. This conditions the deployment of the armed forces and the functioning of the entire military establishment in accordance with the plan of operations.

129. The next part of the maneuvers, under the code name "Wrzos," was played out as an inter-district exercise and involved such problems of the period of national emergency and the initial period of war as the movement of operational troops to assembly areas, their movement over a great distance under conditions requiring the overcoming of many water obstacles, and their commitment to battle from the march and the playing out of a meeting engagement.
130. Another part of the "Jesien" maneuvers, which was played out as a skeleton (szkieletowe) exercise of the OTK forces under the code name "Ziemia Pomorska," provided a picture of the operation of all militarized territorial defense forces on an OW (military district) level with the air defense forces and coastal defense flotillas and of the functioning of the local command organs of these forces. In addition, under the direction of the Territorial Defense Inspectorate the individual commands played out the role of a homeland defense command in this exercise. A particularly significant element of this exercise was the operational cooperation between the OTK commands and forces and the operational commands and forces during their movement.

131. Finally, the quartermaster part of the maneuvers, under the code name "Baza-66," permitted extensive deployment of rear service units and equipment hitherto not encountered in our training experience, and included for the first time deployment of an Advanced Base of the Zone of Interior. This deployment was associated with the execution of supply functions and the servicing of units.

132. The integrated character of the "Jesien" maneuvers gave them their great dimension. The map exercises involved the northern and central strategic axes, while the field exercises were centered in seven provinces in the northwestern and western regions of the country. The rear service units and equipment were moved to the maneuvers area over a distance of from 300 to 500 kilometers from the southeastern and eastern parts of Poland, and a tank division completed a march of 650 kilometers. Participating in the maneuvers were five operational groups -- practicing as commands of two armies, of a military district, of an air defense corps, and of the Navy Main Staff -- and the commands and staffs or forces of 14 various tactical formations, nine regiments of the armed forces, 12 independent subunits, and five provincial and nine county military headquarters. Fifty-three operational-level rear service units were formed. A total of 180 motor transports was mobilized to move the troops and rear units, while the supplies of the operational level depots, consisting of 4,150 tons of materiel and 10,000 sets of clothing, were transported by rail and motor vehicle.
133. Because of the multilevel aspects of the maneuvers and their topical scope, they could not be carried out only within the military system framework, but had to include specific elements of the functional system (particularly in the "Baza-66" exercise) and of the territorial defense system.

134. It is worth emphasizing here the broad participation of party units at all levels. For the first time on such a large scale, they successively engaged in political action intended to create correct attitudes among the public and an atmosphere of readiness to carry out defense assignments and to counteract gossip and panic. The public was thus immune to the perfidious psychological warfare attacks of the aggressive imperialist circles, a significant factor of the present-day defense structure.

135. The multilevel themes of the maneuvers gave us a complete picture of the functioning of commands and forces of the military system as a whole, and also of the system's components within the context of their mutual connection.

136. The maneuvers enabled us to make comparative conclusions on the state of readiness and the capability for action of individual elements within the military defense system and consequently to indicate the directions of our main effort for improving our defense structure in the next few years.

137. It is evident that the inclusion of new problems in the maneuvers did not imply that we expected to solve them completely. Our aim here was to collect information which would give us a more extensive understanding of the intricate problem of national defense. One must bear in mind that in all maneuvers of this kind we shall both return to previous problems and introduce new problems. We shall thus be able to acquire maximum knowledge and practical skills for the solution of the problems of modern warfare.

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138. Of the many problems, conclusions and observations resulting from the above maneuvers we should concentrate mainly on those which will provide us with information in new areas of defense activity or which are especially significant in terms of the high readiness of our defense system.

139. The chief problem is the combat readiness of those command organs on which the efficient activation of not only the armed forces but of the entire defense system depends. By mobilizing the central command organs on an alert basis and by moving them to the field posts as part of the "Malwa" exercise, and by mobilizing operational level commands and the commands of those units participating in the other parts of the "Jesien" maneuvers, we acquired a great deal of comparative information which permits certain generalizations.

140. While the alert deployment of commands of tactical, even operational, formations is already adequately mastered with respect to methodology and practical execution in the deployment of the MND central command organs we are just beginning to acquire information which will permit the formulation of binding principles in the future. Movement of these commands to field posts while maintaining continuity of command is a very complicated action, considerably more difficult and requiring a greater number of personnel and equipment than for all other command levels.

141. Extensive organizational work and thought had to precede the movement of MND central organs to field command posts. It was necessary to develop the principles of control at the MND level, to determine the functions of individual command posts, to make corresponding mobilization assignments, and to work out the organizational structure and principles of operation of the support units.

142. Generally speaking, the experience gained from the maneuvers confirmed the validity of the principles contained in the above-mentioned work and at the same time disclosed numerous weak spots or problems requiring attention and solution.
143. Above all, technical improvements in the warning system are urgently required. The means applied so far are inadequate and do not match the technical level of the equipment in our army. This is a weak element throughout the entire armed forces, and we should therefore give top priority to development -- by the Military Technical Academy and research centers set up for this task -- of solutions assuring an automatic warning system. The commands and institutions should be encouraged to seek their own solutions for streamlining the warning system and duty service operations. At the same time it is necessary to point out that following the issuance of an order on combat readiness considerable interest in this problem has been observed and progress in this area should be forthcoming.

144. The functions of the individual command posts also should be stated precisely, mobilization assignments should be updated accordingly, and systematic drills of command post teams should be conducted. At the same time, it appears that the basically successful functional division at individual command posts employed at the MND level may also be useful at the military district (OW) level. This problem is currently being studied by the General Staff, and one should expect that the conclusions obtained from the maneuvers will contribute to the final definition of a uniform view on the establishment and operation of military district command posts.

