Soviet Strategic and Political Objectives in Arms Control in 1985

Special National Intelligence Estimate

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SOVIET STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN ARMS CONTROL IN 1985

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THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

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SCOPE NOTE

This Estimate examines the Soviet approach to the arms control process through the end of 1985; unless otherwise indicated, its judgments are not intended to extend beyond that period. It does not attempt to provide a detailed preview of Soviet negotiating tactics or possible bargaining packages. Rather, it considers both the broad outlines of Soviet strategy within the negotiations and the political and propaganda campaign whereby the Soviets will attempt both to influence US negotiating positions and to achieve their goals without having to make significant concessions in the talks. It also considers how the Soviets view the relationship between their arms control goals and other objectives worldwide.
KEY JUDGMENTS

The USSR's primary objective in the renewed arms control process is to avert a situation in which sustained US military programs undercut Soviet strategic advantages achieved through past and current force modernizations, and possibly give critical new advantages to the United States in the 1990s and beyond. The Soviets want to protect and, if possible, strengthen their own strategic force capabilities while trying to constrain US and NATO force modernization programs—above all, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

The Soviets will probe for opportunities to accomplish this in the negotiations themselves, and they hope to increase and exploit political opposition to US programs in the United States and Western Europe. Their efforts will be directed toward getting the United States to cancel key US strategic weapons programs, and toward dividing the European NATO nations from the United States and encouraging them to put pressure on the United States on strategic issues.

We expect that during 1985 the thrust of Soviet activities will focus on public diplomacy. Nevertheless, we believe that the Soviets' failure to date to block NATO INF deployments and their apparent respect for the US administration's ability to defend its major weapons programs in Congress will have tempered the Soviets' expectations as to the effectiveness of their public relations efforts. We should, therefore, not be surprised—more likely next year than this year—if the Soviets were to make some changes in their initial negotiating positions at Geneva, particularly as modest demonstrations of flexibility could enhance the impact of their propaganda efforts. US positions in the talks will of course also affect Soviet strategy.

Moscow's arms control campaign will be concurrently aimed at achieving a wide range of collateral objectives, such as reviving a mood of detente in Western Europe aimed at securing economic benefits, reassuring East European allies, complicating Chinese efforts to derive diplomatic leverage from US-Soviet differences, and encouraging Western tolerance of the Soviet role in the Middle East, South Asia, and Latin America.

Soviet strategy and tactics in arms control negotiations over the next year will be shaped by:

— A realistic appraisal that the threats posed by the development and deployment of US systems are not immediate.
— The more favorable prospects for using political means rather than negotiated agreements to limit that evolution.

— The expectation that political and strategic benefits will be realized as Soviet strategic programs now under development become operational.

The Soviets are unlikely to see a major threat to their strategic position stemming from new US systems coming on line during the time frame of this Estimate. They also understand that:

— A comprehensive US ballistic missile defense system lies well in the future.

— Deployment of a number of major new offensive systems (including MX and D-5) is not in the immediate offing, and that in some cases deployment remains clouded by political debate.

Thus, the Soviets are unlikely to feel a need to quickly achieve a major agreement in the Geneva negotiations, although nervousness over a possible US technological breakthrough in ballistic missile defense conceivably persuades them that they do not have forever to attain constraints on US programs. The difficulties of economic and military planning for a future made more uncertain and challenging by US military programs, especially SDI, weigh on the minds of Soviet leaders. In a period of manifold economic problems, they would prefer an environment in which they can set their own pace of force modernization, which existing Soviet programs indicate will be vigorous in any case, rather than additionally having to hedge against new US capabilities. We believe, however, that this consideration will not prompt any significant concession from the Soviets during the period of this Estimate.

Initially, Moscow probably intends to hold firm at Geneva on its present positions while pressing the United States to make concessions that will allow for "real progress." It is likely that initially the Soviets will seek in the talks:

— On space and defensive weapons, a ban or moratorium on space-based and antisatellite weapons and hold the prospect of any significant agreement on offensive systems hostage to this demand.

— On intermediate-range nuclear forces, a moratorium on further INF deployments and compensation for British and French systems.

— On strategic nuclear weapons, a US commitment to continued observance of SALT I and II restraints. In addition, the Soviets
will resist any US attempts to reduce significantly the number of Soviet ICBMs or their throw weight, and they are likely to float proposals aimed at constraining D-5 and cruise missile deployments. The Soviets are unlikely to offer substantial reductions in their strategic offensive forces in return for US restraints on SDI because they probably are not yet convinced that SDI is technologically or politically viable and will be very reluctant to trade off systems in being for systems not yet deployed or deployable.

Moscow’s 19 March proposed omnibus joint declaration is in line with these judgments.

Moscow’s overall political strategy for undercutting US policies is broadly shaped by its belief that the US administration has been under pressure at home and from US Allies to engage seriously in arms negotiations, that a number of US defense programs face strong opposition from segments of the American public and in the Congress, and that there are conflicts over them within the administration itself. The Soviets aim to build public and Allied pressure on the administration to demonstrate that it is “serious” in seeking progress in Geneva by curtailing its strategic programs or making concessions on other arms control issues without Moscow’s having to offer any quid pro quo. The Soviets will seek to counter the administration’s argument that support of its defense programs enhances arms control prospects, and to encourage the view that defeat or deceleration of these programs will clear the way to progress in the talks and even to other favorable shifts in Soviet policies, such as that on human rights, including Jewish emigration. (Specific tactics used by the Soviets to implement their strategy will include those described in annex A.)

In Europe, the Soviets are mounting a major effort to persuade NATO and other governments to put pressure on the United States, the Dutch and Belgian Governments to resist INF deployment, and West Europeans at large that US policies recklessly threaten world peace and particularly the security of Europe. Besides pressing its arguments through diverse diplomatic channels and a large propaganda and disinformation network—probably including forgeries, covert press placements, and agents of influence—the Kremlin will attempt to reinvigorate the peace movement, court West European opposition parties, place before European businessmen the incentive of greater export opportunities, establish new propaganda channels, and exploit international gatherings. (Soviet efforts toward these ends are discussed in annex B.)
The basic political strategy toward the arms control process outlined above will undoubtedly be modified by the Soviets in minor ways as they assess US proposals and, more important, signals emerging from US and European polities. We believe, however, that the Soviets are very likely to stick to the broad outline depicted above for at least the first six months of the renewed Geneva negotiations and probably longer.

General Secretary Gorbachev’s accession to power will not suddenly transform Soviet arms control policies, although he is likely to use any flare for personal diplomacy in an attempt to increase the political pressure on the United States for concessions. More significant for Soviet arms control behavior, though, will be the power structure in the ruling oligarchy in terms of its stability, its cohesiveness, and the strength of Gorbachev’s authority. (These and other domestic factors affecting Soviet arms control policy are discussed in annex C.) Soviet hints of “new lines” on arms control and East-West relations may emerge during the next few months. They could be genuine probes for areas of agreement, but they are more likely in the near term to represent tactical efforts to play on disagreements in the West.
DISCUSSION

Overall Political Objectives

1. The Soviet Union will approach the renewed arms control process, as in the past, in pursuit of political and strategic advantage for the USSR. Moscow's familiar objective will be to protect and, if possible, strengthen its own strategic force capabilities while trying to constrain US and NATO force modernization programs and pursuit of new capabilities—above all, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The USSR seeks in the current phase of arms control interactions to avert a situation in which it sees sustained US military programs undercutting Soviet strategic advantages achieved through past and current force modernization, and possibly giving the United States critical new advantages in the 1990s and beyond.

