BERLIN HANDBOOK

PREPARED BY Office of Current Intelligence
A HANDBOOK ON THE BERLIN PROBLEM

This handbook is intended as a factual study of Berlin. Its purpose is not to analyze Soviet intentions or estimate the future. While the factual data in this handbook includes the latest information available to the compilers, minor details such as pertain to the condition of access routes or border controls, are constantly changing. In its essentials, however, this study is believed to reflect accurately the current situation.
ERRATA SHEET

P. 41 - 1. 13 and 1. 33 "Table I" should read Table IV

P. 44 - 1. 4 "Table III" should read Table VI

P. 10 - Add the following sentence to last paragraph:

The Four Power Communiqué of 4 May 1949, ending the blockade, provided that "all restrictions... on communications, transportation and trade... will be removed...."

Also add to the list of Pertinent Documents the following: 12. Four Power Communiqué of 4 May 1949.

Add Annex H, Pages 71 and 72, and The Index
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Allied and Bloc Positions 1-8

Soviet 1
British 3
French 4
West German 5
East German 7

II. Legal Basis for the Western Presence in Berlin 9-10

III. The Berlin Wall 11-12

IV. West Berlin 13-26

Impact of the Wall 13
Legal Ties with Bonn 14
Allied Responsibilities 15
Berlin Role in Bonn Government 15
Federal Agencies in Berlin 16
Industry 17
Stockpiles 18
Dependence on West Germany 20
Trade 20
West Berlin-West Germany Transportation 21
West Berlin SED 23
City Transportation 24
Steinstuecken 25

V. The Borders 26-29

Sector-crossing points 26
Zonal 27
Bypasses 29

VI. East Berlin Economy 31

VII. Interzonal Trade 32

VIII. Access to Berlin 33-39

Air 33
Road 34
Railroad 35
Waterways 38
IX. Soviet and Allied Military Forces 40-47

West Berlin Police 40
Allied Forces in West Germany 41
Communist Forces in East Germany 44

ANNEXES

A. Select Chronology 48-60
B. Major Documents Establishing Berlin's Legal Status 61-62
C. Extracts of Articles of West German Constitution 63
D. West German Agencies in Berlin 64-65
E. The United States Mission in Berlin 66-
F. Documents Required by the East German Regime for Entering East Berlin, transiting the GDR or Entering the GDR 67-69
G. Currency Controls 70

TABLES

I. Indices of West Berlin Industry 17
II. West Berlin Stockpiles 19
III. Freight Traffic 21
IV. Western Strength in Berlin 41
V. Allied Forces in West Germany 43
VI. Communist Strength in East Berlin and East Germany 47
LIST OF GRAPHICS

Maps
Soviet and East German Ground Forces
East Germany: Missile Sites
East Germany: Permanent Restricted Areas
Berlin Authorized Border Crossing Points
Berlin Zonal Border Crossing Points
Communication Routes between West German and Berlin
Berlin Wall

Charts
Refugee Flights from East Germany and East Berlin
Economy of West Berlin

Photographs
Friedrichstrasse
Babelsberg (2 photos)
SECTION I

The Soviet Position

The current Soviet position on Berlin and Germany is essentially the same as that put forward in November 1958, and modified at the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference in May 1959. In their Vienna memorandum of 4 June 1961, the Soviets demanded a German peace treaty, the establishment of a free city of West Berlin and guarantees that this new status would be respected. They offered two alternatives—a single treaty with both German states, or a peace settlement based on two separate but similar treaties which would be signed at their discretion by some or all of the members of the wartime coalition.

Moscow contends that the peace treaty, or treaties, would end the occupation of West Berlin and establish it as a free, demilitarized and neutral city, guaranteed by the Four Powers who could station "symbolic contingents" in the city. The Vienna memorandum provided for the stationing of neutral troops under the auspices of the United Nations, in West Berlin. Access to the free city from the West would be permitted, but the Vienna memorandum left the manner in which it would be arranged vague, stating only that the free city of West Berlin could "freely effect its communications with the outside world," and that the US would have "every opportunity" to maintain and develop relations with the free city.

As an alternative to such a permanent solution, the Vienna memorandum proposed that "an interim solution could be adopted for a definite period"—apparently for no longer than six months—on condition that meanwhile the two German states agree on the terms of a single peace treaty. In the event they failed, the wartime allies would undertake "measures" to conclude a treaty with one or both Germanies. Barring this, the Vienna memorandum repeated the threat of a separate Soviet bloc peace treaty with East Germany—which the Soviets maintain would end the occupation of West Berlin and
mean that land, water and air access to Berlin would "have to be settled in no other way than through appropriate agreements with the GDR."

Khrushchev subsequently elaborated this position—or, at least, shifted his emphasis. While injecting a note of ultimatum by warning that a separate treaty would be signed in 1961, Khrushchev emphasized that any guarantees desired by the western powers probably would be acceptable. On 28 June, he said that free-city guarantees could be provided by the presence of Four-Power neutral or United Nations troops. He repeated this on 8 July, adding that "if the Western powers have a better version of guarantees let them propose them." At the same time, he did not allude to the possibility of an interim solution and spoke of settling the "question of West Berlin itself"—which, he declared on 11 August, was "not so difficult to solve." He indicated that there could be "other variations of guarantees" for a free city. A significant modification appeared to be Khrushchev's statement that "we presumably the USSR are prepared to give firm guarantees not only to the population of West Berlin but also to Western powers" concerning no interference in Berlin and free access. The Soviets later indicated that they might underwrite East Germany's acceptance of such an arrangement.

Since the beginning of September, Soviet and bloc statements appear to have emphasized a separate Berlin agreement, which would be incorporated into a bloc peace treaty with East Germany. The Soviets have indicated that a separate Four Power agreement on a new status of West Berlin, guarantees for that status and continuing access could be negotiated prior to the conclusion of a peace treaty if the West is willing to end formally the military occupation of West Berlin and sever the city's political ties with Bonn. Moscow purposely has left vague the manner and form in which East Germany might be associated with such an agreement. One variation might be a Soviet-East German agreement to ensure East German recognition of the Four Power accord. In return, however, the Soviets have insisted that East German sovereignty must be "respected" which probably means at least tacit recognition of the Ulbricht regime.
British Position on Berlin

The British government supports fully the West's right to be in Berlin and enjoy restricted access to the city and its determination to defend the freedom of the West Berliners. London makes no attempt to hide its eagerness for a negotiated settlement, but is careful to conceal the issues on which they are prepared to concede.

The Foreign Office prefers a "narrow" approach to talks on an Allied-Soviet agreement on West Berlin access prior to the signing of any bilateral USSR-GDR treaty, but would not oppose broader discussions if Moscow so desired. London hopes that any limited understanding would open the way to a subsequent four-power conference on Germany and European security. It insists that any temporary arrangement contain an acceptable formula for eventual German reunification—no matter how remote.

While they refuse to consider formal recognition of the GDR, the British have not spelled out what concessions they do envisage, making only the vague suggestion that informal "modalities" might be worked out with the Soviets to permit the GDR to exercise nominal access controls. Although London has asserted its unwillingness to compromise on the question of possible limitations on West German rearmament, the strong anti-German feeling that frequently comes to the surface in the press and in statements in Parliament may indicate another area of concession. The transfer of some or all UN agencies to Berlin, as well as a UN role in any settlement, is included in the British list of useful negotiating tactics.

The British were relieved when the US took the lead in explorations with the Soviets. Late in 1961, however, due in part to parliamentary questions from Labor spokesmen, the government grew somewhat restive over delays in formulating a Western position. The Macmillan government believes that recent signs of "give" in the Soviet position provide an adequate basis for opening negotiations and would be prepared to "go it alone" with the US if De Gaulle refuses to participate.
Growing press and Labor Party demands will keep the Macmillan government pressing for negotiations. London can be expected to support an initially "tough" Western position as long as a slight detente in East-West tension endures. Any intensification of the crisis, however, would generate pressure for greater concessions.

French Position on Berlin

France's position on Berlin and Germany is based on the desire to maintain the status quo and promote its "alliance" with Bonn as the foundation of De Gaulle's increasingly Europe-oriented policies. France fears a reunited Germany, free to rearm and thereby pose a threat to France. It also rejects reunification under any East-West agreement to neutralize Germany, because this would sever France's close links with the Federal Republic and leave a reunited Germany free to seek accommodation with the USSR. Paris, therefore, seeks to keep firm ties with Bonn and opposes any change which would alter adversely its relative power status vis-à-vis Germany, or weaken the security of Western Europe vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc. De Gaulle has stated privately that he is no friend of German reunification; he maintains, however, that the West must stand firm on Berlin and avoid any appearance of publicly foreclosing an eventual reunification so as not to discourage the West Germans, who might then incline toward neutralism. The French insist the Berlin problem can be solved only within the context of the whole German problem—the solution of which they maintain is neither urgent nor immediately possible.

De Gaulle consistently has sought to divert East-West negotiations away from the Berlin and German problems to "new ground" i.e., disarmament, and other means of improving relations. It insists that meaningful negotiations cannot be conducted under threat of force, or with one side proposing all of the conditions. The importance he attributes to this point is evident in France's determination to adhere to it, rather than accept US and UK views in order to avoid disclosing publicly Western differences over negotiations. De Gaulle believes that Khrushchev does not want war, and that the West must stand firm in Berlin, maintain its rights and be willing to meet force with force, if necessary.
Although it issued a public statement regretting the West's failure to take more positive action when the Berlin wall was erected on 13 August, Paris subsequently has sought to ease around direct confrontations in Berlin, rather than provoke Soviet retaliation. Generally speaking, the French, whose identification procedures are similar to those of the US, have preferred to deny themselves entry into East Berlin rather than force the issue or submit to East German controls.

At the same time France has opposed altering the Four-Power status of Berlin. It has favored increased three-power control over West German legislation applicable to the city and opposes meetings of the Bundestag and Bundesrat in Berlin on the grounds that such ties undermine legal arguments for continued Allied presence. On the other hand, Paris opposes weakening the existing relationship between West Berlin and the Federal Republic because of the adverse effect it presumes this would have on West Berlin and, ultimately, West German morale. French leaders often have emphasized the importance they attach to maintaining unrestricted Allied access to West Berlin.

Because France has found itself in the position of being the most outspoken opponent of East-West negotiations on Berlin, the points in which it might be willing to bargain are obscure. Paris feels that any bargaining points should be reserved for actual negotiations, but given the strength of De Gaulle's feeling, it is unlikely that France would agree to anything more than a West German government statement disavowing the use of force to change its borders and national control of nuclear weapons. The French feel that even these limited concessions should not be made without something in return from the Soviet Union.

West German Position on Berlin

In talks with President Kennedy in November, Chancellor Adenauer agreed to support further Allied exploratory talks with the USSR with a view to major negotiations over Berlin. In contrast to his long-standing
position that any East-West accord on Berlin should come only within the context of an over-all solution of the German problem, Adenauer apparently now prefers a narrow approach limited to Berlin in order to avoid broader negotiations which might involve European security arrangements and limit West Germany's weapons capability. The new West German government's first policy statement declared that its fundamental foreign policy objectives would be: (1) the security of the Federal Republic; (2) the maintenance of the existing political, legal and economic ties between West Berlin and West Germany; and (3) continued adherence to the goal of German reunification, nonrecognition of the East German regime and the eventual settlement of frontier questions in an all-German peace treaty. The coalition contract of the Christian Democratic and Free Democratic parties, which make up the new government, also explicitly rejected any loosening of ties with West Berlin or any recognition of the East German regime.

Adenauer's fondest hope has been that firm resolve and a strong military posture eventually would convince the Soviets that the West could not be intimidated, causing Moscow to back away from its demands and allow indefinite continuation of the status quo. In any event, Adenauer and most of Bonn's governmental leaders clearly give first priority to the maintenance of the independence and security of the Federal Republic, which they believe can only be assured by close military, as well as political, ties with the West. The Chancellor has strongly and consistently opposed any withdrawal of Allied forces from Germany or disengagement of the Federal Republic from NATO. Berlin, although very important, is secondary, and Adenauer is believed to be extremely reluctant to risk nuclear war over the city.

To facilitate agreement, Bonn officials have hinted that further technical-level contacts with East Germany—including the establishment of commissions for transportation, mail and trade matters—might be possible. Bonn also is willing to repeat its pledge not to use force to achieve reunification or modify existing boundaries, and will "stand by" its renunciation of
ABC weapons—in anticipation that its needs can be met within NATO—although Adenauer opposes repeating the latter in connection with a Berlin solution.

In the past—especially during various periods of intense pressure on Berlin—Adenauer has considered extending de facto recognition to the East German regime, provided this would result in an effective status quo agreement. He reportedly expressed such views to the executive committee of the CDU Bundestag faction in March 1959, and in October 1960, reportedly stated his willingness to negotiate West Germany’s then suspended interzonal trade agreement with East Germany at a governmental level high enough to imply such recognition if the East Germans would "guarantee" free access to and from West Berlin.

Generally speaking Berlin Mayor Brandt goes further than Adenauer in insisting that all ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic be maintained, and has criticized the Chancellor for not being vigorous enough in maintaining them. Brandt opposes abandoning such symbols of Bonn-Berlin ties as the annual Bundestag meetings in West Berlin, and has assailed Adenauer’s suggestion that certain non-essential agencies of the federal government might be removed from the city. Social Democratic party (SPD) officials, including Brandt, are critical of the negotiating line favored by Adenauer and the US, arguing that no permanent Berlin solution is possible apart from reunification. Brandt also opposes the idea of a new Bonn-West Berlin "contract" to regulate the relations between the city and West Germany, warning that any changes in the city’s existing relations with the Federal Republic would require a constitutional amendment which the SPD can and will obstruct.

