INF Deployment: The Role of Intelligence Analysts in a Policy Success

An Intelligence Monograph

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Center for the Study of Intelligence

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Foreword

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Comments on this monograph may be directed to the author.
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I. Introduction

This is an account of an intelligence policy success. It discusses how intelligence analysts can serve effectively and maintain professional integrity when key members of the policy community do not particularly value the analysts' judgments about whether a policy initiative will work. Intelligence analysis professionals frequently face this challenge, yet the problem has seldom been addressed in print.

The case study that follows concerns US efforts to deploy an intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) to Western Europe in the early 1980s in the face of strong Soviet opposition and growing uncertainty about the steadfastness of our NATO allies. To varying degrees, most informed observers now perceive INF deployment as a policy success for the United States, meaning that we secured our goal without incurring unacceptable costs. This study examines the roles analysts performed, and how well they performed them, in helping policymakers achieve that goal.

The period covered begins in 1978 when the United States and its NATO allies began to consider what emerged in December 1979 as the "dual-track" decision. This called for deployment of US theater nuclear missiles in Western Europe while simultaneously inviting the Soviets to negotiate a reduction of their deployed intermediate-range missiles in exchange for a cutback in the number of US missiles ultimately sent to Europe. The case ends in November 1983, when the first INF missiles arrived in West Germany and Great Britain, and the Soviets broke off negotiations with the United States.

The main focus of this study is on 1983—the critical last year before deployment—although the years from 1979 through 1982 are covered briefly to provide context. The two central themes are (1) how intelligence analysts responded to the opportunities and challenges presented and (2) the nature and consequences of the interaction between policy and intelligence analysis.

In the INF case, the utility of the analysts' support to policymaking did not hinge on ingenious retrospective detective work nor did it depend on timely analytic warning that permitted successful defusion of a pending crisis. Instead, the perception of successful support rests on whether the analysts performed effectively three major functions, all involving primarily support of policy execution rather than policy decisionmaking. These functions were:

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• To help persuade West European policymakers that the Soviet INF threat was constantly growing during the period before deployment and that the Soviets bore the primary responsibility for the failure to reach agreement on how the threat could be defused.
• To provide material to policy officials that could be used in their efforts to influence the allies and tactical ideas on how these efforts could be most successful.
• To give early warning of potential Soviet moves that could upset deployment, or of US or West European actions that might inadvertently create difficulties.

More than 20 interviews were conducted for this case study. Material directly attributed to individuals in the policy or intelligence communities, identified either by name or function, comes from these interviews.

Strobe Talbot’s Deadly Gambits also provided background on policy issues for 1981-82.

This monograph has several possible uses beyond illuminating an interesting period in intelligence policy relations:

• Students of intelligence doctrine will find much to consider regarding what works and what doesn’t in providing analytic support for policymakers. This may be of special importance in an era of diminishing resources when all parts of the Intelligence Community need to demonstrate their continuing utility.

• In considering how to allocate available resources, managers of intelligence may benefit from what this example suggests about the comparative value of two kinds of analytical production and what it takes to render services that are directly useful, not just of theoretical utility.

• The documentation presented in this paper could be used to develop one or more case studies on success and failure, professional ethics, and the process of reaching policymakers for use in training courses.

• The rising generation of intelligence professionals and managers might be encouraged to rethink their priorities concerning how they spend the “Nth” hour of their professional day. Some might even conclude that being analytically “right” while no one of policymaking consequence pays attention is not particularly rewarding.
II. Prologue: Converting the Allies and Fencing With the Soviets (1978-82)

The Early Years (1978-80)

*The Policy Setting.* INF as an issue crept in by the backdoor for both the policy and intelligence communities. In the late 1970s, the main Soviet-US military and arms control issue involved intercontinental ballistic missiles. INF then was seen as a much more limited subject involving the balance of forces in Europe. Ostensibly, it was essentially a military issue concerning how best to respond to a widespread perception that the Soviets' conventional force superiority in Europe was growing throughout the 1970s even as NATO's theater nuclear force superiority was diminishing. Particularly unnerving was the arrival on the scene, beginning in 1977, of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles, mobile MIRVed SS-20s.

