Polish Defense Ministry Document Concerning Experiences and Conclusions from the "Narew" Maneuvers

1. (Summary: The "Narew" maneuver conducted in Poland in June 1965 is described as a massive combined operation which for the first time was carried out on the assumption that hostilities broke out in Europe initially on a limited scale involving conventional weapons and later gradually grew into a nuclear war. This development reached its turning point when the Western forces, having tactical nuclear weapons at the ready, in desperation resorted to them in attacks against several Warsaw Pact positions. The communist side then reacted, and the maneuver proceeded through stages in steadily escalating nuclear warfare. In these circumstances, the Polish commanders engaged in the staff work appropriate to each new situation, deploying the forces to bridge the Vistula (presumed to be the Oder in the exercise). In addition, strategic planning described the mission to be assigned the combined forces, which called for them to have reached the line: Groningen-Zwolle-Emmerich by the fourteenth day. The lessons derived from the maneuver indicated a need to
increase rocket capabilities in the Polish forces, to arm
the air force with additional supersonic pursuit aircraft
and fighter-bombers, to form heavy-duty helicopter units,
and to expand the air transport component and the aerial
reconnaissance groups. The exercise revealed some weak-
nesses in staff work and in communications between command
posts and extended elements and some failure properly to
utilize the intelligence arm.)

2. An unopposed bilevel/front-army and army-mili-
tary district within the OTK (Territorial Defense) system
command post exercise, under the name "Narew" was held
from 5 to 11 June in the field with communications support.
Comment: Front is a Soviet military term for
a combination of units roughly equivalent to a U.S. Army
group.) The following was the theme of the exercise: "An
offensive operation of a front in the initial period of
war" - this represents an important stage in the system
of improving commands and staffs of operational forces
as well as of national territorial defense.

3. The exercise was marked by its unusual size.
Regarding space, the exercise theoretically covered land
and water regions of the strategic northern axis of
approximately 900,000 square kilometers in area; oper-
ationally during the exercise, the headquarters and
troops deployed and actually operated north of the Warsaw-
Poznan line in a 100,000 square kilometer region, which
was 200 kilometers wide and 500 kilometers in length. The
staffs and troops assembled for the maneuver area in 32
rail transports as well as a number of motor vehicles from
the western, central, and northern parts of Poland.

4. This regrouping was accomplished in a very
limited period of time; moreover, the command post areas
were not revealed to the staffs involved in the exercise
until they appeared at the loading stations.

5. Because of the commitment of the largest number
of command elements in maneuvers conducted thus far by
the Polish Army, this exercise included a substantial
number of participants.

6. Participating in the exercise - excluding the
alert units - were 12,250 men (the largest number of
men involved in front-type maneuvers conducted so far), including 2,701 officers, 565 NCO's, 8,738 basic servicemen, and 246 civilian employees. The supervisory and umpire group of the exercise consisted of 414 generals and officers; 303 generals and officers worked in the front staffs, and the quartermaster command post comprised 140 men. In all, the command, staff and front support units comprised 4,769 men (including 870 officers and 3,780 NCO's and basic servicemen).

7. A total of 536 various units of communications equipment was employed in the exercise; the staffs relied extensively on high frequency communications, national as well as that of the Soviet Army. Moreover, 2,703 motor vehicles were employed in the exercise; of this number 1,022 different vehicles were assigned to the front staff and the units supporting it.

8. Participating in the exercise were the following:

- Most of the MON (Ministry of National Defense) central institutions, in the role of the Masurian Front command;

- Military district headquarters, in the role of combined arms army commands /POW (Pomeranian Military District) - 2nd Army; SOW (Silesian Military District) - 3rd Army; WOW (Warsaw Military District) - 4th Army/

   Comment: The expression "combined arms army", which appears frequently in the text is a rendering of a Polish term which literally means "a general-military army".)

- Combined arms army command of the Belorussian Military District of the Soviet Army, in the role of the 20th Army command;

- Operational air force command, in the role of the 5th Air Army command;

- Operational group of the Navy Main Staff;

- Warsaw Military District command, as the Warsaw Military District in time of war;

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- Operational group from the command of the 1st Air Defense Corps in the role of the 5th Air Defense Division command, and then in the role of the 1st Air Defense Corps;

- Headquarters of the 18th, 20th and 36th Artillery Brigades;

- Headquarters of five different rear service bases (front field base, front hospital base, 11th District Field Base, 15th Main Field Repair Base, and the 20th Main Ammunition Base);

- Headquarters of an assault battalion and part of the 8th Radio Countermeasures Unit;

- Support and maintenance units.

9. In addition, elements of the following headquarters commands and units were involved in the exercise on an alert basis; the wojewodztwo (province) military staff in Warsaw, the wojewodztwo military staff in Olsztyn, headquarters of the 15th Mechanized Division, division units as well as the 94th Mechanized Regiment, headquarters of the 9th Air Fighter Division and the 41st Air Fighter Regiment, and the 3rd Pontoon Regiment. The MON Military Transportation Echelon and the Warsaw Military District were also initially on an alert status.

10. The National Defense Minister posed the following general training goals for the exercise:

- Coordination and improvement of front, combined arms army, air army, and naval force commands in the skill of commanding under field conditions the first operation in the beginning period of a war, initially waged with conventional weapons, and then with weapons of mass destruction;

- Improvement of teamwork between territorial defense forces and operational troops at the military district - army level;

- Improvement of the proficiency of staffs in effective leadership of troops in the field, especially with the employment of an active communications system,
different command posts, etc.;

- Improvement of the commands involved in the organization of cooperation between the operational staffs of the Polish Army and of the Soviet Army functioning as a single front.

11. Moreover, it was planned to give particular attention to the following:

- Organization of efficient and rapid commitment of a front to battle from the march after regrouping in the interior of the country, against active air operation of the enemy, and against offensive operations conducted by the enemy near the border area;

- Proficiency of commanders and staffs in organizing and conducting offensive operations against strong tactical and operational reserves of the opposing forces;

- Concentration of the necessary fire power in a given place and time as well as of an attack force for selected courses of action;

- Acquisition of additional experience in the efficient operation of the territorial defense system at the district - wojewodztwo level;

- Stimulation of interest and acquisition of experience in regard to special operations, especially diversionary-type operations;

- Verification of the combat readiness of the various headquarters and staffs of tactical and operational units.

12. A plan for the war games was drawn up designed to meet the training goals of the exercise (Plan 1).

13. The exercise was commenced with a presumed attempt by the "West" to detach the German Democratic Republic from the socialist camp by inciting hostile internal activity, by initiating operations, and by
supporting these actions with augmented forces.

14. Using atomic blackmail, the "West" believed fear of a conflict which would expand to all-out nuclear warfare would induce the "East" to accept the accomplished facts and therefore to necessitate military means.

15. The opposing forces were deployed as they would have been under actual combat conditions, and in selecting the maneuver area, an effort was made to duplicate the geographic features of the region west of the Oder River. In a real sense, therefore, Warsaw was the counterpart of Berlin, and the Vistula and the Oder, the counterparts of the Elbe and the Rhine Rivers. The state border for the maneuver extended along a line: Braniewo - Wabrzezno - Wloclawek - West Lodz - West Kielce - Tarnow.

16. The armed conflict developed in the following manner: On 31 May the imperialists decisively expanded the aggression against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. From 31 May to 2 June the "West" gradually built up its forces in West Berlin (Warsaw). On 3 March /sic/ they issued an ultimatum, demanding that one division be allowed to pass through to Berlin (that is, Warsaw). Faced with the refusal and resolute attitude of the "East", the "West" began to transport troops to Berlin by land in the afternoon hours. The counter-action of the "East" resulted in the first engagements with the opposing forces.

17. At daybreak on 4 June, the "West" forces crossed the border with two corps in the direction of Warsaw and on 5 June began fighting north and south of Warsaw. They employed conventional weapons in these operations. By 2100 hours of 5 June, the "West" forces, overcoming the resistance of the defending units (19th Mechanized Division of the 8th Army and the 50th Mechanized Division of the 30th Army of the Warsaw Front), made a penetration along a predetermined line to a depth of 30-50 to 80 kilometers.

18. On 31 May, a state of advanced defense readiness was introduced in the country. Covert mobilization was carried out, and the armed forces were brought to full combat readiness. On 3 June, the key elements of the Defense Ministry, the military districts, and the service
branch commands and headquarters were placed in a state of combat readiness. The commands and staffs were ordered to move their troops out to the assembly areas. In compliance with this order, the basic forces of the Masurian Front moved to the assembly areas and, when the enemy began to attack, these forces began to take up positions in the field.

19. On the evening (2100 hours) of 5 June, the divisions of two armies (2nd and 3rd) of the front's first echelon began to take up line positions. The armies in the second echelon were still some distance from the front - the 20th Army one day's marching distance, and the 4th Army two day's marching distance.

20. According to the operational directive the front was to be committed to battle on the forenoon of the third day of hostilities, that is, 6 June 1965.

21. Operational aims of the opposing forces: The "West" forces, after having created an internal provocation, planned to invade the German Democratic Republic, and to crush the "East" forces stationed there by launching swift mass attacks by land, air and sea, using conventional weapons. According to their plan, the decision to use nuclear weapons would be dependent upon the way the situation developed.

22. The "North" ("Polnoc") Army Group - initially formed (that is, until the assignment of additional forces) as one echelon - operating with a strength of four corps (one German, one British, one Belgian, and the 1st Dutch Corps in reserve), the "Pomorze" operational group, and two combined tactical air forces launched a major attack in the direction of Torun and Bialystok and a secondary attack along the seacoast. The immediate mission was to defeat the defending forces as well as the "East" forces moving from the rear, to capture Warsaw, and to proceed, on the seventh or eighth day of the operation, toward Suwalki, Bialystok, and Brzesc. The group was then to expand the attack eastwards or, if the combat situation did not develop favorably, to shift to active defensive operations with the support of heavy nuclear strikes, to
halt the winter attack of the "East" forces, to inflict heavy losses on them, and then to resume wide-scale offensive operations.

23. The "East" forces planned to bring up elements re-grouped in the rear which, flanked by forward elements already deployed near the border, would defeat the aggressive forces of the "North" and "Center" ("Centrum") Army Groups, capture the main bases and supply centers of the "West" forces, and proceed to the line Groningen-Wesel-Saarbruecken-Strasbourg. Maintaining their nuclear delivery systems in a state of readiness, the "East", however, made the decision to use their weapons dependent on the employment of nuclear weapons by the "West" forces.

24. The Masurian Front, - formed in two echelons with an operational strength of four general-purpose armies (2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 20th), the 5th Air Army, the 7th Airborne Division, the 17th Assault Brigade, and support units-launched a major attack from the Mikolajki, Mlawa, Serock, and Bialystok assembly areas in the direction of Mlawa and the area north of Berlin. The immediate assignment of the front consisted of defeating, from the march, the 1st British and the 1st German Army Corps, establishing a bridgehead on the Vistula River, routing the approaching reserve forces of the enemy, and, at the end of the 6th - 7th day of the operation, capturing the region on the west bank of the Oder (north and south of Berlin) to a depth of 50-70 kilometers. In carrying out its other missions, the front was to attack with its main forces toward Stendal, Hanover, and Enschede, while part of its forces, heading toward Schwerin, Neumuenster, and Flensburg, was to defeat the large advancing reserve forces of the enemy; establish a bridgehead on the Elbe; capture the southern part of The Jutland peninsula up to the West German-Danish border, and proceed - on the 12th - 14th day of the operation - to the line Groningen-Zwolle-Emmerich. Part of the Masurian Front forces was to join the Warsaw Front in capturing the Ruhr industrial region.

25. The front's zone of action was 180 - 270 kilometers in width, and 880 - 920 kilometers in depth; duration of operation, 12 - 14 days; and average rate of advance, 63 - 77 kilometers per day. In addition, the operation called for an average rate of advance of 40 - 50 kilometers in the main direction of attack without the use of nuclear weapons and 60 - 80 kilometers per day with the use of nuclear weapons.

26. The 8th Army of the East German People's Army attacked on the right flank toward Kaliningrad and Elblag, and then took up defense of the coast. On the left flank, the Warsaw Front eliminated the enemy's penetration and proceeded to attack.
toward Tomaszow Mazowiecki, Krotoszyn, Leipzig, and Aachen. On the 13th - 14th day of the operation, the front captured the Ruhr region.

27. The Joint Baltic Fleet conducted operations intended to establish ground force action toward the coast.

28. I shall now discuss the general course of the maneuver and present the major conclusions of the maneuver participants. (Plans 2 and 3)

29. First Day of the Maneuver (6 June).

At 1900 hours of 5 June the headquarters and staffs of the front and armies reported the state of readiness of field command posts. During the night of 5 to 6 June, the salient forces of the front (first echelons of the 2nd and 3rd Armies) arrived at the maneuver assembly areas. The staffs directed the completion of the regrouping, planned the commitment of troops to battle from the march, and prepared the operation plan.

30. At 2300 hours the front commander announced the general aims of the maneuver and described the procedures for committing combat elements near the border zone. The armies received their initial orders (direction of attack, area of operation, and time of attack).

31. At this time (that is, on 5 June and during the night of 5 to 6 June), the enemy was carrying out offensive operations with first echelon division forces, achieving success mainly south of Ostroda (where the 3rd German Armored Division was in action) and in the Sierpc area (where the 2nd British Division was attacking). The air force of the "West" forces was active. The enemy employed 30 reconnaissance aircraft as well as 50 fighter-bombers and bombers in attacks on the front's regrouping zone. The aircraft struck mainly at the crossing over the Narew.

32. As a result of inadequately coordinated actions of individual air defense elements of the "East" forces, the enemy air force suffered comparatively slight losses, which simplified its operations against the front's forces.