East German Policy Toward Berlin

Ulbricht's primary objective in any East-West negotiation is to gain at least de facto recognition. He won an important victory in this respect at the Geneva Foreign Minister's Conference of 1959, when East and West Germany were admitted on equal footing in an
advisory capacity. Ulbricht defined his current demands on 23-26 November: "The negotiations...will have to establish how--while account is taken of certain Western prestige interests—the troops stationed in West Berlin can gradually be reduced, how the sabotage and disruptive activities launched from West Berlin can be liquidated, and by what agreements with the GDR the use of the lines of communication from and to Berlin—all of which form part of the sovereign territory of the GDR—are to be settled. The Soviet government and the GDR government have declared their readiness to provide guarantees for the free city of West Berlin, provided the Western powers undertake to renounce any interference with the domestic affairs of the GDR and to respect the sovereignty of the GDR." He emphasized that East Berlin belongs de jure to the GDR and that lines of communication between West Berlin and West Germany are to be used only on the basis of "contractual" arrangements with the GDR. Both demands are intended to enhance East German sovereignty, although the reference to "respect for," rather than "recognition of," East German sovereignty may permit some latitude.

The East Germans seek to weaken—eventually to eliminate—ties between West Berlin and West Germany, to reduce Bonn's stature and increase the West Berliners' sense of isolation. To date, their public statements have allowed for the maintenance of economic and cultural links between a "free city" of West Berlin and West Germany, on a "country-to-country basis," while demanding an end to all political ties and the elimination of West German government offices in the city. They appear to be moving on to new demands, however—probably encouraged by such developments as Bonn's decision not to convene meetings of the West German parliament in Berlin. On 14 December, East Berlin party boss Paul Verner demanded that the West Berlin Senate discontinue the practice of re-enacting West German laws for application in West Berlin.
SECTION II.

LEGAL BASIS FOR THE WESTERN PRESENCE IN BERLIN

Basis for Occupation (Pertinent documents listed below*)

The four-power status of Berlin and the Western basis for occupying the city as a whole are derived from the four-power agreements of the European Advisory Commission (EAC) dated 12 September 1944-14 November 1944, amended 26 July 1945; the four-power statements of 5 June 1945; the Truman-Stalin letters of 15-16 June 1945; and the Potsdam agreements of 2 August 1945. The EAC agreements specifically defined zones of occupation in Germany and provided that Berlin was to be jointly administered. The 5 June "statement" signed by Marshal Zhukov specifically states: "The area of Greater Berlin" will be occupied by forces of each of the four Powers. An Inter-Allied governing Authority (Komendatura)...will be established to direct jointly its administration."

The Potsdam agreements state: "The Allied armies are in occupation of the whole Germany..." and that "supreme authority in Germany is exercised, (by the four powers) each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole...."

On 14 June 1945 President Truman informed Stalin that American troops would withdraw from the Soviet Zone "in accordance with arrangement between respective commanders, included in these arrangements simultaneous movement of the national garrisons into greater Berlin and provisions of free access by air, road and rail from Frankfurt and Bremen to Berlin for US forces." In replying on 18 June 1945 Stalin asked for a postponement of US withdrawals and entrance into Berlin until 1 July. No mention, however, was made by Stalin of future access to Berlin.

Access to Berlin

In addition to the Truman-Stalin exchange, which is the only document spelling out complete freedom of access to Berlin, there are separate agreements on road, rail, and air access. The three air corridors were agreed to by the Allied Control Council on 30 November 1945. An agreement was also
reached by the Aviation Committee of the Air Directorate establishing the four-power Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC) on 12 December 1945, with minor revisions in 1946.

Rail access for Western military trains, together with a schedule of daily traffic, was agreed to on 7 September 1945 and approved by the Control Council on 10 September 1945. An Autobahn route was agreed upon orally by General Clay and Marshal Zhukov on 29 June 1945.

There is no basic agreement concerning water access, although the British negotiated a separate agreement with the USSR in 1946.

There is, therefore, no specific document signed by all four governments providing for free and unrestricted access to Berlin. However, during the Berlin blockade the US, in a 6 July 1948 note to Moscow, stated that: "These agreements implied the right of free access to Berlin. This right has long been confirmed by usage."

*Pertinent Documents (included in Annex to original)

1. Allied Control Council CORC/P (45) 30, 7 Sept 1945
2. Allied Control Council CONL/P (45) 63, 28 Nov 1945
3. Allied Control Council CORC/P (45) 170, 22 Nov 1945
4. Allied Control Council CONL/M (45) 13, 30 Nov 1945
5. European Advisory Commission Agreement, 12 Sept 1944
6. European Advisory Commission Agreement, 14 Nov 1944
7. Potsdam Agreement, 2 Aug 1945
8. Allied Control Council Proclamation #2, 20 Sept 1945
9. US Note to the USSR, 6 Jul 1948
10. Truman-Stalin Letters, 15-16 Jun 1945
11. Allied Control Council DAIR/P (45) 67, 13 Dec 1945
THE BERLIN WALL

The wall separating East and West Berlin is actually a system of barriers and obstructions of many different types, rather than a single, definite feature. For 43 kilometers, or about 26-1/2 miles, it closely parallels the sector boundary but does not always coincide exactly. The wall, like the sector boundary, mainly follows roads, railroads, canals, or other dividing lines, such as the margins of parks and cemeteries. For about 28 kilometers, or 65 percent of its length, it traverses areas that are built up on one or both sides, whereas for the rest of the distance (15 kilometers: 35 percent) it extends through relatively open areas. The wall parallels railroads for some 8 kilometers and canals for about 10 kilometers. Structurally, it is most formidable in the densely populated central core of Berlin and somewhat less so in the less populated northern and southern areas.

Roughly one-third of the wall, mainly the central section, is composed of masonry alternating with the walls of sealed buildings, generally supported by secondary obstructions. Except for a stretch where the Spree constitutes a natural boundary, further fortified by barbed wire, masonry wall extends along the bulge in the central core of the city. Other sections are formed by multiple barbed wire fences which follow canals and railway embankments and other earlier barriers to east-west movement. Secondary obstructions of masonry wall, tank barriers, pavement blocks, and cleared strips back up the main wall. Lightly constructed fences seem to have been erected mainly to cut off visual contact. Communist officials of East Germany have announced that they will clear a continuous strip 100 meters in width along the East Berlin side of the wall. This will be costly and time-consuming, and involve obliterating cemeteries, churches, and historical landmarks. To date, the cleared-strip plan seems to have been implemented near the extreme northern and southern ends of the wall, where it involved little more than removing orchards, gardens, tool sheds, and the like. Only a few changes indicate clearing in the central core area.

The wall is strongest at the Brandenburg Gate, a point of great symbolic as well as geographic significance. Here the East Germans have piled prefabricated concrete slabs in
layers forming a wall 7 feet high and 6 feet thick with steel-post reinforcement. Away from the Brandenburg Gate, the masonry wall is made of very large prefabricated concrete slabs one foot thick. Around sharp curves and awkward corners, smaller concrete blocks are used; they are also used in other places to increase the height of the wall. Generally the masonry wall is topped by Y-shaped iron rods strung with barbed wire.

Most of the wall is about 8 feet high, but some stretches along Bernauer Strasse are 10 feet high; and the boundary wall of the French cemetery is even higher. Generally, where the sector boundary follows the building line instead of curb or street line, the buildings have been incorporated into the wall by sealing doors and windows.

At authorized crossing points, obstructions have been placed across the road forming a maze with relatively narrow openings that require vehicles to zigzag slowly around obstacles.

In places the masonry wall is backed up by tank barriers. The most publicized of these are between the Reichstag ruins and Potsdamer Platz. Here two rows of heavy steel tripods are cemented into the ground behind the wall. Tank barriers are also located at each end of the masonry wall and along Zimmerstrasse from Wilhelm Strasse to Linden Strasse.

The remainder of the wall is comprised of one or more wire fences, backed by watch towers at irregular intervals. At the northern end, for example, there are 3 fences 7-1/2 feet high. The first follows the sector boundary, the second is 10 feet inside, and the third is some 150 yards to the east. The ground between the first two fences is covered with wire obstacles, whereas the area between the second and third fences has been cleared and can be lighted at night. Watch towers spaced about 600 yards apart provide vantage points for the armed guards. Where the garden colony of Schoenholz formerly adjoined the boundary, everything has been leveled. The situation is the same on the southern end of the sector boundary where the garden colonies of Daheim, Spaethsfelde, Grueneck and Am Rehpfuhl have been changed to a no-man's-land.
Impact of the Wall on West Berliners

The closure of the sector border on 13 August and the construction of the wall strongly affected the morale of the outwardly calm West Berliners. More worried than at any time in the past two years, they regard the wall as a major Communist success which has dealt a blow to the city's four-power status and tipped the balance in favor of the East. As a result, their usual self-confidence has been shaken.

As an immediate effect of the closure, West Berlin industry was deprived of about 60,000 East Berlin and East German "border crossers" or 6.5% of its 900,000-man labor force. Large industry and small industry were affected differently, of course; neither was able to compensate fully in a short time for the loss of skilled employees. Small enterprises, where the key personnel frequently were border crossers, suffered, as did freight handling and coal deliveries. Retail shops along the sector border faced bankruptcy.

The situation has been reflected only mildly in overall economic statistics--because of the relatively short period of time which has elapsed and because of the efforts of West German industry to aid Berlin with continuing orders. Nonetheless, industrial orders have declined somewhat, and the business community is deeply concerned over the future. Personal savings deposits have declined steadily since June.

The border closure brought about an increase in the number of West Berlin residents leaving the city. Approximately 500 a week left before 13 August; after, the number rose to about 1,700. This efflux is partially compensated for by the movement--mostly from West Germany--to Berlin. This number rose slightly from about 800 before 13 August to about 900 since that date. Thus, the net population drain has been running around 800 persons a week.

City leaders, searching for some basis on which to build the future of their city, have suggested making it the cultural center of Germany, perhaps of all Europe, and a center for the training of persons from underdeveloped countries.
West Berlin's Legal Ties With Bonn (See Annexes B & C)

Although West Berlin has developed firm economic and political ties with West Germany over the past decade, the city's legal relationship with the Federal Republic remains complex and unique. West Berlin's legal status is in some ways similar to that of the West German states but remains limited by certain powers reserved to the three Western Allies, whose forces officially occupy the city.

Since 1949 West Berlin has gradually become extensively integrated with West Germany in matters of economy, law, administration, and politics. West Berlin's relationship with the Federal Republic now is governed by the Western Allies' 1955 Declaration on Berlin. This document provides for a large measure of self-government by the Berliners and extensive economic and political integration with West Germany, but reserves certain key areas of responsibility to Allied control. The declaration did not change Berlin's status in international law as an occupied area. Neither the unilateral division of Greater Berlin by the Communists in 1948 nor the establishment of West German sovereignty in 1955 altered this status.

To avoid any action that might be interpreted by the USSR as nullifying the four-power responsibility for Berlin agreed on in 1944, Allied statements and declarations have consistently maintained that Greater Berlin has not become a state of the Federal Republic. The West Germans, on the other hand, have always considered Berlin legally one of their states--limited only by the special Allied responsibilities in Berlin. However, the common German-Allied interest in avoiding any situation lending itself to Soviet exploitation has thus far prevented this divergence of views from having much practical significance.

The Allies have actively encouraged the development of extensive political and economic relations between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. The most significant move in this regard was the approval in 1951 by the Allied authorities of a system in which Berlin may use "cover laws" to enact federal laws and regulations, merely by stating that the provisions of the federal law are also valid in Berlin rather than having the Berlin parliament re-enact the entire law.
Allied Responsibilities: Although all Berlin legislation, including that originating in the West German parliament, is still formally reviewed by the Western Allied commandants, a system of prior informal consultations has virtually eliminated the necessity for the Allies to amend or nullify such laws. Under this system, any federal bill containing a Berlin clause which might impinge on Allied rights or fields of special interest is discussed by Allied, Berlin and West German authorities when it is introduced into the Bundestag. This system has also promoted a close and cordial relationship between the Allies and the Germans and has minimized the chances for serious challenges to Allied authority in the city.

The degree of supervision exercised by the Allies has gradually been relaxed to the point where Berlin, with Allied consent, now may even amend occupation legislation. The 1955 Declaration on Berlin provided that the Allies would normally exercise powers only in such matters as (1) security, (2) disarmament and demilitarization, (3) relations with authorities abroad, (4) payment of occupation costs, and (5) authority over police to the extent necessary to ensure security.

As a result of continuing Allied responsibility for Berlin's security, West German defense legislation does not apply to Berlin, Berliners cannot be drafted into the West German armed forces, and West German Army units are not stationed in Berlin. Generally, however, Berlin is not precluded from participating in the fields reserved to the Allies as long as its actions do not conflict with existing Allied law. For example, despite the limitation of the 1955 declaration, the Federal Republic is allowed to represent Berlin abroad, and West Berlin is included in West German treaties which are made applicable by the same procedure used to effect federal German law in the city.

Berlin Role in Bonn Government: Despite legal restrictions insisted on by the Allies, Berlin takes an active and influential part in the federal government. The votes of Berlin's representatives in both houses of the West German parliament are not allowed to determine the passage or rejection of bills. Berlin delegates, however, participate in debates, introduce bills, and have full voting rights in committees. Berliners, moreover, hold high positions in the federal government and
West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt has served as president of the Bundesrat and was the chancellor candidate of the Social Democratic party in national elections last September; Heinrich Krone of Berlin is a minister without portfolio in the new Bonn government; and another Berliner, Ernst Lemmer, is minister for all-German affairs in the federal cabinet.

To stress Berlin's ties with the Federal Republic as well as to foster the idea that the city is Germany's national capital, the Bundestag and Bundesrat have regularly held annual meetings in Berlin, and two of the three meetings of the federal convention which elects the West German president have been held in Berlin. These meetings have come under increasing East German attack as part of a general bloc propaganda campaign against West Berlin's ties with West Germany.

The federal government also has undertaken a special building program for government offices in Berlin, including reconstruction of the Reichstag building, burned in 1933. A Berlin residence for the federal president was completed in 1960.