145. The factor of command continuity in the central and the district elements should be mentioned at this time. These elements cannot subject their capabilities of commanding subordinate forces to a daily work schedule or to the time of day. We should clarify the problem fully by stating precisely the operational role of the duty service and by setting up this service in such a way that it could actually carry out the functions of a permanent operating element of a command post at its present place of operation, capable of initiating the action of alert deployment of its commands and constituting a base around which, as the officers arrive, the area of activity and competence of the present command post is expanded up to the time of its complete deployment.
146. The maneuvers enabled us to check the usefulness of the organizational structure of the MND command post support units, and also to dispel many doubts and controversies concerning the command of these units. The conclusions obtained will permit us to complete the preparation of a new internal structure for these units, and at the same time will bring about a solution of the manner of placing these units in a uniform group. It seems that such a solution would have the additional advantage of ensuring the continuous and systematic maintenance of command post support units in combat readiness. It will further ensure all-around and uniform training conforming to the concepts of command post deployment on the one hand, while on the other hand, it will relieve operational-level officers from the General Staff as well as those from the headquarters of the combat arms and services from the direct control of command post deployment during a real emergency. This will allow them to concentrate fully on controlling the deployment of the entire armed forces, the most important problem in a period of emergency.

147. Experience from the maneuvers also showed that the ratio of the number of personnel in support units to the number of planners was too high in some command posts. This was brought about by the fact that in establishing the composition of support units for individual command posts, there was a tendency to make them too independent administratively, and also a tendency to create working conditions too comfortable for wartime needs. In order to correct this situation, supply components should be more highly integrated and should assume responsibility for both the planners and all the personnel of the command post support units.

148. The problem of support units also emerged at the army and the wartime military district levels. The organizational situation here is such that, except for the army communications units and a stationary wire communications system for the needs of the military district command, both the deployment of additional support units and the preparation of principles for their use are still unsatisfactory. Most of the endeavors made by the army and military district staffs in this area were in the nature of emergency solutions. These solutions are ac-

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acceptable during maneuvers but are not suitable in time of war because they were often realized at the expense of units of the operational forces and the OTK which did not participate in the maneuvers.

149. In order to eliminate the above-mentioned deficiencies, the General Staff, utilizing the many relevant recommendations of military district commands, analyzed the above areas of command in order to prepare appropriate proposals for the organization of support units at the military district level. This should be done in a manner which will ensure a rapid transition from a peacetime to a wartime footing using an efficient mobilization system and providing for the needs of an army command as well as for those of a wartime military district command.

150. It is evident that the proper functioning of the command system can be achieved when this system acquires a high level of efficiency in peacetime, and when its basic structure corresponds to a wartime structure. Streamlining our peacetime and wartime command and control systems represents one of the main problems taken into consideration this year at the MND level. The basic objectives of this action are as follows:

-- to make the organizational forms of the commands and institutions compatible with their official duties, and to concentrate similar matters in institutions or functional components established for this;

-- to ensure a smooth and efficient transition of entire components, commands and institutions from a peacetime to a wartime footing;

-- to ensure the rapid dissemination of information by eliminating all elements of duplication and bureaucracy and -- related to the latter -- increments of personnel, thus improving the operation of the command and control system; and
to ensure centralized and effective control of the command system by subordinating the actions of all elements to the centralized command, thereby preserving the basic ideas of the operational guidelines.

151. As a result of analyses already completed, a fundamental reconstruction of the central command and control organs is in progress. This action will be extended to the military district, division, and even regimental levels. Although this is still not a fundamental functional reconstruction of the command organs, one can already detect the formation of an echelon for materiel and technical supply, planning and techniques for coordinating the overall logistical planning and technical operation of the services. Also in the making is a new outlook on the role of a combat arm headquarters as an operational and training organ which, with its specialized knowledge, will assist in making operational and organizational decisions affecting the development of individual elements in the armed forces.

152. All actions aimed at streamlining the command system should consider applying modern computer techniques to the command and control systems. The expansion of automation and mechanization systems should be closely connected with the established long-range program of organizational growth of the armed forces, with the continuous process of improving staff operations, with the functioning of the individual components, and with the modernization of communications equipment. This is a new area which in the near future will undoubtedly bring about qualitative changes in all levels of the command system, down to the provincial staff and division levels. This will thus represent one of the main areas of human, materiel and technical investment in the long-range development of our defense structure.

153. Both the analyses made during the work on improving the command system and the training experiences of the "Jesien" maneuvers confirmed the necessity of maintaining commands and staffs in a uniform organizational structure in both peacetime and wartime, a cardinal principle in present-day conditions. This enables their rapid and
154. This principle should also find expression in a refusal to increase the wartime strengths of individual commands and staffs above their peacetime strengths, as has already occurred in the MND central organs. This means a reduction of personnel in the wartime commands and staffs. As seen in the functioning of MND command posts and in training exercises of those operational commands formed according to the principle described above, not only was the quality of their performance not lowered but their operational abilities actually increased -- to say nothing of such advantages as increased maneuverability and more convenient conditions for support and disposition.

155. It should be stressed that valid suggestions for streamlining the command system are made not only at the central level, but that the military district commands (for example, the Silesian Military District) are making noteworthy proposals for a reduction of staffs and for a reallocation of functions.

156. The "Malwa" exercise indicated the need for improving the mechanism for activating and deploying command posts at the central level. This pertains to the principles of column formation, traffic regulation during deployment, the sequence of movement, the organization of duty service operations, etc.

157. Protecting the columns of staffs which are being deployed and providing antiaircraft cover for them are separate problems which require solution at the central and district level.

158. The substance of the "Wrzos" exercise includes a wide range of problems dealing with current operations, among other things: the execution of a long-distance march with the surmounting of many water obstacles; cooperation with the zone for directing and controlling troop movements across wide rivers; efficient execution of some phases of
supplying operational units by the national rear services system (tylowy system krajowy); entry into battle from the march and the meeting engagement; and the transition from conventional to nuclear operations.

159. The experience and conclusions gained from the 650-kilometer march in the above exercise are of particular value. It should be added that this was the first march made over such a great distance.

160. Based on observations of the march, one must conclude that our tactical formations are fully capable of carrying out assignments of this kind. However, it must be pointed out that while the march rate was kept at the level required by regulations on the first day of the march, it decreased on the following days. This was not due to inefficient equipment but to the clearly observable fatigue of the crews. In this instance, therefore, the physical efficiency of the crews was the main determinant of the rate of march. The problem of maintaining an individual’s physical efficiency for the distance and at the rate of march adopted in the exercise can be solved if the time is managed in a highly rational manner and if during halt the time is used entirely for the necessary servicing of equipment and resting the crews. A tested way of maintaining a high march capability is including in the crew an additional driver on the basis of a second military specialty. In some respects, however, this problem is unresolved and requires further work.