2. The Soviets will probe for opportunities to do this through agreements, and they hope to increase and exploit the political opposition to US programs in the United States and Western Europe. Their efforts will be directed toward getting the United States to cancel key US strategic weapons programs, and toward dividing the European NATO nations from the United States and encouraging them to put pressure on Washington on strategic issues.

3. We expect that during 1985 the thrust of Soviet activities will focus on public diplomacy. Nevertheless, we believe that the Soviets' failure to date to block NATO INF deployments and their apparent respect for the US administration's ability to defend its major weapons programs in Congress will have tempered the Soviets' expectations as to the effectiveness of their public relations efforts. We should, therefore, not be surprised—more likely next year than this year—if the Soviets were to make some changes in their initial negotiating positions at Geneva, particularly as modest demonstrations of flexibility could enhance the impact of their propaganda efforts. US positions in the talks will of course also affect Soviet strategy.

4. We believe the Soviets are concerned that, if they do not stop or inhibit SDI, MX, the D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) deployments, and other US force modernization efforts, their long-term strategic ambitions could be seriously threatened. To the extent they can inhibit these developments, at minimal cost to their own programs, they protect and enhance their future global power position. The combination of political controversies about military programs currently coming to a head in the United States makes 1985 a potentially critical year in their effort. If not stopped soon, the Soviets probably believe these programs will gain further momentum in the future.

5. Moscow is especially concerned about SDI, both by itself and in the context of other US force improvements and policy shifts:

   — SDI has the potential to undercut the USSR's strategic war-fighting capabilities.
   — SDI bespeaks a US shift toward the deployment of other war-fighting capabilities that the USSR fears.
   — Countering SDI presents a potentially severe long-term technology challenge and economic cost.
   — The Soviets are uncertain but genuinely concerned about the capabilities it could produce. If substantially successful, the SDI program could conceivably give the United States strategic dominance for some period of time. Even if less successful, it could impart major technology advantages in strategic defense applications and space.

6. The Soviets' concerns about US aims are influenced by their own views of what they would seek to accomplish were they to possess the economic and technological potential they attribute to the United States. Thus, partly for propaganda effect, but also out of conviction, the Soviets reject US protestations about the stabilizing intent of SDI and nearer term force modernization programs, and attribute to the United States the goal of strategic superiority for which the USSR has long worked.

7. In addition to arousing genuine strategic and technological concerns, the symbolism of SDI will
Soviet Perspective on SDI

Moscow is especially concerned about the US Strategic Defense Initiative, both by itself and in the context of US force improvements and policy shifts. The Kremlin's reaction two years ago to SDI was immediate and unambiguous, and to this day has remained consistently and totally negative. The Soviets view the President's announcement of SDI as the opening of a new chapter in an American drive to negate Soviet advantages in strategic offensive forces. Consequently, they have given priority status to the goal of undermining it.

The Soviet reaction has been deeper than just an attempt to preserve military-related advantages in the field of space. The USSR fundamentally objects to what it perceives as a US effort to force the pace in strategic defense efforts on which the USSR has been working intensively for many years.

The Soviet strategic buildup, which began in the mid-1960s, clearly demonstrates that the Soviets have not accepted Western notions of mutual vulnerability as a desirable basis for the US-Soviet strategic relationship. Instead, they have sought to present a credible war-fighting posture—with both counterforce and damage-limitation elements. Their vast air defenses, civil defense program, and antiballistic missile (ABM) research and development effort are all intended to contribute to this posture.

Nevertheless, the Soviets recognize that for the foreseeable future each side will remain vulnerable to nuclear destruction at the hands of the other, even after the other side has absorbed a first strike. Unless they can themselves eventually develop and deploy an effective nationwide defense against ballistic missiles, the Soviets are likely to continue to value the constraints imposed on the United States by the ABM Treaty, which have permitted Moscow to pursue strategic defense technologies and systems at its own pace, and which the Soviets have viewed as tending to dissuade Washington from making comparable investments.

SDI—even a program limited to point defense of US ICBMs and strategic command and control—risks undermining Moscow's counterforce capability, or at least making it substantially more expensive to maintain. Given what the Soviets see as the comparative US advantage in exploiting new military technologies, SDI threatens to do this while the damage-limiting element of Soviet strategy lags behind.

SDI continues to stimulate intense hostility from the Soviets. They see a program whose intended aim is to "render nuclear missiles obsolete" as a political and psychological attack on their position as a strategic superpower whose military backbone is its ICBM force. They also see the advanced technological qualities of the program and its disturbing implications for many in the United States and Europe as inviting polemical attack on the entirety of US military policy and programs.

8. The Soviets realize, however, that these challenges will not all come to fruition in one year or even four years, and anticipate a multiyear political campaign to contain them. They believe there will be future political opportunities to blunt the US strategic challenge, particularly toward the end of President Reagan's second term and at the beginning of the next administration.

9. During the period of this Estimate, the Soviets will aim to:

- Prevent US development of SDI components and, where possible, limit SDI-related research.
- Secure a freeze on further NATO deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe and obtain the withdrawal particularly of the Pershing IIs.
- Block or limit the deployment of new US offensive nuclear systems, including the MX, the D-5 SLBM, cruise missiles, and B-1.
- Prevent any deep cuts in their own current strategic forces and preserve strategic programs currently under development.
- Obtain mutual restraint agreements, tacit or explicit, that preserve in major areas existing Soviet advantage or parity with the United States; for example, SALT II and an ASAT moratorium.

10. Toward these goals, the Soviets will seek to pressure the administration and to influence the US Congress through public statements, diplomacy, and a host of active measures directed at US and Allied audiences. Their arms control political and propaganda campaign will be concurrently aimed at achieving other objectives as well, including:

- "Wedge-driving" between the United States and its Allies.
- Reviving hopes for detente in Western Europe and elsewhere with the aim of securing economic benefits and strengthening political forces cooperative with the USSR.
- Reassuring Soviet East European allies concerned about Soviet "counterdeployments" and the breakdown of previous US-Soviet arms talks.
The Soviets also will seek to:

— Complicate Chinese efforts to derive diplomatic leverage from US-Soviet differences.
— Encourage Western tolerance of Soviet activity in the Middle East, South Asia, and Latin America.

11. The interrelationship between Soviet arms control policy and Soviet domestic factors, including the recent succession of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary, is discussed in annex C.

Strategy and Tactics Within the Talks

Soviet Perceptions of Prospects for Agreements

12. Soviet expectations for the new phase of Geneva talks are lower than they were at the onset of past US-Soviet strategic forces negotiations. Moscow's appreciation of the substantive positions of the two sides and its general assessment of the Reagan administration have limited its expectations of making concrete gains by agreement. The gains the Soviets have made in the past in their strategic nuclear posture vis-a-vis the United States have resulted primarily from their own military efforts. The arms control process ratified the relative growth of Soviet strategic power.

13. Soviet strategy and tactics in arms control negotiations over the next year will be shaped by:

— A realistic appraisal that the threats posed by development and deployment of US systems are not immediate.
— The more favorable prospects for using political means rather than negotiated agreements to limit that evolution.
— The expectation that political and strategic benefits will be realized as Soviet strategic programs now under development become operational.

14. The Soviets are unlikely to see a major threat to their strategic position stemming from new US systems coming on line during 1985, the time frame of this Estimate. They also understand that:

— A comprehensive US ballistic missile defense system lies well in the future.
— Deployment of a number of major new offensive systems (including MX and D-5) is not in the immediate offing, and in some cases deployment remains clouded by political debate.