The initial belief of the Carter administration was that building up NATO conventional forces was more urgent than responding to the changing theater nuclear balance because US ICBMs could handle any theater needs for nuclear deterrence. Thus, only under West European pressure did the United States agree to add a 10th task force (later called the High-Level Group (HLG)) to discuss theater nuclear concerns, to nine others set up by NATO for building up conventional defenses.

Treating NATO theater nuclear matters as an afterthought did not sit well, however, with the West European allies. They were already disenchanted with US defense leadership for other reasons, including President Carter's seemingly inept handling of the so-called neutron bomb issue. In the minds of many observers, it was this perceived loss of leadership in NATO that was the stimulus for INF, not the enhanced Soviet theater nuclear threat. In the words of "The military purposes of INF were never really clear and were always sacrificed to politics. Domestically, Carter was increasingly seen as weak on defense issues, and this also had become a real problem in NATO. He desperately needed a successful defense initiative that could reverse this image."

Throughout the summer and fall of 1978, the Carter administration debated whether the United States should respond to West European concerns with political gestures or by sending new US missiles to Europe. The decision was in favor of sending new hardware. Choices then had to be made about the kind of force that would be deployed, what the link to arms control (a key West European concern) should be, and how aggressively the
United States should be in trying to build a full NATO consensus behind deployment. In discussions within the HLG, a consensus quickly developed that the deployment strategy would be affected more by strategic political considerations than by what number and kind of missiles could best offset Soviet missile forces. The appearance of decoupling the United States from the nuclear defense of Western Europe had to be avoided at all costs.

Ultimately, the High-Level Group in NATO decided that the INF should be a land-based mix of ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing II ballistic missiles; that deployments should occur in as many NATO countries as possible, including in at least one other continental country besides West Germany; and that INF should become part of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. This was the "dual-track" decision: to deploy INF and, at the same time, attempt to negotiate with the Soviets the reduction or elimination of theater nuclear forces.

US officials also decided to be very active in forging a NATO consensus behind deployment, which led to the appointment of a special presidential emissary on the issue, David Aaron, who was Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Aaron went on two missions to Western Europe in 1979 to convey US positions privately to West European leaders before formal votes were taken on deployment decisions and to assess the steadfastness of each ally.

The Analytic Response. Intelligence analysis on INF issues can be separated into three categories: strategic/military analysis concerning Soviet theater nuclear forces, political analysis concerning Soviet reactions and
intentions, and political analysis about the attitudes and concerns of the NATO allies. In all three areas the interaction between policymakers and intelligence analysts was frequent and close. There was agreement on both sides that analysts were helpful on policy implementation in 1980 but had little influence on policy decisions.

This discrepancy probably is clearest in the analysis of the positions and concerns of the allies. Analysts believed their papers were read by policymakers. Policymakers confirm this, but some state that almost every other source of information was more important to them in reaching decisions. In one important case, a member of the National Security Council staff “blew his stack” at what he thought was CIA’s continually negative attitude about whether NATO countries would accept deployment. His basic problem, he said, was that the analysts seemed to be basing their analysis on newspaper reports whereas he and other policy officials were talking directly to West European leaders who were guaranteeing they would accept the missiles. In other instances, issues of importance to policy officials were covered in analysis too late to be of use or did not appear at all. At times this occurred because policymakers did not share with the analysts what they were learning from their official contacts.

A different set of analysts worked with the policy community on Soviet strategic/military matters as they related to INF. Analysts and policymakers agree that considerable material was passed, most of it informally in ad hoc memorandums, briefings, and corridor chatter.

INF strategic/military analysis was most valuable when used operationally in briefings and papers designed to motivate the allies to move quickly on modernizing theater nuclear forces. It undoubtedly also provided some understanding of the Soviet nuclear threat in Europe. But, in the eyes of nearly all the policymakers and analysts involved, most of the policy decisions regarding INF satisfied primarily political criteria to which strategic and military intelligence analyses were not relevant.