Federal Agencies in Berlin: The development of close administrative, judicial, and fiscal relationships between Berlin and West Germany has led to widespread federal activity in the city. Preparations are under way to set up a new federal bank supervisory office in West Berlin early in 1962. Its establishment must, however, await a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court on objections to federal, as opposed to state, supervision of banking. The federal government is represented by a special commissioner for Berlin, Heinrich Voelkel, who has under him a representative of each of the federal ministries, except defense. Federal agencies wield no executive powers over Berlin agencies, however, and in case of conflict with Allied policy, the authority of the Allied Kommandatura prevails.

Berlin is governed by a coalition of the Social Democratic party (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). As a result of the December 1958 city election, in which the SPD and CDU received 52.6 percent and 37.7 percent of the vote respectively, the West Berlin House of Delegates is comprised of 78 SPD and 55 CDU members. The Communists received only 1.9 percent of the vote and despite considerable effort and expenditure have no representation.
West Berlin Industry

West Berlin industry, despite its geographic isolation and mounting Soviet pressure against the city, shows no major sign of faltering. Since November 1958, 50,000 new jobs have been created. Of a total working force of nearly one million, 300,000 are employed in industry. Industrial sales rose almost 30 percent, from $1.9 billion to $2.5 billion during the period November 1958 to mid-1961. From August 1960 until August 1961, the city's production index rose by six percent, as compared to five percent for West Germany. There are more than 2,000 firms, including such world famous names as Telefunken, Siemens-Halske and Schering in West Berlin.

Electric and electronic products constitute the city's largest industry, accounting for 29 percent of its manufactures and 12 percent of the total West German electrical and electronics goods production. Food processing, textiles and machinery are among other leading industries. The physical reconstruction of Berlin also is a major industrial activity. The garment industry accounts for 46 percent of the total West German supply of women's clothing. Output of full length motion pictures has climbed to 40 a year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Production Index (1936-100)</th>
<th>Industrial Orders Index (1952-100)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Jan thru Oct)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Jan thru Jun)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Stockpiles

The knowledge that there exists a large stockpile which would stave off starvation in the event of another blockade is an important factor in bolstering West Berlin morale. Early in 1961, West Berlin was estimated to have on hand $200,000,000 worth of food, fuel and raw materials.

West Berlin officials estimated that as of 30 June 1961 reserves of hard coal, coke and brown coal briquettes were sufficient for a year and that supplies of storageable foodstuffs would last from four to twelve months. Fresh fruits and vegetables and whole milk are not stockpiled.

Enough construction materials, such as bricks, cement and lumber, have been accumulated to last a year. Petroleum stockpiles are inadequate, but additional storage facilities are being completed or are planned for early in 1962. A recent study by the West Berlin Senat indicated that--except for coal--the city gas and water works and other municipal enterprises had supplies for about six months. Based on their current levels of production, West Berlin industrial firms maintain an average of two months' supply, which, together with industrial materials maintained in stockpiles, would sustain plant activity for four to five months.
### WEST BERLIN STOCKPILES
(as of 30 June 1961)

#### Fuels (in metric tons):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Stocks</th>
<th>Percent of Program*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coal, coke and briquettes</td>
<td>3,566,000</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firewood</td>
<td>22,600</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gasoline</td>
<td>27,039</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel Oil</td>
<td>31,035</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Program based on estimated needs for one year.

#### Food (in metric tons):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Stocks</th>
<th>Months Supply (approx.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grain and flour</td>
<td>369,646</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereals</td>
<td>52,473</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fats</td>
<td>28,324</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>46,200</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk, dry whole</td>
<td>4,406</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee substitutes</td>
<td>6,132</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>46,184</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dependence on West Germany

West Berlin's prosperity has been made possible only by extensive US and West German financial aid. For many years Bonn has made good the city's budget deficit and also has made large payments for social and insurance pensions. In 1960 the total West German contribution was about $370,000,000. This transfer of purchasing power enables West Berlin to cover its balance of payments deficit, which totaled $126 million in 1960. West Germany also assists Berlin through preferential taxes and shipping rates and promotes industrial orders for the city. Bonn recently put an additional $125 million at the disposal of West Berlin to help counteract the effects of the border closure.

West Berlin Trade

West Berlin has made remarkable progress in increasing exports and steadily reducing its import-export imbalance. In 1960 the city's total exports equalled 97 percent of imports. Some 86 percent of exports and about 90 percent of imports were accounted for in exchange with West Germany. Trade with the Communist bloc is limited, involving only 2 percent of exports and 3 percent of imports. East Germany supplies small quantities of fresh foods and agricultural products and a major portion of the brown-coal briquettes--a vital import since West Germany does not produce enough to meet its own and Berlin's needs. They are used extensively for heating Berlin's private dwellings. The bulk of West Berlin's food, hard coal, raw materials and various consumer goods are shipped from West Germany and other free world sources via the access routes through East Germany.

Berlin's leading exports are electrical, steel and chemical products and clothing. In recent years, West German markets have purchased about 65 percent of the city's total industrial output, including 73 percent of its production of the electrical equipment, the city's leading industry, and 70 percent of that of the clothing industry. The United States provides an increasing market for West Berlin exports, accounting for about $30,000,000 worth in 1960, as compared to $1,500,000 in 1950. The
position of Asia and Africa—Berlin's fastest growing market in 1958—declined in 1960, while trade with European countries increased, reflecting a high level of demand throughout Europe and Berlin's difficulty in providing credits for underdeveloped countries.

West Berlin — West Germany Transportation (See Map)

West Berlin's dependence on its lifeline to West Germany is demonstrated by the fact that 9,860,345 tons of commercial freight were shipped to and from the city in 1960. About five times as much cargo moves into the city as out, with 36% of the incoming tonnage carried by water, 34% by highway, 27% by rail, and 1% by parcel post. Trucks carry 59% of Berlin's exports, against 23% for water, 14% for rail, 4% for parcel post, and a fraction of 1% for airlift.

TABLE III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Freight Traffic (Metric tons)</th>
<th>January-October 1961</th>
<th>(12 months) 1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO Berlin:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Negl.</td>
<td>Negl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road</td>
<td>2,630,705</td>
<td>2,913,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail</td>
<td>2,030,664</td>
<td>2,249,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWT</td>
<td>2,351,117</td>
<td>2,985,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>7,012,486</td>
<td>8,147,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM Berlin:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>1,088</td>
<td>1,141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road</td>
<td>904,850</td>
<td>1,059,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail</td>
<td>215,555</td>
<td>240,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>355,265</td>
<td>410,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,475,670</td>
<td>1,712,703</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Parcel Post (Rail car loads)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>January-October</th>
<th>(12 months)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To Berlin</td>
<td>7,272</td>
<td>8,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Berlin</td>
<td>7,383</td>
<td>9,259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>14,655</td>
<td>18,118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Passenger Traffic (Excluding Allied Traffic & German Rail Traffic)

TO Berlin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>1961 (Jan-Oct)</th>
<th>1960 (12 months)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>16,584 planes</td>
<td>626,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto</td>
<td>561,356 cars</td>
<td>1,453,388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Cycle</td>
<td>11,953 cycles</td>
<td>18,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>26,782 buses</td>
<td>728,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2,826,887</td>
<td>2,851,283</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FROM Berlin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>1961 (Jan-Oct)</th>
<th>1960 (12 months)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air*</td>
<td>16,584 planes</td>
<td>677,787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto</td>
<td>571,684 cars</td>
<td>1,504,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Cycles</td>
<td>12,729 cycles</td>
<td>20,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>26,693 buses</td>
<td>742,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2,944,835</td>
<td>3,025,978</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Including fly outs of refugees.
Railroad Passenger Traffic (Excluding Allied Traffic)

Exact statistics on railroad passenger traffic between the German Federal Republic and West Berlin are not available because travelers may board or leave trains in East Germany enroute to Berlin, in West Berlin or in East Berlin and in some cases may pass in transit through East Germany to Poland and beyond. The following statistics reveal the number of travelers who crossed the interzonal borders by rail at the four interzonal crossing points between the German Federal Republic and East Germany during 1960 and the first 10 months of 1961.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>January-October 1961</th>
<th>(12 months) 1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exits from Federal Republic</td>
<td>1,999,973</td>
<td>2,304,716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry into Federal Republic</td>
<td>1,909,685</td>
<td>2,220,761</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

West Berlin SED

The Socialist Unity Party (SED) organization in West Berlin, headed by first secretary Gerhard Danelius, claims to be an autonomous branch of the East German SED. In fact, it is controlled by the East Berlin SED organization. Its members, now estimated at less than 5,000, are organized on a ward basis, with a local unit in each of West Berlin's 12 districts. A legal party, it has not shown significant strength in recent elections—in December 1958 it pulled 31,572 votes, or less than 2 percent of the total. In addition to the SED, the Communists have various auxiliary organizations in West Berlin, such as the Society for German-Soviet Friendship. All these organizations lack financial support because of the economies imposed by the parent East Berlin SED organization. They nevertheless retain a potential for sabotage and harassing actions of various kinds, although in the final analysis the threat of such actions comes from East Berlin and East Germany—rather than from inside West Berlin.
West Berlin City Transportation

Although the bus and street car systems were divided in 1949, the elevated (S-Bahn) and subway (U-Bahn) systems served both West and East Berlin until 13 August 1961.

With two exceptions, all S-Bahn lines now terminate at the last station before crossing the sector border. One S-Bahn line running from the northern West Berlin suburb of Tegel to the southern West Berlin suburb of Wannsee still runs through the East Berlin sector stopping only at Friedrichstrasse where anyone entering or leaving is subject to East German controls. The central West to East S-Bahn also enters East Berlin, stops at Friedrichstrasse and then returns to West Berlin. Passengers entering or leaving at Friedrichstrasse are subject to East German controls.

The S-Bahn is operated by a department of the East German Reichsbahn administration, and is guarded by the East German Transport Police (Trapos). It is generally the cheapest and fastest—and most dilapidated—of Berlin's transportation media. About 450,000 West Berliners used the S-Bahn daily before 13 August, after which a boycott, inspired by the trade unions, began. The number of riders then declined to about 50,000 but later climbed back to about 100,000. To break the boycott, the Communists have maintained and even improved S-Bahn service in West Berlin. The boycott has created considerable transportation problems for West Berlin since other media have not been able to fill the gap. Transportation authorities have grappled with the problem by lengthening subway trains, increasing schedules, and ordering additional busses, but for many West Berliners, travel time has doubled and even trebled.

The U-Bahn in West Berlin is run by the city-owned BVG (Berlin Transportation Company), which was founded in 1929 and split into East and West administrations in 1949. The West Berlin U-Bahn, which owns 718 cars, carried 137,000,000 passengers in 1958.

Only two of the four U-Bahn lines that formerly operated in both East and West Berlin still pass through East Berlin. The line from Tegel, in northern West Berlin, to Templehof transits East Berlin stopping only at Friedrichstrasse. The Gesundbrunner-Leinestrasse line passes through East Berlin without stopping.
The BVG also runs 29 street car lines with 990 motor and trailer cars and had 714 busses on 40 lines before 13 August. Since then, it has additionally ordered 100 busses, has leased 51 from private firms, and has had 45 placed at its disposal at no charge by West German cities.

Since the sector border closure, the East German authorities have forbidden their barges and sight-seeing boats to transit West Berlin on the Havel and Spree rivers and the system of canals and locks, and Soviet Zone freight trains no longer enter West Berlin from East Berlin, but only from the Soviet Zone.

The Exclave of Steinstuecken

About one-half mile south of the Zehlendorf District of the US sector, but belonging to it, is the exclave of Steinstuecken, which is entirely surrounded by the East German district of Potsdam. Its inhabitants commute to West Berlin via an East German road on which the VOPOs maintain three control points. Passage is limited to Steinstuecken residents, or for those who are acknowledged to have a "second residence" in the exclave; the East Germans stopped issuing passes to others wanting to enter Steinstuecken after 13 August. Steinstuecken has been subject to intermittent Communist harassment—in 1951 East German police invaded the area and sought to annex it. A near-emergency situation has been reached as a result of pressure since 13 August 1961. The East Germans have fenced off the exclave, except for the one access road to West Berlin, and blocked normal entrance to houses facing the Zone.

Zehlendorf District authorities sought to construct new roads to provide access to all properties, but VOPOs prevented them from bringing in construction workers as "second residents." Clergymen, undertakers, tradesmen, service personnel, and even trash collectors are denied entry. Firemen, a mailman, a doctor and an ambulance driver are the only non-residents permitted through. On the basis of a 1959 agreement, a West Berlin electric meter reader can enter the area, which is supplied with power by the Zone electric company.
Seven other tiny areas of forest or farmland also constitute exclaves of the Western sectors, but for all practical purposes have been absorbed into neighboring areas of East Germany or East Berlin. Two of these exclaves belong to the US sector, and five to the British.

In addition to the exclaves of the Western sectors, a large area adjacent to the British sector belongs to "Greater Berlin"—i.e. to East Berlin. In September 1945 the British traded part of Staaken to the Soviets in exchange for Gatow airfield. Although technically this area forms part of the "Mitte" District of East Berlin, it is administered from Potsdam District and its border with West Berlin is treated as a zonal, not sector, border.
The Borders

West Berlin is surrounded by two borders—one of which separates it from the Soviet sector of East Berlin, and the other separating it from East Germany.

A. The Sector Border

The border between East and West Berlin passes through the center of the city in an irregular jagged line following the ancient borough delineations which have not changed, despite the alterations through the years. As a result, the border may run through the center of a street, or bisect a building or plot of land. Prior to 13 August 1961 the streets that crossed this border were blocked to vehicular traffic or under surveillance by East German police. However, there was very little restriction of pedestrian traffic even though an occasional spot check was made. Vehicular traffic was checked. The elevated electric railroad (S-Bahn) and the underground electric railroad (U-Bahn) crossed the sector border at several points. Although there were facilities for inspection and control of passenger traffic, few restrictions were imposed.