15. Moreover, the Soviets will seek to exploit opportunities in both Western Europe and the United States over the next year to increase political opposition aimed at limiting development and deployment of US and NATO systems. These include:

— Congressional consideration of the administration's request for $3.7 billion in funding for SDI.
— Congressional debate on the MX/Peacekeeper ICBM.
— Renewed Congressional debate on US testing of the F-15-launched antisatellite (ASAT) system.
— The Dutch cabinet decision, scheduled for November, on whether to proceed with INF deployments.
— President Reagan's scheduled trip to Western Europe this spring.

16. The Soviets may believe their strategic position will become stronger over the next year or so as their own sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) deployments get under way and new Soviet cruise missile and ICBM programs come on line.

17. Soviet strategic force modernization programs also have an impact on Soviet political objectives in arms control. The Soviets will try to use that buildup to make the case that all US force improvements will simply prompt Soviet "responses" and thus will be futile. On the other hand, there is an inherent tension between the USSR's claims of being the leader of the forces of peace and its vigorous military buildup. We do not, however, expect the Soviets to make any significant changes to their planned modernization programs solely for political impact. The military imperatives motivating these programs will continue to outweigh any temporary "public relations" benefits.

18. In light of these considerations, the Soviets are unlikely to feel a need to quickly achieve a major agreement in the negotiations, although nervousness over a possible US technological breakthrough in ballistic missile defense conceivably persuades them that they do not have forever to attain political or negotiated constraints on the United States. The leverage of the Soviet side for getting desired results on space/defense issues lies in the weight of past deployments of Soviet offensive systems and the dynamism of continuing programs in both offensive and defensive areas. As US offensive force modernization programs currently still in development move into the
deployment phase, and if the SDI program becomes more of a technical reality, the Soviets may well fear that their leverage, both in negotiations and in political-propaganda terms, will subside.

**Soviet Negotiation Posture**

19. As it has emerged in both public and most confidential communications, the starting position of the Soviet side is very demanding: the United States should forswear completely the “militarization of space”—that is, cancel the SDI and ASAT programs, in return for which the USSR will negotiate limits and “radical” reductions on offensive systems in terms of “equality and equal security.” Although the Soviets have tacitly accepted the fact of some INF deployments, they still insist that any outcome on offensive systems must respect the basic structure of their offensive forces and take account of British and French offensive forces. Some Soviets have hinted that SDI-type research and development (R&D) activities might have to be tolerated because their cessation following any prohibition agreement cannot be verified. But, more frequently and authoritatively, they have insisted that SDI R&D is itself tantamount to an intent to deploy. So far they have not indicated the kind of offensive agreement that realistically might persuade the United States to move toward Soviet positions on space/defense issues. They merely insist that it should do so to avoid the great dangers and costs of an accelerated arms competition.

20. Soviet strategy in the Geneva talks for the period of this Estimate is likely to be one of holding firm to these basic positions, while pressing the United States to show “good faith” by agreeing to interim steps, such as an INF or ASAT moratorium, that would advance Soviet objectives without eliciting significant concessions in return. Soviet leadership statements have repeatedly endorsed a nuclear freeze, a test ban moratorium, and a halt in further missile deployments as “initial steps” that both sides should agree to in Geneva. The Soviets will want to generate pressure on the United States for flexibility, while arguing that US military programs are a threat to progress in the negotiations.

21. Soviet negotiators will hold to the position that progress on strategic arms reduction talks (START) and on INF depends on reaching some type of understanding on curbing weapons in space. This approach will be aimed at exploiting perceived US interest in reaching a START agreement and European interest in an INF agreement and at using NATO’s consultative process as a means of bringing Allied pressure to bear on Washington on SDI. The Soviets, however, must balance their long-term interest in blocking SDI against their interest in limiting ongoing US strategic offensive programs that present a near-term threat. Despite their rhetoric on linkage, they would study carefully any US proposal that they believed offered promise of achieving the latter objective. They would expect that a prospective agreement on offensive forces might undermine support for those programs and SDI even though such an agreement had not actually entered into force.

22. **Strategic Nuclear Weapons Talks.** The Soviets will continue to argue that SALT I and II restraints should be observed while resisting any US attempts to impose deep cuts in the number or throw weight of Soviet ICBMs. They will continue to insist that the SS-X-25 ICBM is a SALT II–permitted modernization of the SS-13 and not a prohibited “new type” of ICBM, as the United States charges; and they will continue with their deployment preparations. They probably will propose again to limit total strategic warheads in order to force the United States to offset its deployment of cruise missile warheads with reductions in reentry vehicles on ICBMs and SLBMs. They also may propose lower sublimits on multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) than they did in START, to constrain the US D-5 SLBM and ALCM programs.

23. At a later stage in the negotiations, the Soviets might show some interest in trade-offs between US and Soviet force asymmetries in cruise missiles, heavy bombers, and land-based ICBMs. They are unlikely to offer substantial reductions in their strategic offensive forces in return for US restraints on SDI because they probably are not yet convinced that SDI is technologically or politically viable and will be very reluctant to trade off systems in being for systems not yet deployed or deployable. Furthermore, limiting their offensive forces without limits on SDI would inhibit their options to respond to US strategic defenses.

24. **Intermediate-Range Nuclear Weapons Talks.** The Soviets will continue their efforts to limit US intermediate-range missiles in Europe while retaining a substantial force of SS-20s. They almost certainly will call for a moratorium on further intermediate-range deployments in Europe by both sides early in the talks; according to a reliable source, an official of the Institute for the USA and Canada said in January that a freeze on US INF deployments would
be “in the forefront” of the talks. They currently have SS-20 bases under construction in the western USSR, however, which they will want to complete under the terms of such a moratorium. They also may seek to use any unfinished bases as bargaining chips in discussing reductions. They will continue to insist on compensation for British and French systems, although the complexity of the “umbrella” talks may provide the Soviets ways to seek compensation for those systems in areas other than INF. For example, Soviet assertions that US missiles in Europe are “strategic” suggest they eventually may address this issue in the strategic talks, presumably to demand that the United States reduce its central systems to compensate for its missiles in Europe as well as those of France and the United Kingdom.

25. On the other hand, the Soviets appear to have dropped their demand for complete withdrawal of the new US missiles. As part of their campaign to influence West European official attitudes toward the Geneva talks, Soviet diplomats in January formally presented Moscow’s version of the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko to US Allies. The Soviets commented that the objective of the intermediate-range talks should be an accord “simultaneously” to stop deployment of additional US and Soviet missiles and “subsequently” to reduce them to an agreed level. The Soviets eventually may focus on securing withdrawal of all or some Pershing IIs, while accepting some ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). They initially will use their SS-12 “counter-deployments” as a bargaining chip instead of some of the 100 to 120 SS-20s they previously had offered to withdraw. The Soviets also may attempt to use their emerging GLCM program as a bargaining chip, protecting their basic military requirement for SS-20s by insisting on trading Soviet GLCMs against NATO GLCMs and, if possible, Pershing IIs.

26. Space and Defensive Weapons Talks. The Soviets are likely to table quickly a proposal—perhaps a full treaty—for a comprehensive ban on space weapons similar to that contained in their 29 June 1984 proposal for space weapons talks in Vienna: a complete ban on “attack space systems.” Calls for such a ban are a staple of current Soviet propaganda, and Gromyko repeated the theme in his press interview of 13 January. They almost certainly will press for an early US moratorium on ASAT testing as a show of good faith. Reliable sources reported in January that Soviet officials privately had confirmed Moscow’s intention to raise this issue, and Gromyko probably had it in mind in his election speech of 19 February, when he said the talks could yield results if the United States exercised the “necessary restraint.”