The Middle Years (1981-82)

*The Policy Setting.* The arrival of the Reagan administration in January 1981 brought a new cast of policy players and a different focus of policy power. The role of the NSC staff in forging policy virtually
disappeared. Instead, INF became an object of struggle between the State and Defense Departments, with a third major player added when Paul Nitze was selected to head the US delegation for INF negotiations with the Soviets. At State and Defense policy decisionmaking quickly became the responsibility, respectively, of Richard Burt and Richard Perle. Burt was an Assistant Secretary of State, initially for Politico-Military Affairs and later for European Affairs. Perle was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. Their policy roles with respect to INF were formalized when Burt and Perle became cochairs of an Interagency Group (IG) created in mid-1981 to guide negotiations with the Soviets on INF. Each also became chairman of a NATO group dealing with INF.

The first INF issue the Reagan administration had to address was whether to accept the NATO "dual-track" decision.

Once the basic US negotiating strategy had been decided, the next set of decisions involved what positions to present at the talks with the Soviets and how best to counter their efforts to influence West European publics against actual deployment. In particular, policy officials concentrated on:

- How to understand and counter the numbers the Soviets were presenting as representing the size of INF forces arrayed against each other in Europe.
- How to construct US negotiating positions that would expose Soviet inconsistencies, maintain momentum for deploying at least some US INF missiles in Western Europe, and keep the onus on the Soviets for lack of progress in the talks.
- How to keep allied governments firmly committed to the deployment schedule despite the rising public outcry against putting new missiles in Western Europe.

The Analytic Response. In the first two years of the Reagan administration, the interest of key policymakers in written analysis and their accessibility to CIA INF analysts diminished, particularly in contrast to the
last year of the Carter administration. This was evident in the change in the way analytical products on the subject were presented during those years.

The subjects and level of analysis also varied considerably between these two periods. The analysis in 1980 often was highly tactical.

In 1981 most written analysis covered broad strategic issues or took the form of comprehensive roundups on where governments stood on deployment. By 1982 the analysis had not changed greatly, but steadily increasing amounts (as compared with the first year of the Reagan administration) were passed informally in preparation for NATO meetings and negotiating sessions with the Soviets. Papers on military-technical issues, such as the status of SS-20 bases, were numerous and continuous. These products were passed at a lower level than was the case during the Carter years, however, and often did not survive as separate intelligence documents by the time they reached higher policy levels.

In October 1982, a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) was published: INF: The Prospects for West European Deployment and the USSR's Reactions. This was the first estimative treatment of INF by the Intelligence Community that focused on these strategic political issues. It concluded that, although serious pitfalls remained, deployment was likely to proceed generally as planned. It predicted that the Soviets would continue to work on West European public opinion, possibly by offering to dismantle a significant number of SS-20 bases within range of Western Europe in return for no deployment of US missiles.

The most difficult issue to judge, according to the Estimate, was to what extent and how the Soviets would carry out Brezhnev's threat in March 1982 to place the United States in an "analogous position" militarily once the NATO deployments began. The SNIE said the Soviets might take
relatively unprovocative actions, such as deploying SLCM-equipped submarines near US coasts, but that they would not risk a major military confrontation with the United States by, for example, placing nuclear missiles in Cuba.
The impact on the analytical community of the changeover from the Carter to the Reagan administration cannot be overstated. By 1980, relations with the former had become very supportive; even while they disagreed with policy officials on the likelihood of INF deployment, the analysts produced useful papers on how to maximize prospects for deployment.

In the early Reagan years, when the focus of policy formulation shifted from the NSC staff to State and Defense, one consequence was to marginalize the contribution intelligence analysis could make. Richard Burt at State knew exactly where he stood on the policy issues, had extensive contacts in Western Europe and outside the government that he could tap for information, and was mainly engaged in struggles with Richard Perle to which intelligence analysis could not contribute. At Defense, Perle and his aides distrusted almost everyone who had worked for the Carter administration. In addition, they disregarded any analysis that might be interpreted as suggesting the Soviet threat to Western Europe was leveling off or declining. This led them to try to stifle what they perceived to be disagreeable analysis by refusing to coordinate on papers concerning Soviet INF forces until it was too late for them to be used in preparing for NATO meetings or negotiations with the Soviets.

