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DCI TALKING POINTS
NSPG RE ARMS CONTROL
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If it is politically necessary to put out a new proposal at this stage, I think the one under consideration is a good one. The banning of mobile ICBMs and new heavy ICBMs would make the world more stable and relatively easier to monitor and verify.

One downside of putting out a new proposal at this stage is that although our proposal is more balanced and realistic than the Soviet proposal, the great bulk of the public will not readily appreciate the differences. To counter this, we need to emphasize—with the Soviets and in public—the differences in the two offers.

The Soviet proposal guts most of the US strategic modernization effort—MX, Midgetman, the D-5 SLBM, cruise missiles, and the Stealth applications. It would allow most Soviet modernization programs. It ignores the enormous Soviet advantage in air defense against our bombers, and that ballistic missiles—particularly land-based—are destabilizing.

The Soviets lump US aircraft carriers and other forward-based systems as strategic weapons, but they can easily back off on that at the appropriate point and appear to be making a big "concession."

The US counter-proposal tries to get at ballistic missile throwweight, a big Soviet advantage, whereas the Soviets preserve their advantage here.

TOP-SECRET

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I don't think we should seek a discussion of the interpretation of the ABM Treaty. You have publicly expressed our position clearly and an effort to seek further discussion of it would be a sign of weakness. Rather, we should focus the discussion on how to work together on a long-term transition to missile defense. This would include an "open laboratories" provision which would permit visits to each others' SDI research sites. It is amazing how our laboratories are open to Soviet and other foreign visitors; we, however, do not get comparable access to Soviet facilities.

I would urge you to seize the high ground on this by proposing this open policy be extended to regular meetings and exchanges of information between those working on missile defense to on-site inspection for SDI testing locations. I believe something positive like this offers the most important and valuable proposal for you to bring to the meeting.

Any US counter-proposal and subsequent arrangement on strategic forces should be subject to satisfactory verification provisions. We are working to make our monitoring capability as strong as possible.

One of our most important objectives at Geneva should be to make Gorbachev understand that if the USSR wants progress in arms control, verification will be the key and their denial practices must be changed through their own corrective actions. If arms control is to have a future, the Soviets must go home from Geneva with this idea clearly set in their minds.
I would not put out a general counter-proposal until the time of your meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev. The Soviets know a US response is coming. For you to put out a specific proposal earlier would give the Soviets an opportunity to come up with another proposal to put you on the defensive. From the way they have operated so far, we should certainly expect this whenever the counter-proposal is broached to the Soviets, I would make it subject to a balanced, comprehensive offer, including specifics on verification, to be tabled at the next session of the Geneva nuclear and space arms control talks.