27. The Soviets will maintain their insistence that the framework of the ABM Treaty be maintained and their assertion that the US SDI program reflects an intention to violate it. Underscoring the importance the Soviets attach to this agreement, an Izvestiya editorial in January called it the “cornerstone” of nuclear arms control. Nonetheless, according to reliable sources, two Soviet officials said in separate conversations in January that Moscow eventually might agree to a revised ABM treaty that would allow expanded ground-based “terminal” ballistic missile defense (clearly favoring their own systems now in development) while bannina space-based components capable of destroying missiles in the boost phase or in outer space trajectory.

28. Gromyko on 13 January seemed to be suggesting that Moscow might propose a partial, “verifiable” ban on the more advanced stages of research. In their effort to restrict SDI, the Soviets may propose a comprehensive ban on all SDI-type R&D related to space. Some officials have privately admitted, however, that research itself cannot be verifiably banned. Hence they are likely, at a minimum, to propose that a workable distinction—going beyond the 1972 ABM Treaty—between research and system development be defined and an effective, verifiable ban on the latter achieved, perhaps encouraging private and official elements on the US side to come up with a practical approach.

29. Compliance Issues. If the United States raises charges of Soviet noncompliance with previous arms control treaties, the formal Soviet response is likely to be that such issues are inappropriate for the Geneva talks and should be dealt with in the Standing Consultative Commission. In informal discussion, the Soviets are likely to repeat their public denials of wrongdoing, their claim that the United States has no evidence to back up its assertions, and their claim that the US accusations cast doubt on Washington’s sincerity in seeking new agreements. They also are likely to repeat their public charge that the United States itself has violated or intends to violate agreements with the aim of achieving military superiority, and that its accusations against the USSR are a smokescreen.

30. The Soviets, however, may take US concerns on compliance into account in formulating their future negotiating positions and attempt to appear somewhat more forthcoming on the issue of verification. The Soviets may at some stage in the negotiations attempt
to address some particular US concerns, such as the Krasnoyarsk radar, in developing their bargaining positions. According to reliable sources, at least two East Bloc officials—including Stanislav Menshikov, of the Central Committee's International Department—indicated in January that the Krasnoyarsk radar could become the subject of negotiations in Geneva.

31. Moscow's 19 March proposed omnibus joint declaration is in line with the above judgments on Soviet behavior in Geneva.

Strategy Outside the Talks
Targeting Western Audiences

32. Moscow's overall political strategy in targeting Western audiences is broadly shaped by its belief that the US administration has been under pressure at home and from US Allies to engage seriously in arms negotiations, that a number of US defense programs face strong opposition from segments of the American public and in Congress, and that there are conflicts over them within the administration itself. This perception has prompted the Soviets to conduct a broad political and propaganda campaign with the dual aim of influencing the US negotiating position within the talks and exploiting the resumption of talks to further a broad range of political objectives. In particular, this campaign encourages US and European opposition to SDI, which clearly has eclipsed US INF deployments in Europe as the target of highest priority for Soviet propagandists. Nonetheless, the campaign also targets other US strategic programs as well as INF deployments in Europe.

33. A number of themes have emerged since the campaign began:

— The real purpose of SDI is to achieve "strategic superiority" for the United States by creating a shield from behind which the United States could launch a first strike without fear of retaliation, and which exposes only Europe to the Soviet response.

— Proceeding with SDI will undermine the ABM Treaty and could destroy the basis for the arms control process itself.

— In addition to being extremely costly, SDI will prove technologically infeasible, and in any case can be countered effectively at much less cost by improving Soviet offensive capability and by implementing Soviet space weapons programs already under way; but the result will be a more dangerous strategic environment.

— US determination to proceed with other strategic programs—MX/Peacekeeper, Midgetman, D-5 SLBM, the B-1 and Stealth bombers, and cruise missiles of various basing modes—and US charges of Soviet noncompliance with previous arms control treaties indicate the United States is approaching the Vienna talks with the intention of camouflaging an arms buildup and scrapping existing treaty restraints in an effort to achieve strategic superiority.

— Both US insistence on proceeding with development of space weapons programs and the continuing deployment of US INF missiles in Europe threaten a breakdown of the Vienna talks.

— The USSR, by contrast, has demonstrated its "seriousness" about arms control by proposing a complete ban on the "militarization" of space, by undertaking a unilateral moratorium on ASAT testing, by unilaterally pledging not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, by proposing a general freeze on nuclear weapons, by proposing regional nuclear-weapons-free zones, and by tabling draft treaties this year at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) and at the talks on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR).

34. In support of their claim to good intentions, the Soviets further note that over the past year they have called repeatedly for US ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosives Treaty, a resumption of negotiations toward a comprehensive test ban treaty, and a chemical weapons ban. They continue to stress the significance of a US endorsement of the principles of nonfirst use of nuclear weapons and nonuse of force, and they frequently repeat General Secretary Chernenko's call last year for a "code of conduct" among the nuclear powers. Besides enhancing the image of the USSR as a proponent of peaceful relations and arms control, these calls almost certainly reflect a belief that, if the United States were to commit itself to any of these measures, public expectations would be raised and political pressure would mount for delays in US strategic programs and for US concessions in Vienna to maintain the momentum on arms control, while their rejection makes the United States look "insincere."

35. This strategy is aimed at building public and Allied pressure on the US administration to demonstrate that it is "serious" in seeking progress in Vienna by curtailing its strategic programs or making concessions on other arms control issues without Moscow's having to offer any quid pro quo. (Specific tactics used
36. Of greater concern to the Soviets than the negotiations themselves, however, will be the fate of major US military programs in the Congress. The Soviets will seek to counter the administration's argument that support of its defense programs enhances arms control prospects and to encourage the view that defeat or deceleration of these programs will clear the way to progress in the talks, and even other favorable shifts in Soviet policies, such as that on human rights, including Jewish emigration.

37. In Western Europe the Soviets will gear their strategy to three kinds of objectives:

— Enhancing pressure of NATO governments on Washington to relax its negotiating positions, and especially encouraging them to communicate anxiety about SDI.

— Encouraging NATO governments to believe that distance from US military and arms control policies will enhance their ability to develop favorable relations with the East on a whole range of issues, including trade.

— Developing among opposition parties and publics the view that the US and their own governments stand in the way of progress in arms control and European detente.

38. The Soviets are likely to enlist the whole gamut of political methods available to serve these aims:

— Extensive official and overt private contacts with governments, oppositions, and influential elites.

— Attempting to reenergize the peace movement with funds and guidance.

— Heavy use of overt and covert media influence.

— Exploitation of agents of influence.

39. The heavy preoccupation of Soviet policy and propaganda with SDI may wear thin on some European audiences that do not feel this issue to be theirs; those governments that either resist the Soviet view or are unwilling to expend political capital to press it on Washington; and segments of European opinion that see merit in participation in the long-range technological venture SDI will represent. The Soviets will seek to maintain the linkage of SDI with European concerns by stressing that progress on INF and other European arms control issues as well as European detente generally depends on satisfaction of Soviet concerns about SDI. The Soviets will continue to try to implant the notion that the intensification of arms competition generated by US military programs will be particularly injurious to Europe and may produce new tensions in Europe in the future.

