FACTORS IN THE FALL OF KHRUSHCHEV
AND THE BEHAVIOR OF THE NEW SOVIET REGIME

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Contents

INTRODUCTION ........................................... 1

Background of Khrushchev's Removal .................... 2
  Economic Policy
  External Policy
  Power Plays

Background of the New Leaders ....................... 4

First Pronouncements of the New Regime .............. 6
  The PRAVDA Editorial
  Initial Speeches

The New Regime's Dilemmas: Khrushchev and China .... 8
  The Problem of Khrushchev
    Behavior of the Soviet Press
    Propaganda Themes Linked to Khrushchev

The Problem of Peking
  The Chinese Nuclear Test
  The Bloc Quarrel

APPENDIX: Some FBIS Articles and Reports Bearing on
  the Background of Khrushchev's Removal ............ 11

CONFIDENTIAL
FACTORS IN THE FALL OF KHURSHCHEV
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Introduction

While the precise circumstances surrounding the events of 14 October remain obscure, the ouster of Khushchev can be viewed broadly as the culmination of a succession of interrelated conflicts and dissensions within the Soviet leadership over Khushchev's policies and personal power. Although Khushchev achieved primacy with the fall of his "antiparty group" foes in 1957, there have been numerous signs since then that conflict over the extent of his powers and over the scope and direction of his policies has persisted.

Signs of contention after 1957 over the Stalin and antiparty group issues on the one hand and the dispute over resource allocations on the other hand betrayed the continued presence of such conflict. Khushchev exploited the Stalin and antiparty group issues as key instruments in his effort to expand his power within the leadership, and he sought to shift the pattern of resource allocations as the basis of a consumer-oriented program that was overturning traditional party policy at home and abroad.

The new regime's transparent attack, in Pravda, on Khushchev's "commandism," "personality cult," and overhasty decisions reflects the involvement of both his use of power and his radical policies as factors in his downfall. But the new leadership has only tentatively come to grips with the crucial and difficult problem of how to treat Khushchev personally. Their initial statements, emphasizing assurances of basic continuity, are open-ended in specific policy areas. There are, however, indications in these statements that some retrenchment in resource allocations and a modified approach to the Chinese and other parties in the bloc quarrel are in the making. The question of how to handle Khushchev and a decision on what attitude to take toward the Chinese nuclear test are the most pressing issues facing the new regime--in both cases in the face of critical reactions from foreign parties. How Khushchev's successors move on these issues could be the bellwethers of the political complexion and direction of the new regime.
Background of Khrushchev's Removal

ECONOMIC On the eve of his fall there were signs that Khrushchev was initiating radical policy moves that may have helped precipitate the formation of a coalition of party leaders powerful enough to effect his removal. Whatever the exact chain of events in the leadership crisis, Khrushchev apparently overstepped the bounds of his effective political mandate within the regime. In his last major public statement, at a joint meeting of the CPSU Presidium and the Council of Ministers, he launched his most radical political initiative in the sphere of domestic policy to date. He proposed a virtual revolution in regime planning in his drive to bring about definitive shifts in both the structure of the Soviet economy and the future direction of its development. Proposing that consumer priority be made the basis of regime economic policy, he openly and unequivocally associated himself with the Malenkov heresy of giving preference to consumer goods over heavy industry and defense.

Khrushchev's proposal flowed logically from the strategy he had been developing since the middle of last year, when he advanced his chemicals program as a means of shifting the economy's center of gravity away from steel and metals and of rejuvenating an ailing agriculture with massive doses of chemical fertilizers. The chemicals campaign of the summer and fall of last year—a refurbished version of the chemicals line introduced in 1958—marked Khrushchev's return to the offensive in regime policy after the downturn in his political fortunes in the wake of the Cuban crisis.

The chemicals campaign generated visible opposition—most notably from the Soviet military, who resisted Khrushchev's plans to obtain resources for his program from the defense establishment. At the February plenum this year Khrushchev made a manifest effort to placate regime elements wedded to traditional policy and to assure them that no radical change in the pattern of resource allocations was in the offing. At the same time, he attacked regime planners for having relegated his chemicals policy to second place in the past even though, he said, it was beyond question that it was to receive priority from the outset.