33. In the Masurian Front's zone of operations, 10 diversionary groups carried out several scores of armed
operations. These groups mainly attacked the march columns but also destroyed communications equipment and installations.

34. The front commander at 0900 on 6 June correctly called for the subsequent swift commitment of forces and issued instructions to the advance echelons of the 2nd and 3rd Armies to carry on operations in the border areas in the afternoon hours. These orders called upon the advance echelon divisions to make a deep penetration of 50 - 60 kilometers on this day.

35. The 2nd Army divisions (18th Mechanized Division, 22nd Mechanized Division, and 26th Armored Division) went into action at 1200 hours. The army concentrated its main effort on the left flank, where two divisions were attacking and the army's entire artillery power was concentrated.

36. At 1000 hours, the 3rd Army committed two divisions (15th Armored and 16th Mechanized), and at 1600, a third division. Its main effort was centered on the right flank.

37. On 6 June, the tactical air force concentrated its main effort on providing air cover (16 air group flights), attacks on nuclear weapons of the enemy (4 air group flights), attacks on the enemy's reserves (2 air group flights), and on providing ground support to the advance echelon divisions going into action, completing two air group flights for the 2nd and 3rd Armies.

38. During this period, the general ratio of fighting strength in the 2nd and 3rd Army zone was to the advantage (1:1.5 in divisions, 1:1.6 in tanks, and 1:1.1 in artillery guns) of the Masurian Front forces, which were successfully taking the offensive against the contiguous flanks of the 2nd and 3rd Armies. Thus the first encounter - a meeting engagement - was decided in favor of the front, although the pre-determined line of advance was not achieved.

39. The enemy, however, kept up the offensive. The enemy planned to hold the area on the east bank of the Vistula in order to be able, after bringing up forces from the rear, to continue offensive operations. For this purpose the enemy committed, at 1300 hours, the following second-echelon divisions: 11th Mechanized Division (from the 1st German Army Corps), which counterattacked
the 2nd Army forces on the right flank in the direction of Paslek, Ostroda, and Dzialdowo, and the 4th Division (from the 1st British Army Corps), which assumed defensive positions along the line of Brodnica-Rypin to meet the attack of the forces on the right flank of the 3rd Army. The enemy's action was intended to check the successfully developing offensive of the Masurian Front's forces and thus to establish the prerequisites for launching (on 7 June) a counterattack by the forces of the 1st (Dutch) Army Corps, which was advancing, on 6 June, toward the area of Paslek, Dzierzgon, and Morag.

40. Active use of its air force (600 fighters, 390 fighter-bombers, and 151 reconnaissance aircraft) enabled the enemy to achieve its objectives on 6 June. The main effort of the enemy air force consisted of strikes on columns of advance echelon divisions of the armies as well as on lines of communication (including 100 air strikes against 2nd Army troops and 80 air strikes against 3rd Army troops). The air force also attacked rocket units of the operational-tactical brigade of the 2nd Army (24 missions), airfields of the 5th Air Force Army (40 missions), and rear areas (30 missions). Forty missions by the enemy air force were intended to delay the advance of the 20th Army.

41. As a result of the enemy's successful completion of the above actions, the ratio of fighting strength shifted greatly in the latter part of the day in the front's zone. The offensive operations of the 2nd Army forces effectively checked the counterattacking 11th Mechanized Division as well as the 1st Mechanized and the 3rd Armored Divisions, which were in defensive positions.

42. The 3rd Army was able to assume the offensive only on the right flank, where it advanced about 40 kilometers toward the end of the day (at 2100 hours). In this situation the preservation of the front's offensive capability and the launching of an offensive operation toward the Vistula could not be assured without the commitment of second-echelon divisions of the 2nd and 3rd Armies, which would provide the superiority in men and equipment required for specific courses of action.

43. At the same time, the front moved quickly to bring up the 20th Army, which was in the assembly area at the fork of the Bug and Narew on the night of 6 to 7 June.
44. In the evening of 6 June, the front command issued an operations plan for the entire action. The plan called for the 2nd Army to go into action along the seacoast up to the Oder and then to move to the second echelon of the front.

45. The 3rd Army was to attack from the center of the front's formation, while on the left flank, the 20th Army, after being committed to battle, was to proceed along the line East Znin-Gniezno. The 4th Army was to go into battle on the 6th-7th day of the operation, after the armies of the front's advance echelon had crossed the Oder.

46. The plan anticipated that at the end of the operation 3 - 4 divisions would be at the Danish border and that there would be 8 - 9 divisions on the front's main line of attack, that is on its left flank.

47. At 0400 hours of 6 June, the Warsaw Military District joined the maneuver in alert status, as did the Wojewodztwo Military Staff in Warsaw at 1400 hours. They were engaged in problems dealing with mobilization.

Second Day of the Maneuver (7 June)

48. On 7 June, the "West" forces attempted to take the offensive, utilizing elements brought up from the rear (1st Dutch Army Corps) and seeking to exploit the fact that the "East" forces had committed only army first echelons by evening. These armies were spread across a broad front without any clearly defined direction of attack (that is, concentration of fire and fighting personnel), which did not assure local superiority and the opportunity for launching decisive operations according to plan as long as firepower was restricted to conventional weapons.

49. In order to hold the convenient assembly area (located east of the Vistula) and delay the advance of the "East" forces, the enemy, at 0800 on 7 June, launched an extensive counterattack, with 1st Dutch Corps forces on the right flank of 2nd Army troops, in the direction of Ostroda and Mlawa, as well as a secondary attack (with a strength of about two British brigades) in the direction of Sierpc and Biezun against the left flank of the 3rd Army. At the same time, in order to disrupt the planned advance of the 20th Army forces to the front and to disorganize the rear service operations of the 3rd Army, an
enemy airborne battalion was dropped in the woods near Mlawa. The enemy also carried out local counterattacks on the west bank of the Drweca in order to delay the advance of the 25th Armored Division of the 3rd Army.

50. On this day the diversionary groups began their operations. The enemy dropped an additional seven groups in the 2nd and 3rd Army zone. These groups carried out numerous attacks against communication centers, smaller staff-headquarters and railroad rolling stock, and also conducted reconnaissance. On the other hand, the operations of the diversionary groups against the 20th Army, although numerous and annoying, did not cause any severe losses because of the effective counter-insurgency defense of this Army.

51. The enemy air force continued to be active, concentrating its main effort on support of the counterattacks by the 1st (Dutch) Army Corps, and of other counterattacks.

52. As a result of these operations, the general ratio of combat strength favored the "West" forces in the forenoon hours; they had an advantage (5 divisions to our 4) in the 2nd Army's zone of action, while the ratio of combat strength was almost equal in the 3rd Army's zone. The enemy, however, had the advantage here because it was in defense positions. These circumstances dictated the method of operation of the front forces on 7 June.

53. On 7 June, according to the decision taken, the Masurian Front commander planned to repel the 1st Dutch Corps counterattack on the right flank, and to launch a decisive offensive on the left flank by committing the 20th Army after it had crossed the Vistula. This plan did not materialize because the unfavorably developing situation forced this Army into action even before reaching the Vistula. Only by taking this action was it possible to attain an advantage in strength ratio, which was further enhanced by concentrating these forces against specific objectives. This ratio, which was to be advantageous to the Masurian Front forces, was to be as follows (after committing the 20th Army: 1.6:1 in divisions (although only 1:1 in manpower; 1.7:1 in tanks; and 1.5:1 in artillery.

54. On 7 June the "North" Army Group achieved significant operational results by exploiting the favorable power
ratio in the north and south and its advantageous position. The 1st Dutch Corps, concentrating its strength on a narrow sector, successfully launched an attack, reaching by nightfall a line bordered by Northwest Nidzica and Dzialdowo, and penetrating 30 - 40 kilometers into the 2nd Army area. On the front's left flank, where about two brigades were counterattacking, the enemy was less successful, but even here it penetrated 20 kilometers into the 3rd Army area. Only on the 3rd Army's right flank, where its two armored divisions were in action, was the enemy defeated and slowly forced back across the Vistula. In the evening, the 3rd Army, using detached units and assault helicopters, established bridgeheads on the river's west bank.

55. In this situation, the 20th Army, as mentioned above, was directed in the late afternoon (on the front's left flank) to establish bridgeheads on the Vistula's west bank at night and then to launch a decisive attack against the enemy by moving toward Lipno, Inowroclaw, and Szamotuly. The Masurian Front held the advantage here in fighting strength. It regained the operational initiative lost during the day. Circumstances now provided a good opportunity for fulfilling its missions. In the combat zone in which the 20th Army was committed there were comparatively small (division and brigade) and understrength enemy forces which suffered about 35 percent in losses. Moreover, the 20th Army commander secured an advantage by concentrating his forces on the central front, planned to use strong detached units to establish bridgeheads, and prepared to cross the Vistula.

56. Compared with the operations undertaken by the two combined tactical air forces, the 5th Air Force operations were less favorable on this day, a decline from the previous day's (6 June) activity, when the air force did not fulfill its operations plan (the troop support plan was fulfilled 70 percent, and the actions against nuclear weapons and reserve forces roughly 50 percent). The ground forces and the liaison officers with the air force (SWL) did not request sufficient support from the 5th Air Force, even though the battle situation required it and the aircraft were available. On the night of 6 to 7 June, a bomber wing dispersed its effort by destroying bridges and crossings over the Vistula along the entire front zone rather than concentrating this effort on the Tczew area, where the 1st Dutch Corps was regrouping for a counterattack.

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57. The Warsaw Military District command, after detaching the 4th Army and assigning it to the front, on 7 June assured replacements for the operational forces through mobilization; organized and carried out defense plans in the district area; and established the prerequisites for grouping and moving operational forces under conditions which assumed only conventional weapons employment by the enemy. On this day 37 air task forces and 7 insurgency-reconnaissance groups were active in the district area. The enemy concentrated its insurgency and fire activity against the communications system, mainly along the Vistula and in the reloading areas (the district area with its actual borders at present is being examined separately from the Masurian Front operations).

Third Day of the Maneuver (8 June) - Plan 4

58. On the night of 7 to 8 June, the "East" forces achieved some basic strategic advances. The 3rd Army, expanding this measure of success, seized bridgeheads on the west bank of the Vistula. The 20th Army was brought forward and, together with the 3rd Army, was in a good position to breach the Vistula and penetrate the enemy's area of operations. Only in the north, where the 2nd Army was active, did the enemy still hold the initiative although it was not in a position to follow up the gains of the 1st Dutch Corps on 7 June. The opposing forces were balanced on the whole, but the units in action here suffered considerable losses and were threatened by encirclement from the west by 3rd Army troops, who were attacking in a northwesterly direction.

59. Warsaw Front successes compelled the "West" forces temporarily to abandon their initial plan of action and to concentrate on maintaining the status quo ante. Since the advance of the "East" could not be checked with the forces thus far committed, the enemy sought successively to employ new combat measures, especially the atomic barrier zone established south of Torun (with gaps in Nieszawa and Wloclawek), then on the employment of tactical nuclear weapons against the "East" forces crossing the border, and finally the launching of a mass atomic attack, and, ultimately, the unleashing of a general nuclear war.

60. To achieve their goal, the "West" forces started to withdraw their troops facing the 20th Army to the Vistula's west bank in the evening hours. At the same time they were preparing a mass attack with tactical nuclear weapons, mainly
to stem the expanding 3rd Army breakthrough.

61. At 0230 on 8 June, when the lead units of the 20th Army began to force the Vistula, the enemy set off the atomic mines in the barrier zone, thereby generally checking the 20th Army advance. Only in the Wloclawek area, where there were no atomic mines, did the 14th Armored Division manage to cross to the west bank by afternoon. On the other hand, the 3rd Army forces, with a superiority in tanks (2.8:1), artillery (1.6:1), and battalions (2.3:1), effectively expanded the attack after the morning hours. By afternoon these forces had advanced about 40 kilometers and had almost completed the river crossing. The 2nd Army troops remained in contact with the 1st Dutch and 1st German Corps.

62. At 1230, the enemy, under extreme pressure and having brought weapons charged with nuclear warheads into firing position, made four hits on gun positions of the 3rd Army's tactical rocket brigades. This act meant that nuclear war had started. The Masurian Front commander ordered an immediate atomic attack with all available types of nuclear rocket weapons. The force of the first strike totalled about 660 kilotons. In addition, nuclear attacks directed from higher command levels were made on the front's zone of operations. The enemy, in turn, also carried out planned nuclear attacks. Thirty-five attacks with a force of 68 kilotons were made against the 2nd Army troops. The greatest losses were suffered by the 23rd Armored Division, the 22nd Mechanized Division, and the 12th Mechanized Division, each unit experiencing 6-8 atomic strikes. The enemy made 28 attacks with a force of 39 kilotons against the 3rd Army troops, each unit experiencing 39 kilotons in atomic strikes. The enemy made 28 attacks with a force of 39 kilotons against the 3rd Army troops, each unit experiencing 39 kilotons in atomic strikes. The enemy made 28 attacks with a force of 39 kilotons against the 3rd Army troops, each unit experiencing 39 kilotons in atomic strikes.

Comment: Presumably 390 kilotons were meant. The figure of 39 kilotons is too low for 28 attacks. The enemy made a nuclear attack against the 20th Army during its forcing of the Vistula. In particular, the 14th Armored Division, which was expanding its attack on the west bank of the river, was neutralized by six nuclear attacks and suffered heavy losses. The enemy launched two nuclear attacks each on the 4th, 16th, and 17th Mechanized Divisions. Finally, two leading divisions of the 4th Army, which were in the assembly area, suffered losses of 35 to 65 percent as a result of 14 nuclear attacks by the enemy.
63. In all, however, the losses of the "East" forces were less than those of the enemy, which, after completion of the necessary preparations and regroupings, allowed the offensive operations by the 3rd and 20th Armies to be continued. The 3rd Army expanded its offensive in a westerly direction.