161. It should be stressed that in spite of the noticeable fatigue of the crews, the march was carried out without accidents and all the combat equipment reached the designated areas. This is undoubtedly a result of the organizational ability of our commanders and staffs and the effective training of personnel in the participating units.

162. The exercise, however, showed the need for further organizational improvement of the traffic control service of tactical units and tactical formations. In addition, this service should be supplied with appropriate military clothing and special equipment. This question should be resolved uniformly for the entire army.

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163. The "Wrzos" exercise made possible a check of the value of the services rendered by the traffic control and direction zone to the moving operational units. The functioning of this zone had an added influence on the efficiency of the movement of the 26th Tank Division. Both experience and training show that during the movement of units through the traffic control and direction zone, close cooperation between the tactical formation command and the zone headquarters is necessary to prevent slowing down the movement of the units and to ensure efficient direction of individual units to the designated crossings.

164. The movement of units was also combined with the surmounting of numerous larger or smaller water obstacles which differed from each other in the number and the kind of permanent crossings, the characteristics of the river banks and beds, and the suitability of approach to the water surface. The use of different crossing techniques and of different types of crossing equipment was therefore necessary in order to surmount these obstacles. In spite of the complex conditions under which the crossings were conducted, the units carried out their designated assignments. It must be understood that during movement in Poland, the use of crossing equipment organic to a division is not advisable, although permissible in special circumstances.

165. The efficient conduct of the march in the final phase of movement and the coordination of the efforts of several combat arms created favorable conditions for the rapid deployment of units to battle.

166. This phase of the exercise disclosed, however, that both the operational and the tactical command echelons did not completely eliminate basic deficiencies in the skillful use of atomic weapons. These deficiencies had been noted repeatedly in the past and firmly stressed in training orders. These deficiencies appeared all the more distinct because they were associated with underestimating the crucial importance of the time factor in the transition from conventional to nuclear operations. When the "West" mounted the initial nuclear strike on a strategic level,
there was no justification for the very limited and inconsistent use of atomic weapons by the 1st Army and the delay in their use by the "West" 3rd Tank Division. Such paralysis of action -- which prevents the transition to a new phase of action completely different from the previous one -- attests to the inadequate mastery of commanding troops. This was also reflected in the ineffective operation of the system for conducting reconnaissance of the enemy, especially of his nuclear weapons. The same applies to the 6th Airborne Division, which, being in the rear of the enemy, could have reconnoitered or immediately destroyed a missile battalion.

167. Against this background one may point out that effective reconnaissance of the enemy is a prerequisite for the correct use of nuclear weapons. This powerful striking medium can release its force in a desired direction only when a way is opened for it by reconnaissance. A specific operational or tactical concept intended to solve major, clearly defined problems should also lie behind the use of this weapon. This weapon's power should not be wasted on incidental, unimportant targets or, what is worse, on targets which have not been identified or which merely have been assumed. In the above situation in which the "West" lost the initiative in the first nuclear strike, and in which indifference as to the use of nuclear weapons reflected serious deficiencies in the exercise of command, the "West" 1st Army -- and even more so the 3rd Tank Division -- actually would have been defeated in battle because the 26th Tank Division -- like the "East" 10th Army command -- generally managed to make better use of available nuclear weapons.

168. Attention must also be called to the improved capability for concentrating personnel and equipment in order to breach the enemy's defense during the conduct of conventional operations.

169. It is worth stressing at this time that opposed exercises permit a maximum determination of the operational effectiveness of the individual sides and the level of fulfillment of their assigned missions. The advantage gained by one side because of better decisions
and operations should find expression in appropriate re-
actions to leadership by the participants. This unfor-
tunately did not occur completely during the played out
meeting engagement between the 3rd and 26th Tank Divisions.

170. On the other hand, the methodical and skill-
ful working in of a demonstration of offensive operations
of a mechanized regiment from the 3rd Tank Division against
the operational background of the exercise merits a fa-
vorable evaluation. These offensive operations were car-
rried out in an instructive manner, and effectively illustrated
the principles of modern tactics and combat; they also re-
lected the high training level of the personnel.

* * *

171. The substance, course and results of the "Ziemia
Pomorska" exercise, combined with the results of previous
OTK exercises involving the OTK commands, staffs and
troops, allow the definition of the following main con-
clusions as the guidelines for further work.

172. The participation of a wartime military district
command, of operational teams of an air defense corps and
of the Navy, of provincial and some county military staffs,
and of troops in joint exercises accentuated the uniform-
ity and interrelationship of operations conducted in one
area by the organs and forces subordinate to different
command centers (osrodki dyspozycyjne) -- from the top
level, through the military district, OPK corps, naval
command, provincial and county military staffs, down to
the local military staff). This generally brought the
problem of the command system into sharp focus. In spite
of unquestionable achievements in this area we cannot con-
sider its present status satisfactory. Further studies
and organizational work with the objective of streamlining
this system, of assuring it the necessary features of
clarity and organizational simplicity and, consequently,
of achieving unity of command, are necessary. Unity of
command is especially important in the organization and im-
plementation of action to eliminate the effects of nuclear
strikes, in the control and assurance of conditions for
unit redispositioning and all movement within the country
and in operations against airborne or amphibious assaults.

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173. In the "Ziemia Pomorska" exercise, as in the previous ones of this type, the control elements of the other KOK departments did not participate, even in a secondary role. Perhaps this moment brought about definite attempts of overemphasizing purely tactical matters, of the military district to overextend its management of the territorial defense forces, and of too much unilateral direction of these forces toward the fulfillment of duties involving defense against landings at the expense of their other duties, which are the basic duties for most of the territorial defense forces. In the future, therefore, it will be necessary to enrich the exercises of the above type and to broaden the outlook of commanders and staffs on the vastness of territorial defense problems of a military district by bringing in representatives of the functional and territorial systems.