Conceivably, Khrushchev's reneging on earlier assurances brought about an alliance between those in the military and in the higher echelons of the regime who were opposed to a radical departure from traditional policy.

EXTERNAL It is likely, however, that Khrushchev's move on the economic front is only one visible—though perhaps crucial—aspect of the vexatious issues of policy that contributed to Khrushchev's downfall. Khrushchev's major
moves in domestic policy have been dovetailed with major initiatives in external affairs. He was engaged in an intensive effort to convoke the world party meeting where he may have hoped to formalize the split in the communist movement. He was also preparing the ground for a visit to Bonn with the apparent intent of broadening detente with the West. These moves carried major implications for Soviet foreign policy, just as his moves on consumer goods at home did for Soviet domestic policy.

Khrushchev's initiatives came in a period of steady disintegration of Moscow's control in the communist movement and the bloc, especially in Eastern Europe. This circumstance alone could have provided an obvious pretext for the assault on his leadership. Khrushchev's plan to go to Bonn, which Soviet media have never mentioned, may have been viewed as a dangerous maneuver to broaden links with the West at a time when the Soviet bloc was in a state of disarray. More specifically, it may have been viewed as undercutting the East German leadership and threatening its very stability. Such a move, it could have been argued, would have accelerated already powerful polycentric tendencies in Eastern Europe and menaced the security of the USSR's European flank.

Khrushchev's power and the threat it posed to the leadership group either in part or as a whole appears to have been the other major factor underlying his fall. The 17 October PRAVDA editorial's indirect references to Khrushchev's "commandism," "personal decisions," disregard of collective leadership, and "personality cult" support this conclusion. PRAVDA's accusations bring to mind Khrushchev's surprise onslaught at the 22d congress on Stalinism and the "antiparty group," an action which apparently signalled a renewed drive to expand his power and an intention to use these issues as a prime weapon for enforcing discipline in leadership ranks. On the eve of the Cuban crisis, Khrushchev even raised the threat of a purge of "Stalinist" elements within the leadership. It was at this time that he arranged the publication of Yevtushenko's poem "Stalin's Heirs," which alluded to unregenerate Stalinists in high places--people tacitly in alliance with the fallen "antiparty" faction and the Chinese-Albanian opposition.

In April 1964, almost a year after Khrushchev had regained the political momentum after the setback of the Cuban crisis, it was divulged that the "antiparty group" members had been expelled from the party. This move, long sought by Khrushchev against visible resistance, was publicly revealed without specifying when it had occurred. It was, moreover, disclosed by Suslov, who had been at odds with Khrushchev on this and other issues.
Khrushchev's return to the offensive had been accompanied by signs that Suslov was personally under attack. A major indicator was the full-scale rehabilitation of Voznesenskiy, a Politburo member liquidated under Stalin. The latter's economic views were condemned as heretical in 1952 by Suslov, the only member of the present ruling group linked with the affair. A striking example of Khrushchev's exploitation of rehabilitations for factional political purposes, this incident may have been seen as a storm signal by other members of the hierarchy who were likely targets of Khrushchev's maneuvers. One recent sign that the rehabilitation policy was a sore point in regime politics came in early September, when Izvestiya sought to counter charges that a Trotskyite was among the recent rehabilitees.

Background of the New Leaders

The 17 October Pravda editorial's stress on collective leadership as "the main task" of the party, while implicitly pointing to Khrushchev as a violator of that principle, accords with the apparently tenuous power distribution in the new regime—the top executive authority now divided between Brezhnev and Kosygin where it had formerly rested with Khrushchev alone. Power is presumably shared by a coalition within the Presidium and Secretariat; and the impression that this grouping spans diverse political forces is fortified by the fact that Brezhnev's rise to power was closely linked to Khrushchev's patronage.

Brezhnev of the present leaders Brezhnev has been one of the most closely identified with Khrushchev's major policies. In the post of Kazakh First Secretary he bore prime responsibility for the implementation of the virgin lands program during its initial phase. Generally, he can be counted as one of the most avid past supporters of Khrushchev's economic policies. As far back as the 20th CPSU Congress he seconded Khrushchev's controversial philosophy that problems of "practical economics" take first place in the party's work, taking primacy even over political and ideological questions.