40. The Soviets will pay particular attention to Britain and France. They will try to exploit British and French fears that SDI will result in an expanded Soviet ballistic missile defense effort, thereby reducing significantly the value of their national nuclear deterrent forces. They also will try to portray the technological and economic aspects of the US SDI program as injurious to West European interests.

41. Soviet political strategy also will give emphasis to influencing the government, opposition, and public of West Germany—particularly after the 40th anniversary of VE Day, which the Soviets will attempt to exploit to give West Germans a feeling of isolation. The Soviets will probably intensify a combination of hardline pressures on the government and more enticing hints of possible improvements to all West German audiences to encourage strains between the Federal Republic and the United States.

The Arms Control Process and Regional Security Issues

42. Regarded by Moscow as part of the wider political strategic struggle between East and West, the arms control process will intersect with regional security issues. In some cases, Soviet activity in relation to arms control will complement efforts to expand Moscow's regional influence. In other cases, the tactics used to pursue the two sets of objectives may work at cross purposes.

43. In Western Europe generally, the Soviets doubtless perceive their campaign to build Allied pressure on the United States over arms control as simultaneously serving their longstanding goal of splitting the NATO Alliance. A good example of their propaganda effort was General Secretary Gorbachev's recent election speech, which paid tribute to the 'wisdom' of West Europeans in wanting to prevent 'Europe, our common home' from being turned into a 'firing range for testing Pentagon doctrines of limited nuclear war.' Should the Soviets try to use pressure tactics on specific European security issues, such as access to Berlin, they run a risk of generating the opposite reactions.

44. In Eastern Europe, the Soviets probably hope that their willingness to negotiate with the United
States will have allayed some resentment over their previous walkout from the Geneva talks and subsequent "counterdeployment" of SS-12 missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Gromyko and party secretary Rusakov have claimed that the USSR will be speaking not just for itself but for its allies, and that their security interests must be "just as well protected" as those of the USSR. Making at all good on this pledge, however, will require more forthright consultation with, or at least informing of, East European governments about Soviet policies.

45. In the Middle East, the Soviets may believe that they already have gained somewhat from the easing of bilateral tensions marked by the return to arms negotiations. It was in their preliminary meeting in Geneva that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko agreed to resume bilateral discussions of Middle Eastern issues. The Soviets may hope that their propaganda campaign to portray themselves as a responsible international actor in conjunction with the arms talks will help reduce resistance to their playing a role in a future Mideast settlement and indirectly aid in their access to moderate Arab states.

46. Moscow's conduct of its relations with China is unlikely to be directly affected by the arms control talks, but the Soviets probably hope that the resumption of US-Soviet negotiations will complicate Chinese efforts to derive diplomatic leverage from US-Soviet differences.

47. Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan runs directly counter to the image Moscow is trying to create for itself in the West. There is, however, no indication the Soviets plan to alter their policies there, and they are unlikely to be dissuaded by arms control politics alone from taking steps they deem likely to improve their prospects of victory.

48. In Central America—particularly Nicaragua—we believe the arms control process will not change Moscow's policy of attempting to expand its regional influence. At the same time, the Soviets are aware of the special US sensitivity to their involvement in the area. Thus, they might be particularly inclined to avoid certain provocative actions that could threaten the Geneva talks unless there are unusually high payoffs. The Soviets will want to avoid any conspicuous softening of their stance so as not to give their clients the impression that Moscow is prepared to sell out their interests for a deal with the United States, and to avoid giving Westerners the impression that the USSR is approaching the Geneva talks from a position of weakness.

Outlook

49. The basic political strategy toward arms control outlined above will undoubtedly be modified by the Soviets in minor ways as they assess US proposals and, more important, signals emerging from the United States and Europe. We believe, however, that the Soviets are very likely to stick to its broad outlines for the first year of the renewed Geneva negotiations and probably longer. During this period the Soviets are very unlikely to make major concessions in the talks toward accommodating the basic US aims of substantially reducing offensive nuclear force levels while keeping open paths toward agreed tolerance of increased strategic defenses, and Moscow is likely to perceive Washington as also unwilling to compromise.

50. The reasons for this prognosis are the following: first, it is likely to take at least six months, and possibly more, for the Soviets to determine how well or poorly their political strategy is working. Although their objectives and tactics are familiar, they are operating in a novel environment defined by the introduction of space and strategic defense issues, the actual deployment of INF systems as talks proceed, the second term of an administration they regard as deeply hostile to them, and other factors. The Soviets will be most attentive to how the US administration's defense budgets and programs, especially SDI and MX, fare in Congress. But outcomes in either direction are not likely to cause quick changes in the basic Soviet political strategy. Should the administration do well, the Soviets will be inclined to keep to their strategy in the hope of doing better next year rather than to move promptly toward US positions or back out of the arms control process. Should the administration lose on important programs in Congress or confront new roadblocks on INF deployment, the Soviets are likely to try to parlay these developments into sustained trends by political means, rather than jump quickly to new arms agreements.

51. A second factor auguring continued near-term adherence to the Soviet arms control tactics described is the Soviet internal political scene. Mikhail Gorbachev now must consolidate his power in the midst of personal political rivalries and differences on important domestic issues. The current Soviet leadership constellation will not suddenly be transformed. We believe Soviet leaders may have somewhat different perspectives about how best to hedge against an intensified arms competition, but are in general agreement that little can be expected from this phase of the arms control dialogue with the West. Having seen the
meager results of their walkout strategy in 1983-84, however, they probably agree that their best chances of tempering US military policies and achieving other objectives toward NATO lie in a patient but active engagement on the arms control front while avoiding early substantive concessions. This strategy will continue to make sense to a majority of Soviet leaders as they grapple over their own status and major domestic policies. Soviet hints of “new lines” on arms control and East-West relations may emerge during this process. These could be genuine probes for areas of agreement, but are more likely in the near term to represent tactical efforts to play on disagreements in the West.
ANNEX A

Influencing US Opinion

1. As the Geneva talks proceed, the Soviets are likely to intensify their ongoing campaign to advance their objectives by attempting to influence US opinion at various levels. This campaign will include:

- Careful attention to any evidence of division within the executive branch, private and public attacks on individual officials judged hostile to arms control, and encouragement of a view that progress is possible if the “hardliners” are kept in line.

- Extensive efforts through formal visits and exchanges, contacts through diplomats, and other contacts to lobby various individuals such as members of Congress, staffers, and Congressional research offices against funding SDI and to limit US defense spending generally.

- Continuing contact with US scientific organizations, think tanks, and influential citizens to press Soviet views and develop an impression that great arms control progress can be made if the United States is flexible in the talks and moderates its overall policies.

- Efforts to persuade key business interests that US-Soviet trade can profitably increase if arms talks progress.

- Attempts to exploit the US media through leadership statements, communications with peace groups, press conferences, and op-ed placements. As the negotiations proceed the Soviets will continue to hint outside the negotiations at possibilities for modifying their positions in Geneva if the United States makes concessions. Their aim will be to encourage the US side to make the concessions that might bring new Soviet positions out of the closet.

2. The Soviets probably hold little hope of influencing directly the views of US administration officials. They are, however, waging a campaign against those who they believe most strongly oppose arms control positions Moscow would like to see the United States adopt. Soviet media continue to devote attention to alleged differences of opinion within the administration and criticize by name certain officials allegedly opposed to arms control. This has been accompanied by occasional private remarks meant to be conveyed to the administration to the effect that the Soviets believe the President himself is serious about seeking an agreement but fear he may relinquish management of the talks to subordinates who allegedly are not. The Soviets and their East European allies will lobby US officials in Washington. They also will press their case with West European officials in the United States.