174. The ability of the military district command to identify the most important duties from the complex of matters and to direct all manpower and resources, all stocks and reserves toward their fulfillment is still unsatisfactory. In circumstances involving responsibility for the discharge of many alternative duties, effective determination of their actual sequence is necessary. This sequence may and will change, obviously, as the situation develops. For instance, in the "Ziemia Pomorska" exercise the most important duty on the first and second day of war was to ensure operational units the conditions for movement and freedom of operation, not defense against landings. This required the concentration of forces to eliminate disorder in the movement and supply of units brought about by enemy air and diversionary attacks. The realization of this main assignment required the concentration of effort on the areas adjoining water obstacles and on the problem of crossing sites, on providing maximum assistance to the air defense forces and border guard troops to protect their radiotechnical systems, and on assistance to permanent depots and to moving rear service units. In the next phase of action, eliminating the effects of nuclear strikes then became the first priority.

175. There are extensive and increasingly growing reserves hidden within our society and economy which are
176. For this purpose it is necessary that:

-- First, the military district commands in particular, and the unit commands of the internal and territorial defense forces in general, be far better and more broadly familiar than hitherto with their area and its possibilities and establish the means of using these possibilities for defense purposes. The information collected must be constantly evaluated in order to discern and determine the organizational methods of its exploitation and to verify to the extent possible the reality of activating these resources.

-- Second, all commands and staffs should display ample organizational initiative in using existing reserves. Every commander and chief should consider it his duty to inspire the administrative and economic authorities collaborating in the defense area. This requires increased contact with them in all areas and an explicit attitude of commanders at all levels not only as commanders but also as political, economic and social officials and as close collaborators and advisors of the local authorities.

177. The problems of how to utilize the local potential for accomplishing the defense goals [and how to develop skill in organizing complex defense activities clearly appear in connection with the problem of controlling movement within the country. Continuing the research and experiments initiated in 1964, we established a zone for directing and controlling the movement of "Wisła" troops within the framework of the "Ziemia Pomorska" exercise. The zone had at its disposal a limited number of personnel and equipment, which permitted only certain phases of its
operation to be played out. The limited number of operational troops (a great deal smaller than called for in real conditions) which were tactically moved in the zone during the exercise, does not yet permit a complete evaluation of the efficiency of the system adopted for directing troop movement. A complete "strain" on this system would certainly produce different kinds of conditions. Actually these conditions would develop under the stress of problems related to assuring at least a limited freedom of movement for militarized units and the other rescue forces, the dispersed population and the national economy simultaneously with a mass movement of operational troops.

178. In perfecting the troop movement control system, the system should not be considered as an isolated matter but should be closely linked at all organizational levels with the requirements of other users of the transportation system. A common course compels one to establish a uniform troop movement control system in the country which would include the needs of all users benefitting from the transportation system.

179. And if we look at control zones with such broad powers, we see there is need for extensive commitment of manpower and resources of the functional and territorial systems for the efficient operation of these zones. These zones would then become continuous operating organs not only during the movement of troops. It seems that this would be indispensable under contemporary conditions of warfare in which the problem of movement within the country becomes more important and more complicated than it was under the conditions existing during World War II. Assuming this, it would be necessary to consider in further studies whether to limit oneself to the present number of zones adjoining large bodies of water or the state border, or to include movement in the whole country in a complex organization, basing its administrative divisions on the provinces and utilizing the manpower and resources at their disposition.

180. The current troop movement control system thus requires further improvement both from the theoretical and practical aspects, with a much broader view of this matter than called for originally.
181. Among the special problems remaining to be defined in the above area, we may mention the need to introduce clarity as to the operational disposition of zonal commandants by the central organs and military districts, and also by the operational command and transportation organs. It is also necessary to correlate the organizational measures associated with the establishment of a zonal system and the organization of traffic control units, to define the duties of these units, and to determine their role within the framework of and in connection with the activity of the zonal system. The echeloning of personnel and equipment to protect the roads and crossings should be improved by bringing them closer to the areas of anticipated use. There is also need for a more comprehensive preparation and training of ponton units so that they can acquire the skill of constructing ordinary shallow-water bridges. The crossing equipment of these units should be adapted for use with watercraft (for example, the devices for connecting pontons to boats in bridge construction). The anti-aircraft cover for crossings, especially against low-flying aircraft, represents another problem. The commitment of air defense equipment for such direct cover is not out of the question. A trial of this kind was made during the exercise and it showed that the air defense artillery units are not trained for such a maneuver. At the same time there are shortcomings in their system of moving out in an alert (for example, a subunit which moved out on a combat alert basis did not take its ammunition).

182. Further, the exercise indicated the need for developing various forms of cooperation between the zonal command and crossing sectors and the local organs. Close cooperation between military units supporting a crossing and the local waterway and inland shipping agencies, and the use of their capabilities and resources, may bring inestimable advantages in the area of river reconnaissance, reconnaissance and preparation of approach roads, the use of local timber, materials and equipment, adapting barges, etc.

183. An important place in the system for safeguarding transportation in the country is held by the militarized units of the transportation department (jednostki zmilitaryzowane dzialu komunikacji) in the construction and reconstruction of bridges, organized on the basis of.
appropriate civilian enterprises. They are capable of constructing permanent structures but at a rate which does not meet the requirements of a war situation. Defensive training in these units should therefore be centered mainly on practical instruction in the construction of hasty crossings (for example, the construction of shallow-water bridges) according to methods approximating those applied by engineer troops. The means of conducting such training must be found and verified; in this respect the transportation department is being assisted by the military transportation organ and the engineer troops.

184. The "Ziemia Pomorska" exercise posed once more very sharply the problem of an intricate and centralized system of warning and alerting regarding the danger of air attack, executed nuclear strikes, and detected and anticipated radioactive contamination -- a system capable of fulfilling its mission operationally and effectively in the required time.

185. Because of the time requirements and the actual capabilities of communications, it is not possible at any level of this system to separate, organizationally or on an area basis, the organ responsible for collecting data on completed strikes and radioactive contamination and for predicting this contamination from the organ responsible for warning and alerting a region.

186. Consequently it seems that the situation has reached a stage where the hitherto scattered efforts of the civilian and military organs in this area can be combined.