In foreign policy, Brezhnev was the first of Khrushchev's associates to endorse the 1963 test ban agreement. He took the lead in promoting Khrushchev's rapprochement with Tito, and in September 1962—on the eve of the Cuban crisis—his trip to Belgrade paved the way for the subsequent exchange of visits between Khrushchev and Tito. In the aftermath of the Cuban crisis there were signs of high-level discontent with Khrushchev's renewed wooing of the Yugoslav "revisionists," a situation reflected in backing and
filling over acknowledging Yugoslavia's "socialist" status in the 1963 May Day slogans. Brezhnev appeared to be a strong supporter of Khrushchev's de-Stalinizing policy and was among the more vigorous detractors of Khrushchev's old foes in the "antiparty" group. He was also free with adulatory references to Khrushchev.

KOSYGIN  The new Premier, on the other hand, rose to prominence largely apart from Khrushchev's tutelage and has seemed to represent a somewhat more independent position in regime politics. He had already reached the higher echelons under Stalin. In the post-Stalin period his career did not take an upswing until after the fall of the "antiparty group," but the circumstances of his rise since 1957 raise some doubts about the firmness of his allegiance to Khrushchev in that period.

Although Kosygin had long been linked with the consumer and light industry sector of the economy, there are grounds for believing that he was not a wholehearted supporter of Khrushchev's pro-consumer policies. In the immediate aftermath of the June 1957 purge he was outspoken in stressing the party's continuing allegiance to the heavy industry line. Under Kosygin's direction as planning chief, Khrushchev's chemicals program inaugurated in 1958 failed to prosper. As Khrushchev himself complained this February, it was consistently relegated to second place since its inception.

Kosygin rose to full Presidium membership in the immediate aftermath of the U-2 crisis, when a major leadership realignment occurred and when Khrushchev's political prestige had suffered a severe blow. In subsequent months Kosygin, along with Koslov and Suslov, gained new prominence in leadership activities. Kosygin delivered the main report on industry at the July 1960 plenum. During the same month Khrushchev seemed to fade momentarily into the political background; and a major move was made toward re-centralization of the economic administration, scarcely in line with Khrushchev's philosophy of economic decentralization. Kosygin can also be numbered among regime figures who resisted Khrushchev's effort to expel the "antiparty group" from the party and perhaps even to try them. Kosygin neither called for their expulsion nor attacked them for "crimes" at the 22d congress or afterward. He has also been notably restrained in his personal praise of Khrushchev.

* Documentation may be found in Radio Propaganda Report CD.225 of 10 April 1963, "Soviet Slogans for May Day 1963."
First Pronouncements of the New Regime

The new regime's first statements repeat enough of the staples of Khrushchevian policy to sustain the image of continuity, but are sufficiently imprecise and broadly phrased on specific areas of policy as to leave Khrushchev's successors free to move in a variety of directions. The medley of elements in these statements can also be read as reflecting the diverse political composition of the new leadership.

THE PRAVDA The content of the regime's first authoritative policy statement, the 17 October PRAVDA editorial, is not inconsistent with the notion that the Soviet Union is now under the rule of an unstable coalition. In its opening passages the editorial strikes contrasting notes that represent the two poles of post-Stalin Soviet politics. In consecutive sentences PRAVDA invokes both the policy of coexistence and the necessity of strengthening the country's defenses. The former has been the basis of Khrushchev's policy of détente abroad and relaxation at home, the latter a fundamental principle of militancy and orthodoxy in traditional party policy. Before his fall Khrushchev had increasingly tended to relegate the latter principle to a subordinate position, thereby incurring opposition from defenders of orthodoxy. PRAVDA's balancing of these two bases of strategy may suggest something of the character of the factional alignment of the ruling coalition. And the prominence given defense may augur a tendency toward a general retemchment in policy under the new regime.