3. The Soviets will continue to attempt in various ways to influence the US Congress. They probably place the highest value on opportunities to present their case directly to influential legislators, both during their visits to the USSR and as Politburo member Shcherbitskiy did as the head of the Supreme Soviet delegation to the United States recently. The Soviets will encourage travel to the USSR by US Congressmen and provide them access to Soviet leaders. In Washington, the Soviets also will attempt to cultivate the staffs of key members and committees as well as members of research offices serving the Congress. Soviet diplomats accredited in Washington will be the principal actors in this effort, but a diversity of Soviet visitors also will be used.

4. The Soviets also will attempt to influence members of important private research centers and universities throughout the United States. According to a reliable source, for example, six Soviets described as “generalists and diplomats” called on senior professors at US universities in January to propound the Soviet view on the Geneva talks. Representatives of various institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences also have made conspicuous efforts recently to meet with their US counterparts and make the case for Moscow’s positions, particularly on SDI. They may be most hopeful about affecting the views of those who visit the USSR, where the Soviets control the agenda and can grant the “favor” of access to prestigious institutions and individuals. The Soviets’ reading of US media may lead them to conclude that their best direct arguments to members of Congress lie in exhortations about the cost of new strategic systems and the futility of them because they will be matched with no real gain to US security one way or the other.
5. The Soviets also have attempted to enlist the support of US businessmen by hinting that progress on arms control would benefit US-Soviet trade. At the same time, a Soviet academician told US bank officials that expanded trade would serve as a "peaceful opener" to US-Soviet arms negotiations. Soviet press reporting on a Politburo meeting in December noted that Soviet leaders "viewed with understanding" the interest of US business circles in "normalization."

6. On the other hand, Moscow is likely to continue to avoid making the pursuit of this concrete interest in trade directly dependent on progress in arms control. The Soviets want expanded trade ties to boost the impression that bilateral relations are improving and need to be reinforced by US "flexibility" in the arms control process. The Soviets, moreover, have important economic objectives, including continued access to US grain and technology, that they would not want conditional on success in Geneva. If there were to be substantial progress in the negotiations on arms control, the Soviets doubtless would attempt to use the improved bilateral climate to obtain a relaxation of US restrictions on trade, particularly the embargo on strategic exports.

7. The Soviets also may attempt to influence segments of the US public by holding out the hope that progress in arms control could affect Soviet policies on human rights, including Jewish emigration. A reliable source recently reported that the director of the Space Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the vice president of the Academy, frequent visitors to the United States, have suggested on several occasions over the past six months that a US position on arms control that eased Soviet security concerns could lead to a relaxation of Moscow's human rights policies. Shortly after the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in January, the Soviets extended an invitation to the president of the World Jewish Congress to visit the USSR in March. This may have been intended to imply that the USSR's future policies toward its Jewish minority and toward Jewish emigration could depend in part on US conduct in the talks. If the Soviets decide to make this appeal a major part of their campaign on arms control, they probably will convey the message directly to influential Jewish organizations in the United States.

8. The Soviets will continue to attempt whenever possible to convey their message directly through US media. They doubtless will continue those practices that have proved successful over the past year in garnering increased US media coverage of their positions, including interviews where Soviet leaders respond in writing—or occasionally in person—to the questions of US correspondents, press conferences by Foreign Ministry spokesman Lomeyko and occasionally by higher ranking officials, and appearances on US talk shows and televised discussion groups by Soviet officials, academicians, and journalists whose command of the issues, knowledge of US society, and linguistic ability equip them to make an effective presentation. Another means of carrying the Soviet message directly to the US public will be a continuation of periodic "responses" by Soviet leaders to letters from US citizens and organizations, and occasional invitations to "ordinary citizens" to visit the USSR, to the accompaniment of lavish media attention. These efforts will seek to play on US interest in a "balanced view" and "understanding of others."
1. To achieve its objectives, Moscow is seeking to exploit differing views on arms control within NATO through a major propaganda effort, diplomacy, and active measures. Its failure to block NATO's INF deployments to date will temper Moscow's hopes.

Public Posture and Propaganda

2. During NATO discussion of the neutron bomb issue and the INF negotiations, the Soviets conducted a major campaign to derail NATO deployments and tried to exert pressure on the United States to make concessions in the talks. Top Soviet leaders played major roles in Moscow's effort to demonstrate the seriousness of the alleged threat from Western military programs and plans.

3. Although the Soviets undoubtedly see further opportunities in the Geneva talks to exploit European concerns over INF, they have in recent months shifted their propaganda and diplomatic campaign toward raising West European concerns over a space arms race. Since spring of last year, the Soviets have, in fact, conducted a major propaganda and diplomatic campaign similar in scope to that conducted in opposition to INF deployment, but with current emphasis on SDI and the interrelationship of the three sets of talks in Geneva. On 1 February, before his death, General Secretary Chernenko, in the most authoritative Soviet statement on arms control since Foreign Minister Gromyko's press interview of 13 January, reaffirmed that the Soviets see an "organic interrelationship" between nuclear and space arms, asserting that no limitation or reduction of nuclear arms is attainable without "effective measures" to prevent the "militarization" of outer space.

4. Authoritative Soviet statements and routine media commentary also have sought to encourage public and governmental opposition to SDI by claiming that Washington's plans undermine the ABM Treaty and would leave Western Europe exposed in the event of nuclear war. The Soviets have sought to convey the impression that the "overwhelming majority" of the population in Western Europe opposes SDI by consistently portraying it, as they did INF, as being forced on NATO by the United States.

Diplomacy

5. Because some European leaders have voiced serious concern about SDI, the Soviets seek to persuade NATO leaders to communicate their doubts and uncertainty to the United States. A number of trips by high-level Soviet officials to NATO capitals already have been set for this year—including Gromyko's recent venture to Italy and Spain—in an effort to increase pressure on the United States from official European sources. Meanwhile, Moscow will continue its campaign to delay or derail INF deployments in Western Europe. As long as the Soviets believe these deployments are in doubt, they will argue that US deployments dim the prospects for future agreements.

6. Along these lines:

— When West German Foreign Minister Genscher visited Moscow in late May 1984, Gromyko said in his luncheon speech that Moscow had "paid attention" to Genscher's recent discussions on the space weapons issue in Washington and urged the West Germans to "assess soberly" the situation and declare their support for using outer space for "peaceful purposes only." The general assault on SDI was continued during Genscher's brief trip to Moscow in March 1985.

— In June, Chernenko told visiting French President Mitterrand that Moscow shared French concerns about the SDI program, and he urged France to exert influence on the United States.

— With visiting British Foreign Secretary Howe in early July 1984, Gromyko devoted a considerable part of his luncheon speech to space weapons.

— During his trip to the United Kingdom in December, party secretary Gorbachev reinforced this theme in talks with Howe, declaring it "unrealistic" to hope for an end to the "nuclear arms race" unless it can be kept from expanding into outer space.

7. Following the Shultz-Gromyko talks in January, Soviet diplomatic efforts went into high gear, particular attention being paid to European countries that had not yet started INF deployments. Soviet ambassa-
dors throughout Western Europe delivered demarches on the Shultz-Gromyko meeting, claiming that Gromyko had taken the initiative in urging "measures to stop the arms race" and had stressed that "questions concerning space weapons, strategic systems, and medium-range nuclear weapons should be considered and resolved as a single complex, in their interrelationship." In addition:

8. Moscow is making a special effort to influence West European opposition parties, particularly in countries where it sees little hope for a change in the governing party's stance. In West Germany, for example, contacts with the Social Democratic Party (SPD) frequently focus on disarmament issues.