64. The 20th Army, after several ineffective attempts to cross the contamination zone and to surmount the Vistula obstacle, executed an effective maneuver with two divisions of the second echelon, i.e., with the 17th Mechanized Division on the left flank, south of Wloclawek, and the 4th Mechanized Division passing through the 3rd Army's zone of operations north of Torun where there was no atomic barrier zone and where the enemy resistance was negligible. These divisions, by taking up positions far west of the Vistula, were in a favorable position to mount an offensive in depth against the enemy's defenses.

65. Conditions also permitted an expansion of operations in the 2nd Army's zone of operations. Since evening the enemy had ceased offensive operations and begun to withdraw. The 4th Army was in the assembly area prepared for further movement in a westerly direction. The navy was attacking the enemy's naval transport facilities.

66. On 8 June the command and staff of the Warsaw Military District directed decontamination measures in the district area. The enemy concentrated its main effort in 32 attacks (with a force of 20, 50, and 100 kilotons) on the communications system and military and industrial installations.

Fourth Day of the Maneuver (9 June)

67. On 9 June, the "East" forces, after several days of rigorous action, were in a position rapidly to advance into the area of operations. The enemy, weakened by the preceding action, could not offer strong resistance. The enemy's additional reserves (the British Corps) were directed to the Warsaw Front zone of operations, where the front was launching a determined attack. Enemy air activity was one-half of that of the initial days of the operation. On this day the enemy focused its attention on the gradual withdrawal of forces facing the 2nd Army which were in danger of encirclement, and tried to reconstitute the reserve forces for employment in organizing resistance in the interior.

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68. The problem of disposing of the northern formation ended in an interesting manner. As a result of the initial nuclear attacks on the country and of the changes occurring in the internal structure, the Netherlands decided to withdraw from the war. Therefore, the 1st Dutch Corps, with its ranks depleted by combat and subjected to psychological warfare, decided to stop fighting.

69. The Masurian Front, in contrast to the enemy, was in a position to expand the gains of the 3rd and 20th Armies by committing the 4th Army. The 4th Army went into action (on the night of the 9th to 10th June) after moving its forces up in an unusually rigorous march of 800 kilometers, and sought to implement the front commander's orders quickly to expand the gains already achieved. Two of its divisions were attacking toward the west: the 13th toward Koszalin, and the 19th near the Oder in the Szczecin area. In addition, the 5th Mechanized Division attacked northward to prevent the enemy from retreating beyond the Vistula and to block its exits from the Tri-city /Gdynia, Gdansk, Sopot/. Thus the divisions were operating in widely separated directions and broke through to the coast along a zone over 500 kilometers long. Particularly skillful planning (rozwiazania) was required to ensure the command of the 5th Division breakthrough to Gdansk and its operations so remote from the main forces.

70. By the end of 9 June (2100 hours), the Masurian Front forces reached the line Barczewo - Ostroda - South Kwidzyn - Zlotow - Wegrowiec - East Gniezno.

71. The 2nd Army straightened the front, attacking the withdrawing enemy and mainly menacing its left flank. The 3rd Army, committing the 16th Mechanized Division, advanced about 60 kilometers and, with its detached units, established a bridgehead on the Gwda. The 20th Army made the biggest advance, amounting to 60 - 70 kilometers.

**Fifth Day of the Maneuver (10 June)**

72. On 9 June, the operation date was changed to 12 June. The situation, as reported to the staffs involved in the exercise at 0600 on 10 June, was an expected consequence of the previous operations. The situation from 9 to 12 June was as follows: the "North" Army Group, under effective attack by the Masurian and Warsaw Fronts, was engaged in delaying actions in prepared defense lines. These actions were intended to slow the "East" attack and to organize an effective defense on the Oder.
73. The Masurian Front, crushing enemy resistance along successive lines, was rapidly advancing westward. The front captured sizable areas along the Pomeranian coast, including the port of Swinoujscie with the help of helicopter-landed forces. The front also forced the Oder in two sectors. The northern bridgehead was taken by an airborne division (17th Airborne Division) and the lead units of the 3rd Army; the southern bridgehead was credited to the 17th Mechanized Division of the 20th Army. In a similar manner, the remainder of the enemy's forces in the Tri-city and Elblag were crushed. This mission was assigned to the 8th Army of the East German People's Army. Two divisions of the Masurian Front were temporarily placed under the command of the 8th Army. These divisions were to return to the Masurian Front by 13 June and were then to be placed under the command of the 2nd Army, which at this time comprised the front's reserve.

74. In the situation thus developed, the front was ready to fulfill its second mission, which - like its first mission - was to be carried out under exceptionally difficult conditions. The enemy prevailed in its intention of shifting to counterattack and of defeating the divisions of the "East" forces, utilizing for this purpose the extensive "West" reserves, including U.S. forces, and taking advantage of the favorable terrain. In particular, the 4th U.S. Corps was committed against the Masurian Front southwest of Berlin and began to move to the forward area. Disembarkation of two British divisions continued in the ports of Hamburg, Lübeck, and Rostock. It would require about two days to bring these units into action against the attacking forces of the front. Moreover, a perimeter defense of Berlin was prepared, consisting of territorial defense units and the Berlin Garrison.

75. In this situation the Masurian Front commander made the following decision: first using forces of the 3rd and 20th Armies, and then bringing up 4th Army troops, to mount powerful offensive operations from the established Oder bridgeheads along the main line of attack: Kostrzyn - south of Bremen (with a pincer movement from Berlin), to defeat the advancing reserve forces of the enemy and to deploy quickly along the line of the front's followup mission. Then, committing to battle on 14 June the 2nd Army which was far in the rear area, the commander planned to attack and destroy the enemy's reserves that were forming on the Baltic Sea coast, at the same time putting ashore an assault brigade in the Kiel Canal area.
76. The above decision provided the subordinate armies (equivalent units) the basis for their plans and preparation for carrying out their own objectives in accord with the general plans of the front.

77. After the commanders and staffs reported their proposals, the maneuver ended at 1500 hours of 12 June.

78. [Translator's Comment: The following 2 pages in the original Polish document are missing/]

79. Comrades! The just-concluded "Narew" maneuvers, in which the Belorussian Military District participated alongside our higher operational commands, represented the next important phase of the planned joint training activities under the Warsaw Pact framework. With regard to our armed forces, this was the first training exercise at the central level in which the general scenario was the outbreak of war in Europe - initially on a limited scale, without the use of atomic weapons, and then its escalation to nuclear war. We have been studying this problem for approximately two years. The present maneuvers represent to a certain extent a summation of current doctrines so far and is intended to serve as a starting point for further thorough theoretical training and practical exercises in the areas of operational procedures, defense planning, organizational-mobilization planning, logistics planning, etc.

80. The operational-strategic objective of the "Narew" maneuvers considered both the realities of the strategic situation in the Central European TDW (Theater of Military Operations) as well as the current international situation.

81. Before beginning a detailed discussion of the problems directly related to the maneuvers and the conclusions stemming from them, I would like to direct the attention of the comrades to the basic features of this situation, which will permit a better presentation of the substance, characteristics, and problems of the present maneuvers.

82. One of the most important and consistent features of the contemporary world situation is the continued systematic growth of economic, moral, and defense forces of the socialist nations, their, particularly the Soviet Union's, maintenance of a lead in strategic nuclear/rocket weapons over the imperialist...
bloc. As a result of the quantitative and qualitative level achieved by the USSR in this field, the United States, fearing the catastrophic effects of retaliation, had to reduce its efforts to achieve its principal political strategic objectives with the use of force on a broad, and especially unlimited, scale. This significant fact was specifically confirmed by the repeated declarations by leading Western politicians acknowledging the futility of nuclear war and professing a need for coexistence. Further confirmation was found in the changes in U.S. military strategy which took place in the past few years. The strategy of massive retaliation, understood as strategy of massive aggression, was replaced by the strategy of so-called flexible response, which is reflected in the search by imperialists for other less dangerous ways to continue the policy of power and aggression aimed at imperialism's ultimate goal, that is, defeat of the socialist world. The West is now attempting to reach this goal gradually, to achieve successively narrower, local, indirect goals.

83. The strategy of flexible response is no less, and in some respects even more, menacing to world peace and national security within the socialist system than the strategy of general nuclear war. This fact is demonstrated by the current attempts to pursue this strategy by the U.S. Government, whose policy, despite some vacillation is increasingly being influenced by ultra cold war forces. If, until recently, it was possible to notice trends toward a sensible attitude in U.S. policy on power alignments, a real break with the peaceful coexistence doctrine is presently evident as well as an endeavor to conduct policy with the use of military forces, although on a limited scale for the moment.

84. The flexible response strategy is dangerous because its basic component is represented by the strategic nuclear forces, which are continually being improved and maintained in top readiness. Threatening to use these forces, imperialism intends to expand and is expanding its aggressiveness and is employing limited resources in individual armed provocations and interventions. This strategy is also extremely dangerous because, in addition to developing the so-called general purpose forces and their use in limited wars, it calls for increased use of psychological warfare media, the ideological struggle, and varied subversive methods to be used against the socialist countries and the progressive forces in the world. This action is intended to
soften the socialist peoples and to make them less resistant to successive American pressures, provocation and aggression which, under a fraudulent call for freedom and struggle against communism, are aimed at change by force in individual areas with socialist economic and social systems, or at overcoming efforts by nations to free themselves from imperialist domination. For this purpose imperialism particularly desires to exploit the political and ideological divergencies which have emerged in recent years in our camp. A relation seems to exist between the position held by the People's Republic of China towards the March consultative meeting of some Communist parties and the American change to bombing raid tactics against North Vietnam. American imperialism decided to use force, believing its position favorable enough to ensure victory without any determined, coordinated counteraction by the socialist countries.

85. In the economic field, U.S. imperialism's present strategy calls for maintaining and intensifying the armaments race with the hope that it will lead to disorganization and collapse of the economies in socialist countries, thereby presumably resulting in a decided lowering of living standards, which in turn is to provoke a wave of dissatisfaction and lack of faith in the socialist structures among our people.

86. Perhaps no need exists to explain how fallacious are these imperialist calculations. In no event, however, must these actions be disregarded. Their substance must be well understood, and it is necessary to sharpen alertness to particular aggressive manifestations now taking place in different areas and levels - from political, ideological, psychological, and economic warfare to and including armed aggression - in order to use an intensified offensive spirit and the appropriate political and military weapons to thwart these multilevel imperialist actions.

87. The strategy of flexible response is primarily the strategy of U.S. imperialism, which the imperialists want to impose upon all their allies and the nations associated with them, a strategy which is to assure the United States' leadership in the capitalist world, her position as the main power shaping the world, and assure her ability to recapture the lost strategic initiative. Despite their common objective in the struggle against socialism, however, the imperialist nations in recent years have experienced very significant changes, undermining considerably U.S. imperialism's dominant position.
and weakening considerably the Atlantic Pact's cohesion and unity.

88. Some imperialist nations, acting in their own interests which are often contradictory to the general American policy and strategy, attempt to weaken the American dictatorial role and play a more significant, independent role. Discrepancies are also increasing against a different background and foundation not only between the United States and other capitalist countries, but also between France and West Germany, between Great Britain and France, between West Germany and Great Britain, and between the strong and weak NATO members. As a result NATO's political unity is presently weaker than ever, and France is openly demanding a revision of the principles on which this alliance rests, proclaiming that the year 1969, when the 20-year treaty expires, will be decisive in this matter.

89. France, guided by her own interests, has become the main opponent of the U.S. within NATO. We are definitely opposed to General de Gaulle's atomic plans, and the basic political and ideological premises by which he is guided in his endeavors are alien to us. However, we note many positive features in his present foreign policy and even to a limited extent in his views on military doctrine. These views reflect a consideration of the actual power alignments, political good sense, a comprehension of France's national interests, and an understanding of factors which favor coexistence among nations with different social systems. The foregoing is indicated by France's position toward Communist China; toward Germany's boundaries; partly toward solutions to the German unification problem; by France's standpoint on U.S. aggression in Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic; and by France's standpoint on coexistence between East and West in general, etc. If the political course chosen by France turns out to be firm, one can then expect a rapprochement between France and the socialist countries regarding their positions on many concrete matters, which in turn can help to improve the international political situation.

90. Moreover, the United States' control over other aggressive military groups is not absolute at present.

91. In generally evaluating the current international political and strategic situation, one can say its development results from manifold complex processes, currents,
and trends, including many which serve its stabilization on a peaceful basis, favor detente and coexistence, as well as others, above all current trends in U.S. policy, which are designed to sharpen the international situation, to provoke critical tensions throughout the world through provocation, aggression and intervention. The present U.S. administration under L. Johnson is reviving the "position of power" policy, is restoring the doctrine of ousting communism and "liberating" the nations oppressed by communism, and wants to instigate direct showdowns in some trouble spot areas from which they will emerge victorious, hoping the socialist nations will yield to this blackmail. In a certain sense this policy resembles the Nazi policy in the 1936-1939 period, which comprised blackmail, terror by war, and efforts to force concessions in this manner. This theory calls for successive limited "blitzkriegs" screened by thermonuclear power.

92. The adventurousness inherent in this policy constitutes a serious threat to peace. Such a dangerous game with fire, threatening the world with war, is the situation in Vietnam, where the American imperialists are attempting to test their new strategy in practice, are expanding - by premeditation - the military action against the National Liberation Front in the south, without hesitating to use gases and napalm, and where they have been carrying out air attacks against North Vietnam for the past four months, intimating thereby that in the further phase - the ultimate step in the blackmail - tactical nuclear weapons may be used by them. Johnson and the Pentagon strategists acknowledged as the favorable moment for this aggression - this must be clearly repeated - the decline in Soviet-Chinese relations, hoping this situation would cause socialist nations, especially the Soviet Union, to react less effectively. The Vietnam example demonstrates drastically how important is unity among the socialist nations, especially unity in cooperating in the practical struggle against imperialism, including military engagement. Action to restore this unity is undoubtedly at present the most important and most urgent matter for the socialist countries and the international communist movement.