INITIAL Both Brezhnev's and Kosygin's first public speeches, at the ceremonies for the returned Soviet cosmonauts, are consistent with such a tendency. Both hew closely to the framework of the PRAVDA editorial. Brezhnev reasserts the theme of continuity that has pervaded the regime's initial statements, much as it was used in the period of leadership transition after Stalin's death. He repeats PRAVDA's avowal that the party pursues the general line of the 20th, 21st, and 22d, CPSU Congresses—an avowal reinforced by its introduction into the CPSU slogans for the October Revolution anniversary, released 18 October. But this is followed in Brezhnev's speech by an emphasis on strengthening the country's "might" and by a call for developing "productive" forces and "on this basis" steadily raising the welfare of the people. The same linkage between welfare and "productive forces"—a term traditionally connoting heavy industry—is drawn more explicitly in the PRAVDA editorial of 22 October, in the statement that "on the basis of the expansion of heavy industry there has been a steady growth in the production of consumer goods." In the
thinly veiled controversy over resource allocations in the party press in recent years, the defenders of heavy industry have stressed that expansion of "production" is primary and that raising welfare only occurs on this basis. The advocates of consumer goods have turned the point around to assert that it is the welfare goal which must control the development of production.

Brezhnev reiterates the regime's adherence to coexistence, and specifies disarmament, but does so following a reference to strengthening defenses. While not mentioning the coexistence policy as such, Kosygin pledges that the USSR will strive to settle international issues "through negotiations" and will seek disarmament agreements. He balances this statement with the admonition that "we cannot ignore" the imperialist threat to peace. And his invoking of the imperialist threat in turn leads into an emphasis on the regime's intention to take "measures to strengthen [the USSR's] defense potential."

Neither leader's generalized statement that the regime will seek a "steady" rise in living standards gives any inkling of the actual place consumer goods will occupy in resource allocation priorities. Both men's stress on the "work" facing the Soviet people--especially Kosygin's admonition that abundance will not "drop from the skies... without work"--may be a hint that some belt-tightening is intended. A possible sign that some change in Khrushchev's policy on resource priorities may already be occurring appears in one of the current October Revolution anniversary slogans on chemicals. The greeting to chemical workers omits a previous call for a speedup in chemical plant construction and adds an appeal for improving the quality of mineral fertilizers. Khrushchev's chemicals policy involved a crash effort to expand chemical production facilities and fertilizer output.

The 17 October PRAVDA editorial contains other elements which heighten the impression that the regime may be contemplating a measure of retrenchment. PRAVDA's statement that the practical problems of communist construction "cannot be divorced" from the ideological indoctrination of the population and the inculcation of "communist consciousness" can be read as critical of Khrushchev's concentration on economic problems to the detriment of ideology. There had been numerous signs before Khrushchev's fall that this issue had been pressed by the party's more orthodox elements in inner-party debate.

PRAVDA's oblique attacks on Khrushchev--while registering discontent with his style of leadership--also echo a charge that he was moving too far and too fast in his efforts to reform regime policy. Its
references to "subjectivism," "hare-brained schemes," "immature conclusions," "hasty decisions," and so on, while applicable to Khrushchev's methods, also convey the notion that he was pursuing an overly radical policy. The swipes at Khrushchev's leadership suggest that the new regime intends to pursue a more cautious course. Viewed in this context, the stress on continuance of the "Leninist" line of the 20th, 21st, and 22d congresses seems calculated as reassurance that the new ruling group has not rejected reform as such and is not breaking out of the framework of past policy.

The New Regime's Dilemma: Khrushchev and China

THE PROBLEM OF KRUSHCHEV

Whatever direction Soviet policy ultimately takes as the inevitable factional realignments develop and are consolidated, the difficult problem of how to handle Khrushchev is likely to become a key issue in factional politics. How this prime issue is resolved will have a major bearing on the political complexion of the new regime. Further development of the attack on the fallen leader begun in the 17 October PRAVDA editorial—just as in the case of the denigration of Stalin—is likely to involve a turn away from his policy line if not a rejection of it. An expanding attack would also tend to increase the political vulnerability, in factional infighting, of those party figures most closely allied with Khrushchev. Paradoxically, the new leaders' emphasis on continuity during the period of transition can only weaken their case for having deposed him.