9. Soviet diplomatic efforts to influence arms control opinions in Western Europe, moreover, extend beyond the Alliance.

10. Moscow's propaganda and diplomatic efforts during the talks will be coordinated with the timing and substance of its proposals to influence West European opinion. Early on at Geneva, we expect the Soviets to propose a moratorium on further NATO deployments and Soviet countermeasures, while claiming that their SS-20 force has not increased. The Soviets may go so far as to publicly hold progress on INF issues hostage to such a moratorium in an effort to influence the Allies to halt the deployment of US cruise missiles.

11. Moscow, however, faces a problem in its anti-US diplomacy due to its insistence on compensation for British and French systems. In recent months, the Soviets have sought to assuage concern over this issue on the part of the French in particular—whom the USSR views as sympathetic on the issue of space weapons.

12. The Soviets also are careful to note to the French that "compensation" for such weapons would not involve dismantlement of the Force de Frappe.
Other Pressures

East-West Relations

13. The Soviets have demonstrated their intent to use the carrot-and-stick approach across a wide range of bilateral and multilateral issues in attempting to influence the West Europeans on arms control. Gorbachev's trip to the United Kingdom in December and Gromyko's trip to Italy and Spain in February and March appear to have been an effort to demonstrate that at least the atmospheres of bilateral relations can improve as a result of the improved East-West climate deriving from arms talks.

14. West Germany, on the other hand, has become a target of Soviet opprobrium for supporting US Pershing II deployments on German soil. Bilateral economic relations remain unaffected, but political relations have soured as the Soviets have conducted a propaganda campaign against alleged "revanchism." Soviet Foreign Ministry officials told US Embassy officers in mid-January that relations between Moscow and Bonn remain "under a shadow" because of the Kohl government's support for INF deployments. This Soviet line may be echoed throughout 1985. But it is likely to be combined with more vigorous efforts to court West German public opinion and to persuade Bonn that pressure on Washington could earn it significant improvement in Soviet-FRG relations.

15. Moscow not only will seek to persuade West European businessmen that increased trade will result from a "positive" arms control process; it also may attempt to influence them to newly pressure Washington to allow currently restricted exports to the USSR on the basis of the renewed dialogue and utility of such trade for inducing greater Soviet flexibility.

16. Moscow has also pressured its own allies to weigh in with the West Europeans on arms control. Although West Germany has been the principal target of this tactic, other West European countries are not immune to threats in this regard.

Other Disarmament Issues

17. Moscow is attempting to play on West European interest in improving East-West relations through disarmament initiatives outside the Geneva arena. Moscow also has used multilateral arms control forums to try to demonstrate a continuing interest in disarmament. The Soviets returned to the MBFR negotiations last year despite their walkout at START and the INF talks, and placed propaganda emphasis on their participation in MBFR talks and CDE. In recent weeks, the Soviets tabled draft treaties at both those forums in attempts to appear forthcoming. The proposals offer little substantive progress and are clearly an effort to demonstrate Soviet interest in movement in these areas so as to put the onus for lack of progress on the United States. On 2 February, Izvestiya strongly criticized the United States for allegedly trying to block "business-like" discussion of the Soviet CDE proposals and to discredit the CDE in European eyes.

18. The USSR, moreover, is not averse to using multilateral forums in a more negative way. At the end of the last MBFR round, for example, the Soviet representative harshly attacked West Germany in an apparent attempt to demonstrate that Bonn would have to pay a price at MBFR for its role in support of INF deployments.

19. In the months ahead, Moscow will continue to make a variety of general proposals, such as calls for US pledges on no first use of nuclear weapons and the nonuse of force, in an effort to enhance its image in Western Europe. In this vein, Chernenko shortly before his death reiterated support (previously expressed by Brezhnev and Andropov) for a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone.

Active Measures

20. Moscow clearly would like to reinvigorate the West European peace movement in the hope that it can generate public sentiment against US policies strong enough to provoke uncertainty in Washington about the wisdom of those policies or cause US policy to change as a result of Allied government pressures. After the initial INF deployments in late 1983, the West European peace movement lost momentum and suffered a series of setbacks. Since then, the Soviets have launched a "broad front" strategy in their relations with the West European peace movement. To regain a measure of influence in non-Communist groups, they have dropped their former demand that peace groups give unerring support to the Soviet policy line; the Soviets now are encouraging their supporters to join in the formation of broad coalitions even if they criticize the USSR.

21. At the same time, Moscow has begun to drum up support for a conference of Communist parties to
impart greater unity to worldwide Communist efforts. The Soviets justify the need for a conference by saying that the alleged Western threat necessitates greater cohesion and discipline on the part of all Communist parties. Moscow sees such a conference as a way to coordinate the "peace" work of East European governments and nonruling Western Communist parties and to promote cooperation with non-Communist elements of the West European peace movement.

22. Reliable sources have reported that Communist and other pro-Soviet leaders in recent months have called repeatedly for increased unity among Communist countries and for stepped-up cooperation between Communists and non-Communists as remedies for the current malaise in the West European peace movement. For example:

- An October 1984 meeting of the WPC, convened to discuss the "waning of the European peace movement," called for increased coordination to improve methods of influencing US and West European groups.

23. According to reporting from a number of sources, the Soviets have undertaken a variety of measures designed to strengthen the peace movement.

- In mid-September 1984, Moscow assigned Warsaw Pact countries differing responsibilities for funding the peace movement, giving Czechoslovakia responsibility for Austria, Switzerland, and southern West Germany; and East Germany responsibility for northern West Germany, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Moscow maintained control over funding for the Benelux countries.

24. Many mainstream elements of the peace movement are trying, as suggested above, to identify and isolate peace groups that subscribe to Moscow's policy line. For example, the 1985 European Nuclear Disarmament (END) conference, to be held from 3 to 6 July 1985, has a ground rule that will force Soviet-controlled organizations to show their true colors.

- This rule could force the WPC and other Soviet-sponsored organizations to associate themselves openly with official East European peace organizations, while independent Western groups presumably will choose as partners dissident Eastern groups like Solidarity in Poland.

25. Since the Soviet walkout from START and the INF negotiations, Moscow also has appeared to place increasing emphasis on the role of organized labor worldwide in the peace movement:

- At least twice in 1984, delegates from the Danish "Labor Movement for Peace" visited the Soviet Union, according to the US Embassy in Copenhagen.

- The Labor Movement for Peace has organized conferences and demonstrations throughout Denmark.

- Other Soviet initiatives involving the international labor movement in recent months have included the International Trade Union Meeting for
Peace in Managua, the Lisbon meeting which sought "Space for Trade Union Dialogue," and the joint statement by the New Zealand and Soviet labor federations on "international cooperation in Asia and the Pacific on peace and disarmament."

26. A new element in Soviet peace strategy is the "private" peace conference. Such conferences are set up, often with Soviet assistance, by Westerners having ties to the Soviets but not to Western governments or peace groups. For example, according to the US Embassy, Dutch businessman E. van Eeghen, who derives a considerable portion of his income from trade with the USSR, organized a conference in November 1984 for Dutch industrialists and former government officials. The focus of the conference, as reported in the Dutch press, was alternative defense concepts which, if seriously pursued by the Netherlands, would weaken the Dutch contribution to NATO defense. The US Embassy reported that Soviet participants at the meeting included a retired KGB general, the local KGB chief, and a resident KGB officer under journalist cover.