During this period, intelligence analysts continued to make their most significant contribution to the work of the State Department’s NATO group working on INF (the Special Consultative Group [SCG]) and in support of Paul Nitze in negotiations with the Soviets. CIA analysts provided the stage-setting intelligence briefing at SCG meetings, Nitze himself was particularly receptive to analysis showing how the Soviets had constructed their negotiating positions, using it not only in talks with the Soviets but also when briefing allied governments and the press. He was his own analyst, however, in assessing West European positions on INF.
The Players and the Issues

In 1983, the final year of the countdown toward deployment, INF became even more of a political issue than it had been in earlier years, and thus it became enmeshed in White House politics.

In addition, political rivalries within the administration had an impact on how the issue was handled as the NSC staff led by William Clark, a political insider who was President Reagan's national security adviser, sought to reestablish its influence as a power center.

Political considerations abroad also became more prominent in relation to INF. Because the United States had placed so much emphasis on linking NATO's future to successful completion of the "dual-track" decision, even the slightest hint that deployment might be derailed caused nervous tremors both in Western Europe and in Washington. Chancellor Kohl in West Germany had to face re-election in March 1983, and INF was considered one of the main foreign policy issues that might affect his prospects. British Prime Minister Thatcher was thought likely to call for elections in 1983 and to face opposition on INF.

In these circumstances, senior US decisionmakers, including President Reagan, became much more attentive to INF as an issue. As a consequence, their deputies and assistants also paid more attention to the subject. The principal policy contestants remained Burt at State, Perle at Defense, and Nitze the negotiator, but in this supercharged atmosphere they had more people with real political clout looking over their shoulders.

On the intelligence side, there was remarkable continuity of involvement. For the most part, those DI analysts and managers who previously had worked on the subject were still in place. The nervousness around town about whether deployment would occur stimulated additional interest in INF at all levels of CIA management, including DCI Casey. Nonetheless, working-level analysts, because of their expertise, contacts throughout the policy community, and reputation for responsiveness, continued to be the major presenters of analysis to important US policymakers and foreign officials.

In the year before deployment, only one strategic decision on INF remained: whether, when, and how to abandon the zero-only policy position as the basis for negotiating with the Soviets. This issue, although it began to
heat up toward the end of 1982, apparently did not seriously come to the President's attention until January 1983. In part this was because Soviet General Secretary Andropov offered in late December 1982 to cut the SS-20s targeted at Western Europe to 162—a number equal to the French and British missiles aimed at the Soviet Union—if the United States would not deploy any new missiles to Western Europe. After Andropov's offer, Ambassador Nitze became even more alarmed that West European governments, in the absence of any significant US counteroffer, would continue squabbling among themselves, ultimately jeopardizing the entire "dual-track" strategy and probably preventing INF deployment.

Nitze was alone among policymakers harboring this level of concern about NATO. Burt and others at State thought the United States ought to move to a more flexible position at some point, but they did not believe such a policy shift should be sharp or that it was urgent. Even when the President became aware of the debate, most of his major advisers (including Weinberger, Clark, and Casey) were strongly opposed to moving off of zero-only, in part because they believed doing so might complicate Chancellor Kohl's re-election prospects.

This concern was removed on 6 March when Kohl won handily. Very soon thereafter he advised Washington that he believed the White House should demonstrate flexibility by proposing an "interim" solution. The Chancellor suggested holding to zero-zero as the ultimately desirable outcome of negotiations but in the meantime allowing for equal numbers at some higher level. State and Defense each developed their own proposals on what an interim solution should look like, and these were exhaustively debated.

In the end, President Reagan "split the difference." On 30 March he announced a new US position affirming the US preference for no medium-range missiles on either side in Europe, but calling for substantial reductions to equal numbers of deployed missiles in the interim. In words he used later when responding to another Soviet negotiating ploy, the President had decided he could not let Andropov "out-flexible" him.

Once this decision was made, the primary policy concerns again became almost exclusively tactical. The focus, above all else, was on keeping the allies from faltering and on squelching the notion that the Soviets were offering concessions significant enough to justify delaying deployment in order to allow additional time for the talks to succeed.
The Intelligence Track

The heightened political interest in INF in 1983 was reflected in a virtual explosion of the kind of analytical products most likely to reach top-level policymakers.

The increased coverage in the current intelligence publications reflected primarily what analysts and their managers thought were the policymakers' greatest concerns at that time. Prominent throughout the year was the question of how the West Germans perceived the state-of-play on INF and, particularly, whether they were showing any signs of wavering on deployment.

