Our current judgments on what the Soviet leaders are likely to bring and expect in their discussions with you are based on analysis and speculation from the Soviets' basic concerns about SDI and their economy and a stream of hints and feelers and leaks, most of which appear authorized and deliberate.

Overall, Soviet objectives in the two meetings will be:

-- To commit us, partially if not fully, to limit SDI testing and deployment accompanied by overall impression of progress in arms control.

-- To create the perception of the easing of tensions and of "progress" across the board (this as a first step to rekindle the atmosphere of detente with a longer term view to restoring a flow of trade, financing and civilian technology).

-- With or without progress on arms control, they will aim to position USSR favorably for post-meeting politicking. If they cannot stop SDI through negotiation, they will try to stop it politically in the US--they see the Geneva meeting as a way to advance both approaches.
Despite these overtures and others likely to come, it is our view that the Soviets see the two upcoming meetings primarily as political and propaganda contests and that they believe there is little chance for substantial progress, especially on arms control.

Their other objective, enhanced by an attractive arms control proposal, will be to use discussion of bilateral issues and other subjects to convey an impression of reasonableness and to kindle a warmer atmosphere between the two countries. They might propose some sort of written document or communique affirming the need for improved relations and surround the entire exercise with agreements on bilateral issues and media coverage of a friendly atmosphere. This, in turn, they expect to lead to a sigh of relief in the West and a better climate for trade and other economic relations as well as increased pressures on US for cooperation in other areas.

In trade, regional issues, human rights and bilateral relations, the Soviets will try to complement their arms control strategy in terms of rekindling the appearance of a warmer atmosphere between the two countries.

On trade, will not come hat in hand, rather they are likely to make the case for mutual benefit and advantage.

On human rights, we doubt the Soviets would initiate discussion.

We may see new commitments on Jewish immigration and perhaps even release of a dissident or two to appear forthcoming on human rights.

and we believe there will be a significant increase in Jewish emigration limited to the next three months, with hints that a possible extension depends on Jewish support for improved Western ties with the USSR. Pretty blatant attempt to manipulate pressure groups--will see more.
They are likely to give only fleeting attention to bilateral agreements in meetings with you but would want to have couple of things to sign in Geneva (cultural agreement, Kiev consulate, Aeroflot).