187. Finally, an analysis of the activity of the air defense corps command which participated in the "Ziemia Pomorska" exercise indicates that the problem [of developing a] system of command in the OPK (air defense) corps has not been definitively resolved. In repelling massive raids, the corps command is considerably lacking in its ability to discern and comprehend the air situation; it thus loses its ability to command the forces subordinate to it. This problem requires further study.
188. The magnitude of action -- the greatest so far in practice -- in committing large numbers of forces and equipment both of the military and of the national economy was characterized by the deployment of the rear services in the "Jesien" maneuvers. In this exercise there were many new elements in the formation of rear service units, in their achievement of readiness, and in the organization of immediate supply facilities for the troops on the external front.

189. The main purpose of the quartermaster training efforts was to examine the validity of the accepted organization-mobilization guidelines, to perfect the various supply and service elements in the operational forces and in the country and [to perfect] cooperation among these elements. A significant purpose was also the refresher training of reservists and the playing out of mobilization deployment of rear service units, considering that these units for the most part are either newly formed or formed on the basis of small organizational units.

190. In the particular areas of organization and operation of the rear services, the maneuvers embraced the territory of the whole country and all elements of the armed forces supply system, from the rear services of tactical units, through the rear services of an army or a Front, up to the rear services of the zone of interior. For the first time an Advanced Base of the Zone of Interior was organized in the rear services of the zone of interior.

191. The organization of an advanced supply base results from the consideration of the nature of modern warfare. One must reckon with the possible destruction of the rail network, with the paralysis of the transportation system, and with the creation of zones of radioactive contamination and destruction in specific areas, together with a simultaneous extension of the supply line to the troops on the external front. In such a situation the traditional means of supplying troops by rail transport and permanent-type crossings become increasingly doubtful. The rear services are confronted with demands for maneuverability and a capability to supply troops with
their own transportation, i.e., motor transport; at the same time, the independence of units is enhanced by increasing the amount of supplies transported by them. This is one of the most difficult problems in present-day operations; thus far it has not been completely solved. The delivery of supplies continues to be handled to a great extent by rail transport; the rear service units and their equipment are still large and heavy; and the movement of supplies to line units and the encumbering of their organic rear service subunits with these supplies are also limited by a fear of reducing the maneuverability of the combat elements.

192. This difficult situation is worsened by the fact that most of the rear service units and equipment at the operational level are mobilized from a fundamental structure (in the present exercise 53 rear service units were mobilized on the basis of 32 units, and a motor transport battalion was formed on the basis of civilian transportation facilities); moreover, one cannot count on some sort of basic change. Antiaircraft cover, protection and defense are among the weak points in the preparedness of the rear services for action.

193. Thus the problem of the operations and organization of the rear services is in essence still unsolved. This should particularly stimulate creative research in order to find better and more efficient forms of organization for rear service units and equipment, and a more rational disposition of supplies. Considerable attention should also be given to the continuous improvement of the mobilization system for rear service units in order to reduce deployment time by observing the principles of mobilization assignments, by introducing alert assignments for at least some reservists, and by having systematic drills involving the call-up of reservists for the deployment of units or their elements.

194. The Advance Base of the Zone of Interior organized in the present maneuvers may be accepted as a new solution in the search for more efficient organization, and one more adaptable to modern conditions, of the operational rear services. In anticipation of destruction of rail lines

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and permanent crossings, this base is supposed to carry out the mission of maintaining a continuity of supplies for troops at the front through the organization of transshipments from rail to motor transport and through the administration, as a representative of the central organ, of the reserve supplies apportioned to its region and earmarked as replenishments for the troops. The advance base may also perform an important role during an emergency; it may accept the supplies from the permanent depots. Thus the supplies will be dispersed and also removed from the threatened permanent storage places which have been identified by the enemy; moreover, the supplies will be closer to the anticipated area of operation. The conclusion reached concerning the suitability of deploying the base in a period of emergency follows from the factors noted above.

195. The problem of an Advance Base of the Zone of Interior is a novel one that still requires further theoretical elaboration and definition of its functions and duties, so that it would not be burdened, as happened in the present maneuvers, with questionable duties (e.g., the setting up of field bakeries and washing facilities). The destination of a base should also be accurately defined by its leadership; this was not the case during the present maneuvers. Also required is a solution for the problem of protecting the base, especially against diversion; this may be accomplished by committing forces of the territorial system.

196. Among the particular conclusions drawn from the "Baza-66" exercise, as well as from previous exercises, are the following.

197. The units, equipment and rear service elements attained readiness for action in the prescribed time, but this took place in a period of increased national defense readiness during which a number of preparatory actions were carried out. Moreover, the rear services fulfilled only part of their assignments, for all rear service units were not fully mobilized. Consequently, in order to balance the degree of readiness of the rear services with that of the troops, a decision will have to be made, as the situation increases in intensity, concerning the gradual and
earlier achievement of full readiness in the initial phase of war by part of the operational rear services and of the zone of interior. This should be expressed in appropriate plans. This applies especially to units supporting command posts, to the rear services of first echelon armies, to some transport, road and bridge construction units and others protecting the transportation system, and to some Front hospitals of the first echelon. To the extent possible and through effective management of available means and reserves, it is also desirable to deploy elements in units performing basic functions in the initial period, especially road and bridge construction units and units for supporting command posts.

198. Streamlining the system of picking up and activating supplies of units and tactical formations as well as supplies for the operational level maintained in the army and state-owned depots should be continued. The ability to pick up supplies quickly is currently a factor governing the alert readiness of units. This may be attained at the tactical level primarily by keeping the supplies in transport equipment and in combat vehicles, by adapting warehouses to rapid loading operations, by applying mechanical equipment, etc. Unfortunately there is a peculiar fear here of taking action on such problems: one observes a search for allegedly objective drawbacks, reference is made to existing regulations, and even new ones are formed which do not take into account the combat readiness requirements and which might make it impossible to implement the principles of keeping the supplies "on wheels." In the end, this all seems to smack of self-protection based on rigid plans that may reduce the matter to absurdity.

199. One should therefore expect from the pertinent commanders and chiefs an active approach to the solution of this difficult problem. Such solutions are possible and moreover are being applied. However, one must consider the local conditions with respect to these solutions and adapt the regulations and methods of operation to them. In this area, a uniform plan cannot be in force for the whole armed forces, but there can be creative, realistic principles which correspond to the local conditions and reflect a full sense of responsibility.
200. The efficient picking up of operational level supplies depends on the implementation of tasks dealing with their distribution, the preparation of a plan for using transport facilities, and the preparation of extensive loading facilities including the use of mechanical transshipping equipment.