Coverage of Soviet developments was steady throughout the year. Every time construction occurred at an SS-20 base, that was reported. Similarly, each twist and turn in Soviet negotiating positions was analyzed, as was every Soviet threat or blandishment to Western Europe.

The number of typescript memorandums produced in 1983 also increased. Well over half were requested by policy consumers, and most of the others were written for senior CIA officers for their briefings of policymakers. Five were written especially for Vice President Bush, and one was requested by the NSC staff for President Reagan.
These memorandums were directly relevant to policy execution. Four of those for the Vice President were intended to prepare him for trips to Western Europe, where he was to attempt to calm nervousness among allied leaders about apparent US inflexibility and strengthen their resolve to carry on.

Three other memorandums concerning West Germany also are illustrative. The first, written in July at the request of William Clark, the President's National Security Advisor, discussed West German tactics on INF. Chancellor Kohl and some of his senior officials had been quoted as supporting a possible US-Soviet agreement (the so-called walk-in-the-woods proposal) that would have canceled Pershing II deployments. The West German statement caused great alarm in Washington. The memorandum assessed that, while Kohl would welcome an agreement obviating the need for the Pershing II because this would help him domestically, he would follow through on deployment in the absence of such a negotiated outcome.

By contrast, relatively few interagency estimates and hardcover analyses were produced on INF during 1983. The one new Estimate, issued in July, covered West German security issues and Bohn's relationship to NATO generally, with major emphasis on INF. The Estimate repeated the Intelligence Community's conclusion that the Kohl government would maintain Germany's commitment to deploy.
In Memorandum to Holders, issued in early November 1983, calm reappeared. Deployment was termed "all but certain" and the Soviets were likely to have suffered a "major political and military setback." Soviet countermeasures were still expected, but the tone of the new Estimate was considerably different. The main judgment was that the Soviets had acquired the capability of sending some nuclear missiles to Cuba without being detected, but that "we still believe it unlikely—a 10-percent chance." The rest of the possible military countermeasures were described either as essentially accelerating what already had begun, or as militarily unimportant.

Three hardcover publications covered much the same ground. A February 1983 Intelligence Assessment (IA), Soviet Strategy To Deraile US INF Deployment, laid out the complex strategy of inducements and threats, directed particularly at the West German Government, that the Soviets were likely to employ in trying to delay deployment. The ultimate inducement, the IA suggested, might be a version of the "walk-in-the-woods" formula, whereby the Soviets would accept limits on the numbers of SS-20s deployed in exchange for no Pershing IIs and some lower level of GLCMs sent to Western Europe. The probable threats ranged from deployments of new cruise and ballistic missiles opposite Europe to cautious stimulation of the Peace Movement in Western Europe to higher levels of protest. The paragraphs summarizing possible military threats were paraphrases of statements in the October 1982 SNIE.
Policy-Intelligence Interaction

The increased concern about whether deployment would occur accelerated both written production and interaction among policymakers and intelligence analysts. In part this was because the number of meetings in which analysts were involved increased. In the last year before deployment, for example, NATO meetings on INF occurred on an average of every other week. The reestablishment of the NSC staff as a center for policy planning and the increased participation of Vice President Bush also contributed to greater analyst involvement; Mr Bush, having been DCI, supported drawing on the Agency's expertise.

One role analysts continued to play at the behest of policymakers was that of briefer.
Another function of the analysts was to prepare US policy officials for dealing with their foreign counterparts. While they had done this regularly in the past, in 1983 they did it at a higher level. Vice President Bush, in addition to getting several typescripts written specifically for him before his February trip to Europe, met with two groups of analysts. A group from the Arms Control Intelligence Staff (ACIS) discussed with him what he might say to West European leaders about Soviet negotiating tactics and military strategy. The analysts left with him colorful graphics showing the balance of US and Soviet intermediate nuclear forces in Europe, which he used extensively on his trip. Another group covered INF politics in Western Europe. These analysts warned the Vice President that the West Europeans were expecting him to bring a US proposal to move off the zero option to a proposed interim solution for presentation to the Soviets, an issue that had not yet been settled in US policy circles. When the Vice President asked what he should do, the analysts advised him to try to deflate the West Europeans' expectations in order to avoid the appearance that his trip was a failure. Two days later, an article in The New York Times said Mr. Bush would not be carrying new negotiating proposals to Western Europe.
Although CIA analysts believed their relationships with the NSC staff, State, and the Vice President were excellent, many problems remained between Defense and CIA in the first half of 1983. The two were at loggerheads, for example, over how many SS-20s the Soviets had or intended to have.
CIA analysts responded that their estimates were based on sound analytical principles.