27. 

28. The Soviets currently are making preparations for the "Twelfth International Festival of Youth and Students," to be held in Moscow this July. The Soviet-backed religious front, the Christian Peace Conference, also will stage a massive world assembly that month in Prague; its main theme will be US responsibility for the arms race. Soviet propaganda officials—including Boris Ponomarev, chief of the party's International Department—declared that the festival should enhance the input of the younger generation in the struggle against "imperialist" forces.

29. We believe the Soviet active measures effort dedicated to combating SDI and supporting Soviet objectives in the arms control talks is gaining momentum and growing in intensity. The Soviets will probably soon broaden their tactics beyond those mentioned above. On 23 January, Peace Committee Chairman Zhukov asserted that it would be "utterly irresponsible" to think that antiwar forces might "scale down their actions while the diplomats come to accord." Judging by earlier Soviet campaigns, we believe that future Soviet active measures will include:

- Forgeries and disinformation that allege that SDI hardware, even in its development and testing phases, presents dangers to innocent populations.
- Covert press placements suggesting that the United States seeks strategic superiority, is abandoning the ABM Treaty, and is willing to sacrifice Europe—while protecting itself—in a nuclear war.
- Use of agents of influence in West European governments and media to influence NATO policymakers to pressure the United States into altering its projected defense posture. At this point, however, we have no evidence that Moscow is using such agents.
Gorbachev's Succession

1. The USSR's conduct of its arms control policies in 1985 will be influenced by recent and prospective Soviet leadership developments to a modest degree. It is unlikely that General Secretary Gorbachev's future positions or the collective performance of the post-Chernenko leadership will be a simple projection of the tone of recent speeches. More significant for Soviet arms control behavior will be the power structure in the ruling oligarchy in terms of its stability, its cohesiveness, and the strength of Gorbachev's authority. The Soviet decision to propose new arms talks probably reflects a fairly broad consensus that Moscow has a better chance of combating the military and foreign policies of the United States while negotiations are going on. This consensus has permitted the definition of firm public positions by the USSR and also probably supports the broad strategy of appealing beyond the negotiating table to US and Allied governments, legislatures, and publics while sticking to inflexible basic negotiating positions.

2. We believe the Soviets are unified in their broad strategy toward strategic weapons issues and the arms control process. The internal political concerns that are likely to dominate the Soviet leadership in 1985 would make a consensus to change arms control policies, and especially to make major concessions required to bridge the gap between opening positions, even more difficult to reach than would normally be the case. Should Foreign Minister Gromyko exercise a dominant role in Soviet foreign policy, as he appears to have recently, this would tend to raise the odds for an inflexible Soviet performance at the negotiating table and a vigorous pursuit of familiar propaganda lines in the public arena. Defense Minister Ustinov's death, meanwhile, has removed a figure who probably played in his late years a significant role in integrating the interests and perspectives of the military and political leaderships. Such a role is important to policy change in arms control, among other areas, and the next year is unlikely to see a figure of Ustinov's stature and background emerge to fill it.

Economic Considerations

3. Long-term economic concerns have helped persuade the Soviets to reengage the political process of arms control. The multifaceted and protracted challenge of SDI, especially, makes the future much more uncertain than they like to deal with, the more so when the task of meeting more familiar military needs while trying to modernize the economy and to keep consumption at politically tolerable levels is becoming more difficult. They would like to increase the prospects that the United States will scale back its military challenge, and they would like to increase their access to Western technology; they see the arms control process as a means to encourage these developments. We do not believe, however, that these economic considerations will persuade the Soviets to make substantive concessions in the negotiations during 1985, the period of this Estimate, or prevent them from seeking to counter US programs.

4. The Soviet leadership may hope for some small economic benefit if the talks eventually produce an agreement limiting nuclear arms. It is doubtful, however, that Moscow expects any immediate large savings to result directly from agreements. Even deep cuts in strategic offensive nuclear forces would have a relatively small impact because such weapons account for only about 10 percent of the total Soviet defense budget. The Soviets, moreover, want to pursue their own ongoing strategic research, development, and deployment programs. For these reasons, it is possible that some Soviet expressions of concern over the economic impact of arms competition are deliberately exaggerated, to convince Westerners that Moscow is not really approaching the arms talks in good faith because it has compelling economic reasons to negotiate an agreement. Other such statements probably reflect naivete on the part of lower or middle-ranking officials as to the actual Soviet judgment on the matter.
the concrete economic benefits of arms control agreements, a naivete that the top political and military leaders would not share.

5. Nonetheless, there appears to be an element of genuine concern in Soviet statements over the potential long-term economic costs to the USSR of continuing to pursue its strategic goals in the face of accelerated US programs on strategic offense, strategic defense, and other military fronts.

6. The Soviets appear to view SDI in particular as confronting them with a severe technological challenge in areas where Soviet innovative capabilities are weakest, including high-speed computers; optics; command, control, and communication software; sophisticated high-speed electronics; infrared, optical, and nuclear sensors; composites; and precision machinery to manufacture the complex components of these new systems. If the Soviets are unable to block US development of SDI through negotiations or political means to buy themselves time to improve their technological capabilities, their problems in defense planning and resource allocation could also be further complicated. They could be in the position of losing some of the freedom they have had in the past to select the focus and pace of their own military modernization efforts.

7. The economic aspects of Soviet concern about the arms competition are tempered by countervailing factors. The Soviets remain uncertain over the ultimate extent of the US military buildup, and especially over the long-term sustainability and outcome of the SDI program. We believe Moscow is attentive to economic constraints that might force the United States to reconsider SDI. Even if the United States goes forward with SDI, the Soviets will not necessarily expand their own SDI-type programs. They will, however, have to give special emphasis to developing countermeasures against the US program.

Military Attitudes

8. Substantial continuity remains, despite the departure of the two principal military figures in Soviet arms control policymaking during the past decade—Ustinov and former General Staff Chief Ogarkov. Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, Ogarkov's successor as Chief of the General Staff, was head of the General Staff's Main Operations Directorate during the SALT II negotiation period. This is the only staff element with access to all technical arms control information from various Soviet agencies. This gives the military considerable influence in Soviet arms control decision-making.

9. Soviet military leaders have tended to be more strident than most political leaders in arguing that arms control will not change the hostile nature of "imperialism" or eliminate the dynamics of strategic competition. Since becoming Defense Minister, Marshal Sokolov has indicated skepticism about the utility of the arms control process. Other Soviet military officials also have labeled the US administration as insincere and have expressed pessimism that the impending talks can produce any mutually beneficial result. The military newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda has been the most pessimistic of the major Soviet newspapers regarding the Geneva talks.

10. We have no reason to believe, however, that the Soviet military oppose the conduct of negotiations in the framework of continuing military modernization and of a wider political strategy aimed at undermining US and NATO military programs. They would, indeed, see much to gain from success in such efforts. Expressions of skepticism about arms control by the Soviet military are designed primarily to remind the public, the military establishment, and the political leadership of the need for vigilance and vigorous military programs while these political efforts proceed.

*A working group of Soviet scientists published a propaganda “study” last year, based on Western literature, that outlined in detail possible active and passive countermeasures. Soviet scientists also have indicated that the USSR might simply increase the size of its offensive arsenal to ensure adequate penetration of US defensive systems at a fraction of the cost of developing an SDI system.
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