201. The continuation or the initiation of several undertakings of a research or organizational nature is required to further streamline the mobilization system of rear service units and equipment. Above all, the work of issuing clothing and personal equipment to reservists with alert assignments (przydzialy alarmowe) should be accelerated. This matter is especially urgent in view of the transition of built-up divisions to the new structure that provides for their augmentation with reservists from the alert allocation.

202. In order to shorten the time for replenishing the medical equipment which is stored in public health service facilities for army needs and which has a basic effect on the readiness of units, the possibility of having the public health service deposit the equipment with the units and periodically rotate it should be considered.

203. The method of forming transport units at civilian transportation bases must be improved in order to shorten the time for forming these units as progress is made in the organizational preparations of the mobilization bases. The depositing of some military gear and equipment directly with the civilian transportation bases may also help to shorten mobilization time. The provincial military staffs should play an important role in the prudent management and adaptation of the storage space at these bases. The experience of forming a full-strength transport battalion during the present maneuvers confirmed the validity of the action taken so far in this respect. With the equipment at the base and with the efficient organization of its formation, the battalion attained readiness for executing its transport duties one day earlier than that anticipated in the plan.

204. The introduction of varying quantities of current supplies for satisfying mobilization needs, according
to the mobilization duties of a given unit should also be considered.

205. Regarding the deployment of Front hospital bases, a further definition should be made as to the composition of the individual bases to improve the regional arrangement in a given area of those hospitals designed to form a specific hospital base.

206. The "Baza-66" exercise, despite its broad scale, did not provide a full image of the scope of operation of the rear services. In this exercise we merely considered the operation of some elements of the rear services -- transportation and supply at the technical services and repair level. This is now an area which is becoming a separate problem because of the large supply of technical equipment to the army. The concept of a technical rear services (tyły techniczne) under the direct control of a deputy commander for technical matters is becoming apparent. Emerging here also are problems such as mobility, the delivery of technical supplies, and, in particular, finding the most suitable means for handling repairs. On the agenda is also the problem of coordinating the supplying of troops -- both quartermaster and technical supplying. In the present stage of our work we accept the fact that the quartermaster officer will be the commander and organizer of the entire area of the rear services and the dispatcher of transport vehicles for delivering all kinds of supplies. Moreover, this is still a major area of research in which we are far from final solutions and in which one should anticipate very important changes in the control and implementation of supplying troops which involves the use of modern control technology, including computer technology, as well as in the integration of technical equipment supply operations and the handling of repairs.

207. The preparedness of the rear services for action (as any field of activity of the armed forces) is closely linked with suitable mobilization preparations in the national economy and with the close support of the manpower and resources of the functional system. The current exercise provided ample proof of this. A supposition may be made here that suitable peacetime organizational and
to the mobilization duties of a given unit should also be considered.

205. Regarding the deployment of Front hospital bases, a further definition should be made as to the composition of the individual bases to improve the regional arrangement in a given area of those hospitals designed to form a specific hospital base.

206. The "Baza-66" exercise, despite its broad scale, did not provide a full image of the scope of operation of the rear services. In this exercise we merely considered the operation of some elements of the rear services -- transportation and supply at the technical services and repair level. This is now an area which is becoming a separate problem because of the large supply of technical equipment to the army. The concept of a technical rear services (tyły techniczne) under the direct control of a deputy commander for technical matters is becoming apparent. Emerging here also are problems such as mobility, the delivery of technical supplies, and, in particular, finding the most suitable means for handling repairs. On the agenda is also the problem of coordinating the supplying of troops -- both quartermaster and technical supplying. In the present stage of our work we accept the fact that the quartermaster officer will be the commander and organizer of the entire area of the rear services and the dispatcher of transport vehicles for delivering all kinds of supplies. Moreover, this is still a major area of research in which we are far from final solutions and in which one should anticipate very important changes in the control and implementation of supplying troops which involves the use of modern control technology, including computer technology, as well as in the integration of technical equipment supply operations and the handling of repairs.

207. The preparedness of the rear services for action (as any field of activity of the armed forces) is closely linked with suitable mobilization preparations in the national economy and with the close support of the manpower and resources of the functional system. The current exercise provided ample proof of this. A supposition may be made here that suitable peacetime organizational and
mobilization preparations in the national economy will primarily determine the proper preparation of the rear services.

208. For the first time on such an organized level our intelligence service functioned as a training element in the maneuvers. This was intended as training for the intelligence officers as well as a check of the security of troops against penetration by a foreign intelligence organization in a period of direct threat to the nation's security and in the course of waging war.

209. There was notable improvement in this respect compared to previous years. The alertness of our officers and enlisted men increased and the operational efficiency of our counterintelligence units also increased, making the operations of the [enemy] intelligence officers considerably more difficult and resulting in the elimination from the maneuvers of an appreciable number of participating intelligence officers.

210. Nonetheless, the participating intelligence officers obtained a great deal of varied information on the units in action, primarily from conversations with officers and enlisted personnel. Talkativeness is still the main danger to the troops.

211. On the other hand, the participating agent network (agentura) did not obtain any information on nuclear weapons delivery means, which was its principal mission.

212. Reconnaissance and diversionary operations, which have become one of the elements giving reality to the image of a modern battlefield, were also carried out during the maneuvers. These operations, despite the use of relatively small forces in them, forced the participating sides to employ virtually constant camouflage and security measures.

213. The reconnaissance and diversionary teams transmitted a great deal of important information on the strength and movements of the columns of participating units and, through their diversionary action against troops on the
215. The "Jesien" maneuvers made it possible to show the complexity of political work, and the need for its extensive association with a specific operational background and an actual situation in the participating units.

216. In appraising the entire political work during the maneuvers, we must state that the Party-political organizations found their right place and generally handled the tasks confronting them correctly. Due to the experience already acquired, the method of directing political work, and especially of organizing it, was perfected. The political counteraction to all phenomena impairing the morale-political state and the psychological resistance of soldiers was generally good and effective, and there were no major reservations concerning the speed and content of preparing political information responsive to the needs of both the commands and staffs and the participating troops.