By the middle of 1983 the CIA-Defense relationship began to improve, apparently because Perle and other Pentagon officials came to believe that Agency analysts did not have an ax to grind and that, in any case, the DCI could not be persuaded to suppress their analysis.
<table>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<td>1977</td>
<td>Soviets deploy intermediate-range nuclear missiles (mobile MIRVed SS-20s) to Warsaw Pact forces in Eastern Europe.</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>Carter administration decides it will send similar missiles to Europe to allay West European concerns.</td>
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<td>December 1979</td>
<td>NATO decides to pursue a &quot;dual-track&quot; policy, deploying INF while simultaneously seeking reduction or elimination of theater nuclear forces through negotiations with the Soviets.</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>Reagan administration adopts &quot;zero-only&quot; position: the United States would agree not to field INF missiles in Europe only if the Soviets would withdraw all of theirs.</td>
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<td>March 1982</td>
<td>Brezhnev threatens to respond with additional unspecified military deployments when NATO INF deployments begin.</td>
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<td>December 1982</td>
<td>Andropov offers to reduce number of SS-20s targeted at Western Europe to 162, the number of British and French missiles aimed at Warsaw Pact forces, if INF is not deployed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 March 1983</td>
<td>Chancellor Kohl survives West German election in which his support of INF deployment is important issue.</td>
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<td>30 March 1983</td>
<td>President Reagan announces new position affirming US preference for no intermediate-range missiles in Europe on either side but calling for substantial reduction in interim to equal numbers deployed and projected for deployment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 1983</td>
<td>First INF missiles arrive in West Germany and Great Britain; Soviets break off negotiations with the United States.</td>
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IV. Conclusions

When Pershing II missiles arrived in West Germany and GLCMs arrived in Great Britain in late November 1983, intelligence analysts could fairly conclude that they had played a major role in achieving the US foreign policy objectives originally set forth by President Carter in 1978. Subsequent events, including the strengthened sense of unity demonstrated by NATO and the inability of the Soviets to punish the alliance or the United States for defeating Soviet policy, reinforce the perception that the analysts and US policymakers had generally worked together effectively. Ultimately, the United States achieved even more than the most optimistic policymaker or analyst could have foreseen with the signing of the INF Treaty and the agreement to withdraw and destroy all SS-20s (and other shorter range missiles) aimed at Europe.

Good fortune contributed to this success. The United States could hardly have hoped for a more favorable opponent than the USSR. The Soviets did almost everything wrong, always offering concessions too late or eventually rejecting those (such as the "walk-in-the-woods" proposal) that would have caused the United States the most trouble with its NATO allies. When the Soviets blustered, they did it unconvincingly and in a way that aggravated rather than scared the allies. It is now clear that, during that period of ill and dying CPSU Chairmen, Moscow's ability to make and execute foreign policy decisions was even more paralyzed than we knew at the time.

Much of this US success, however, was achieved because our policymakers defined problems accurately, chose workable solutions that were well coordinated within the US Government and NATO, carried them out diligently with close attention to detail, and did not panic in the face of uncertainty. Intelligence analysts made major contributions to this process, although not to all parts equally.

In particular, most participants agree that the Directorate of Intelligence, although it produced a vast amount of analysis on INF that reached policymakers, did not contribute much to shaping the policy options or influencing the choices that were made. In addition, while the analysis produced dealt regularly and in depth with such central questions as "Will the West Europeans deploy?" and "What will the Soviets do?," the evidence suggests the policymakers put little weight on what analysts said on these issues. Instead, the policy officials seemed to put more trust in their own sources of information and judgments on these matters. Because they had parallel and somewhat separate information gathering and analytical processes, they perceived different "facts," analyzed for different
purposes, and focused their efforts in different directions. As a consequence, as an aide to a Defense Department policy official stated, the policymakers were content when CIA's information and analysis supported their own, usually discounted it when it did not, and in no case waited for it before making up their minds about what to believe or do.