93. Comrades! In the existing situation, standing firmly ready to defend the peace, with continued efforts to relax the dangerous tension through political negotiations and talks, we must be prepared for every, even the worst, contingency. In this regard we cannot have any illusions about those reviving the "position of power" policy.
94. Lately U.S. imperialist aggressiveness gained in intensity, especially in the peripheral areas. In Europe, the principal area, where our immediate defense interests and efforts are mainly concentrated, the situation is less tense; no significant signs of crisis are apparent here. However, it is not precluded that future events can proceed in a direction which will result in a sharp deterioration.

95. The U.S. flexible response strategy assumes a possible local war and a gradual increase in military commitment in Europe, too. The United States, fearing a catastrophic nuclear retaliation against her territory, has for many years made an effort to restrict a possible encounter between the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces within Europe. The Americans would like to see Europe as a local theater of war, as an area in which U.S. imperialist interests would be militarily supported without American military involvement, a theater in which nuclear weapons would be employed entirely on a tactical scale, but not immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. They even advanced, but did not accept in the end, a so-called threshold concept, which anticipated a possible very long - 30 to 90 days - period in which nuclear weapons would not be used in Europe.

96. In American planning, the main burden in such an aggression would rest on the European allies of the United States, who would be protected by a "thermonuclear umbrella" (deterrent forces), but the U.S. would retain control over the strategic nuclear weapons. The U.S. concept required a change in NATO military organization and equipment, especially in the ground forces, to increase combat strength and maneuverability to enable the NATO forces to carry out various types of armed conflict. The U.S. began forcefully to call upon the European NATO members to make these changes.

97. The European capitalist nations distrusted the new U.S. strategy, which resulted in serious resistance to U.S. efforts to fulfill her aims, increased efforts by some nations to acquire their own nuclear weapons or a voice in deciding their use, and a disinclination to assume the financial burden involved in intensive conventional build-up.

98. As a result, the U.S. plans had to undergo many changes - hence, the multilateral nuclear force concept and other similar proposals, including McNamara's last
proposal for partially allowing Atlantic Alliance members jointly to exercise nuclear decision. However, the general direction taken by the changes which occurred in the NATO armed forces in 1961-1965, is, insofar as its basic guidelines is concerned, in line with the new U.S. strategy.

99. The most loyal U.S. ally in Europe is West Germany. As her economic and military power grows, West Germany, capitalizing on the differences within NATO, strives to assume the top position among European capitalist nations and to fulfill her revisionist-revanchist plans through the North Atlantic Pact.

100. The West German imperialist threat must not be exaggerated. This menace, it should be noted, is not a completely independent factor in the present power alignment. However, West Germany's neo-Nazi policy, which calls for revenge, border revision, territorial expansion, refusal to accept the irreversible two Germanies concept, and refusal to accept her political and social legacy resulting from World War II, a policy closely linked with the aggressive American plans, presently constitutes the basic source of serious anxieties and danger to security in Europe, periodically creates crisis situations which, under certain circumstances, can be transformed into armed provocation. This danger is not diminishing but, rather, with the present independent policy, especially American, toward West Germany, is increasing. This is reflected in the speech by Johnson at the 20th anniversary of victory over Nazi Germany. The military potential of West Germany and her strategic central location in Europe, which is utilized by NATO to concentrate the main NATO forces on her territory and to establish a jump-off area for attack against our countries, as well as the role assigned to the Bundeswehr /West German armed forces/ within NATO have caused the West German government and its military hierarchy to endeavor ever more insistently to participate in joint nuclear decision and to exert an ever greater influence on the strategic policy-making within the North Atlantic Alliance, increasing the aggressive aspects in this policy.

101. The above is reflected in the decision by NATO and the Alliance defense ministers at their recent meeting to accept as official doctrine the forward strategy which was mainly prepared by West Germany. Fearing aggression with conventional weapons only, West Germany wanted tactical nuclear weapons to be used almost at the very outset in any armed conflict in Europe.
(after 3-5 days at the most); moreover, this strategy called certain areas to be protected by an atomic mine belt. Atomic weapons were to be committed gradually as the war expanded. The aggressive character inherent in the forward strategy is attested to by moving the planned frontal jump-off line close to West Germany's eastern boundary and by NATO force realignments in areas adjoining the border, which provide convenient jump-off points for aggressive action in peace time.

102. We are concerned not only with armed aggression on a broader scale but also with various lesser acts, e.g., subversion, provocations, and disorders, which would be intended to create situations, under favorable circumstances, similar to the Berlin incident in 1953. Such a situation could become a hotbed and pretext for starting aggression on a broader scale, for example, to capture East Germany by force under the pretext of quickly assisting her people who want "to be liberated" and "to be united" with their brothers across the Elbe.

103. Despite extensive differences in interests among individual nations within NATO and serious difficulties in forming a joint policy and military doctrine, the NATO forces made notable progress in the 1961-1965 period in their preparation for various war situations, including limited warfare.

104. The United States has divided her armed forces into two major functional parts: strategic attack forces and general purpose forces. The latter are supposed to be the specialized instrument for conducting local or limited wars. Steps to expand the special forces, which presently number seven groups, are characteristic. The U.S. ground forces manpower increase from 858,000 men in 1961 to 965,000 in 1965 is also significant. The number of regular divisions in these forces increased from 11 to 16, including the 8 which represent the so-called strategic intervention forces which are stationed in the continental United States prepared for rapid deployment to particular war zones. Similar intervention forces, with more than 5,000 men in strength, have been formed in NATO.

105. The total military NATO strength has not greatly increased, and, in part, there has been an insignificant drop in strength. This drop involved, among other things, the earlier reported reluctance of some nations to expand their conventional forces and the sizable cuts in the
French Army after the Algerian war. In particular however, two nations - the United States and West Germany - increased the military strength by 177,000 and 41,000 men, respectively, in the 1961-1965 period. Moreover, West Germany is the only nation which completely met her military commitments and which, with 366,000 men under NATO, presently represents the numerically largest NATO member.

106. Compared with the total almost unchanged NATO strength, the ground forces divisions increased in strength by 15 percent on the average and airborne divisions by 26 percent. This increase occurred as all divisions in the NATO ground forces for the Central European TDW (Theater of Military Operations) were transformed into a brigade-type organization. This organization was mainly intended to prepare the divisions to fight both a general nuclear and a limited war. During the reorganization, efforts were made to form strong, mobile, independent units and tactical formations equipped with adequate conventional weapons and with many delivery vehicles for nuclear warheads; an increase in the latter in accordance with the forward strategy has been especially noticeable.

107. In the 1961-1965 period, the number of tactical and operational-tactical rockets for delivering nuclear warheads increased by over 200 percent (from 165 to 422, including an increase in tactical-operational rockets from 67 to 108) if Davy Crockett launchers are taken into account, and by over 100 percent if they are omitted.

108. The numerical increase in tank and antitank weapon strength is also extensive. Tank strength in divisions increased by 64 percent on the average, and the total number of tanks exceeded 10,000, which denotes an increase of over 3,500 units. Antitank weapon strength in divisions, mainly rocket weapons, increased by 200 percent.

109. The number of artillery guns in tactical formations increased slightly by 13 percent; however, there was a distinct drop in the total number of artillery pieces from 5,000 plus to 2,100, but at the same time the number of atomic artillery (175, 203, and 280-mm) increased tenfold. The increase in the number of artillery guns in divisions evidently caused a reduction.
in the number of artillery pieces at the higher levels, but the total tactical and operational firepower increased significantly through the notable increase in the number of rocket and artillery weapons for delivering nuclear warheads.

110. The number of transports and organic aircraft in tactical formations also increased considerably. The tactical air and the air defense strength was increased by over 300 aircraft. The changes which occurred in the tactical air force were intended to insure effective support and protection to ground forces on the battlefield.

111. The changes effected in 1961-1965 in NATO's strategic concepts and the trends in troop training can be demonstrated by analyzing the maneuvers conducted by our potential enemies. The period in question is marked by an increase in maneuverability, improved organizational and combat methods, and a systematic check of combat readiness through alerts.

112. In 1963, 75 different types of training exercises were held in Europe, 158 in 1964, and 103 up to 30 May 1965; moreover, the number of maneuvers is increasing. The Central European TDW (Theater of Military Operations) accounts for the largest number (over 60 percent) of exercises; they were mostly ground forces training exercises.

113. Changes in principle with respect to nuclear weapons employment, especially in the past two years, represent the most substantial changes in the training exercises. In the 1961-1963 period, despite the departure from the "massive retaliation" strategy, most exercises were conducted under massive nuclear warfare conditions, but there was a radical departure from this principle in the 1964-1965 period. Most of the exercises in the Central European TDW were commenced without a nuclear weapons commitment. These weapons were employed on a limited scale in the third to fifth day of operations, mainly against troops and military installations. In the Jutland peninsula area the exercises were conducted entirely without weapons of mass destruction.

114. All the more important exercises concentrated on the early phases in the conflict; moreover, the war between the Warsaw Pact nations and the NATO countries was presumed to have developed from local border conflicts.
115. Offensive-defense operations basically reflect the activity carried out in the exercises. Defense conducted in a vigorous and mobile manner usually lasts 1-3 days, followed later by offensive movements using nuclear weapons. In such a training exercise, it is necessary to observe not only the attempt to conceal the aggressive NATO aims but also the fundamental principals for undertaking aggression on a broad scale by the ground forces which calls for the use of nuclear weapons.

116. Airborne landings, ranging from company to brigade strength, were used extensively in offensive operations; these units were dropped 20-60 kilometers from the front line.

117. In the exercises and in training more attention than in the past is given to such problems as: diversionary and partisan operations, combatting airborne landings, and counterdiversionary and counterpartisan operations.

118. In recent years, Internal Defense troops, especially in West Germany, Denmark, and France, have trained intensively with the operating forces. In Denmark the internal defense units and subunits were mainly assigned to combat air drops and amphibious landings and to defend the islands. In West Germany and France, on the other hand, the main assignment was to support the operating forces.

119. In the NATO armed forces we have noted intensified checks on the combat readiness through alerts, often combined with troop movements to training exercises or assembly areas. For example, from 1 January to 31 May of this year the combat readiness of the staffs and units of NATO forces was checked 80 times in the ETW (European Theater of Operations), including a check on the entire theater on 23 May; this check was combined with division and detachment movements to the assembly areas. During these 80 checks the combat readiness of nuclear weapon crews was checked 30 times, and the communications systems were checked 40 times.

120. All branches of the NATO armed forces are held at a high level of combat readiness, as attested by the fact that most of the ground forces divisions are in excess of 80 percent combat strength and can move from the garrisons to the assembly areas two hours after the alert has been sounded. A significant percentage of
aircraft and operational rockets (about 30-40 percent) is maintained at a readiness level enabling them to be operational in about 12 minutes.

121. This report on NATO military preparations would appear generally to show the directions taken by these preparations, their scope and the degree to which they have been realized, to describe the threat against us in its substance and nature, and to allow us better to understand the counteractions we must take in the existing constant struggle for superiority and strategic initiative.

122. In fulfilling our long-term 5-year plan for expanding and improving the defense structure in Poland during the 1961-1965 period, and in providing rockets and making other fundamental qualitative changes in the Polish armed forces, we took into account the changes occurring in the aggressive NATO forces. An analysis made by the General Staff, comparing the Warsaw Pact Forces with the armed forces of our potential enemy, indicates that, in combat strength, quality, training, combat readiness, etc, we have, through our defense efforts, achieved the required superiority over the possible aggressor.

123. The "Narew" maneuver's operational-strategic goal was prepared, as indicated earlier, after considering all the above described factors in a strategic situation in the Central European TDW and their relation to the general international situation.

124. In the general politico-strategic background of the exercise we assumed that expansion of the military conflict in Vietnam was accompanied by development of a critical situation in Europe by the adversary. This situation originated mainly as a result of diversionary attempts to provide disorder and hostile action in East Germany, particularly in Berlin. This was supposed to be a pretext, and simultaneously the justification, for undertaking aggression to conquer East Germany under the pretext of fulfilling the "liberation mission".

125. In conformity with its military doctrine the opponent decided to fight with the NATO forces stationed in the Central European Theater, without using nuclear weapons but maintaining them at full readiness for immediate use. The aggressor relied on the speed of his action and on surprise, and on our unsteadiness and hesitation which were
supposed to encourage the aggressor to blackmail us by threatening to use thermonuclear forces. In this manner, the aggressor expected to seize East Germany quickly and to place our side on the defensive.

126. At the same time, as a contingency against an unsuccessful attack by its conventional forces and a determined counterattack by our side with conventional weapons, the enemy initiated action to make its territory invulnerable and to hold us along the line of its "forward positions". The enemy planned to achieve this objective by the gradual use of nuclear weapons on a tactical level - at first by partly setting off the atomic mine belt in the middle of the border, and then by employing rocket weapons against the forces which succeed in crossing the border.

127. In this complex situation our side decided to repulse the aggressor without resort to nuclear weapons as long as the attacker did not use them. Our side did this in order to avoid or limit a general nuclear/rocket conflict as long as possible and because it was believed that the power of our conventional forces would, in the face of limited aggression by the enemy, allow not only decisive defensive responses but also the attainment of far-reaching goals - crushing the attacking units of the aggressor and eventually transferring the operations to the enemy's territory.

