As pointed out, Mr. President, the new START proposal the Soviets tabled at Geneva, in its language on long-range cruise missiles and forward based systems, appears to modify some of the most objectionable parts of Moscow's earlier position. Yet the new proposal is linked to our acceptance of their call last week for a mutual obligation not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 15 to 20 years.

We believe that their new tack on cruise missiles and forward based systems is designed to help them look good and get concessions on the ABM Treaty which they hope will stop or impede SDI.

The Soviets clearly are putting forward proposals designed to create an image of comprehensiveness, progress and coherence, but their proposals in the aggregate are not in the US interest. We should put forward similarly comprehensive proposals which are in our interest. We have the basis for this in the framework we have already put forward. We should try to package it more broadly and do what we can to make it more specific.

We should continue to pursue our basic objective in arms control which has been and should remain thoroughly verifiable reductions in offensive missiles together with transition towards greater emphasis on defensive systems. Any response to the new Soviet offer should emphasize a desire for a safer world in which defense becomes increasingly important so that offensive weapons progressively lose their value and their deep reductions and elimination becomes increasingly acceptable. We should stick to that basic objective while looking for approaches and mechanisms that link reductions in offensive missiles to the transition to defense.
The fact is that we have been asking for that kind of a discussion but we have failed to be specific as to how it can be achieved. That's not an easy task.

In approaching it we should focus on developing a transition that supercedes the ABM Treaty rather than allow ourselves to be sucked into or reaffirming a treaty which would have to be modified or abrogated if we are to achieve our SDI objective. We should recognize that the ABM Treaty is out of date and an obstacle to our basic SDI objectives. The Soviets want us to reaffirm the ABM Treaty to get the President to put his personal blessing on a treaty that would block SDI. This would undermine the program's funding and lessen any future prospect of our abrogation.

This would be a singularly inopportune time to agree to making withdrawal from the ABM Treaty harder. You have just determined not to be bound by SALT accords which have been violated. The ABM Treaty was agreed to on the explicit premise that tight limitations on offensive weapons would follow. This has clearly not been accomplished. Indeed, the Soviets almost immediately launched a massive increase in their offensive weapons. Simultaneously, they have continued to develop their ABM capabilities to the point where they have put themselves in a position to break out of the Treaty and rather quickly deploy a strategically threatening missile defense in other parts of the country. In addition, they have violated the ABM Treaty itself. It would be hard to imagine a weaker signal on the heels of your response to violations of the two SALT accords than to switch your position at Geneva and negotiate key changes in the ABM Treaty which the Soviets clearly want to stop or to impede the development of SDI.

State, Defense and ACDA have all done serious work on how to achieve the transition to defense and on the feasibility of sharing a strategic defense when and if it is developed. That work should be mined for ideas we can use now.
I have the impression that, up to now, we have only philosophised vaguely and hoped to draw the Soviets into a discussion of a transition to defense. We should try to work towards a more realistic discussion which would recognize that the Soviets, too, are working on missile defense and see whether we can develop some understandings on the pace with which the work should proceed and seek to develop a relationship between offensive missiles and the progress which can be made in creating defense capabilities to make them less necessary. We can talk about controlling the pace of SDI development, but we cannot accept restraints on the development itself.

Uncertainty as to where we and the Soviets stand on our respective missile defense programs and as to the rate of progress that can be achieved will make it difficult to be very specific in proposing or agreeing on time frames. It will be difficult but we should try. The very process of dialogue can well enable each of us to learn more about the other's programs, in a way which we could afford. The Soviets' response to your proposal of open labs provides some encouragement on this.

We should look at what both sides are actually doing and will continue to do on strategic defenses. We need to be careful not to create additional limits we would observe and the Soviets would evade or violate. We must not fall again into the fatal flaw of the ABM Treaty which gave prior assurances on defenses (which the Soviets have evaded and are now violating) while leaving offensive reductions open to future negotiations which did not succeed.

Moreover, we should start to think in private about our political and military options with respect to the ABM Treaty itself. The Treaty review is scheduled for late 1987 and the sooner we give some thought to what we might want to do there, the better off we are going to be. This is especially
important if Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty continues and if the Soviets refuse to engage in a discussion of transition to a safer world involving strategic defense.

Whatever proposal we make, it should not be one which signals a readiness to place additional restrictions on defense, but one which clearly reaffirms our objective of monitorable missile reduction, together with working for progress on a defensive system which will impair the value of offensive missiles.

Finally, we should note that there are prerequisites to making missile reductions safe and workable. These would include:

-- Resolving the imbalance in conventional forces and chemical/biological weapons.
-- Full compliance with existing and future agreements, and effective verification.