Since 23 August, all but seven crossing points on this sector border have been closed. Of the crossing points remaining, one is reserved for Allied and foreign diplomatic personnel, 4 for West Berlin residents and 2 for West Germans. They are:

(1) Reserved for Allied occupation forces, members of diplomatic corps and foreign travellers.
   a. Friedrichstrasse

(2) Reserved for residents of West Berlin.
   a. Chausseestrasse
   b. Invalidenstrasse
   c. Oberbaumbruecke
   d. Sonnen Allee

(3) Reserved for residents of the German Federal Republic.
   a. Bornholmerstrasse
   b. Heinrich Heine strasse
The West Berlin-East German Zonal-Border

The West Berlin-East German zonal border is controlled by Soviet and/or East German guards at seventeen control points. As of 12 August they were:

(1) Glienecke Bridge, on the road to Potsdam, where two Soviet soldiers and two Volkspolizei man a movable barrier.

(2) The Sakrow Ferry, where two Volkspolizei man a barrier. There is a constant Soviet patrol here.

(3) The Autobahn checkpoint at Babelsberg, where two to four Soviet soldiers and five Volkspolizei man a movable barrier and check Autobahn traffic.

(4) Fifty meters north of the US checkpoint at Drei-linden where two Volkspolizei stationed in a wooden shack check identification cards of travelers other than Allied official travelers. There is a constant patrol of two or three Soviet soldiers in this area.

(5) Stahnsdorferdamm, on the road to Klein Machnow. There is a barrier here where vehicular traffic is checked by one Soviet soldier and two Volkspoli-zei. Apparently there is no pedestrian traffic here.

(6) Machnower Strasse, on the road to Steinstuecken. A movable barrier is operated by two Volkspolizei who check pedestrians and bicyclists. No vehicles can pass here. Two Soviet soldiers patrol this area.

(7) Berliner Strasse, on the road to Teltow. The street is partially blocked by a fixed barrier, a barbed wire fence, a ditch and piled-up sand. One or more Volkspolizei control pedestrians and bicyclists here.

(8) Diedersdorferweg in Marienfelde. There are four ditches across this road as well as a screen of shrubbery. There is a barrier about 200 meters inside East Germany which is guarded by one Soviet soldier and two Volkspolizei. Apparently pedestrian traffic is permitted here.

*Later information not available.
(9) Sakrower Landstrasse, on the road to Sakrow. There is a barrier operated by Volkspolizei and a guard house 200 meters inside East Germany. In addition, the road is barred to vehicular traffic by a tree barrier, a ditch and a wooden fence.

(10) Krampnitzerweg. Vehicular traffic barred by a tree barrier and a ditch. A movable barrier for pedestrians is operated 200 meters inside East Germany by two Soviet soldiers and two Volkspolizei.

(11) Potsdamer Chaussee. Vehicular traffic here is barred by a ditch and a barbed wire fence. Two Volkspolizei in a guard house control pedestrian traffic.

(12) Heerstrasse, Highway 5 to Hamburg. A movable barrier is guarded by two Volkspolizei and two Soviet soldiers.

(13) Seegefelderweg, on the road to Falkensee. A barrier 20 meters inside East Germany is manned by two Soviet soldiers and one Volkspolizei. Vehicular traffic is barred by two ditches and a barbed wire fence.

(14) Schoenwalder Allee, on the road to Schoenwalde. Guarded by two Volkspolizei. Vehicular traffic barred by a ditch and screened by brush.

(15) Bergfeld Stadtweg, Frohnau. A barrier 200 meters inside East Germany guarded by Volkspolizei.

(16) Leninstrasse, leading to Glienecke. Closed to vehicular traffic. A fixed barrier guarded by one Soviet soldier and a Volkspolizei.

(17) Berlinerstrasse, to Glienecke. Blocked by a fixed barrier, barbed wire and ditch. Open to pedestrian traffic.

All access routes which are not controlled have been blocked and the entire border area is patrolled by East German police. Most of the border is marked by a fence and cleared areas and some sections contain watch towers. S-Bahn rail lines from West Berlin into East Germany have been blocked. Suburban East German travelers who formerly used the S-Bahn through West Berlin to East Berlin now must use the Berlin outer ring.
The Berlin Bypasses

A. The Havel Canal (Paretz-Niederneuendorf)

The Havel Canal, connecting the Upper Havel Waterway and the Oder River with the Lower Havel Waterway and the Elbe River is a means by which East German traffic may bypass West Berlin. The canal was completed in 1953 and is capable of handling barges of up to 750 tons. Two way traffic is possible although heavy silting sometimes limits two way traffic to barges of less than 500 tons.

B. The Berlin Ring

The Berlin ring is a standard gauge railroad which circles Berlin, thereby affording through trains a bypass of the center of the city. The outer ring was planned and some sections were completed before World War II. During 1948-1949 the uncompleted gaps were closed and about half of the entire route was double tracked. Since 13 August double tracking has been completed on the route from Birkenwerder on the northern outskirts of Berlin to Michendorf, southwest of Berlin, thereby completing the entire ring.
THE EAST BERLIN ECONOMY

East Berlin encompasses an area of 156 square miles and has 1,100,000 inhabitants, or 6.4% of the total population of East Germany. Industry provides employment for about one third of the 578,000-man work force. As a result of efforts to make it a "showplace" and to lessen the contrast with the Western sectors, living conditions probably are somewhat better than in the rest of the country. A key manufacturing center, it accounts for about 7% of East Germany's total industrial output, ranking 6th among the 14 administrative districts. East Berlin produces about 10% of the gross value of the country's metal processing industry output and is a major supplier of electric and electronic equipment to the Soviet bloc. It also provides a significant share of East German production of turbines, machine tools, high pressure boilers, anti-friction bearings, rubber tires, and abrasives.

East German industry as a whole is heavily dependent on East Berlin industries, particularly for machinery and equipment. The four major East Berlin machine tool plants, for example, account for approximately half of the GDR's total production. The planned expansion of the East German electric power industry, moreover, will rely heavily on equipment produced in East Berlin. Finally, East Berlin is the most important center in the GDR for the manufacture of printing equipment, and ranks third in the output of ready-made clothing.

East German consumption levels generally are about 25% below those of West Germany, although this is less important now that the absolute level of East German consumption has passed the prewar level. Retail distribution gradually is being modernized; the East Germans have much less choice than the West Germans in purchasing consumer goods and consumer durables still are in very short supply. The supply of fresh fruits, vegetables and dairy products is irregular; there is still informal rationing of butter and potatoes. Before 13 August 1961 East Berliners were able to shop in the Western sectors, where the supply and choice of goods are much better. Some 50,000 East Berliners crossed daily to jobs in West Berlin and enjoyed a favorable rate of exchange for their earnings.
INTERZONAL TRADE

Interzonal trade between East and West Germany is conducted on the basis of a semi-barter agreement arranged through the TREUHANDSTELLE, a joint non-governmental agency. Trade in goods with the GDR represents 2 percent of the total West German exports and imports but it provides Bonn with a counter to possible East German moves to close access between the Federal Republic and West Berlin. For East Germany interzonal trade represents about 11 percent of its total volume of trade and provides important amounts of strategic items such as high grade steel products, machinery and transportation equipment, chemicals, coking coal, and some foodstuffs. When West Germany abrogated the interzonal trade agreement in September 1960, the East Germans realized the magnitude of their dependence on West Germany and launched a campaign to achieve "economic invulnerability" from western imports in general and West German imports in particular. Although interzonal trade will probably continue at a normal level in 1962, the achievement of "invulnerability" remains uppermost in the minds of the East German leaders and the GDR can be expected to continue dispersing its imports from West Germany to seek closer ties with the bloc.

A semi-barter trade agreement negotiated annually provides the basis for interzonal trade and establishes the amounts of permissible annual indebtedness between the two zones. Imbalances can be liquidated by deliveries of specified goods by the debtor country, or by payment of currency. Total indebtedness is limited to 100 million DM on each account.

Goods exchanged between East and West Germany fall under two accounts. Sub-account I regulates exchange of steel, machinery, coal and coke for brown coal briquettes, petroleum products, and machinery. Sub-Account II includes agricultural products, chemicals, textiles, some machinery and other goods not included in Sub-Account I. East Germany has not only exceeded the credit margin under this account but is not able to transfer on the due date the money to pay its bills.
Access Routes and Controls

A. Air:

Flights between West Berlin and West Germany must pass through three corridors established by the occupying powers in 1945. The corridors are straight, 20 miles wide, and lead from a 20 mile "control zone" encompassing Berlin to Hamburg, Hanover and Frankfurt in the Federal Republic. The Western powers hold that there are no altitude limits within these corridors. The USSR, on the other hand, maintains that the Western powers have renounced any right to fly above 10,000 feet, and Moscow has objected to test flights of C-130 turboprop aircraft above this ceiling.

Within West Berlin three airports--Templehof, Tegel and Gatow--are used for military and commercial air traffic. Templehof, the largest, is most used for commercial operations. Located almost in the heart of the city, it has two 5,300 foot runways capable of accommodating C-124 and DC-7C type aircraft, is fully equipped for instrument flying, and has ample facilities for maintenance, freight and passenger handling and various operational offices. Templehof has a daily capacity of 720 planes.

Tegel, in the French Sector, opened for commercial traffic in January 1960. Equipped for instrument flying, it has 7,840 and 5,500-foot runways and is capable of handling medium-range jet aircraft, such as the Caravelle. It has a daily capacity of 500 planes. In the event of a blockade of surface transportation, Tegel would be of major importance. Gatow is a secondary field located in the British Sector. It is a military field. However, it has a permanently surfaced runway about 6,000 feet long, and a daily capacity of 280 planes.

Air corridor flights to Berlin are restricted to commercial-military planes of the occupation powers and subject to procedures and regulations agreed to by the quadripartite Berlin Air Safety Center, (BASC). The Western powers license air operations over Berlin and in the three corridors. Allied civil and US military flights are controlled by the US Air Force at Templehof. Military flights to Gatow and Tegel are controlled by the British and French military authorities.
Air France, British European Airways and Pan American fly into West Berlin. Together they made 17,815 flights in 1960, carrying 688,250 passengers into the city and 842,785—including 121,778 refugees—out. As of 1 November 1961 the three lines averaged 385 flights per week during 1961. Air France uses the Caravelle and the Super Constellation Aircraft, BEA the Vickers Viscount and Pan American the Douglas DC-6B.

B. Roads

Five roads are designated for interzonal and international traffic with East Germany and for traffic between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. All are thought to be in good condition. From north to south they are:

1. Selmsdorf-Berlin

This route enters East Germany north of Lubeck on highways 104 and 105. Highway 105 proceeds eastward to Wismar. Highway 104 proceeds in a southeasterly direction to Schwerin, where it connects with highway 106 running south to Ludwigslust and highway 5, the main Hamburg-Berlin route.

2. Horst-Berlin

This route enters East Germany on highway 5 and proceeds southeast through Ludwigslust, Nauen and Staaken to West Berlin.

3. Marienborn-Berlin

This is the 4-lane autobahn which enters East Germany at Marienborn and extends eastward to Berlin, approximately 165 kilometers. It is the only authorized route for allied military and other official traffic. Personnel travel on documents issued by their allied military commanders or by the allied ambassadors in Bonn. Travel controls are exercised by Soviet guards at Marienborn, on the western end of the Autobahn, and at Babelsburg on the eastern end at the outskirts of Berlin, before entry into West Berlin. Allied freight carried by truck is not subject to inspection or control. During the last half of November 1961, permanent raffles and drop gates were erected at Babelsburg by the East Germans to facilitate traffic control.
4. Wartha-Berlin

This route, an autobahn, enters East Germany at Wartha and extends east to Gera, where it joins a north-south autobahn to Berlin.

5. Hof-Berlin

This route enters East Germany on highway 2 north of Hof and joins the main north-south autobahn to Berlin. It is the main Berlin-Munich autobahn; traffic is detoured over highway 2 because a principal bridge near the zonal boundary has not been restored.

All highways from the Federal Republic enter West Berlin at one of two points on the West Berlin-zonal border. The Selmsdorf-Berlin and Horst-Berlin routes enter West Berlin via East German highway number 5 at Staaken. The Marienborn, Wartha, and Hof routes enter West Berlin via the autobahn at the Babelsburg-Dreilinden checkpoint. Over 60% of all West German vehicles use the Helmstedt autobahn. About 8,000 American passenger cars travel it annually. Freight traffic must pass East German customs control upon entering or leaving East Germany. Road tolls are assessed according to a schedule established by East German authorities. These tolls amounted to an estimated 41.7 million DM (West) in 1960.

C. Railroads:

There are seven East-West German interzonal crossing points for rail traffic. Five of them normally are used for freight. International passenger trains between Western Europe and East Germany, including Berlin, normally are routed over four of these crossing points. From north to south the seven crossing points are:

1. Lubeck-Herrnburg

This route serves the northern area of the German Federal Republic and East Germany and links with a ferry connection to Denmark and Sweden.

2. Buchen-Schwanheide (Hamburg-Berlin)

This is the principal route between Hamburg and Berlin and formerly extended about 245 kilometers from the
interzonal crossing point, through West Berlin, to the main railroad station in East Berlin. At Nauen, in East Germany, it connects with the Berlin Outer Ring and bypasses West Berlin. The route is double-tracked from the interzonal crossing point to Wittenberge (110 km), and alternately double or single tracked from Wittenberge to the Berlin Outer Ring. There are 35 bridges, ranging in length from 10 to 70 meters, on this route. All are thought to contain demolition chambers.

3. Vorsfelde-Oebisfelde

This is a major route between the Ruhr and Berlin, and is used to route empty freight cars from West Berlin to the Federal Republic. The distance from Oebisfelde to the East Berlin main railroad station, passing through West Berlin, is about 170 kilometers. From Oebisfelde to the Berlin Outer Ring at Wustermark, the distance is 137 km. This route is largely single tracked from Oebisfelde to the Berlin Outer Ring and multiple tracked into East Berlin. There are twenty-five bridges, ranging in length from less than ten meters to an 810 meter span across the Elbe River, on this route. All are thought to be chambered for demolition.