128. Regarding this question it seems necessary to say more on the problem of our responses to limited armed aggressions and our attitude toward so-called local wars. It must be resolutely stated that the main guidelines of our political and military strategy remain unchanged. Its main purpose is prevention of war, the winning of peace. We felt and continue to feel that so-called local wars constitute a significant threat to peace, represent an intrusion which can lead to a thermonuclear catastrophe. Therefore we reject and fight against these wars and we do everything to prevent them. We feel that the most effective instrument for preventing limited wars is a correct political line, political means of counteraction, and the military argument associated with the latter. However, we must realize the fact that we are not capable of preventing all imperialist military adventures or of negating the possibility of an outbreak of limited hostilities.

129. In such a conflict the enemy should meet with our determined counteraction, corresponding to the degree
of danger and indicating unequivocally that failure to desist from aggression or its expansion will be met with full mobilization of our defense might.

130. In one of the possible variations of this type of conflict, which was executed in the maneuver, there were military as well as political features upon which hinged the manner of operation of the Masurian Front forces. This variation, being very specific and complex, was executed by us for the first time in maneuvers, requiring a correct combination of atomic and conventional warfare thinking in combat operations and continual thinking in political terms. Comprehension of the substance of the developed political-strategic situation hinged completely upon finding a correct solution of the operational tasks.

131. In order to achieve its goal, to intimidate and force concessions from the "reds", the enemy operated simultaneously in three fields: political, psychological and military. Limited resources were employed by the enemy in the military field, because it did not want - being aware of the catastrophic threat - the conflict to expand into a general nuclear war. The enemy, however, engaged in several levels of blackmail by threatening to unleash nuclear war.

132. In this situation our counteraction had to consist of a combination of offensive and defensive measures: political, psychological and military, employed in a degree and manner corresponding to the kind of aggression of the enemy and very closely subordinated to the political aims of our action.

133. The insufficient "immersion" of the participants into the difficult subject of the maneuver, underestimation of the importance and inadequate comprehension of the political sense of the assignments, and the gradation of assignments resulted in the maneuver participants' often superficially reading the picture of the situation and its substance, particularly in the beginning of the maneuver.

134. Cessation of the aggression depended upon the speed and resoluteness of our offensive operations with conventional weapons, reflected in the endeavor to crush the enemy in the shortest time possible by a concentrated attack on the most important lines of the enemy formations which succeeded in crossing the border and to place the enemy in a position of defending its own territory. These were the important aspects of the front's immediate mission.
135. Thus, without losing sight of the perspective - as defined in the Supreme Command's directive - of extensive operations with the use of nuclear weapons and maintaining these weapons in constant readiness, it was necessary to subordinate the entire initial effort of the front forces to the above idea and to focus the principal attention of the commands on it.

136. It must be stated, however, that the stereotyped thinking with respect to categories of extensive operations using nuclear weapons obscured the situation for the maneuver participants, which consequently made it difficult to isolate the first phase from the immediate mission and to find an appropriate form of movement. This led to a dispersion of effort in separate directions, caused fear of speedier introduction of reserves, and produced a situation of balance of combat strength.

137. Not until the development of such an unfavorable situation, expanded by a strong enemy counterattack which completely contained the 2nd Army, did the commanders of the maneuver clearly see the need for seeking other solutions which would determine the success of operations conducted with conventional weapons and which would correspond to the political aims of the operation's first phase.

138. The 3rd Army was then committed to battle, as was the 20th Army which thus far had been in the front's second echelon. Of particular note here is the initiative displayed by the 20th Army commander in speeding up the Army's advance and commitment to battle from the march in a formation assuring it a decided advantage over the enemy as well as the advantage of momentum.

193. The border conflict - as is typical for this kind of encounter - was in the nature of a meeting engagement, in which the two sides seek the initiative and attempt to carry on offensive operations. Under conditions of operating without the use of nuclear weapons, retention of the freedom of maneuver and skillful use of reserves play a special role. In the action of the enemy after the commitment of the Masurian Front's first echelon, the above was portrayed by the execution of a strong offensive movement in the form of a counterattack. It caused a serious situation on the front's right flank, which was all the more dangerous since the 2nd Army initially did not organize an effective repulse of this counterattack. It did contain the enemy, but it committed its forces in a manner which deprived the unit of the possibility of a more forceful
counterattack, which in spite of a general balance of strength was possible through maneuver and concentration of effort along selected courses of action.

140. The key moment of the maneuver was the transition from conventional operations to operations with the use of nuclear weapons. The use of nuclear weapons was initiated by the enemy when the aggression with conventional weapons collapsed as a result of the border battle and when the Masurian Front forces, with the addition of the 20th Army and after checking the counterattack, began to cross the state border in the main direction of attack. The enemy, in conformity with its doctrine of escalation, took the first step in using nuclear weapons by setting off the atomic mine belt in the path of attack of the 20th Army and hastily withdrawing its forces beyond the border. The enemy sought by this means to force the "East" to halt and withdraw in fear of succeeding atomic moves, enabling the enemy to return to the status quo while issuing propaganda to the effect that it was merely defending its own territory. Thus the Masurian Front commander was faced with a dilemma of major politico-strategic importance - whether to make an immediate response in the form of a retaliatory attack on a front scale or to wait for orders from above. A correct evaluation of the grave situation indicated to the front commander that he should refrain from immediate retaliation, for which he obtained the approval of the Supreme Command accompanied by instructions for use of nuclear weapons in event the enemy proceeds with the next stage in the nuclear war. At the same time the enemy was warned that its next step would be met with a decisive retaliation.

141. In the resultant situation, which changed to the disadvantage of the enemy when the fighting shifted to its territory and the setting off of the atomic mine belt did not produce the intended effect on operations of the Masurian Front - the enemy decided to carry out the second stage of employing nuclear weapons. This time the enemy employed purely tactical weapons against the 3rd Army and partly against the 20th Army, believing that the "East" side would not dare to carry out its warning just as it failed to employ nuclear weapons after the mine belt was set off, even after the enemy intensified its propaganda action on world opinion by depicting itself in the role of defending its territory against Communist aggression.

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142. Unfortunately the above situation did not develop in maneuver because of an arbitrary decision of the umpire, who earlier had included one element of the subsequent course of the maneuver, namely - execution of a heavy nuclear attack by aerial bombs on the rocket brigade in the Sierpc area; this created a considerably easier situation for the "East" but at the same time made it impossible to examine a very significant problem involved in the achievement of the maneuver goals which was carried out with such effort and cost.

143. The front commander, authorized by the Supreme Command to respond immediately with all his resources to the next enemy attack, reacted in conformity with this order.

144. In spite of a significant change in the plan and goals of the maneuver, the leadership decided to carry it further in accordance with the existing conditions, recognizing that they could actually result from error or unilateral action by a lower level command or aircraft crew.

145. The enemy, surprised by the retaliatory atomic attack of the front and drawn into a trap set by itself, fully suffered the effects of the nuclear attack by the Masurian Front, sustaining serious losses in nuclear weapon delivery capability and in atomic warheads, thereby reducing the force of its next nuclear attack. The situation thus created enabled the Masurian Front to carry out its operation with full impetus.

146. Addition of the 4th Army to the battle took place after its long (about 800 kilometers) march. Situations of this kind are normal in contemporary warfare. Each successive maneuver confirms the constant need for perfecting the roles of commands and forces in planning and executing rapid marches over great distances while maintaining combat readiness of the units. In planning such marches, however, realism is necessary. Under conditions which existed in the maneuver, the movement of an army over a distance exceeding 300 kilometers in 10 hours could not be undertaken.

147. Commitment of the 4th Army to battle was not routine, but hinged upon a concrete situation. The Army's units were not used in a close formation or for augmenting the striking force in the main axis of attack. Each of its three divisions fulfilled specific, virtually independent missions of a tactical nature with the aim of advancing to the coast and seizing the ports and of cutting off the
western routes of retreat of the enemy formation fighting east of the Vistula. The latter action was essentially operational in character since upon it hinged the rapidity with which the enemy penetration could be driven back and the 2nd Army freed. In this situation, the divisions were required to operate on individual, broadly separated lines of action. Because of command requirements, however, it was advisable to subordinate the division blocking the enemy to the 2nd Army commander; later, after disengagement of the 2nd Army from battle with the enemy, it was almost immediately possible to place one of its divisions under the 4th Army in order to establish a reserve. The example of using the 4th Army also proves that at times an army of limited strength (two divisions if the change of sub-ordination is taken into account) can, under certain circumstances where an unusual gap appears in the distribution of the enemy forces, fulfill its missions along an extensive front.

148. A completely unusual and interesting part of the maneuver, which was closely connected with the operational situation but important chiefly because of possible political implications, was the resignation from battle under terms of neutrality by the Dutch Corps, which was fighting in the northern part of the area penetrated by the enemy. This action took place when the operations of the "West" were failing, when the threat of nuclear war brought on a feeling of terror by the men and command of the Dutch Corps. This feeling was intensified by the skillful psychological warfare of the "East". This was the political effect of our determined response with nuclear weapons to the enemy's first nuclear attack. It seems that some nations, especially the small European countries, when threatened with expanded nuclear war and the possibility of their destruction, will seek a sensible way to withdraw from the war. Their attitude would be a factor favoring cessation of hostilities and a return to efforts to solve the conflict by political means.

149. This element of the general strategic-political situation was operationally reflected in the fighting of the 2nd Army; neutralization of the Dutch considerably simplified and accelerated the defeat of the enemy forces opposing the 2nd Army.

150. Maneuverability in contemporary operations is represented in the frequent exploitation, on the tactical as well as operational level, of the adjacent unit's zone of action to obtain freedom of movement. Such a maneuver is
not always simple; it requires suitable preparation, support, and close coordination, for otherwise it can have adverse effects. However, it will often be employed as the only means of accelerating the tempo of attack. This applies especially in situations arising after extensive radioactive contamination of an area. The 20th Army encountered this situation when the enemy set off the atomic mine belt along the Vistula. The Army's movement was checked for many hours. The only possibility, thus, was to maneuver the Army's forces (or at least part of them) through the zone of the adjacent unit to the right to the Vistula sector between Torun and Bydgoszcz, which was free of atomic mines.

151. The situation resulting from the conflict's political aspects and from the non-use of nuclear weapons in the initial period required the appropriate operational planning, decision making and political work by the maneuver commanders. This planning can be described as multilevel, requiring for each situation and for the entire time concepts centered on conventional warfare, a possible nuclear commitment and continuous psychological warfare on a broad scale. With respect to tactical-operational solutions, planning should on the one hand assure the fulfillment of missions by conventional means with allowance made for the dispersion measures required for an atomic battlefield as well as an aggressive concentration of fighting forces along selected lines of action, and, on the other hand assure maximum nuclear readiness for attacks on specific, identified targets. The element linking conventional operations with the expected operations with nuclear weapons should be constant reconnaissance and conventional attacks against the enemy's nuclear capability.

152. Bilevel planning also applies to operational maneuver and impetus - the tempo, depth of mission, and axis of attack must be appropriate to the individual, qualitatively distinct operational phases and must be based on combat realities and on the actual circumstances.

153. In planning the operation it was necessary to view the action of the front as a continual process which does not, however, develop in a smooth manner, a process with major and critical points. The operation was specifically characterized by the front's action on successive missions from a meeting engagement on the immediate mission through the ultimate mission with atomic weapons.

154. The terms established in our maneuver exacted from those planning the action serious thought and skill in linking
offensive operations with definite superiority in power along specific sectors and lines of action and in carrying out defensive operations effectively against the enemy with a distinct advantage in power.

155. During the maneuver a very specific and instructive situation obtained which required an unusual, constructive look at the correlation of primary and secondary missions in operational planning. Involved was a situation resulting from an enemy counterattack south of Elblag. The assignments carried out in this area by the 2nd Army were secondary missions compared to the missions carried out by the tactical formations fighting along the main line of attack; however, unless these missions could be rapidly and successfully accomplished, the opportunities for fulfilling the primary mission were very slim. Thus fulfillment of the primary mission of the entire operation, since it was decisive and had to be carried out in the designated time, depended on the secondary mission but also required an immediate decision in a certain phase of the operation. The secondary mission became for a certain period of time a quasi-primary mission.

156. With respect to planning, it is also worthwhile to mention the failure to understand the problems in cooperation with the Navy in the initial period, which, especially for the front and the 2nd Army, was necessary since fighting was in progress toward the coast.

157. The role and significance of guerrilla operations, both our own as well as those of the enemy, were also underestimated. Only the 20th Army commander, after the first guerrilla attacks, assigned suitable forces to fight these guerrilla groups which emerged in the rear areas.

158. A complete knowledge and evaluation of one's own forces and those of the enemy should constitute the basis of planning. Superficiality in this area often leads to seeing only detached parts of the situation without an understanding of its substance, to seeing only the key aspects, which on occasion made it difficult in the maneuver to define the general purpose of a main idea in a given decision and consequently to make a correct implementing decision.

159. In the maneuver too much meaning was attached to the role which detached units can play in achieving and sustaining a fast tempo of attack. Minimizing the role of OW (Detached Units) does not seem correct. The aggregate of
properly organized operations of several detached units combined with airborne and guerilla operations can often exceed the tactical framework. This applies particularly to seizure of crossings and bridges over a wide water obstacle at the right time along a broad front.

160. Moreover, the matter of observing the effects of enemy nuclear attacks, each of which is an important factor affecting the course of action, was not attentively considered by the participants of the maneuver, and at times they displayed unconcern about the estimate of radioactive contamination, the recording of this contamination, etc. In a similar manner, in many instances the maneuver participants did not follow on a current basis the process of regrouping rocket units or the state of readiness of rockets and atomic warheads. As a result the rocket brigades became detached from the fighting forces at a distance equal to the firing range, as was the case, for example, with the front and the 3rd Army, and the number of rockets and atomic warheads ready for action was actually at times lower than the prescribed figure.

161. Among the most serious defects observed among the maneuver participants at all levels must be included the deficiency in specifying ways of using nuclear forces according to importance of missions, significance of targets, and effect of planned attacks on achieving the various goals of the operation.