The dilemma is already being exacerbated by the critical reactions from East and West European parties to the manner, if not the fact, of Khrushchev's removal. The expressions of dismay and surprise as well as praise of Khrushchev and demands for explanations from an increasing number of parties amount to none too subtle warnings against any basic departures in policy toward the bloc and the world communist movement.

The Norwegian party paper FRIHITEN, objecting to the brusque method by which Khrushchev was cast aside, touches precisely on the sore point produced in Soviet factional politics by Khrushchev's fall: The paper asks rhetorically whether the blame for failures placed on Khrushchev by the new leadership should not rest also with "those who failed to see" the fallen leader's "weaknesses and faults." Tirana optimistically takes note of the factional implications of the situation in its comment that Khrushchev's "expulsion" marks the start of a "process of decomposition" in the ranks of the "revisionists."

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Repetitions of the transparent attack on Khrushchev's leadership in the 17 October PRAVDA have already appeared in PARTY LIFE and in the republican press and may signify pressure from regime elements who stand to gain the most from further denigration of Khrushchev. SOVIET MOLDAVIA on 21 October and SOVIET RUSSIA on the 22d essentially repeated PRAVDA's allegations in their own editorials. SOVIET MOLDAVIA directly connects the charges with the 14 October Central Committee plenum that deposed Khrushchev. SOVIET RUSSIA adds some flourishes to the indictment without adding any new substantive elements. It adds, for example, the suggestion that Khrushchev's leadership had become "bankrupt" and that he had "served his time."

On the other hand, the press blackout on favorable references to Khrushchev that the new regime immediately sought to impose with his fall has not been complete. TASS on 14 October duly reported Cuban President Dorticos' comment on arrival at Vnukovo airport that day that he hoped to talk with "the beloved friend of the Cuban people, Nikita Khrushchev." The same reference to Khrushchev appeared in a PRAVDA version on the 15th--but, curiously, not in a "recorded" version of the speech broadcast by Radio Moscow to Cuba on the 14th.

Disarray over the handling of Khrushchev has seemed reflected in the Soviet military press, with favorable references to him persisting through 16 October in RED STAR. In PRAVDA on 14 October, the day of Khrushchev's ouster, an article by Marshal Konev on the Ukrainian liberation anniversary contained no reference to Khrushchev. RED STAR, however, carried an article by Marshal Biryuzov containing repeated favorable references to Khrushchev on the next two days:

On the 15th, RED STAR's front-page editorial on the latest Soviet space achievement quoted a Khrushchev aphorism--and attributed it to Khrushchev--on socialism as the "launching pad" of space feats. Also on page one of this issue, a TASS report of Cuban President Dorticos' arrival noted the presence of portraits of Khrushchev as well as Mikoyan, Castro, and Dorticos on the outside of the airline terminal. In a third page-one reference, a report of a Latvian liberation anniversary meeting in Moscow said the participants sent a greetings message to the CPSU Central Committee and Khrushchev. On an inside page, in a preface to an article on radioelectronic communications with the spaceship Voskhod, Khrushchev's conversation with the cosmonauts was quoted.

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On the 16th, in a "Brief" on an inside page concerning the visit of a group of servicemen with a corn-grower, it was noted that the latter recalled a "warm and cordial meeting with N.S. Khrushchev."

While these references might be attributed to initial confusion, they could also be read as reflecting discord among the military on the treatment of Khrushchev. Those military leaders who were most closely allied with Khrushchev and his line in military affairs would presumably have a practical political interest in opposing further denigration of the fallen leader. Moreover, if the military did have forewarning of Khrushchev's fall, the possibility must be considered that the publication of the Biryuzov article reflected an effort to prevent the defaming of Khrushchev.

No such reticence, however, has been evident with regard to other foreign policy initiatives, lines, and themes that have been closely identified with Khrushchev. Thus the Soviet-Cuban communique released by TASS on the 16th does not contain the reference to the test ban treaty that has been customary in such communique—but it states that "the republic of Cuba highly assesses the proposal by the Soviet Government to conclude an international treaty or agreement on rejecting the use of force in solving territorial disputes and frontier questions." References to this proposal, advanced by Khrushchev in his letter to heads of government on 31 December 1963, have continued to appear in Moscow propaganda since the release of the Soviet-Cuban communique.