4. Helmstedt-Marienborn

All allied freight and passenger traffic and all West German freight traffic to West Berlin use this route. It also serves as the principal route for international rail traffic from Western Europe to Eastern Europe via Berlin, and for through passenger cars between Paris and the Hook of Holland and Moscow. The distance between Helmstedt and the East Berlin railroad passenger station, transiting West Berlin, is 196 kilometers. The distance from Helmstedt to Wildpark, where the route connects with the Berlin Outer Ring is 158 kilometers. The route is double tracked from Helmstedt to Beideritz, (56 km), and single tracked from Beideritz to Wildpark. There are about 45 bridges, the longest of which is a 680 meter span across the Elbe River. All are thought to be chambered for demolition.

As authorized by a 1945 quadripartite agreement, there are 13 freight trains, including all Allied military
freight trains, from the Federal Republic to Berlin daily, with a maximum capacity of 800 tons per train. Allied freight, which is not subject to inspection or control, moves on the basis of a document known as a warrant. There has never been an agreement on outbound freight trains, which average about one per day. Empty freight trains returning to West Germany from West Berlin may be routed via Stendal through the interzonal crossing point at Oebisfelde.

There are ten pairs of West German passenger trains a day between West Berlin and the Federal Republic, plus two American and one British, in addition to two pairs of French trains a week. Allied trains to Berlin are pulled by East German locomotives and manned by East German personnel. As of 23 November 1961, USCHCEUR reported the following schedule for US Army Duty Trains:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Departure</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Arrival</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bremerhaven</td>
<td>1948Z</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>0512Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>0552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>2040</td>
<td>Bremerhaven</td>
<td>0540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>1807</td>
<td>Frankfurt</td>
<td>0536</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Bebra-Wartha

This route enters East Germany at Gerstungen, re-enters the Federal Republic for a short distance north of Gerstungen and again enters East Germany near Wartha. The East German regime is constructing a by-pass for the Gerstungen-Wartha stretch near Eisenach. The distance from the interzonal border to the main railroad station in East Berlin via Erfurt and Leipzig, transiting West Berlin, is 350 kilometers. The distance from the interzonal border to Michendorf, where the route connects with the Berlin Outer Ring, is 310 kilometers. This route is double-tracked throughout, and electrified from Leipzig to Dessau. There are over 100 bridges, most of which are thought to be chambered for demolition.

6. Ludwigstadt-Probstzella

This is the principal route between Berlin and South Germany and provides a connection between Berlin and Munich and with Austria and Italy. It enters East Germany at Probstzella and proceeds to Berlin via Leipzig, tran-
siting West Berlin, a distance of 323 kilometers. The
distance from Probstzella to Michendorf, where the route
joins the Berlin Outer Ring, is about 230 kilometers.
It is single-tracked from Probstzella to Leipzig and
double-tracked from Leipzig to Berlin.

7. Hof-Gutenfurst

This line, a principal route for international
freight trains from Austria and Italy to Berlin and to
the Scandanavian countries, enters East Germany at Guten-
furst and serves local passenger traffic.

All freight and passenger trains between the
Federal Republic and West Berlin enter or leave West Ber-
l in via Griebnitzsee and Drewitz in the Soviet zone.
The Hamburg-Schwanheide, Vorsfelde-Oebbelde, Helmstedt-
Marienborn and the Bebra-Wartha lines enter West Berlin
via Griebnitzsee, near Potsdam. The Ludwigstadt-Probst-
zella line enters via Drewitz in the south. Passenger
trains on these lines stop at "Station Zoo" in West Ber-
l in before crossing the intersector border and ter-
minating at the Friedrichstrasse station in East Berlin.
The Lubeck-Harrnburg and Hof-Gutenfurst lines do not
enter West Berlin.

Passenger traffic across the interzonal crossing
points is subject to the same controls as highway traffic.
However, in some instances customs and immigration control
is exercised aboard the trains. International travellers
to East Germany may obtain entry or transit visas at the
interzonal crossing points in East Germany or aboard the
international trains in East Germany.

Freight traffic is subject to customs control
upon entry into East Germany. Parcel post trains to and
from West Berlin are subject to particularly careful con-
trol according to available reports.

D. Inland Waterways:

There are two inland waterway connections between the
Federal Republic and East Germany. Both are linked to
greater Berlin through a system of canals. The connecting
waterways are the Elbe River and the Mittelland Canal.
1. The Elbe River connection is at Cumlossen about 45 kilometers downstream from Magdeburg, on the interzonal border. The Elbe flows from the Czechoslovak border 570 kilometers through East Germany, past Dresden and Magdeburg, and continues through the Federal Republic to Hamburg. Near Magdeburg it connects with the Elbe-Havel Canal which, in turn, links with the Lower Havel waterway system serving Berlin. In West Berlin the Lower Havel connects with the Teltow Canal, the Oder-Spree system and the Oder River at the Polish border. North of Berlin the Lower Havel connects with the Oder-Havel system, which also connects with the Oder River on the Polish border. The Havel Canal branches off the Oder Havel system north of Berlin to join the Lower Havel system, thus by-passing West Berlin. The greater portion of this system is capable of handling barges of up to 750 tons, although there have been some indications that silting in the Havel Canal by-pass may limit the capacity of that waterway to barges of less than 750 tons. Upstream from Hamburg to Magdeburg the Elbe River can handle barges of 1,000 to 1,350 tons.

2. The Mittelland Canal, the second connection, enters East Germany at Buchhorst and joins the Elbe near Magdeburg. The average transit line from the Ruhr to Berlin via the Mittelland system is 6 days for self-propelled craft and 12 days for barges under tow.

Freight is subject to customs control. All vessels are required to have operating permits issued by the Federal Republic and East German authorities. Prior to April 1961 West German barges were required to pay tolls which amounted to 23.6 million DM (West) in 1960. These tolls were abolished by a decree of the East German Council of Ministers on 20 April 1961. West German vessels may proceed to East Berlin via West Berlin and are subject to police supervision upon entering East Berlin. Vessels of East German registry have been prohibited from transiting West Berlin since 13 August 1961 and are permitted to enter West Berlin only at the Henningsdorf checkpoint on the Havel River north of Berlin. Prior to 13 August 1961, 1700 East German vessels, carrying 320,009 tons of freight, transited West Berlin each month. East German vessels now use the Havel Canal to by-pass West Berlin. East German barges from the West with cargoes destined for East Berlin proceed through the Havel and Oder Havel Canals to the Oder River, up the Oder to the Oder Spree Waterway and back to East Berlin via the Oder Spree. This requires several additional days' time.
SOVIET AND ALLIED MILITARY FORCES

Soviet, East German and Allied Military and Security Forces in and around Berlin:

Western military and security forces in West Berlin are far outnumbered by the Soviet and East German forces immediately available and, of course, could be readily crushed if additional Soviet and East German military strength were to be drawn from other parts of East Germany. The comparative strengths of all military and security forces in the Berlin area appear at Table I.

The West Berlin police and security forces:

The regular uniformed West German police, "force A" (Schutzpolizei), number approximately 6,000. Normally, they carry pistols. Although not organized in military-type units, they are trained in riot and mob control and have infantry small arms and some automatic weapons available. In addition, there is a paramilitary "force B" (Bereitschaftspolizei), in units of approximately 1000 men each stationed in each of the three Western sectors. Authorized in 1950 when the Commandants felt the need for a stronger police force to counter heavily armed East German military and paramilitary units, "force B" cannot be used without the specific approval of the respective Western Sector Commandant. Maintained in a high state of readiness and equipped with pistols, carbines, automatic rifles, light machine guns, mortars and rocket launchers, "force B" is intended to quell serious disorders. In the event of a mass incursion into West Berlin, "force B" would be used to support American, British and French troops. Additional West Berlin police strength is provided by the Einsatzkommandos, who numbered 1,865 in November 1960. At that time, the police forces totalled 15,876, but only 10,764 of these were organized in units which could be employed tactically for the defense of West Berlin.

On 18 May 1961, the West Berlin house of deputies authorized an auxiliary police force, thought to number 4,000, to guard buildings and other installations, thus freeing the regular police for other duties. These auxiliary police do not perform semi-military duties.
To match the firepower of the East Berlin border guards, West Berlin police on border patrol were issued American-made rifles and submachine guns on 23 October 1961—three days after the release of these weapons and gas grenades had been approved by the Allied Commandants. The Commandants also approved oral instructions to police to open fire (1) to protect fleeing refugees who reach West Berlin territory; (2) to return VOPO fire aimed into West Berlin and endangering police, civilians or military forces; (3) to repel VOPO encroachments; and (4) to prevent capture or damage of property in military or police custody.

TABLE I

Western Strength In Berlin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States Army</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Army</td>
<td>2,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Army</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Berlin Police</td>
<td>15,876</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Allied Forces in West Germany

In the event of local hostilities the substantial Allied forces in West Germany probably are adequate for immediate defense purposes. (The comparative strengths of these forces appear in Table I.)

The West German armed forces, under the impetus of the current NATO buildup, are slowly approaching authorized strength. At present, they are at only 70 percent of that strength and their combat capabilities can be rated only as fair. The army is capable of providing an effective combat-ready force of eight fighting brigades from the eight NATO-committee divisions. Since mid-October 1961 Bonn has recalled 5,000 reservists for one- to two-months' duty, twice
extended by three months the terms of service personnel, agreed to increase arms purchases from the US, assembled F-104 and G-91 aircraft for the first time in Germany, and approved seven NIKE sites in northern Germany. A law to extend conscription from twelve to eighteen months is to be introduced in the Bundestag early in 1962, when the Bundeswehr is expected to total 364,000. However, incomplete training and equipment will leave the West German military establishment substantially below full combat potential. The government has substantially increased its defense budget—according to one report by one billion dollars—and hopes to have twelve fully trained and equipped divisions assigned to NATO by July 1963, when total Federal Armed Forces strength will be approximately 375,000. Nine new air force squadrons—in addition to the eight already incorporated in NATO—are being formed. Production to fill part of the naval commitment to NATO lags because of shortfalls in the construction of conventional destroyers. The Defense Ministry is considering the construction of six missile firing destroyers.

The first French Army, headquartered at Baden-Baden, comprises two divisions in the Saar-Mosel and Palatinate-Wuerttemberg-Baden areas. Attrition and obsolescence of equipment and inadequate training has greatly reduced combat effectiveness. Paris has announced that it intends to fill out divisions in Germany—now at 80 percent of strength—by adding 10,000 men to the First Army. Another division, with its headquarters in France, has one brigade in Germany opposite the Swiss border. Paris has also recalled the 7th Light Armored Division and the 11th Light Infantry Division from Algeria to eastern France and has indicated that three additional divisions will be recalled to Europe in 1962. France has increased its air defense capabilities along the French-German border with the assignment to tactical units in 1961 of the first Mirage IIIIs—a high-performance jet interceptor.

The British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), 50,000 men comprising five infantry and two armored brigade groups and the 3,000 man non-NATO Berlin garrison, would have to be increased by approximately 40,000 men to give it M-day status, according to NATO military authorities. Recent BAOR exercises revealed extensive deficiencies in manpower
and conventional equipment and an unpreparedness to fight a non-atomic war. BAOR lacks support units and is dependent on 40,000 West German employees, whose loss in the event of hostilities would practically cancel combat logistic capabilities. British planning assumes a seven-days' warning in order to reinforce the BAOR with two brigade groups; but there are no UK forces currently earmarked as a strategic reserve—although moves are underway to assemble such a force by recalling reserves. Such troops would be partially trained. The BAOR probably could not be brought to wartime strength in fewer than 60 days.

Canadian forces consist of two excellently trained and equipped brigade groups, at 100 percent of strength. The Canadians are assigned to the British sector under the overall command of the BAOR.

Belgian forces in West Germany are at about 75 percent of combat strength. Training and equipment are fair.

### ALLIED FORCES IN WEST GERMANY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Army</th>
<th>Total Navy</th>
<th>Total Air Force</th>
<th>Total Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>612,439</td>
<td>25,700</td>
<td>130,900</td>
<td>1,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>237,000</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271,700</td>
<td>1,097</td>
<td>769,039</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Communist Forces in East Germany

The comparative strengths of Soviet and East German forces in East Germany appear in Table III.

The Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG), consists of six armies made up of 10 tank and 10 motorized rifle divisions—at about 70-75 percent of strength. Support elements include: free rockets of up to 35 miles range, mounted on tracked amphibious chassis; and 150-mile, 350-mile, and possibly a few 700-mile SS missiles. The six Soviet armies are deployed tactically. The bulk of the motorized rifle divisions are forward in the armies on the western borders of East Germany, and the tank divisions of the tank armies are disposed on the flanks and in depth. These forces constitute a highly-trained, mobile, striking group capable of immediate deployment for combat operations.

The East German Army is organized into two military districts which, during war, could become tactical army headquarters. The units are disposed generally throughout the country. Its size has remained fairly constant, at 75,000 men, organized in four motorized rifle and two tank divisions similar to the most modern Soviet ones. It is well equipped, with no notable shortages except in heavy long-range artillery and reserve stocks of weapons. In training exercises, the East German Army has in the last few years displayed a high standard. In recent years, an extensive reserve program has been developed, and there are now about 250,000 trained reserves. The chief weakness of this army is its dependence on the Soviet Union for logistic support.

Soviet air forces immediately available for support of ground operations include 522 jet fighters and 120 jet light bombers of the Twenty-Fourth Tactical Air Army stationed in East Germany, and 252 jet fighters in the Thirty-Seventh Tactical Air Army in Poland. Readily available for reinforcement of the air forces in East Germany and Poland are 6 air armies in the western USSR and the air forces of the Soviet Southern Group of Forces in Hungary, plus bomber elements of naval aviation, with a total of 1,030 jet fighters, 490 light bombers, 1,216 medium bombers, and 87 heavy bombers.
The East German air forces consist of about 200 jet fighters organized into 6 fighter-interceptor regiments. Because of the relatively low level of pilot training and because only 24 of these aircraft are night fighters, the operational capability of these forces, particularly in night or all-weather flight operations, would be slight.