162. The maneuver showed that the structure, strength, and equipment of the front and Army headquarters, despite the reductions effected so far, still do not provide for the required maneuverability and operating effectiveness. This is particularly true of the headquarters of the combat arms and services. The maneuver showed the need for improving the structure and organization of headquarters, for relieving staff officers from technical duties through broad use of work mechanization and through the employment of a specific number of NCOs. In preparing the organizational changes it is necessary to be guided by the endeavor of limiting the officer complement in principle only to efficient, independent-thinking personnel. The function of such a staff should rest in principle on teamwork and continuity, correctly dividing time for maximum output and relaxation, which will require well-integrated groups comprising persons having equal competence and productivity. Moreover, it is necessary to consider the need for organizing in these staffs separate components which can carry out
complex assignments, for example, components for planning the use of mass destruction weapons which would comprise various specialists. Thus it would be necessary to prepare an experimental, abridged headquarters T/O and, according to this T/O, to conduct several maneuvers to reach conclusions regarding the proper organizational structure for the headquarters, which would assure them operating effectiveness and maneuverability.

163. The defects in the organizational structure of the operational headquarters are intensified by the principle of placing headquarters in an over-expanded area, which considerably complicates cooperation among individual elements and the organization of internal staff communications. For example, instead of laying the amount of cable specified in the regulations, 100-120 kilometers, at the front's command post (SD) in the above maneuver, over 250 kilometers were laid. Furthermore, the time required for setting up a communications system for a front command post, amounting to 24 hours, is too long, and, moreover exceeds the established guidelines for setting up a command post (in the above maneuver the internal communications of the front's command post was put into operation after a 6-hour delay).

164. In examining the functions of the operational headquarters it is also necessary to call attention to the following:

- The inadequate use of such signal equipment as radio-telephones and telegraph-teletype units while at the same time making unreasonable use of wire communications. This is undoubtedly associated with the disinclination of officers to use the imperfect code documents. In such a situation, every break in wire communications causes substantial confusion.

- The trend toward preconceptions, especially during the shifting of command posts, which was manifested in the shifting of some posts ahead of time - at times even in an area still held by the enemy - or in remaining inadmissibly long at one place for "convenience" in work, as well as in the unsatisfactory direction of staff columns advancing over a great distance, etc.

- The lack of precision in the manner of transmitting information, especially in exchanging information, which was clearly revealed in transmitting information on the atomic mine belt.
165. The problems of the initial period of war, especially those involving the position and actions of the operational troops, cannot be considered in abstraction from the actual situation in the country and from the over-all actions accomplished in this period at the territorial defense force level as well as in the entire defense system of the nation.

166. Some characteristic elements in the mutual ties and cooperation in this area which appeared while attaining combat readiness and in the initial fighting have been analyzed by us by observing actions taken by the Warsaw Military District.

167. A detailed analysis was made of the procedure of placing on alert status the commands of the 4th Army and the OW (Military District) and OTK (Home Territorial Defense) in their wartime structure with the simultaneous movement to bring commands and forces into position for action. It was established that this process should take place parallel to necessary nation-wide precautionary measures and that in the armed forces the complex actions to be taken in particular periods of danger must be embraced in a uniform plan for achieving combat readiness and cooperation which would be applicable to both command and line-levels. This plan must take into account the specific assignments and responsibilities for particular actions accomplished both during command detachments as well as during regrouping. It was also established that detached commands and staffs should not, in principle, be involved in technical and operational support activities related to regroupings.

168. During the maneuver it actually turned out that the topical assignments and responsibilities and the operational documents concerning combat readiness in force in a district staff are not properly coordinated; as a result the basic functions related to the detachment of commands and support of regroupings were carried out by the 4th Army.

169. The peacetime Warsaw Military District headquarters still does not have in essence a well-integrated officer corps that understands the complex OTK problems which can be used as the district command in wartime. This very important matter has not thus far received the necessary attention; therefore a quick and radical adjustment is required here.
170. Our peace-time military districts must be bodies comprising two separate commands having equal importance: army command and district command in wartime (OTK).

171. The above maneuver enabled us to evaluate again the general guidelines and concepts relative to the role, place, and assignments of military districts as the basic component in the system of operational territorial defense, including air and ground defense, coastal defense, and defense against mass destruction weapons. In this system, in which, besides the territorial defense forces, there are militarized forces arranged functionally in KOK /Committee of National Defense/ sections, military staffs, regionally arranged units, and the defensively organized public, the foremost need is to combine these forces in the operational and technical support activities required by the military districts.

172. Further direction to the over-all planning, training and equipment for territorial defense, as well as the full preparedness in the military districts to fulfill their projected assignments to combat air and sea landings, safeguard and defend state borders and economic installations, combat special purpose forces, and participate in the maintenance of security and internal order, will be provided in the recently adopted KOK decision on the immediate regulation of all basic problems related to the subordination of the Internal Forces to the MON, which is the Military Department of KOK.

173. Since the present maneuver covered a broad area, lasted a long time, involved considerable personnel and equipment, and was varied in nature and complexity, it was a difficult exercise not only for the participants, but also for the supervisory-umpire group. Being in principle an unopposed exercise, it did to a certain extent simulate an opposed (two-sided) exercise. It forced the leadership to consider many elements which were only in outline form or did not exist at all in the maneuver plan.

174. It must be said that equally with respect to the organizational structure, and the modus operandi, the supervisory-umpire group did not completely satisfy the maneuver's requirements, did not - despite the extensive effort and good will demonstrated by the majority of officer umpires - provide efficient and realistic direction of the maneuver. This difficult maneuver...
distinctly proved that the methods and principles which we have applied so far in directing maneuvers must undergo considerable improvement since they do not satisfy the new requirements.

175. The problem of improving the organization of the leadership and the umpire group in this type of maneuver requires detailed research and the drawing up of generally binding principles in this field on the basis of extensive experience. Here too, as with the problem of staff organization, efforts must be made significantly to reduce the number of officers notably to improve the technical equipment and organizational structure, in order to provide for methodical, efficient, and operative work.

176. The maneuver was also designed to gauge the efficiency with which the commands and forces from the military district level to the regiment level responded to alerts. These alert checks showed serious defects in organization, methods, and techniques. For example, transmittal of the alert signal from the General Staff through the military district staff, the staff of the 15th Mechanized Division to the 94th Mechanized Regiment required 50 minutes, of which 38 minutes were consumed by the division staff. The transmittal to a subunit within a unit is slightly better, but even here a great deal of time is consumed. The basic causes of this situation are lack of training of some duty service components and the sole reliance on telephones for alerting the troops and informing the cadre. The duty service and the information system were especially ineffective in the Warsaw Military District Headquarters and in the 15th Mechanized Division. Basic improvements must therefore be made in the system of alerting troops and headquarters and in informing the cadre. For this purpose the commands of the armed forces components and of the military districts should immediately analyze the present alert system and take the necessary steps to improve it. On the other hand, the General Staff should expeditiously solve the problem of using suitable technical equipment in the alert system.

177. Standing procedures for troops during a combat alert also require continuous improvement. An endeavor must be made to establish necessary time limits for achieving readiness in assembly areas. The alert conducted in the 3rd Pontoon Regiment indicates the possibility of reducing the time spans in force.

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178. The General Staff, together with the interested key MON offices, should consider how mobile stocks can be more effectively used in order to reduce the time consumed by troops in achieving readiness in assembly areas.

179. The completed readiness check showed that the state of readiness is maintained at a good level in the 3rd Pontoon Regiment, the Headquarters of the MON Military Communications Service, the Headquarters of the MON Motor Transport Service, and in the wojewodztwo military staffs in Warsaw and Olsztyn, as compared to a barely adequate level in the command and staff of the Warsaw Military District, in its support and maintenance units, and in the 41st Fighter Group (Air Force). The level of combat readiness is unsatisfactory in the 9th Fighter Division (Air Force) and in the units checked in the 15th Mechanized Division except the 94th Mechanized Regiment and the 46th Engineer Battalion, which received a satisfactory rating.

180. The Front Staff provided the commander sufficient information to enable him to make decisions and preserve continuity of command. The staff also organized effective cooperation within the front command as well as with the individual tactical and operational formations subordinate to the front. Initially, however, a certain individualism and lack of teamwork appeared in specific sections of the staff, which should work together in solving their operational problems. In addition to this, there were other shortcomings, of which I would like to mention the following.

181. The staff devoted almost its entire attention to planning the operation but ascribed less importance to the preparations for the front's forces to go into battle. Insufficient forces were assigned to protect the line of deployment of the first operational echelon; inadequate thought was given to antitank and antiair defense as well as artillery and air support for the attack.

182. Since the forces were limited, assurance of central control over these forces in accordance with the front commander's concept was of particular importance. The staff, however, did not seem to be completely in
command of the situation. For example, in conformity with
the front commander's decision, the 3rd Army was supposed
to assign three divisions to the first echelon, but the
army commander assigned only two.

183. When a situation develops unusually quickly
and the need consequently arises for frequent decisions,
it is necessary to document and record the orders and
directives issued, but this was not done by the front
staff.

184. On the other hand, of particular note are
the following: a correct evaluation of the danger posed
by the enemy Dutch Corps, and the efficient work in
organizing a repulse of the enemy counterattack. During
the operation the staff displayed considerable initiative,
and as it acquired more experience, its work became increas-
ingly more effective. In the operations of the command
and staff, the effective and ingenious use of nuclear
weapons must be particularly emphasized.

185. Participating in the maneuver for the first
time was a special operations unit, which was organic to
the reconnaissance component. This unit devoted its main
effort to reconnaissance and destruction of enemy nuclear
weapons, communications installations, and transport
targets. Despite the lack of experience, this unit per-
formed pretty well.

186. The Commander of Artillery and Rocket Forces
of the Front and his staff fulfilled their assignments
during the initial period. The commander made the assign-
ments which took into account his staff capabilities, and
the chief of staff skillfully directed the entire effort.

187. Of particular note was the skill of the com-
mander and the chief of staff in focusing their attention
on the basic problems of obtaining accurate data on the
enemy and of bringing the tactical formations (zwiazki)
into firing position as quickly as possible.

188. The following are further positive aspects of
the work of the front's artillery command and staff:
correct description of the objectives of using rocket
troops, quick decisions regarding changes in the plan
of attack based on the new data, and appropriate and
specific making of assignments.

189. However, there were also serious shortcomings.
Because of a lack of earlier understanding among the
officials concerned, it was not established whether the retaliatory attack should be carried out at the same time or should be determined by the level of readiness in the individual armies. Efforts to clarify this question caused many problems, and the attack was made at different periods of time. Moreover, the necessary fire discipline could not be established because of the differences in the time stipulated in the orders and the times the attack was launched. The commanders did not always report the attacks, nor were the changes of command posts (SD) reported. The quantitative and qualitative aspect of the attacks was not accurately reported.

190. Of particular note in the staff of the Anti-aircraft Defense (OPL) Forces Headquarters was the proper division of assignments and the sound organization of duties within the staff. The headquarters displayed much initiative in obtaining from the front staff current data on the position of their own forces and those of the enemy; however it did not exploit the possibility of obtaining more current information from the OPL headquarters subordinate to the armies, as a result of which this intelligence was delayed about four hours.

191. Meriting attention is the attempt to coordinate the operations of the front's OPL forces, the 5th Air Army, and the 5th Air Defense (OPK) Division. For this purpose commander of the OPL forces assigned liaison officers to the 5th Air Army commander and the 5th Air Defense Division, thus ensuring cooperation and the employment of forces for particular phases of the operation.

192. Operations in the Engineer Forces Headquarters of the front proceeded quite efficiently in general. The planning of engineer support was correct and covered the entire operation, but there were also shortcomings, of which I shall mention only the following.

193. At first no initiative was displayed in establishing contact with the engineer headquarters of armies and, up to the morning of 7 June, there were no personal contacts. The same applied to the units directly subordinate to the headquarters. On the other hand, contact with the Soviet 20th Army command was established in time, but the exchange of information with it was slow at first.

194. The efforts to provide the right support for the Vistula crossing during the operation is worth pointing
out. Considerable initiative was displayed to assure troop movement following the change-over to nuclear warfare. The front's demolition units were also effectively used; among other things, they laid 60,000 anti-tank mines in the path of the enemy counterattack.

195. The Chemical Forces Headquarters' planning in using chemical troops and equipment for particular stages of the operation was done correctly. A positive element was the operational planning which considered the various nuclear weapons which might be used, including tactical as well as mass attack weapons. Thoroughness and detailed calculations were involved in planning for chemical units and subunits along the Vistula and the Oder, that is, in places where the most dangerous contamination regions were expected.

196. Shortcomings in this period included the delay in establishing contact with the chemical forces headquarters of the 2nd and 3rd Armies and the lack of concrete planning for assuming control over the chemical units and subunits. Moreover, operational data to all commanders was not transmitted concerning the contamination following the minefield detonation.

197. During the operation the decisions on the use of chemical forces were rightly made and corresponded to the consequent situations. However, the significance of exchanging information on contamination with neighboring units was not properly evaluated. The information was sporadic and did not provide a complete picture of the contamination.

198. The front's Quartermaster Directorate effectively organized the rear services and logistical support of troop operations. In a relatively short time the quartermaster staff drafted a general logistics plan for the entire operation, including a detailed description of support in the initial contact with the enemy and in carrying out the immediate mission. Effective support was also given to the allied/Soviet/ army, and close cooperation was established with its quartermaster component.

199. On the other hand, however, inexperience was evident in the staff with respect to taking command of rear service units approaching the front's rear area, and to organizing logistical support in the first days of fighting while simultaneously preparing a logistical support plan for the entire operation.
200. In the second stage of the operation the quarter-
master staff devoted considerable attention to directing
rear services as well as to adjusting area plans to conform
to the changing situation and, through close contact with
the front's command post, became oriented in the current
operational situation.