217. The effectiveness of the political work played a large role in developing a soldierly awareness of the duties posed by the maneuvers and [creating] good discipline among the participating troops, great dedication and devotion, and a proper attitude toward the public.

218. The proper cooperation and collaboration of the...
military's Party-political organizations with the local Party units and administrative officials are worth stressing. At the same time, however, the political organizations concentrating their attention on the combat operations of the troops, considered the political aspects of these operations too superficially on occasion and did not always manage to perceive the main element in the particular stages of the maneuvers. Moreover, the political organization did not give adequate attention to research aimed at finding more effective solutions to problems in political work during maneuvers.

* * *

Comrades!

219. The completed "Jesien" maneuvers have provided us conclusions which confirm the validity of the general trend of defense growth for the current five-year period, and at the same time facilitate the definition of specific goals for 1967 and subsequent years.

220. The valuable conclusions which we obtained from the maneuvers of recent years, the analytical work in progress in the General Staff, our closer insight into the actions of the fraternal armies as a result of increasing cooperation and closer contact with them -- permit us to look more closely at operational goals and their implementation, above all through an improvement in the basic structure of the armed forces, mainly the operational troops. This will ensure a greater readiness of the troops in general, especially those forces which would be the first to go into action or would ensure conditions under which the government could administer the nation.

221. This problem, vital to the growth of the armed forces, is under study by the General Staff.

222. In 1967 we shall implement the objectives of the five-year plan for the organizational growth of the armed forces. Moreover, if 1966 was in this respect a year "of starting", then 1967 will be a period of numerous new organizational undertakings. Included among the
major undertakings are completion of the buildup of the 4th Mechanized Division according to the new organizational structure and the converting of the 12th Mechanized Division to this structure, increasing the combat effectiveness of the 7th Assault Landing Division, the formation of an anti-aircraft missile regiment, increasing the number of tactical rocket battalions, the formation of new front and army radioelectronic and communication units, the buildup of chemical warfare units with the adaptation of their peacetime structure to a swift transition to a wartime structure, continued rearming of fighter aircraft in the Operational Air Force and the Air Defense Forces as well as reinforcement of aviation for artillery and tactical reconnaissance, the addition of new ships to the Navy, streamlining the command system of the Air Defense Forces and completion of the organizational streamlining of the internal troops (wojska wewnetrzne), which will thus have a structure adapted for fulfilling duties in the general system of territorial defense.

223. In 1967 we shall begin the creation of a new regular cadre structure. Following the fulfillment of the plan in this area, calculated for the next 10 to 15 years, there will be a change in the image of the Polish Army cadre. This change will result in proper ratios between the officer corps and the regular noncommissioned officers and warrant officers, in which the officer corps will be a corps of personnel with higher education and in which a new corps of warrant officers—military technicians will be developed, and the noncommissioned officer corps will gain higher proficiency and rank through the acquisition of skills at the basic trade-school level.

224. The changes in the cadre structure will be accomplished mainly through the qualitative reconstruction of the military education system. We started this process this year by activating five regular noncommissioned officer schools and by recruiting the first candidates for the technical schools for warrant officers.

225. Activating the new school system will require special effort, as of the fall of this year, on the part of the central institutions in the Ministry of National Military Education.
Defense, the military academies and the officer schools, especially with respect to the preparation of new training facilities, the working out of new curriculums, and the selection of staff personnel.

226. In consequence of the work by the commission appointed to streamline the command and control system in the armed forces, there is in progress now, and scheduled for completion next year, a reorganization, often rather extensive, of the management bodies at the central and military district levels, and partly at the lower levels. This should be handled as a first-stage problem in the work of streamlining the control processes, as the initial basis for further systematic and continuous studies and improvements in the area under discussion, with an increasing introduction of modern computer technology.

227. The implementation of the plan for streamlining the mobilization system, which was approved this year, should result in an improvement of all mobilization planning with respect to the methodology of activating the mobilization system, the division of reserves into echelons, mobilization assignments from the viewpoint of the qualifications of reservists and territory, determining realistic mobilization dates, the proper allocation of mobilization duties, and the appropriate distribution and close connection of these duties with the operational goals. All this is supposed to ensure the maximum efficiency possible under our conditions in the transition of the armed forces from peacetime to wartime footing.

228. In close connection with the above fundamental, operational, organization-mobilization, and cadre projects, we shall implement in 1967 the basic task of the armed forces in peacetime -- operational, tactical and combat training based on present doctrinal principles, along with the introduction of several additional principles and the provision of guidance on some problems.

229. According to the long-term operational training plan, the scope of training will be expanded. This training will involve the perfection not only of all echelons of the armed forces but also, and to a broader extent than
230. Variations of the problems concerning the initial period of war will continue to be paramount in the training material. In this connection, particular attention will be given to the development of the nation's defense potential -- the distribution of operational troops and the activation of defense systems in the country. We shall, therefore, consider the less advantageous means for the outbreak of war, that is, with a short period of emergency, and also include the variant of an initial nuclear strike by the adversary. Variants of the manner in which war may break out and the initial nuclear strike may occur should be made, but we must constantly bear in mind that we cannot allow the adversary to mount a pre-emptive nuclear strike.

231. Regarding a further rise in combat readiness, the association of the control of alert systems with the exercises should continue to be strongly emphasized. In this connection, alerting should be based on perfected, unified, integrated alert systems. Appropriate orders in this area will be issued this year which will take into account the experience to date and will contain new duties.

232. The reserve training system should be closely connected with mobilization goals and should make possible both the maintenance of skills acquired during active duty and familiarity with new equipment and the training of teams, detachments and whole units. For this purpose, one should differentiate adequately the periods of drill participation by reserve personnel -- from one day to a precisely calculated number of days corresponding to the needs of accomplishing a specific training goal, in order to eliminate wasting reservists' time on incidental exercises. This will be of particular importance to understrength tactical formations in a state of constant readi-
ness. These formations will be able to call up the missing personnel even during the conduct of alerts in units. We should also begin next year the buildup for a period of several days of [word illegible, possibly "established"] and newly formed units to full strength.