There are also 12 operational SAM sites protecting Berlin and key Soviet installations. Additional support to ground operations could be furnished by medium-range ballistic missiles deployed at Taurage and Mukachevo in the western border districts of the USSR, well within range of the target area.

The reinforcement of Soviet ground forces in East Germany could be most readily accomplished by 41 combat-ready line divisions now located in the 3 western border districts of the USSR and 2 in Poland. Disregarding the effects of any Allied interdiction effort, these divisions, using 8 major road and 6 rail routes from the Soviet Union to the West German border, could be introduced into the area of operations at the rate of 4 divisions per day, beginning on the third day after movement was initiated. Two of the divisions in the western border districts of the USSR are airborne units and could be deployed in East Germany within one or two days. The remainder of the divisions are tank and motorized rifle. Although they would not be employed in the limited action being assumed, the Czechoslovak Army of 14 divisions would probably be deployed along Czechoslovakia's northern and western frontiers and brought up to strength as a threat to tie down US forces in West Germany. The four divisions of the Soviet Southern Group of Forces in Hungary could also be a threat to the US southern flank, but these divisions might be required in Hungary to maintain the stability of the Communist regime there.

Enemy logistical requirements could be met from supplies currently stockpiled in the 14 major and numerous smaller depots in East Germany, which are believed sufficient to support the 20 divisions in GSFG for about 60 days of combat. Rail, road, air, and sea lines of communication from the Soviet Union into East Germany are adequate to move and support a force larger than the 6 East German and 63 Soviet line divisions mentioned above.
Soviet-East German basic capabilities, therefore, are as follows:

a. The East German Army could oppose a penetration of East Germany along the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn with 4 motorized rifle and 2 tank divisions, supported by 182 jet fighters of the East German air forces.

b. The Soviets could resist a penetration effort on the Helmstedt-Berlin axis by concentrating 4 motorized rifle and 3 tank divisions in the Helmstedt-Magdeburg area within 12 hours after starting movement. For this operation and defense of the remainder of the East German border, the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, could use any or all of its 10 motorized rifle and 10 tank divisions, supported by missiles and by 522 jet fighters and 120 jet light bombers in East Germany, and by missiles and medium and heavy bombers from the Soviet Union.

c. The Soviets could reinforce their forces in East Germany with up to 43 divisions from Poland and western USSR within 12 days, as well as with additional fighters and light bombers.

d. Concurrently with these capabilities, the Soviets and East Germans could seize West Berlin at any time.
### TABLE VI

#### 1. Strength in East Berlin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security Guard Regiment (MFS)</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st and 2nd Border Brigades, Berlin</td>
<td>8,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East German Army</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Army</td>
<td>6,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 motorized rifle regiments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 tank regiment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 independent brigades</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>19,900</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2. Strength in East Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SOVIET</th>
<th>EAST GERMAN</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>405,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>11,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Manpower</td>
<td>28,500</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>36,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>349,000</td>
<td>154,000</td>
<td>503,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10 Nov In a speech in Moscow, Khrushchev stated that the USSR intended to hand over to the East German regime "those functions in Berlin which are still with the Soviet organs." Khrushchev declared because of their "violation" of various aspects of the Potsdam agreement, the Western Allies "have long ago abolished that legal basis on which their stay in Berlin rested." Charging that the Allies misused Berlin "which is the capital of the German Democratic Republic (GDR)" as a base for "subversive activities" against the GDR and the Warsaw Pact countries, Khrushchev called on the Allies to "form their own relations with the GDR and come to an agreement with it themselves if they are interested in certain questions connected with Berlin...." He also committed the USSR to give military support to the GDR in the event that the Western Powers engaged in "provocation" to defend their access rights to Berlin. Khrushchev further stated that "the Soviet Union has been proposing and proposes to tackle this matter /Signing of a German peace treaty/ without delay."

27 Nov The USSR sent a note to the three Western Powers in which it stated that "the Soviet Government finds it possible for the question of Western Berlin to be settled for the time being by making Western Berlin an independent, demilitarized free city." The USSR laid down an apparent ultimatum stating that if the Western Powers did not agree to negotiate the details of a "free-city" status for West Berlin within six months, there would be "no topic left for talks on the Berlin question by the former occupying powers," that the East Germans would be empowered to control Allied access to the city, and the Soviet Union would refuse further contact with the Allies there. By specifically confining its proposals to West Berlin, Moscow showed that it considered East Berlin as East German territory. By demanding that both German states participate in any agreements concerning the creation of a "free-city" of West Berlin, the USSR indicated that recognition of the GDR was an immediate goal.
In reply to the Western notes of 31 December, the Soviet Union sent notes to 27 other countries that fought Germany in World War II proposing that a 28-nation conference be held within two months in Prague or Warsaw to negotiate a peace treaty with Germany as a step toward settling the West Berlin problem. Accompanying the notes was a draft peace treaty to be signed by both German states.

At a news conference in Moscow, Mikoyan said that the main factor in the Berlin crisis is not the Soviet deadline but to get talks started between East and West and "to end the occupation status of West Berlin." Negotiations "could be prolonged for a few days or even a few months" if they were conducted "in the spirit of finding a settlement" and if the Soviet Union could "see there is goodwill on the part of the Western Powers."

Khrushchev, in a speech at Tula, stated for the first time that the USSR was ready to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany by which the GDR would "acquire all the rights and will be bound by all the obligations of a sovereign state." "Therefore, no encroachment whatever on the territory of the GDR, in whose center Berlin lies, can be permitted, either by land, air, or water. Any violation of the sovereignty of the GDR will meet with a vigorous rebuff, irrespective of whether it will happen on water, on land, or in the air. All this should be considered by the gentlemen imperialists." The USSR, he said, has no concessions to make on the German question.

In Berlin, Khrushchev reaffirmed Soviet willingness to have the UN participate in guaranteeing the status of West Berlin as a "free city," adding that there would be no objection to a minimum garrison composed of US, British, French and Soviet forces as well as neutral troops to enforce the guarantee, but with no right to interfere in the "internal" affairs of the city. He repeated this formula the following day, insisting on Soviet participation if the West remained, but without mentioning neutrals.
9 May  Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, arriving in Geneva, called for a liquidation of the occupation forces in Berlin and for an early summit conference, which could make "necessary" decisions. East German Foreign Minister Bolz called for recognition of East Germany.

Khrushchev told a group of West German editors visiting Moscow that the Soviet Union could wipe the Western Allies off the face of the earth.

10 May  Gromyko asked for full participation of both East and West Germany in the conference. The Western foreign ministers said that a dispute on this question could prevent the conference from opening on time.

11 May  The Geneva conference opened after a delay caused by the Soviet proposal that East and West German delegations be admitted as full participants. Both sides claimed victory in the compromise seating arrangement which permitted both German delegations to be seated near, but not at, the conference table.

10 June  Gromyko offered a proposal for an interim agreement on Berlin. The West could "temporarily" maintain certain occupation rights for one year. During this period the two German states would set up a committee to discuss and work out measures on unification and peace treaty. If the Germans failed to reach agreement after one year, the USSR would sign a treaty with East Germany. The Western Powers were to reduce forces in Berlin to "symbolic contingents," restrict hostile propaganda, liquidate subversive organizations in Berlin, and agree not to station atomic or rocket weapons in West Berlin. If these were agreed upon, then the USSR would preserve communications to Berlin in present form. The interim agreement was to be guaranteed by four powers, and, secondly, by the East German government. The guarantees were to be based on a protocol already submitted (apparently for free city). The arrangement was to be supervised by a four power body.

19 June  Gromyko renewed his proposal for an interim settlement on Berlin but extended the 12 month deadline to 18 months with the foreign ministers to meet at the end of this interim agreement. The Big Four foreign ministers
19 June

agreed to recess the conference until 13 July. The Western foreign ministers issued a statement charging that the latest Soviet proposals would reserve "freedom of unilateral action" to the USSR at the end of the specified period. The Soviet proposals were basically the same as those offered on 10 June. The Western statement declared the Soviets hoped to induce the West to acquiesce in the liquidation of Western rights in Berlin and Western responsibility for maintaining the freedom of the city. It referred to the recess as an opportunity for the USSR to reconsider its position and for the West to examine the situation in the light of Khrushchev's 19 June speech in which he said that the Soviet Union would never sign an agreement perpetuating the occupation status of West Berlin. Khrushchev called on the foreign ministers to renew their efforts to reach an interim settlement, and asserted that the Soviets have never issued an ultimatum on the Berlin situation. He repeated his willingness to go to any number of summit meetings to achieve a solution to East-West problems, and reaffirmed his intention to sign a separate peace treaty if there were no agreement on an all-German treaty within a specified period.

9 July

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin told the West German Ambassador in Moscow that the USSR would accept a compromise time limit of two years, during which the West could remain in Berlin but under new agreements superseding those on which Allied rights are presently based, and that an all-German committee would attempt to negotiate a permanent settlement. Zorin stated that the USSR would not challenge Western rights in West Berlin at the end of this period if agreement had not been reached by the Germans. He observed that a separate peace treaty with East Germany would be a very serious step and that Moscow would resort to this alternative only after all attempts to reach a negotiated settlement had failed.

23 July

Khrushchev made a statement in a speech at Dnepropetrovsk that "the time has come" for the heads of government to tackle "complex unsettled international issues."
5 Aug  In a press conference in Moscow, Khrushchev adopted a posture of statesmanlike moderation and restraint, stressing the prospects for establishing a "climate of confidence and mutual understanding" between the US and the USSR and underscoring the "immense importance" of the state of US-Soviet relations for maintaining peace. He contended that there are no territorial disputes or "insoluble contradictions" standing in the way of "improved relations" and renewed his pledge that the status of Berlin would not be changed while negotiations are in progress. He added, however, that he did not consider the talks with Eisenhower a substitute for a conference of heads of government which the USSR still considered "useful and necessary."

27 Sept  The joint communique signed by Eisenhower and Khrushchev at the close of the Camp David talks emphasized that the question of general disarmament was "the most important one facing the world today," stated that an exchange of views had taken place "on the question of Germany including the question of a peace treaty with Germany," and that, on the subject of Berlin, an understanding had been reached "subject to the approval of the other parties directly concerned, that negotiations would be opened with a view to achieving a solution which would be in accordance with the interests of all concerned and in the interest of the maintenance of peace."

21 Dec  The Western powers in similar notes to Moscow proposed the holding of a summit meeting in Paris on 27 April 1960.

25 Dec  Khrushchev's prompt and cordial acceptance of the Western proposal of 21 December for a four-power summit meeting in Paris carefully refrained from injecting any controversial issues. He expressed "profound satisfaction" that the powers had found it desirable to discuss "major international problems" at summit meetings which "should be held from time to time in countries participating in such conferences." His offer of alternative dates for the meeting was carefully phrased to avoid any appearance of pressure. His reference to the "four-power" meeting suggested that he did not intend to press for full participation
25 Dec by the two German states. On the other hand, in private talks with the Western ambassadors when delivering the 25 December letters, Gromyko raised the question of bringing in the Germans.

26 Dec An official of the East German council of ministers said that Khrushchev and Ulbricht had worked out a "Berlin strategy" to be carried out in successive phases, according to a usually reliable source. In the first phase—the first summit meeting—Khrushchev would introduce a plan for the neutralization of West Berlin and follow this up with a proposal to eliminate all traces of the Federal Republic. In the second phase, the Communists would maintain pressure against West Berlin following the summit meeting to create suspense. In the third, the plan for neutralization would again be introduced, and Khrushchev would propose a four-power administration—including the USSR—in West Berlin. The Communists would be patient, in the expectation that it was only a matter of time until the Western powers became "tired." The East German official further stated that bloc strategy was to some extent based on the assumption that a Democrat would be elected to follow President Eisenhower.

25 Apr In a major address at Baku, Khrushchev combined a rigid restatement of the maximum Soviet demands on Germany and Berlin with his most sweeping portrayal of the consequences of a separate peace treaty for the Western position in Berlin since he first threatened to conclude such a treaty. He totally rejected any summit discussion of reported Western proposals for an All-German plebiscite on reunification and a peace treaty. While his statements did not add any new elements to the established Soviet position on Berlin, he had not previously personally spoken of a separate peace treaty ending Western Allied air access to Berlin and of meeting force with force since his speech of 17 February 1959.
9 May

The Soviet Ambassador gave De Gaulle a proposal for an Interim Agreement on Berlin, "to prepare conditions for the ultimate transformation of West Berlin into a free city and the adoption of measures leading to the preparation of future peace settlement."

A. This temporary agreement would be for two years; to include approximately the same list of questions as discussed at Geneva. The agreement should envisage:

1. Reduction of effective strength of forces of three powers, to take place progressively in several stages;
2. No nuclear weapons or missile installations in West Berlin;
3. Measures to prohibit the use of West Berlin as a base of subversive activity and hostile propaganda;
4. The agreement would take account of declaration of the Soviet Union and the GDR concerning the maintenance of communications of West Berlin with the outside world;
5. The engagements concerning the GDR could take a form which would not signify diplomatic recognition of the GDR by West;
6. Supervision of agreement by four-power committee.

E. The Four Powers would make a declaration inviting the two German states to take advantage of the interim period to attempt to arrive at a common point of view on the German question. Contact could be established between the two German states by creation of an all-German committee or some other form.

C. If the German states refuse to engage in conversations or if it becomes clearly evident that they are not able to come to an understanding, the four-powers will sign a peace treaty with the two German states, or with one of them, as they would judge it desirable. Moreover, measures will be taken in order to transform West Berlin into a free city. As for a statute for a free city, USSR would prefer to elaborate this in common with the three-powers. The Soviet Union states that it also favors participation of the UN in the guarantees for a free city.