201. The Medical Service Administration effectively
planned the medical support for the 2nd and 3rd Army
Commands. The projected number of beds and the disposi-
tion of hospital bases corresponded to the needs. A
correct decision was made in providing additional hospitals
to the armies; however, the 5th Air Army's needs were not
taken into account. On 6 June, this unit had no medical
transportation or hospital facilities. The available
medical equipment was effectively used during the opera-
tion. To assure medical aid to those injured in enemy
nuclear attacks, additional hospitals were set up, and
companies from independent medical battalions were sent
to the areas affected by nuclear explosions.

202. The Chief of the Administration of the Mili-
tary Transportation Service made valid proposals regard-
ing the use of the transportation network and the capa-
bilities of the individual kinds of transport during
the regrouping. Also meriting attention was the correct
decision to organize provisional trans-loading areas on
the Vistula for the combined use of three types of trans-
port—rail, motor vehicle, and water. Close cooperation
was established with Engineer Forces Headquarters of the
front concerning the construction and use of bridges over
the Vistula.

203. A negative aspect of this administration's
activity was the fact that the unloading areas for the
rail network were assigned too near the fighting forces
and that the organization of traffic for the motor trans-
port units and of the line of march along automobile
routes was not prepared in detail.

204. The Motor Transport Service Headquarters of
the front was a well integrated body, capable of handle-
ing its assignments effectively. In filling the indivi-
dual positions, junior officers who had served under
officers with extensive experience were assigned for
training.

205. The technical equipment plan in support of
the immediate mission of the front's offensive opera-
tion was prepared carefully. The projected deployment
of repair-evacuation equipment and collection stations for damaged vehicles was to assure proper repair and evacuation of equipment. Correct decisions were made during the operation. In an accurate and rapid manner, a supply and evacuation plan was prepared when the enemy launched a counterattack.

206. In the front's Armor Maintenance Service Headquarters, data on the technical-material support for command use were prepared without reservation. The technical support plan accurately took into account the needs stemming from the commitment of the advance echelons of the 2nd and 3rd Armies to battle as well as the needs of the entire operation with respect to conventional and nuclear weapon employment. The front's repair and evacuation units were also correctly disposed.

207. During the operation material-technical support was properly organized, with the emphasis on maximum combat vehicle availability. Field depots for armor equipment were re-established in an efficient manner.

208. In the first preparatory period of the operation, the work of the Ordnance Administration in supplying rockets and ammunition to the troops and in organizing ordnance repair and evacuation was carried out according to plan. Officers of the Administration were well prepared for the maneuver and showed that they have had considerable experience in their specialties.

209. In planning the technical and material support of the operation, all required documents were prepared, which, dependent upon the situation, made it possible to supply the troops with rockets and ammunition in a flexible manner and also enabled the Administration to direct the operation and movements of the subordinate ordnance units.

210. The mission of the front's WSW headquarters was to provide diligent protection for the front's offensive operations; that is, realistic security for the training staffs and troops with regards to counterintelligence and investigation. As for the latter responsibility, the front's WSW headquarters effectively supported the staffs and properly directed the subordinate units. The experimentally formed WSW brigade staff was adequately prepared for the tasks assigned to it. On the other hand, the teamwork between individual subunits of the brigade
and the counterintelligence center with respect to radio-electronics equipment must be better organized. As the enemy expands its guerilla operations, the need arises for developing effective methods of protecting staffs dispersed over wide areas and for preventing infiltration of traffic control posts.

211. The Topographic Administration had at its disposal complete sets of maps and folders of crossings over the Bug, Narew, Vistula, and Oder Rivers which were used in planning crossings. The supply of maps to the forces was handled efficiently.

212. The experience gained by the front's Troop Replacement Administration (Zarzad Organizacyjno-Uzupełnieniowy Frontu) and the replacement units of the armies resulted in many recommendations as to the placement of these units under the general organization of staffs and as to their method of operation.

213. Taking part in the maneuver for the first time were the Cadre Administration of the front and the cadre units of armies and of the navy operational group. They had not yet had any experience in this type of activity, but they put considerable effort into carrying out their assigned tasks and thereby gained valuable experience. The participation of cadre units in the maneuver will make it possible more completely to appraise the qualities of the officer cadre.

214. The Signal Units which assured long distance and internal communications to the front command and staff were moved out to the maneuvers while on alert, and, depending on the distance to be traveled to the maneuver area, they moved to their designated places by rail or motor vehicle transport.

215. The capabilities of these signal units were diminished by the fact that only about 25 percent of their strength comprised trained, active duty personnel. The remainder consisted of recruits inducted in the spring, reservists undergoing refresher training, and officer-candidates.

216. Despite these difficult circumstances, the assignments given the signal units were fulfilled through the massive effort of the army signal detachments (signal administration of the front) as well as the above signal units.
217. In the performance of the 2nd Army staff, which, on the whole, is a well-integrated and experienced group, various shortcomings were observed from the very outset, such as: a rather schematic deduction of fighting strength ratios without taking the qualitative aspect into full account; failure to consider losses in personnel and equipment as well as the time required for committing tactical formations and units to battle; and lack of a detailed analysis of the operational capabilities and goal of the enemy. Moreover, there was no consistent effort apparent in collecting intelligence on the situation and intentions of the opposing forces.

218. The staff performed better in the second stage of the maneuver but was unable to work out a clear plan for gaining the initiative and defeating the enemy. The men and equipment of the Army were not employed in active operations on a selected basis but were dispersed along the entire zone of action of the Army.

219. In particular, the estimate of enemy capabilities in this period was incomplete; generally, they were underestimated. The enemy secured the advantage after the nuclear attack but this was not stressed in the Army command's report. This suggests that the staff is deficient in planning and directing operations under conditions of nuclear warfare by the enemy and in planning the use of its own rocket and nuclear weapons.

220. The staff handled the other problems correctly; the conclusions of the staff and the decisions of the command were valid.

221. The proposals of the 2nd Army Artillery and Rocket Forces Command on the use of artillery and rocket forces do not leave any reservations. Moreover, the organization of the tactical-operational rocket brigade and its projected movements were correctly planned; this also applies to the distribution of rocket and artillery ammunition. However, the brigade was not assured antiaircraft protection, and the action of assigning an infantry company for this purpose was too late.

222. After the enemy nuclear attack, the army countered with its attack. It seems that the retaliatory attack was not directed against enough targets, e.g., enemy troop formations,
with the result that the army forces could not take immediate advantage of the effects of these attacks. The enemy, on the other hand, mainly launched attacks against troop units arranged in tactical depth, thereby enabling immediate expansion of its operations.

223. The Quartermaster Directorate adopted the correct forms and methods of commanding the rear services. The circulation of information at the KSD (Command Post of the Directorate) was well organized. The lack of cooperation among quartermaster units and sections aroused doubts at the outset; in the course of the operation, however, this cooperation steadily improved. At times the Quartermaster Directorate adhered too rigidly to the originally prepared plans and did not take the battlefield situation into full account. For example, it deployed a force from the army mobile base and one from the KSD army too close to the fighting troops, with the result that both of these forces could have been completely destroyed by the enemy who was launching a counterattack in their direction. Asthese forces were quite large, comprising 200-500 vehicles each, it was possible to execute swift and complicated maneuvers with them.

3rd Army Command and Staff

224. The command and staff of the army showed that their members understand the essence of contemporary warfare and the conditions of shifting to operations using nuclear weapons. Reflected in the decisions and estimates of the operational situation were the necessity for concentrating men and equipment on pre-determined lines of action, with the exception of the divisions committed to battle in the initial phase, the necessity for destroying detected enemy nuclear weapons, and the continuous readiness for employing their own nuclear weapons.

225. The performance of the staff was marked by a high level of efficiency; however, it sometimes neglected to collect information on the situation of friendly forces. One serious shortcoming of its performance was the fact that it permitted the command post to be detached such a great distance from the troops that the army commander could not direct the troops.

226. The Artillery and Rocket Forces Commander, in a comparatively short time, drew up detailed proposals for the use of the formations and units under his command. He did not, however, define the zones of action and reconnaissance
for the first echelon tactical formations.

227. The staff did not do everything necessary to organize centralized control in supporting the commitment of the army's first echelon to battle. No data were requested concerning the position of friendly forces and those of the enemy in front of the battle line.

228. During the operation, information on the carrying out of a possible retaliatory attack was kept on a steady and current basis, and close contact was maintained with the artillery and rocket forces command of the front. Transportation of the rockets was carried according to plan, and the transport requirements were based on the actual capabilities of the base and the transport capabilities of the rocket units.

229. The 3rd Army Quartermaster correctly organized the material support of the operation. Close cooperation was effected with the services, with whom frequent briefings on the operational situation were held and at which the services received their assignments. Appropriate action was taken in order to replenish the supplies destroyed by enemy nuclear action.

The 4th Army Command and Staff

230. Detachment of the 4th Army command and staff from the district staff was carried out in an efficient manner. The army staff began to prepare a plan by regrouping as well as a plan for moving the army to field command posts in two variations: by rail transport as well as by combined means, whichever the situation should call for. Operational groups were dispatched to the staffs of the 2nd, 3rd and 20th Armies, the 5th Air Army, and the Front Staff, in order to establish initial cooperation. The troops were efficiently moved toward the battle line.

231. The staff managed to assure itself continuous detailed information on the enemy and the neighboring units but did not fully utilize these data in organizing the troop operations. The command function was generally equal to the situation.

232. The Quartermaster Staff of the 4th Army was efficient in getting organized and joining the operation while on alert. It carried out the alert assignments
effectively and in relatively quick time. Since its members were basically familiar with contemporary warfare principles, the staff managed to adapt itself to solving problems together with the general purpose staff. The plan for rear service support and the other documentation were prepared swiftly and in detail.

The 20th Army Command and Staff

233. The 20th Army Command Staff was represented in the maneuver by 15 officers, including 3 who comprised the operational unit, 2 the reconnaissance unit, and 1 each the remaining sections.

234. The 20th Army Staff exemplified unusually efficient teamwork, precision, and orderliness, as shown by the fact that it, being a small group, managed to complete almost all the operational documents and to be equal to the duties which a staff of normal strength fulfills.

The 5th Air Army Command and Staff

235. During the initial period, the 5th Air Army command and staff was passive in commanding its units. An assignment which should have been handled on its own initiative, without waiting for instructions from the front, was to assure fighter aircraft for the front's antiair defense when 5th Air Army units arrived at the front airfields. Since there was no cooperation with the Antiaircraft Defense Forces Headquarters, and the responsibility for ground support was not established, the Air Army command issued an order in which it did not sufficiently define the tasks assigned the fighter divisions.

236. The command's activity pointed to the fact that it was geared mainly to provide service when requested by the supported armies; it did not perform like a command body which should display its own initiative in preparing aircraft deployment plans.

237. The staff's performance improved somewhat after the initial period; an attempt to function more effectively was apparent. However, even then the exchange of information among the services was poor, and actions and missions which should have been originated by the staff and carried out by the services were not coordinated.
238. The command function improved during the operation. However, there were still examples of insufficient analysis of the situation and of the capabilities of its own units.

The Operational Group of the Navy

239. The initial reports made by the unit chiefs of the group were well prepared and correctly estimated the situation. The proposals for using naval forces in the initial period of action called upon them to seize the initiative; they were valid and took into account the resultant situation and the capabilities of the group. The landings, which were designed to seize the ports of Hel, Gdynia, and Gdansk, were planned in an effective manner.

240. Inadequate coordination of action of the individual sections was a deficiency in the initial period of activity; however, this was partly overcome during the operation.

The Command and Staff of the Warsaw Military District for National Territorial Defense

241. The major problem confronting the maneuver participants in the period of advanced defense readiness, and the immediate danger to the nation's security, was the detachment of the 4th Army command and staff from the district as it was simultaneously changed to a wartime organizational structure as a military district for national territorial defense, whose assignments also included operational and technical support of the regrouping of army forces.

242. While the district did prepare a suitable plan of action in this respect, its basic parts were not coordinated between the OTK OW (National Territorial Defense of the Military District) level and the operational staff level. Therefore, the plan's practical implementation did not allow the planned goals to be completely and efficiently achieved.

243. /Translators Comment: The following 2 pages in the original Polish document are missing./

... of the results of expanding the defense structure in the 1961-1965 period and in defining the plan of defense goals for 1966-1970.

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244. The maneuver confirmed our manifold defense structure, indicated the relationship between individual defense systems, and vividly disclosed the tasks which our defense system should be equal to in general, and the individual armed forces levels and branches in particular.

245. The conclusions and proposals stemming from military theory and from the experience gained in the maneuvers represent only one of the important elements among the several upon which the plan for expanding our defense structure is based. In this plan, admittedly, we also consider the alliances which link our country with the other socialist nations, and particularly its membership and role in the Warsaw Pact, as well as the internal economic and moral-political capabilities for expanding the defense structure.

246. Considering these factors as a whole, it was established that the development of the defense structure in the next five-year period will be marked by a complex improvement of all its systems and an expanded scope to cover all social areas in the country; hence its character will be ever more universal. We have determined that our defense structure will expand in close connection with, and according to, the general national development and that the defense organization, representing the nation's security factor, will share in the peaceful development of the national economy as well. This means that we shall accomplish our defense undertakings so as to assure maximum fulfillment of tasks with the allocated funds, so as not to burden the national economy with additional expenditures apart from those provided for in the KOK guidelines for 1966-1970, which anticipate a rise in expenditures at the rate of increase of the part of national income designated for the consumer sector. This also means the effective management of reserves for additional tasks, especially in fulfilling that of getting all potential military candidates in uniform and, with the cooperation of other ministries, that of contributing to the general development of the country.

