SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

NGA Review Completed. State Dept. review completed. DIA review(s) completed.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

Approved For Release 2008/10/27 : CIA-RDP79-00927A003400090001-7
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 December 1361

THE WEEK IN BRIEF
(Information as of 1200 EST 14 Dec)

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Moscow appears to be marking time on the Berlin question, awaiting the outcome of Western consultations. Khrushchev in his 9 December speech again criticized Western positions and reiterated Soviet demands for a free city, a peace treaty, and Western agreement with East Germany on access. However, Soviet statements have generally expressed neither impatience on the timing of negotiations nor pessimism about the outlook for successful talks. East German statements suggest that further controls over Allied traffic to East Berlin are being prepared. Danish approval of the NATO Joint Baltic Command was the subject of a Soviet protest note of 12 December. On the test ban issue, the Soviets seem to be laying the groundwork for an attempt to gain UN endorsement of their proposed treaty banning all nuclear tests. On general disarmament negotiations, the USSR and the US have agreed in the UN on a new committee composed of the old ten-nation committee plus eight other countries.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Moscow appears to be marking time on the Berlin question while awaiting the outcome of Western consultations. Khrushchev's speech of 9 December and reports from bloc sources suggest that Soviet policy is in an interim phase, relying mainly on propaganda and agitation to keep the Berlin issue in the forefront.

Soviet comment on the De Gaulle-Adenauer talks and the meeting of Western foreign ministers has stressed the theme of Allied disunity. TASS claimed that the discussion of the four foreign ministers revealed substantial differences in policy regarding negotiations with the USSR on long-overdue international problems. Moscow said that the notion of Adenauer's trying to influence De Gaulle in favor of negotiations was a paradox, since Adenauer himself was a fervid opponent of a Berlin settlement.

On 9 December, for the first time since the party congress, Khrushchev discussed Berlin publicly. In a speech to a meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Moscow, he reaffirmed that the USSR was prepared for talks on Berlin, but not—as some Western statesmen would like—on the question of "stabilizing and improving" the occupation status in West Berlin. Without mentioning President Kennedy by name, Khrushchev once again strongly opposed the President's concept of international control of the Berlin autobahn. He claimed this "unrealistic" approach was not intended seriously by its authors. Khrushchev stressed that assurances of free access would have to be on the basis of an agreement with East Germany.

Despite this rejection and the reiteration of unreduced Soviet demands for a free city and a German treaty, there has been a notable lack of high-level statements expressing impatience on the timing of negotiations or pessimism about the outlook for successful talks. This restraint, noted by the American Embassy, has been accompanied by comments by Soviet Foreign Ministry officials indicating an awareness that Western consultations are aimed at achieving agreement on the timing and substance of Berlin negotiations.

Additional moves to concentrate attention on the Berlin and German questions were evident in a letter from Khrushchev to Italian Premier Fanfani, in a note to the US, in a warning to Denmark, and in an aide-memoire to Austria. The letter to Fanfani...
asserted that De Gaulle and Adenauer were obstructing progress toward negotiations. The note to the US—requesting that General Heusinger, Bonn's representative to the NATO military committee in Washington, be arrested and handed over to the USSR for trial as a "war criminal"—was a blatant propaganda maneuver, apparently timed to coincide with the sentencing of Adolf Eichmann and the NATO meetings in Paris.

Danish approval of the NATO Joint Baltic Command with West Germany was the subject of a Soviet protest note on 12 December. The note charged that approval of the command arrangements would complicate the situation of Denmark's neutral neighbors and force the USSR to adopt necessary measures, implying renewed pressure on Finland.

The Soviet note probably was aimed primarily at focusing international attention on Soviet allegations of West German militaristic intentions and at bringing pressure on Denmark to delay the implementation of the joint command agreement. It does not appear to foreshadow an immediate Soviet move to revive the demand for military talks with Finland. Repetition of the line that the USSR will be compelled to take security measures, however, is probably intended as a reminder to Finnish President Kekkonen of the watchdog clause in the communiqué he signed with Khrushchev. That part of the communiqué expressed Soviet hopes that Finland would "attentively follow" developments in Northern Europe and the Baltic and, in case of necessity, suggest "appropriate measures" to the Soviet Government.

A new feature of the Soviet note was the charge that inclusion of the island of Bornholm in the Baltic Command violated the letter and spirit of assurances given to the USSR after World War II that no foreign troops would be stationed there.

German domination of the Common Market has been the main theme of Soviet opposition to Austrian association with the EEC, and on 12 December the Soviet ambassador delivered an aide-memoire asserting that Austria's association would be incompatible with a policy of neutrality and thus a violation of the State Treaty.

Berlin

The East Germans are taking further steps to consolidate their gains along the East-West Berlin sector border and to prepare new moves. Ulbricht said on 6 December, in an interview to be broadcast over CBS television on 4 January, that conditions for entry into East Berlin would "soon" be "normalized" to require passports with visas at the sector border, which he described as the state frontier of the German Democratic Republic. Western acceptance of East German visas would be tantamount to recognition of the Ulbricht regime.

Ulbricht was more evasive on the subject of allied military entry to East Berlin, merely observing that this question would not arise, since there would be "no place" for allied military personnel in East Berlin—presumably a reference to the Communist position that signature of a Soviet-East German peace treaty will invalidate all Western occupation rights in Berlin.

Heavy construction at the sector-crossing points in recent days—particularly at Friedrichstrasse, the point designated for Allied use—is intended to deter forcible attempts to pass the barrier. All seven crossing points have been provided with all the trappings of an international frontier.

The Soviets and East Germans have both continued to emphasize the new line that rotation of American troops to and from Berlin is heightening tensions and is illegal because the troops are subordinate to NATO.

Civilian traffic on the highway to Berlin has been
subjected to long customs checks by East German authorities. These measures caused a backlog of 100 trucks at the Babelsberg checkpoint on 11-12 December. However, US troop convoys on the autobahn have continued to move without difficulty, although there have been some delays at the West Berlin end of the highway due to meticulous checking by Soviet guards at Babelsberg.

The East German regime also has taken steps to increase its control over rail traffic between East and West Germany by rerouting the important line from Hamburg so that all Western rail traffic, except some outgoing freight trains, must enter and leave West Berlin on one line via Potsdam. This increases the vulnerability of rail traffic to stoppage in case of accident. In the meantime, US military trains have been subjected to increasing delays in reaching Berlin.

This move has been accompanied by warnings that the refusal of Western countries to attend a recent international meeting in East Germany concerned

SECRET
with railroad scheduling might "entail serious disturbances in traffic crossing the border." Such threats presumably are intended to promote the regime's campaign for negotiations with West Germany on a governmental level.

The East Germans are also emphasizing charges that East German-operated elevated railroad (S-Bahn) coaches on the only two remaining S-Bahn lines passing through West Berlin are being damaged by "hired rowdies" as they transit the Western sectors. Since the S-Bahn now is running at a financial loss, such threats may be preliminary to further curtailment—or even a shutdown—of the S-Bahn service.

More recently, East German officials have also claimed damage to interzonal trains and equipment and warned that such "criminal actions" could result in serious disturbances to transportation between Berlin and West Germany, including Allied rail transport.