A Radio Moscow commentary by Boris Leontyev entitled "The Problem of Preserving Peace Is the Most Urgent Problem of Our Time," broadcast in the domestic service on 19 October, brings up themes which neither Brezhnev nor Kosygin used in their speeches and which have been closely linked with Khrushchev. Leontyev declares that the system of socialism "gains decisive victories in peaceful competition with capitalism, and the workers and the national liberation movements gain in strength." Stressing the prime urgency of the problem of averting a world war, Leontyev uses phraseology identified with Khrushchev in declaring that the aim of communists has always been "creation of a society without weapons, without wars"—a concept to which the Chinese have taken serious exception. Leontyev also raises a sensitive issue in speaking of "excluding war from the life of society." He stops short of reiterating the controversial 21st CPSU Congress thesis that this is possible even while capitalism exists; but he quotes from the 1960 Moscow conference statement the passage stating that communists see their historic mission not
only in the eventual exclusion of war from human society, but also "in ridding mankind even in the present epoch from the nightmare of a new war."

Avoidance, on the other hand, of language that would evoke Khrushchev's image seemed manifest in an 18 October Moscow domestic service roundtable discussion: Izvestiya commentator Matveyev, taking note of Dorticos' visit and the anniversary of the "Caribbean crisis," credits "the Cuban people and the active policy of all peace-loving forces" with blocking an attack by U.S. aggressors. It would have been customary to credit at least the Soviet Government, if not Khrushchev personally.

THE PROBLEM OF PEKING

Alongside the problem of Khrushchev, the regime faces a pressing and closely related dilemma in the matter of how to deal with Peking. The CPR leaders' prompt "warm" greetings to the new leaders, dated 16 October, appear in the 19 October Pravda. There is no firm indication to date of how far the new leaders, having removed the man who personified "modern revisionism," may be willing to go toward conciliating the Chinese. Regime spokesmen and propagandists have made no direct anti-Chinese attacks since the leadership change, although Soviet reportage of French and Italian CP statements on the world party conference issue includes these parties' censure of Peking. On the question of the Chinese nuclear test, Soviet media have so far withheld comment. They have acknowledged the test in a one-sentence announcement, and a TASS report on the President's TV address notes simply that it "touched on the explosion of a nuclear device in China." Soviet media have not mentioned the CPR's call for a summit conference to discuss a nuclear weapons ban.

Moscow's delay in commenting on the Chinese test of itself suggests the absence of a firm consensus on a course of action which could serve as a bellwether of Soviet policy both in the spheres of East-West and intrabloc affairs. It is possible, however, that the language of the 19 October Pravda editorial on the CPSU slogans
was framed with an eye to the Chinese as well as to provide a demonstration of the continuity of Soviet policy: The slogans' appeal for a comprehensive test ban is buttressed in the editorial's protestation that "we have stood and now stand for a complete cessation of all types of nuclear weapons tests...."

All of the European satellites have reported the Chinese test, and not all have shared Moscow's reticence. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND has said that the CPR "brusquely disregarded" the universal call for nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Budapest called the test "unfortunate." Prague reported a Slovak paper's comment that China's "small bomb" has produced "great evil" by stimulating the nuclear arms race. And Belgrade's KOMUNIST, according to TANYUG, has attacked the Chinese test as an affront to the test ban treaty. Here again, as in the case of the reactions to Khrushchev's ouster, statements from foreign parties can complicate the new regime's problem of what attitude to take toward the Chinese.

THE BLOC QUARREL

The new regime's cautious, restrained initial statements of position on bloc issues allow room for flexibility in future conduct in the bloc quarrel. Brezhnev declares in his first speech that the CPSU will strive for unity among socialist countries "on an equal footing" and "on the basis of correct combination of the common interests with the interests of the people of each country." This basic problem of reconciling national with common interests within the bloc had been recognized in speeches by Andropov and Ponomarev on 25 and 28 September. In a talk in Albanian and Hungarian on 20 October, Radio Moscow stresses the need both for "unity in action" and for insuring "independence and equality of rights" for all parties.