247. We shall keep in mind that our armed forces should ensure fulfillment of tasks stemming from membership in the Warsaw Pact as well as from OTK missions, and develop their organizational structure, ordnance and equipment, as well as command system, to meet these needs. Regarding the operational forces and the national air defense forces, this means a continuation of the work begun in the
past five-year period, with the intention of maintaining these forces at a level required for the European Theater of War. This creates the need for further modernization of these forces, including rearming with new types of weapons and technical equipment, additional armor and motorized equipment, improvement of organizational structure, and an increase in combat and mobilization readiness. Regarding the OTK forces, this will mean further supply of weapons and necessary equipment, refinement of organizational structure according to the anticipated tasks, and the establishment of a uniform, efficient system of command under the peace-time subordination of the Internal Forces (Wojska Wewnętrzne) to the National Defense Ministry.

248. Rearing of forces will be reflected mainly in:

- Providing additional rocket equipment to all branches of the armed forces;

- Adding modern aircraft and better detection, communications, and guidance equipment;

- Adding new types of vessels to the naval forces as well as increasing the number of amphibious assault units;

- Equipping the forces with new types of radio-electronics signal equipment.

249. The recently begun mechanization and automation of staff operations, which is still in experimental form, will be considerably expanded and put in an appropriate organizational structure so as to form within the next few years a solid base for using these systems at different command levels and with respect to different military activity.

250. In order to achieve in the 1966-1970 period the maximum possible effects in the operational, organizational, and logistical functions involved in expanding and improving the armed forces, as well as the nation's defense system in general, all action undertaken must be based on thorough scientific analysis; moreover, the particular problems related to this activity and to the manner in which assignments are made must be represented in suitably prepared studies and research projects.

251. In the operational forces basic attention will be focused on a further increase in the combat readiness of
a first echelon army, an air army and some front and army combat support units while a second echelon army is gradually reinforced.

252. Above all, we plan to increase the combat value of general-purpose tactical formations as the basic striking force of the operational forces. Apart from bringing the divisions to full combat readiness, it is planned to increase the number of tanks in the combat-ready armored and mechanized divisions by 22 and 14 percent, respectively; conventional artillery by 109 and 69 percent; antiaircraft artillery by 28 and 18 percent; to further expand the number of armored carriers including a certain number for infantry use; to reinforce reconnaissance subunits; and to expand the number of rocket launchers by 50 percent while simultaneously replacing equipment with later models, introducing new guided antitank missile models and expanding their number. It is planned to introduce the latter weapon in mechanized infantry divisions and battalions. Cadre divisions will also receive rocket equipment.

253. While these plans are being implemented, division personnel strength will be increased. As a result, these actions will prevent a disproportion between our basic tactical formations and those of our potential opponents.

254. As a further step in equipping the forces with rockets, operational rocket units equipped with longer range rockets will be formed.

255. Rearming the antiaircraft defense forces with rockets at the operational as well as tactical level represents an urgent task for strengthening antiaircraft defense support for the troops; this action appears possible in the forthcoming plan.

256. In connection with the established order of requirements we have concentrated our main effort in recent years to raising the combat readiness level of first echelon divisions, with the needs of the combat support units remaining in the background. To increase the combat readiness of combined-force armies and operational forces as a whole, the disproportions in readiness between the divisions and some combat support units of first echelon armies and the front, mainly engineer, signal, and antiaircraft artillery forces, will be presently balanced.

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257. It is also planned further to develop the reconnaissance and electronics countermeasure units by converting the existing basically stationary ones into units designed to fulfill assignments for the troops fighting under field conditions.

258. In developing the operational air force, greater stress will be placed on preparing these units for operational support, cover, reconnaissance, and transport of front forces. The new equipment which will be provided the operational air force will include supersonic pursuit aircraft for the fighter component, and multipurpose supersonic fighter-bombers for the fighter-assault component. Heavy-duty helicopter units will be formed. The present air transport component as well as the air reconnaissance groups will be expanded. Air subunits for rocket and combined forces tactical formations will be expanded to meet the build-up in rocket equipment of the ground forces. This action will be accompanied by an increase in an air army's capability for supporting operations and movement accomplished by effectively adjusting the organization and equipment of air force rear services for these assignments.

259. At the OTK forces level, a major task will be that of effectively including the Internal Forces in a uniform body and command system in the armed forces, and to assemble these forces in a manner which, together with the present OTK units, would ensure the best possible national defense. From this viewpoint, the organizational structure of all units remaining in the OTK system should be examined, their designation should be defined, and, according to this organizational structure, the disposition of each unit within the framework of OTK operational assignments, especially those units formed years ago and presently in the OTK system, should be precisely stated.

260. In connection with this, the General Staff is going to take immediate action to update operational and mobilization plans at all command levels, to make new assignments in a responsible way and to prepare operational plans for OTK forces in the general national defense system as well as for cooperation with both the operational forces and for the personnel and equipment required by the functional and territorial system.

261. A central organ - the National Territorial Defense Inspectorate (Inspektorat Obrony Terytorium Kraju) - will be formed in the MON to be immediately responsible for directing the national defense, and especially for organizing ground
defense, for commanding territorial defense forces, mobile and specialized OTK units, and KOK and WKO /not identified further/support units, and for organizing defense training.

262. The experience gained in moving the institutions and OTK commands to the command posts while on alert, and especially the conclusions stemming from this maneuver, point up the urgent need further to effect systematic organizational improvements in these institutions and commands in order to make them effective command organs capable of fulfilling their assigned tasks within the OTK system. This action should be accompanied by an appropriate development of the support units and headquarters for command posts of the commands in the OTK system.

263. In the territorial structure, besides organizational improvements in the wojewodztwo military staff, powiat (county) military staffs will continue to be systematically developed so that in the next few years there will be a staff in each powiat capable of administering defense matters in its area.

264. A basic task in developing the OTK and the defense structure in general will be to improve the units from brigade to battalion level. These units will form a reservoir for conscripts subject to compulsory military duty who have not been called up because the conscript age group is too large to be absorbed by the operational or Internal Forces. We shall mold this reservoir into different organizational forms - from stationary wojewodztwo brigades and regiments as well as territorial defense battalions to battalions in which duty is performed according to a mixed system or a system involving travel to and from the unit.

265. In cooperation with social organizations involved in defense activity, and using the opportunities which will be created by the planned law on the universal obligation of public services for the nation's defense, we are proceeding to strengthen existing regional and plant self-defense units and further to develop others as the basic organized element in the OTK territorial structure.

266. The National Air Defense Forces, representing both an important element in the combined Warsaw Pact air defense system as well as in the nation's territorial defense, will continue to receive rockets (a 44 percent
increase), modern aircraft, and automated detection, communications and guidance equipment. This will enable initiation of the transition from an installation (obiektowy) to an installation-zonal (obiektowostrefowy) air defense system, comprising zones toward the northwest and separate installations in the most important national centers. The qualitative changes being effected in the Air Defense Forces have brought on the need for improving the command system and its security. This problem, which is fundamentally important for an efficient air defense system, requires a particularly thorough, substantive and universal examination and responsible consultations on this matter to find the best solution, both operationally and economically.

267. The organizational action and the modernization of the armed forces in the next five-year period will be accompanied by actions of a cadre and training nature, which should produce an effect on raising the over-all combat readiness of the armed forces. The above undertakings include:

- A twice yearly induction of conscripts (already in effect this year) which reduces the percentage of untrained personnel in units during the period when men are being discharged and newly inducted recruits are receiving their individual training;

- Plans for improving the cadre structure which are supposed to establish the right proportions between the officer corps and the warrant officer and regular NCO corps, the latter being considerably expanded;

- The introduction of voluntary long-term military service for privates, during which these men, performing their service in specialized positions, would simultaneously obtain the equivalent of a basic trade school education in the course of five years;

- The reorganization of the system of training basic service NCOs and specialists, including a reduction of the training period to the absolute minimum and organization of training in such a manner that, to the maximum extent possible, it would not reduce unit personnel strengths;

- The reorganization, in agreement and cooperation with other ministries, of the training of fully
qualified drivers from among preconscripts, who would constitute a basic pool of drivers for the national economy upon completion of their military duty;

- The reorganization of the officer cadre training system by reducing the training periods to the absolute minimum, by training only those officers who really require it, while simultaneously developing a broad self-education system as the basic form of improving the career cadre.

268. With regards to the operational-tactical training and training of troops, we shall concentrate primarily on the skillful handling of assignments of contemporary warfare combined with the effort of all combat arms and services under conditions of the use of mass destruction weapons as well as under conditions in which the fighting is done with conventional weapons with the threat of atomic warfare. It is thus necessary fully to coordinate training in the operational forces and OTK forces structure as well as in the functional and territorial structure. Simultaneously training programs must be improved on the basis of scientific methods of didactics, so that their content will correspond to actual needs of the individual combat arms and services and, at the same time, so that every soldier on active duty can assimilate this training material.

269. The same applies to training programs for military studies at higher schools and for premilitary youth training. A particularly urgent task is to include basic trade school students in the premilitary training program.

270. In party-political, cultural and propaganda activity, we shall require that the achievements of contemporary pedagogy, sociology, and psychology be taken into account; appraising favorably the results achieved thus far by the educational initiatives in individual military districts, we plan further to develop this activity as well as recommend a bold and broad generalization of the conclusions from the educational experiments. In particular, the soldier collectives must be put to better use in improving discipline in the units.

271. We direct the Propaganda Department to ensure that the entire public, especially the youth, understands the broadly conceived defense problems, by systematically propagandizing defense problems, the right views... and
attitudes of citizens toward defense matters will be shaped. The intensified educational effect on the public should be reflected in the practical steps taken by institutions and organizations directly involved in public propaganda.

272. In our structure, the career serviceman is faced with especially high moral requirements; he is required to excel in this regard. Hence the "Code of Ethics for the Polish Army Cadre" should constitute the basis for the self-education of career cadre collectives, for forming their moral attitude, and for evaluating their behavior and actions. A basic task of the cadre in the next few years should be to understand the importance of the code of ethics, to assimilate its content, and to respect it in daily practice.

273. The above maneuver provided valuable conclusions that will help to identify ways for accomplishing many of the general aims for developing the nation's defense in the next five-year period.

274. The information and conclusions derived from the maneuver should be the subject of comprehensive analysis and should provide the basis for taking concrete training, organizational, research and substantive action. For this purpose I order the Chief Training Inspector, the commanders of military districts and of the armed forces branches, and the commanders and chiefs of the combat arms and services to prepare a detailed report of the maneuver by 30 June of this year. In addition, I order the Chief of General Staff to form a commission comprising representatives of the General Staff, commands, headquarters and institutions, which will examine information on the maneuver obtained by the umpires and, from these reports, will prepare a plan for implementing the conclusions stemming from this information.

275. Achievement of the goals set for this maneuver required considerable physical and constructive effort from the officers involved in the maneuver, the leadership and umpire group, as well as from the servicemen of support units and the civilian maintenance personnel.

276. In recognition of this effort I extend my thanks to the front commander in the maneuver, General Broni (General) Jerzy Bordzilowski; the Chief of Staff of the front, General Dywizji (Major General) Tadeusz Tuczapski; the Deputy Front Commander, General Dywizji Zygmunt Huszcza; the Deputy Front Commander for Political Affairs, General Brygady (Brigadier General) Zbigniew Szydlowski; and the Front Quartermaster,
Colonel Mieczyslaw Obiedzinski.

277. I also thank the following officers:

- General Dywizji Józef Kaminski, Commander of the 2nd Army
- General Brygady Eugeniusz Molczyk, Commander of the 3rd Army
- General Dywizji Czesław Waryszak, Commander of the 4th Army
- General Brygady Franciszek Kaminski, Commander of the 5th Air Army
- General Brygady Aleksander Jankowski, Commander of the OTK Warsaw Military District
- Rear Admiral Ludwik Janczyszyn, Commander of the Navy Operational Group
- Colonel Zdzisław Zarski, Commander of the Operational Group of the 1st Air Defense Corps

I kindly ask the above officers to extend my thanks to the officers under their command, especially those who participated in this maneuver.

278. I extend my sincere thanks to Lieutenant General Folenkov, commander of the Belorussian Military District army in the exercise, and his chief of staff, Major General Kuzmenko, as well as to all officers under their command. I have a high regard for the operational skills which they displayed in the maneuver. Joint maneuvers serve well the strengthening of fraternal friendship in training practice, cooperation and mutual understanding, as well as add to an increase in defense readiness of both our armies.

279. I extend my thanks to the umpire group and to the staff of the maneuver command, and I also thank my immediate assistants: General Dywizji Wojciech Jaruszelski, General Dywizji Józef Urbanowicz, General Brygady Bolesław Choła, and Colonel Bolesław Szczepaniak.

280. I also want to thank the representatives of the Joint Armed Forces Command - Colonel General D.S. Zherebin, Major General Ulyanov and Colonel Ivanov for their part in the maneuver and their interest in it.
281. I thank all participants of the maneuver for their fulfillment of a difficult and responsible task.

282. On behalf of all maneuver participants, may I be allowed to express my sincere pleasure at the interest in our maneuver and attendance for part of it of the Politburo members of the PZPR (Polish United Workers Party) Central Committee, Edward Ochab, Chairman of the Council of State; Stefan Jedrychowski, Chairman of the Planning Commission in the Council of Ministers; and Wladyslaw Wicha, Secretary of the PZPR Central Committee.

283. This indicates to the entire top military command echelon the importance and meaning which the leadership of our Party and people's authority attach to the defense and security of the Polish Republic, to our contribution to the general effort of the Warsaw Pact member nations and other socialist nations for world peace.

284. I also use this opportunity to extend to you comrades my best wishes for further great accomplishments in your responsible work, success in your personal life, and good health.

I hereby declare the "Narew" maneuver ended.