233. In implementing the goals dealing with the preparation for operational [word illegible, possibly "deployment"] of the armed forces and the whole defense system, we shall give attention to the need for systematic action. The major goal is still the preparations for moving the armed forces to the area of combat operations and the deployment of a field control system of the zone of interior.

234. The basic directions of training in the individual systems and branches of the armed forces basically will remain the same; however, attention will be given to several characteristic elements of training.

235. The operational troops should give attention to the selection of varied axes of operation in exercises within the framework of the West European theater of operations and the further improvement of cooperation with the allied armies, as well as to the improvement of cooperation between the individual branches of the armed forces.

236. The training effort should continue to be centered on increasing mastery of the ability to conduct combat operations without the employment of nuclear weapons but with constant readiness for their use, and on operations involving the use of nuclear weapons, with particular attention to the [word illegible] moment for the transition from conventional to nuclear operations -- which introduce conditions and means of conducting a battle or operation that are basically different from conventional operations.

237. Inclement weather and the time of year and day should be considered to a greater extent in the entire training of troops.
238. We shall perfect the ground forces in movement over great distances, adding to the substance of this movement by a broader consideration of their cooperation with the territorial defense forces, the necessity of overcoming water obstacles, large areas of destruction and radioactive contamination zones, the organization of medical support, and the execution of combined marches. The tactical formations should be trained to enter into battle from areas located in the rear and directly from the march.

239. Attention in the operational air force should be given to the efficient redeployment of manpower and material resources to the assembly area, with the simultaneous execution of missions in the air defense system as well as of protection for the movement of operational troops. Increased emphasis should be placed on training involving support of ground units in action along an entire front and also on organizing the redeployment of air units in the course of the above action. Tactics should be perfected and the efficiency of air operations should be increased, particularly with respect to increasing the ability of air units with a nuclear weapons delivery capability to launch nuclear strikes. The adversary's antiaircraft defense and the experience from the Vietnam war front should be considered to a greater degree than hitherto in air operations.

240. Regarding the air defense forces, particular attention should be given to streamlining the command system and to cooperation in the units of an air defense corps -- an air regiment (a missile battalion). The present system of collecting, preparing and transmitting information on the air situation, as well as the method of controlling aircraft operating at maximum range, should be improved. The preservation of stability in the command system is a very important problem. The air defense command should devote maximum attention and effort to this problem.

241. The naval forces should be further perfected in cooperating with the allied fleets in the Baltic and in conducting amphibious landing operations. Taking the above
as major goals, one should also give attention to the organization and implementation of defense of the Polish sea communication lines in the Baltic. Training assignments should be implemented to a greater degree than hitherto in inclement weather and at night.

242. The basic goal in territorial defense is the inclusion of the entire manpower and resources of the functional system in defensive training. The basic contents of the training goals in the territorial defense area should include the following: to repulse enemy air attacks, to protect the lives of the people and the production facilities, and to restore the supply facilities for the operational forces under conditions of nuclear warfare.

243. The Party and political organizations should perfect their skills in carrying out relevant political duties especially during such training actions as the mobilization build-up of units along with the further training of reservists, the movement of troops over great distances, the redeployment of air units, and the testing of the alert readiness and combat readiness of troops.

244. Of particular significance in undertakings related to mobilization is the ability to organize quickly the party members and political activists from among the reservists coming into the unit and, through this akti~, to influence effectively all the personnel of the unit being mobilized.

245. Perfecting the political organization in the operation and most fitting use of modern technical propaganda equipment are also necessary. Further development of this equipment should be continued.

246. It is necessary to continue the development of theoretical thinking and the search for a solution to several complicated problems of waging modern warfare. Extensive knowledge of the adversary's forces and his operating methods is necessary.
247. The methodology of conducting large-scale exercises also requires perfecting. The principal requirement here is a common guiding idea and strategic-operational background as well as an organizational arrangement of the control apparatus so that it could effectively supervise many complicated and concurrent actions of the exercise participants and effectively react to every situation resulting from a decision of the participants and their action in implementing the designated training goals.

248. In the course of many years, especially recent years, we have gained very rich and varied training experience. We must not allow even a small part of this experience to be squandered. We must make the most of this experience to perfect the different areas of our defense system, particularly for developing tactical and operational knowledge and the professional skills of our officer cadre. It would be suitable to expand the present narrow and specific official forms of consolidating training experiences in reports and official bulletins by preparing many valuable aids, mainly professional handbooks, which would reflect our achievements in military doctrine. This matter requires extensive study as well as personal and organizational decisions. The first to deal with this situation, it seems, should be the General Staff Academy, with the assistance and close cooperation of different institutions, especially the central institutions, and above all the General Staff.

249. The observations, appraisals and conclusions of the completed maneuvers presented in this discussion are not to be construed as a broad and exhaustive treatment of the copious problems of the maneuvers; they should be treated as preliminary, indicating the basic directions for extensive studies and official work in all the basic elements of the Ministry of National Defense. I also ask my assistants responsible for particular phases of the maneuvers to submit detailed conclusions on matters in their areas of operation and to include these conclusions in plans for implementation. The chief of the General Staff will assure the coordination of these plans.

250. The collective and extensive physical and mental
efforts of all participants of the maneuvers -- the performers, the directors, and those in various support roles, -- made it possible for us to attain all the objectives of this complicated training undertaking.

251. I would like to single out the good combat attitude of the basic service personnel and the reservists called up in mobilization built-up units.

252. The significance of the effort in the growth of our defense system and the importance of the present maneuvers were emphasized by the keen interest in their progress and by the personal participation of the Party and state leadership in the essential parts of the maneuvers: Władysław Gomułka, Party First Secretary; Józef Cyrankiewicz, chairman of the Council of Ministers; Ryszard Strzelecki and Władysław Wicha, secretaries of the Party Central Committee; and other comrades from the Party and state administration.

253. Army representatives of three allied countries, as an expression of the international aspect in the handling of our defenses, also participated in our maneuvers.

254. We appreciate the well executed work and also the fact that the activity dealing with the growth of Poland's defensive power enjoys the respect of the chief executive elements, the armed forces, and the entire public.

255. I thank the maneuvers participants present in this auditorium for their contribution and at the same time I express my thanks to all who conducted the maneuvers with such dedication: the participating generals, officers, junior command cadre, enlisted personnel and civilian employees.