While noting that the CPSU "is pursuing an active policy" looking toward a world party conference, the 20 October commentary does not mention the preparatory meeting slated for mid-December. Rather it suggests indirectly that Moscow may now consider appeals from other parties for extended preparations for such a conclave: It describes "exchanges of experience" and "bilateral and multilateral meetings," as well as "extensive international conferences," as "the most useful forms of cooperation" to solve problems in the communist movement. Both Brezhnev's speech at the cosmonaut ceremonies and the 17 October PRAVDA editorial assert that the regime is still "actively" working for a world conference, but both fail to mention the preparatory meeting. In his last previous speech, in Berlin on 6 October, Brezhnev had similarly neglected to mention the preparatory meeting, speaking simply of the "impending" world conference.
The East German party now intimates that Brezhnev apprised the GDR leaders while he was in Berlin of an impending change in Moscow's approach to the world meeting. The communique on the 17 October SED Politburo meeting on the Soviet leadership change, released in GDR media the next day, reveals that the "consultations" during Brezhnev's visit produced agreement that

in the interest of preparing the session of the editorial commission and of the conference of communist and workers parties, the atmosphere of mutual understanding and cooperation must be developed on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

The issue of the preparatory meeting for the world conference has clearly been a sensitive one: KOMMunist, in an extensive version of Andropov's 25 September speech in Berlin, excised a reference to the multiparty commission that would meet in December—a reference included in an earlier, shorter version of the speech appearing in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND. Soviet media have nevertheless continued to pick up mentions of the 15 December preparatory meeting by foreign parties: The 17 October PRAVDA includes such references in its account of statements by the French and Italian CP's, and TASS on the 19th reports that a Finnish CP plenum has elected representatives to "the conference preparatory commission."
APPENDIX: SOME FBIS REPORTS AND ARTICLES
BEARING ON THE BACKGROUND OF KHRUSHCHEV'S REMOVAL

Early background on the fortunes of the post-Stalin leaders after the 1957 purge and on evidences of contention over Khrushchev's policies may be found in the compendium entitled "Soviet Leadership Studies, 1957 - 1963," issued by FBIS on 10 April 1963. This volume compiles RADIO PROPAGANDA REPORTS and a selection of articles from the biweekly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS, with an index indicating references in the volume to the individual leaders.

Special attention is called to the final report contained in the above collation, Radio Propaganda Report RS.56 of 5 April 1963, which sums up "Signs of Conflict in the Soviet Leadership Since the Cuban Crisis."

Listed below is a selection of Radio Propaganda Reports, designated by number in the RS (Research) or CD (Current Developments) series as well as by date, and articles from the SURVEY bearing on domestic issues since the December CPSU Central Committee plenum:

LEADERSHIP ALIGNMENTS

"Soviet Press Articles on Voznesenskiy Appear Aimed at Suslov," CD.136, 6 December 1963

"Antiparty Group Denounced in Suslov Report," SURVEY, 16 April 1964, page 37

"Brezhnev, Mikoyan Shifts Alter Leadership Picture," SURVEY, 23 July 1964, pages 52-53

MILITARY ISSUES


"Armed Forces Day Statements Avoid Troop-Cut Issue," SURVEY, 5 March 1964, pages 33-36

"Marshals Differ in Portraying Khrushchev's Military Role," SURVEY, 14 May 1964, pages 44-46

"Navy Chief Defends Naval Role in Modern War," SURVEY, 20 August 1964, pages 53-55


KHRUSHCHEV'S ECONOMIC POLICIES

"The Evolution of Khrushchev's Chemical Fertilizer Program," CD.239, 20 December 1963

"Khrushchev Rebuts Criticisms of Chemical Program," SURVEY, 20 February 1964, pages 40-42

"New Agricultural Reforms Hinted at Post-Plenum Meeting," SURVEY, 19 March 1964, pages 46-50

"Signs of Contention Over Implementation of Khrushchev's Program for Chemicals and Agriculture," CD.247, 8 June 1964


"Khrushchev Calls for a Consumer-Oriented Long-Range Plan," SURVEY, 15 October 1964, pages 33-42

A continuing chronicle of communist propaganda bearing on the Sino-Soviet conflict and bloc relations, including signs of dissension over the critical world party meeting issue, will be found in the "Bloc Relations" sections of the SURVEY.