In other ways, intelligence analysts were critical to the success of the INF policy. Almost all of what they did in this regard occurred during the implementation phase of policymaking rather than the strategic decisionmaking phase. The key element was that successful execution of the policy depended on the political will of allied governments—on persuading them to remain committed to deployment. Analysts were instrumental in accomplishing this goal.

The record in this case indicates that, if given the chance, intelligence analysts can be excellent persuaders and producers of persuasive material for others to use. There are several reasons for this:

- Readymade venues often exist for using intelligence analysis to exert influence. In the INF case, intelligence briefings routinely set the scene for NATO meetings.

- Intelligence analysts often have more time and a better temperament than policy officials for mastering large masses of material, perceiving trends and meaning, and conveying the information concisely and convincingly. Moreover, they frequently have easier access to documentary and graphic materials than policy officials and know how to use them.

Another key to the contribution intelligence made to the INF success was the access analysts had to policy officials. What made the major difference was the analysts' willingness to respond to what the policymaker really wanted. In most cases, that need was not analysis of trends, national-level problems, nor even probabilities. It was information, assessments, and ideas about how the policymaker could accomplish his goal or solve his problem. Alerting the policymaker to oncoming problems or opportunities was also useful. An analyst's utility in this regard depended largely on his ability to know in operational, not just theoretical, terms what those goals and problems were, and this sometimes turned on a policymaker's willingness to share that information. Often he did not realize the analyst could
contribute in that fashion until the latter volunteered an example of such work. Moreover, this kind of help cannot be supplied effectively in a document intended for general distribution. The policymaker responds better if he believes the analysis has been prepared specifically for him, and a tailored document often is the only vehicle that can carry the proper level of detail.

Another important factor in obtaining access to policymakers is the time and effort analysts put into getting and retaining their attention, even when there is little important analysis to pass on. During the INF negotiations, good analysts assessed their policy counterparts and then used every means they could muster to give him support: alerting him with phone calls, providing interesting numbers or technical details that the policymaker could play with in his own mind, giving him titillating tidbits from clandestine reporting, and responding quicker than anyone else when asked for information.

The ability to handle policymaker needs in this manner may be affected by the level at which analyst-policymaker contact takes place. Working-level analysts (as distinct from their managers) routinely had direct contact with policymakers during the INF deployment experience, possibly because at first the subject was a relatively unimportant issue. In addition, analyst continuity was unusual; several analysts focused on the subject for several years, and the expertise they developed gained recognition in policy circles. A major contribution of intelligence management was in not superseding these analysts when INF became a hot policy issue, although the level of supervision did increase. Moreover, even when NSC principals became directly involved, working-level analysts remained key participants in preparing and delivering intelligence to the policy community and to foreign audiences.

This level of involvement had important consequences. The analysts remained more responsive to policymaker needs than probably would have been possible had they not had such direct contact. A high level of operational detail could be supplied in support of policy execution that probably would not otherwise have occurred. In addition, the analysts felt personally responsible for the success of the policy, and this heightened their willingness to take action rather than pass the buck when something arose that needed immediate attention.

An examination of the close working relationship between intelligence analysts and policy officials during the INF negotiations inevitably leads to the question of professional ethics. As far as I am aware, no one who served as an analyst believed his or her intelligence products were
tarnished by "politicization." Apparently none felt tainted by active involvement in policy execution:

* With one major exception, intelligence officers were not subjected to pressure from policymakers to slant analysis in order to help achieve a policy objective. Because they shared the policymakers' view that Soviet SS-20s posed a growing threat to Western Europe.

• When, under the Carter administration, policy and intelligence officers disagreed over the likelihood that NATO countries eventually would accept deployment, the disagreement was openly resolved to the apparent satisfaction of both sides. The analysts did not abandon their doubts, although they expressed them less frequently, but provided effective tactical intelligence support for even those policy options whose efficacy they doubted.

• Early in the Reagan period, when Defense Department officials tried to change or suppress certain views of intelligence analysts, senior CIA officials held firm. Subsequent appeals to the DCI also did not succeed.
Secret