20 May

Khrushchev made a speech in East Berlin in which he stated that the USSR had a moral right to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany that would end Western rights in Berlin and give the GDR full control of access to the city. No unilateral action would be taken, however, until efforts were made at a summit
20 May

meeting within "six to eight months" to reach agreement on a treaty with both German states. He offered qualified guarantee of status quo on condition that the Western powers would be willing to avoid "any unilateral steps" which would prevent a meeting in six to eight months. East German leaders were visibly distressed by Khrushchev's speech.

-1961-

9 Mar

In his conversation with Ambassador Thompson, Khrushchev showed some flexibility in his discussion of the Berlin problem, and asserted that the USSR would provide any guarantees necessary to preserve the internal situation in West Berlin and assure the US that its prestige would not suffer as a result of a settlement. He reiterated his intention to sign a peace treaty with the GDR with a clause providing for a free city of West Berlin if the West did not agree to a peace treaty with both German states, but he set no deadline for action.

-24 Apr

Khrushchev told West German Ambassador Kroll that he had originally planned to raise the Berlin question during the first part of 1961, but that he realized President Kennedy needed more time. While emphasizing his determination to solve the Berlin and German question during 1961, Khrushchev stated that the bloc had set no precise deadline and could wait until the West German elections and "possibly" until the Soviet party congress before convening a bloc peace conference to sign a separate treaty with East Germany. Such restraint, however, would depend on no "unexpected" Western moves such as a Bundestag meeting in Berlin. As to the consequences of a separate treaty, Khrushchev stated that the Western powers would have to make arrangements with East Germany to maintain their communications to Berlin and that he would advise Ulbricht to abolish the air corridors. In response to Kroll's statement that this could bring about an international crisis, Khrushchev said he was convinced that the West would not risk a general nuclear war over Berlin. He said he expected that the West would resort to economic sanctions and possibly a break in diplomatic relations but that the USSR could cope with such measures.
4 June

The aide memoire delivered at the conclusion of the
President's talks in Vienna with Khrushchev, sum-
murized the standard Soviet position on Germany.
While not foreshadowing a precipitate Soviet move
on Berlin, it made clear that Moscow is not pre-
pared to offer any concessions to break the existing
impasse and, in effect, left the next step up to
the West. The memorandum proposes a decision "with-
out delay" to convene a peace conference to conclude
a treaty with both German states, or to sign separate
but similar treaties between the bloc and East Ger-
many and between the West and the Federal Republic.
The treaty would establish a free city and, as part of
the guarantee for it, the West and Soviets would main-
tain token forces in West Berlin. Neutral forces could
also be introduced. If the West is reluctant to
agree to a peace conference, the memorandum proposed
an interim decision "for a specified period of time." All four-powers would then appeal to the "two German
states" to negotiate a peace settlement and reunifi-
cation within a period of "not more than six months." If these bi-lateral German talks fail, Moscow pro-
poses to sign a separate treaty with East Germany,
transferring access control to the GDR, formally
defining West Berlin as a free city, with access to
it "by land, water or air" dependent upon negotiations
with the East Germans.

15 June

Khrushchev used his report on the Vienna meeting to
emphasize his determination to carry through with
his announced policy on Berlin and Germany.
For the first time, he committed himself publicly
to sign a separate treaty and transfer access con-

17 July

Soviet Ambassador Menshikov told White House staffer
W.W. Rostow that it is "absolutely firm and predictable"
that the USSR would convene a peace conference during
the second half of November to sign a separate peace
treaty with the East Germans. Menshikov said that in-
vitations would be sent at some future date and asked
17 July
Con't
whether he was correct in assuming that the US would
not attend. He told Rostow that for the first time
he believes war to be possible, though not in-
evitable; he expressed the hope that there would be
US-USSR negotiations before it became inevitable.
Asking, "Why do you wish to be in Berlin as conquerors,"
Menshikov said that, given a separate treaty, the East
Germans will not interfere with Western access if "of-
fensive activities" in West Berlin are halted and if
the West--without necessarily extending de jure re-
cognition to the GDR--is prepared to deal with the
Ulbricht regime.

12 Aug
Effective upon publication, the East German Ministry
of Interior issued a decree which limited interzonal
pedestrian and vehicular traffic to 13 crossing
points--Kopenhagenerstrasse, Wollankstrasse, Bornholmer-
strasse, Chauseestrasse, Brandenburger Tor, Fried-
richstrasse, Heinrich Heine Platz, Oberbaumbruecke,
Puschkin Allee, Elenstrasse, Sonnon Allee and Rudower-
strasse--sealing off the remaining 74. All roads leading
from West Berlin into the Soviet Zone were sealed ex-
cept for the Helmstedt Autobahn and the main highway
to Hamburg, according to West Berlin police. Allied
personnel, other foreign nationals and West Berliners
were to be permitted to cross into East Berlin--and
did so with difficulty during the first 24 hours
after promulgation of the decree--although West Ber-
liners were required to show identity cards issued by
West Berlin city authorities. West Germans seeking to
enter East Berlin henceforth were to be required to apply
at one of four East Berlin police control posts for "one-
day passes."

13 Aug
The Brandenburg Gate crossing point was closed.

22 Aug
The East German Ministry of Interior further restricted
access to East Berlin by West Germans, West Berliners,
and Allied diplomatic and military personnel. Foreign
nationals, members of the diplomatic corps, and per-
sonnel of the Western occupation forces were limited
to use of the Friedrichstrasse checkpoint; West Germans,
to the Bornholmerstrasse and Heinrich Heine Strasse
points; West Berliners, to Chausee Strasse, Oberbaum-
bruecke, Sonnenallee, and Invaliden Strasse. West
Berlin citizens were required to obtain an East German
permit, at a cost of one West German mark, to enter East Berlin. The Ministry of Interior announcement stated that the new regulations—like those of 13 August—will stay in effect "until the conclusion of a peace treaty."

6 Oct

At his meeting with the President, Gromyko read from a prepared text. He stressed that the Soviet government attaches great importance to the conclusion of the peace treaty; if the US does not agree, the Soviets will sign a separate treaty, but they do not wish it to further aggravate US-Soviet relations. Therefore, prior to a separate treaty, they are prepared to work out jointly a free city status for West Berlin and to reach an understanding on other questions relating to "normalization of the situation" in West Berlin. The Soviets proceed on the premise that such understanding:

1) would be reflected in a Soviet-GDR treaty
2) that it would be formalized in special documents appended to the peace treaty. Gromyko said that the Soviet government believes that the best thing is to see a way out on the basis of a compromise. Even though a separate Berlin agreement would benefit the US, the USSR is prepared to have such a separate agreement.

As to the timing of a treaty, the Soviet government sees no fatal date. Negotiations must not be artificially protracted. The Soviet government believes that agreement on a free city would provide strict guarantees with regard to the observance of the city's status and non-interference in its internal affairs. These guarantees would be in the form of Four-Power contingents, neutral or UN troops stationed in Berlin for specified periods of time. The Soviet government does not intend to restrict West Berlin's ties with the outside world or access to West Berlin by land, water, or air. But the Soviet Union does propose that the procedure for the exercise of such ties and the use of communications lines across the GDR be the same as that applied in the case of any other state. Gromyko said the Soviet Union could not agree to any West German claims to West Berlin; West Germany has no relation to West Berlin. Future ties between Bonn and West Berlin must be on the same basis as ties between any other sovereign state and the city. If the US declines to sign a treaty, then— in addition to the solution of West Berlin problem—an
understanding will have to be reached on other questions important to European peace and security; (1) the legal formalization of existing German borders, and (2) the non-transfer to two Germanies of nuclear and rocket weapons, as well as the prohibition of the manufacture of such weapons in the two states. Gromyko stated that the Soviet government places the utmost emphasis on these questions.

Khrushchev's report to the 22nd Party Congress contained a generally moderate and routine restatement of established Soviet foreign and domestic policies. His formal and specific withdrawal of the year-end deadline for signing a German peace treaty probably was intended to meet Western objections to negotiating under pressure of threats of unilateral action. His positive assessment of Gromyko's recent talks with US and British leaders and his reaffirmation of the USSR's readiness to seek a "mutually acceptable and agreed settlement through talks" were also aimed at opening the way for formal negotiations on Berlin and Germany. He specified, however, that a German settlement cannot be "postponed endlessly" and repeated that a German peace treaty will be signed with or without the Western powers.

Foreign Minister Gromyko's uncompromising stand in his talk with Ambassador Thompson suggests that the USSR considers its prestige has been challenged by recent events in Berlin. Gromyko read a formal protest which warned that if American actions continue, "they will be regarded as an act of provocative armed invasion of GDR territory, and the German Democratic Republic will be given necessary support for purposes of ending such actions." During the ensuing conversation with the Ambassador, Gromyko made no effort to respond to suggestions that the discussions on the issue could continue in Moscow or Berlin. The Soviet protest also went beyond the current issue of identification documents for US personnel in civilian clothes to assert in effect that East German police have the authority to permit or deny all passage across the sector border. Ambassador Thompson's preliminary conclusion is that the USSR considers it has a good issue and will be prepared to use force. Despite the
tense situation in Berlin, Khrushchev in his third speech at the party congress made a point of reiterating his previous statement withdrawing a deadline for a German treaty and urging a "businesslike and fair solution of the problem." He also endorsed further US-Soviet exploratory talks in order "to prepare fruitful negotiations" although he coupled this with a warning against use of talks merely to delay a settlement. He concluded his remarks on Germany and Berlin by stating: "Such is our stand, we have adhered to it so far, and we abide by it firmly." According to a TASS summary Khrushchev did not touch directly on the current events in Berlin. He claimed that the West wanted the USSR to act as "traffic police" in Berlin but that the Soviet Union could not be forced to act against its "vital interests." He also emphasized that it was "high time" the West realized that it could not negotiate with the Soviet Union on the basis of "positions of strength."

The NATO Council agreed that the basic objectives of its policy in regard to Berlin are: (1) the maintenance of the presence and security of the three Western garrisons in West Berlin, (2) the maintenance of the freedom and viability of West Berlin, (3) the maintenance of freedom of access to West Berlin. The Council also agreed that under present circumstances, contacts with Moscow should be resumed "at an early moment."

In its first policy statement, the new West German government presented three fundamental principles-- 1) the security of the Federal Republic; 2) the maintenance of the existing political, legal and economic ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic, including free civilian access; and 3) the maintenance of a joint policy with regard to reunification, non-recognition of the East German regime and eventual settlement of frontier questions in an all-German peace treaty-- which "in no event could be abandoned."
MAJOR DOCUMENTS ESTABLISHING BERLIN'S LEGAL STATUS

1. Protocol on the Zones of Occupation in Germany and the Administration of Greater Berlin, concluded by representatives of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union in September 1944, established the status of Greater Berlin as a separate and special occupied area under three-power control (France was added as a fourth power in July 1945) and provided for a governing authority (kommandatura) to direct the city's administration. (The unilateral division of the city by the Soviet authorities in 1948 suspended the four-power administration, leaving West Berlin under tripartite Western administration but did not change four-power responsibility for Berlin.)

2. Article 23 of the Basic Law (Constitution) of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949) included "Greater Berlin" as a state (land) of West Germany.

3. Military Governors' Letter of 12 May 1949 stipulated that Berlin should not be governed by the Federal Republic and could be represented in the federal parliament only on a non-voting basis.

4. Three-Power Statement of the Principles Governing the Relationship Between the Kommandatura and Greater Berlin (14 May 1949) declared Berlin should not be included as a state in the initial organization of the Federal Republic.

5. Berlin Constitution (1950) included Berlin as a state of the Federal Republic, contrary to the 1949 Statement of Principles, and stated that the West German constitution and laws are binding on Berlin. (The Western military commandants suspended these provisions of the Berlin Constitution and established the requirement that any federal law to have effect in West Berlin must first be adopted separately by the Berlin parliament.)

6. Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic (1954). The Western Allies recognized the close relationship between West Berlin and West Germany by stating their intention to consult with the Federal Republic in regard to the exercise of Allied rights and responsibilities in Berlin.
7. Declaration on Berlin (5 May 1955) superseded the 1949 Statement of Principles and is the basic document governing Allied-German relations in Berlin. It provided for a large measure of self-government for West Berlin and for extensive economic and political integration with West Germany while reserving certain key areas of responsibility to Allied control. Berlin's status in international law as an occupied area was not changed.
ANNEX C

EXTRACTS
ARTICLES OF WEST GERMAN CONSTITUTION PERTAINING TO BERLIN

Article 23

For the time being, this Basic Law applies in the territory of the Länder Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, Greater Berlin, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower-Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein, Württemberg-Baden and Württemberg-Hohenzollern. In other parts of Germany it is to be put into force on their accession.

Article 127

Within one year of the promulgation of this Basic Law the Federal Government may, with the consent of the governments of the Länder concerned, extend to the Länder Baden, Greater Berlin, Rhineland-Palatinate and Württemberg-Hohenzollern the legislation of the Bizonal Economic Administration, insofar as it continues to be in force as federal law under Articles 124 or 125.

Article 144

(1) This Basic Law requires adoption by the representative assemblies in two-thirds of the German Länder in which it is for the time being to apply.

(2) Insofar as the application of this Basic Law is subject to restrictions in any Land listed in Article 23 or in any part of such Land, the Land or the part thereof has the right to send representatives to the Bundestag in accordance with Article 38 and to the Bundesrat in accordance with Article 50.

Article 145

(1) The Parliamentary Council determines in public session, with participation of the representatives of Greater Berlin, the adoption of this Basic Law and signs and promulgates it.

(2) This Basic Law comes into force at the end of the day of promulgation.

(3) It is to be published in the Federal Gazette.
WEST GERMAN AGENCIES IN BERLIN*

(Source: Die Bundesrepublik, 1958/9)

The Plenipotentiary of the Federal Republic in Berlin-
Dr. Vockel

Branches:

Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs
" " " Interior
" " " Justice
" " " Finance
" " " Economics
" " " Food, Agriculture and Forestry
" " " Labour
" " " Transport
" " " Federal-owned Property
" " " Housing
" " " Refugees
" " " All-German Affairs

Federal Public Accounting Court

Further Federal Offices

Federal Statistical Office
Institute of the Federal Health Office
Institute for Water, Earth and Air Hygiene
Max-von-Pettenkofer Institute
Main Archives
German Archaeological Institute
External Branch of the Institute for Space Research
Federal Office for the Acceptance of Foreign Refugees
German Patent Office
Federal Building Directorate
Federal Debt Administration
Welfare Institute of the Federation and the Laender

Berlin Liaison Office

Federal Printing Office
Federal Commissioner for the Handling of Payments to
the Conversion Fund

Refugees Transit Centre
Federal Cartel Office
Federal Railways (various administrative offices)
Technical Telecommunications Office
Annex - continued

Postal Technical Office
Federal Supervisory Office for Insurance and Building Society Funds
Berlin Institute of the Physical-Technical Federal-Institute
Federal Institute for Material Testing
Federal Insurance Institute for Employees
Federal Insurance Office
Import and Supply Depot for Grain and Fodder
  "  "  "  Fats
  "  "  "  Meat
Biological Federal Institute for Agriculture and Forestry
Federal Research Institute for Grain Products
  "  "  "  the Meat Trade
Land Labour Office Berlin

Courts

Division of Supreme Court for Criminal Appeals
Federal Administrative Court
Supreme Federal Prosecutor – Federal Administrative Court
Federal Disciplinary Court

* 17,000 employees as of April 1961
In 1954, when West Germany gained sovereignty, the functions formerly exercised by the US High Commissioner devolved upon the US Ambassador in Bonn who retained his role as chief of the Mission in Berlin. Actual leadership in Berlin is shared by the US Commandant, with the rank of deputy chief of Mission, and the assistant chief of mission, the top US diplomatic official in the city. Effective 1 December 1961 the US Commandant, now also entitled Commanding General Berlin, reports to the Commander-in-Chief, US forces Europe. The Berlin Garrison, now designated as the Berlin Brigade, is subordinate to the Commandant. In addition, General Lucius Clay was appointed as President Kennedy's personal representative in Berlin in August, 1961.
DOCUMENTS REQUIRED BY THE EAST GERMAN REGIME FOR ENTERING EAST BERLIN, TRANSITING THE GDR OR ENTERING THE GDR

To Enter East Berlin

A. West Germans are required to secure 24-hour permits (Aufenthaltsgenehmigung) from East German police at certain specified crossing points on the city sector border. (degree of 9 September 1960). According to the terms under which Bonn agreed to reactivate the interzonal trade agreement on 29 December 1960, the East Germans undertook to facilitate the issuance of these permits. In practice, Bonn has implicitly recognized the right of the GDR to issue such permits.

B. West Berliners have been required since 23 August to secure East German permits to enter East Berlin. Most West Berliners have refused to comply with this requirement, or are unable to enter East Berlin to secure them, and have not visited the Soviet sector; those who continue to hold jobs in East Berlin or find it necessary to go to the Soviet sector pick up the permits at the crossing points. The GDR is seeking to establish permit-issuing offices in West Berlin.

C. US, French and British military personnel in uniform at present are not required to show documentation. Nevertheless, in the past, in response to East German attempts to force the showing of documentation the British have flashed their identity cards: the US and French have refused.

D. US, French and British civilian members of the occupying forces or diplomatic missions in West Berlin and military personnel out of uniform are required by the East Germans to show identification—AGO cards have been accepted although efforts have been made by the East Germans to insist on passports, in some cases successfully. Military personnel on foot and not in uniform have long been permitted to show their identification but personnel, both military and civilian, not in uniform but traveling in US licensed vehicles have not shown credentials. In October, the East Germans began demanding identification from such individuals and at present, Allied officials not in uniform are not permitted to enter the Soviet sector except on official business.

US and French military personnel in uniform refuse to show documentation to East German police. In the past, British personnel in uniform have flashed their identity cards.
US Mission personnel traveling on the S-Bahn are authorized to show their AGO cards; to date, East German guards have usually accepted this identification. At present, all personnel, military and civilian, of all three powers are permitted to travel to the Soviet sector only on official business. Civilian personnel traveling on US and French military sightseeing buses do not show identification; British have on at least one occasion shown passports. At present, no military buses are entering the Soviet sector.

E. Officials and private citizens other than those of the three Western occupying powers are required to show passports but visas have not been required. This applies even to the members of the military missions accredited to the pre-1948 Commandatura.

To Enter or Transit East Germany

A. West Germans transiting the GDR to Berlin are required to present their identity cards (Kannkarte) but do not have to show passports. To visit in East Germany they are required to have "residence permits" (Aufenthaltsgenehmigung) issued by local authorities in the area visited. At the zonal crossing points, West Germans are subject to customs controls and, if driving automobiles, pay vehicle taxes.

B. West Berliners desiring to enter East Germany are required to present identity documents (Ausweis) issued by the West Berlin Senat and have to secure "residence permits" issued by local East German authorities.

Since 15 September 1960 the GDR, and later other bloc countries, have refused to recognize the use of West German passports by West Berliners for travel within the bloc but have accepted West Berlin identity documents and issued GDR visas on separate sheets of paper.

West Berliners transiting East Germany to West Germany are required to show identity documents.

C. Allied military and civilian officials transiting the GDR on the Autobahn present Russian translations of travel orders issued by "competent authorities" to Soviet
officials at the two checkpoints; the latter stamp the documents and return them. "Competent authorities" are defined as the three Western commandants in Berlin, the commanders-in-chief of the US, French and British forces in Europe, and the ambassadors of the three Western powers in Bonn. While traveling on the Autobahn, US and French personnel not in uniform have refused to show identification to East German police but the British have done so on occasion.

D. Allied military trains on the Helmstedt-Berlin route travel under the four-power occupation rights and train commanders show Russian translations of travel orders for the train and for all passengers, Russian translations of individual travel orders, and AGO cards or passports to Soviet officials at the Marienborn checkpoint.

E. Military convoys on the Autobahn also travel under four-power occupation rights and do not acknowledge East German jurisdiction. The convoy commanders present the convoy manifest to Soviet officials at both checkpoints, showing the names and rank of all personnel and descriptions of all vehicles. Soviet and Allied authorities make a head count of personnel and Soviet guards check vehicles against the manifest but are not permitted to climb onto the vehicles to carry out their inspection.

F. Military Liaison Mission personnel are accredited to the Commander-in-chief, GSPG and are given permits to travel in non-restricted areas of the GDR by his office. Vehicles also receive permits from the Commander-in-chief's office. Not all personnel attached to the missions receive travel permits.

G. Other Categories:

1. All private citizens other than West Germans are required to show passports and obtain visas. US citizens are advised not to enter the GDR or, if they must do so, not to accept a visa stamp in the passport.

2. Officials from non-bloc countries (other than the three Western occupying powers) are required to show passports and obtain visas.
ANNEX G

CURRENCY CONTROLS

West Berliners and West Germans entering or leaving East Berlin and East Germany are not permitted to bring East German currency. Currency must be exchanged at the high legal rate at designated points along the sector border or at certain East German banks. Identification is required. Such travelers must keep a record of all exchanges and are subject to heavy penalties if caught trying to take East marks with them when they leave. The regime is eager to secure hard Western currencies.
Berlin

ZONAL BORDER CROSSING POINTS

- Vehicular and pedestrian traffic
- Pedestrian traffic only

UNCLASSIFIED
COMMUNICATION ROUTES BETWEEN WEST GERMANY AND BERLIN

Boundaries are not necessarily those recognized by the U.S. Government.
### Refugee Flights from East Germany and East Berlin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Monthly Totals</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td></td>
<td>7 Oct</td>
<td>Establishment of the so-called &quot;GDR&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 Feb</td>
<td>Establishment of the Ministry for State Security and the State Security Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15 Oct</td>
<td>&quot;Elections&quot; for the People's Chamber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15 Dec</td>
<td>&quot;Law for defense of the peace&quot; passed by the People's Chamber</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1951**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Monthly Totals</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Sept</td>
<td>Reorganization of the university system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4-19 Dec</td>
<td>German Question before the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 Feb</td>
<td>The Bundestag passes a law for an All-German Election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26 May</td>
<td>Security measures along the Zonal boundary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12 Jul</td>
<td>&quot;The building of Socialism&quot; proclaimed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7 Aug</td>
<td>Establishment of the Society for Sports and Technology (paran military formation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1952**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Monthly Totals</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25 Feb</td>
<td>Restrictions placed on inter-zonal tourist travel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26 May</td>
<td>Climax of the Church struggle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 June</td>
<td>&quot;New Course&quot; and 16--17 June uprising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21 Nov</td>
<td>New regulations for inter-zonal traffic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1953**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Monthly Totals</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18 Feb</td>
<td>Conclusion of the Berlin Foreign Ministers Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27 Mar</td>
<td>&quot;Sovereignty&quot; declaration of the &quot;GDR&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27 Oct</td>
<td>&quot;Elections&quot; for the People's Chamber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13 Nov</td>
<td>Beginning of propaganda for &quot;youth consecration&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued on next page)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>18 Jan, The Law establishing the &quot;National People's Army&quot; passed&lt;br&gt;25 Feb, The Anti-Stalin campaign in the USSR&lt;br&gt;Oct./Nov, Polish &quot;October&quot; and Hungarian uprising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>30 Jan, Proposal for a &quot;German Confederation&quot;&lt;br&gt;7 Mar, Show-trials of advocates of &quot;Revisionism&quot;&lt;br&gt;29 May, Bons on travel of students to West Germany&lt;br&gt;12 Oct, Currency reform imposed without warning&lt;br&gt;11 Dec, Law calling for further restrictions on travel to West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>10 Jul, Fifth SED Congress adopts Program to expedite &quot;Socialist Transformation&quot;&lt;br&gt;27 Nov, Soviet ultimatum on Berlin&lt;br&gt;10 Jan, Soviet peace treaty draft proposed&lt;br&gt;10 May, Beginning of Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference&lt;br&gt;5 Aug, End of Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference&lt;br&gt;2 Dec, New School law (Polytechnical education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>April, Forced collectivization campaign&lt;br&gt;17 May, Paris Summit Conference wrecked&lt;br&gt;12 Sept, Formation of State Council with Ulbricht as chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>12 April, Labor Code declared by State Council&lt;br&gt;Serious and prolonged food supply crisis&lt;br&gt;International tension sharpened as a result of Soviet Policy&lt;br&gt;13 Aug, Berlin borders closed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ECONOMY OF WEST BERLIN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GROSS PRODUCT BILLION DOLLARS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>2.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EMPLOYMENT THOUSANDS

- 1951: 749
- 1954: 747
- 1957: 875
- 1958: 891
- 1959: 862

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 1936-100

- 1936: 46
- 1951: 114
- 1954: 119
- 1957: 133
- 1958: 133

TRADE DISTRIBUTION 1960

- FREE WORLD 12%
  - WEST GERMANY 86%
  - WEST GERMANY 90%
- SOVIET BLOC 2%
  - FREE WORLD 7%
UNCLASSIFIED

BABELSBERG CHECK POINT
23 NOVEMBER 1961

STEEL I-BEAM POST 4'-6" LIFT GATES WOOD FENCE 2 1/2'

BERLIN
Schoenefeld Airport, south of Berlin, is one of the most important airfields in East Germany and the Berlin terminal for civil and military aircraft of the USSR and all the Satellites except Albania. Western airlines do not fly regularly to Schoenefeld, although specially chartered flights have landed there.

Construction to expand the airfield into a major terminal, equipped for all types of commercial aircraft, began early in 1959. An 11,000-foot runway, capable of handling the largest Soviet planes, was completed in the summer of 1961. It connects with a 6,600-foot concrete-asphalt runway, which is being lengthened to 6,800 feet. In addition, there are two 2,700-foot runways, and two more runways are to be finished by 1965. The airfield is well-equipped with navigational/landing aids--airport control, D/F, beach approach system, approach control, ILS, GCA, and a broadcast station in Berlin--and obstruction, rotating runway and approach lights. Long-line telephone and teletype services, and complete aerological service are provided. The field has adequate fire fighting and snow removal equipment.

Two underground fuel storage dumps, with an estimated capacity of 800,000 gallons, are located near the southeast edge of the field and are served by a railroad spur. An average of 4 tank cars of fuel arrive each day. These will be augmented by a new storage facility about 10 miles east of the field at Kablow, connected by pipeline.

The field has terminal and administration buildings, workshops, a motor transport section, power plant, and warehouses, and is capable of providing aircraft field maintenance. Two large hangars with maintenance shops are located at the southeast end of the field. A new 6-bay hanger is about 75 percent completed. In addition, there are barracks and dependents' quarters, mess, VIP hotel accommodations, and medical and recreational facilities.

Access routes to the airport, now only adequate, are being improved. There are good roads to Berlin, and a branch of the Berlin/Mittenwalde railroad services the airport with a station at Schoenefeld. A new S-Bahn line to connect East Berlin and the southeast portion of the airport via East Berlin/Wuhlheide and East Berlin/Adlershof-Gruenau lines is due for completion in the spring of 1962. A short double-tracked spur will branch off from the Adlershof-Gruenau line.
and terminate west of the airport. It probably will carry POL to the storage center. A single line which already connects the western part of the airport with the POL facilities will be improved. The S-Bahn line will be paralleled by a new 4-lane highway.

Schoenefeld's relatively large area and its location away from the heavily populated central part of Berlin make it potentially superior to West Berlin's airports as a base for jet operations. This, coupled with the fact that use of West Berlin airports is restricted to civil airlines of the Western occupation powers, may make the prospect of using Schoenefeld increasingly attractive to non-Allied airlines. The East Germans, backed by the USSR, are likely to intensify their efforts to attract airlines, such as the Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS), which do not use West Berlin's airports. International usage requires that government-to-government air agreements be concluded before the inauguration of regularly scheduled civil flights. The East Germans will not be able to capitalize fully on Schoenefeld until its expansion has been completed and international recognition of the regime achieved.