At afternoon session on Dec 8, senior officers continued examination
substantive paper (BKD 55), noted contingency planning paper (BQD 66) for
referral to ministers, approved report on status of Sept ministerial decisions,
and reviewed French draft cover paper of report to ministers. Letter and
substantive paper referred to drafting sub group to meet December 9 a.m.

Following principal substantive points emerged from discussion:

1) In discussion of III 3 a of substantive paper Carstens assumed that
status of Berlin meant present status. Kohler pointed out some modifications
might be possible but essential nature of status would remain unchanged.
Accordingly, it was agreed to substitute "any arrangement" for status as more
accurate reflection of possible developments in negotiations.

2) At Carstens' suggestion it was agreed that catalogue of proposals
most might put forward in event Soviets should broaden scope of negotiations
(III 4) should begin with "submission of revised Western peace plan" and remaining
proposals should be rearranged in accordance with more logical sequence.
3) In discussion of bracketed language on Four Power Commission to study arms control measures (III 4 d) Carstens indicated his agreement with proposal provided it made clear that establishment of Commission would not be directly linked with Berlin negotiations, that arms control measures to be considered would not be confined to Europe, and that views of other members of MAC be taken into account before proposal actually put forward. Leloy argued vigorously against bracketed language on ground that proposal reflected new and dangerous concept of Western willingness to discuss European security measures outside traditional context of political settlements. In Leloy's view, if West should pursue such line of approach after Soviet rejection of Western peace plan and related measures Soviets would assume West now prepared to discuss European security measures on basis of traditional Soviet formula. Kohler agreed that for reasons 2 mentioned by Leloy Western powers must handle proposal with appropriate caution but disputed implication of Leloy's remarks that proposal entailed unavoidable and fatal dangers for West. In Kohler's view, idea offered possibility of agreement on workable forum for discussion of arms control measures which not now possible under UN aegis. Furthermore, Kohler saw no reason why West could not control proceedings in Four Power Commission in such a way as to avoid pitfalls which concern Leloy. Shankburgh who supported Kohler's rationale pointed out that in his view proposal might conceivably be useful lure in effecting Soviet agreement to

Despite Shookburgh's suggestion that proposal might be consigned to separate section of paper to avoid over-identification with Berlin negotiations, Laloy insisted that bracketed language remain as is for consideration by ministers.

Carstens suggested substituting "on world-wide basis" for "not limited to Europe" in identification of arms control measures to be studied by Four demurred Power Commission. Kohler insisted on ground that Carstens' formula might be troublesome to U.S. because of Red China problem and agreed to provide alternative language for consideration by drafting sub group.

4) In discussion of unbracketed language on method of handling September proposals on European security (III d) Laloy asked if demilitarized zones intended also to cover zones of inspection. Kohler said no, pointing out that in U.S. view any inspection behind curtain would be to net West advantage. Laloy disagreed employing traditional French argument that inspection zones must inevitably lead to restrictions or limitations on Soviet pattern.

At conclusion of meeting, Kohler asked Carstens to comment on apparent divergence between recent Brandt statements on issue of narrow versus broad negotiations, and Fedrep's acceptance of concept of narrow negotiations. Carstens replied that in recent discussion of issue with Brandt Fedrep had taken position that while real solution of Berlin problem must await settlement.
must await settlement of German question, some aspects of Berlin situation
might be discussed with Soviets -- for example, access and the wall. In
Carstens' view Brandt's relatively mild treatment of issue in recent Bundestag
debate reflected previous discussion with Fedrep and likelihood that Brandt
satisfied with Fedrep formula. Be that as it may, Carstens made strong pitch for
Western initiative in negotiations in removal despite strong probability of
Soviet rejection. German public opinion would resent Western silence on wall
even though fully aware Western initiative would get nowhere.

Next plenary session 3:15 pm Saturday.

[Signature]

Authenticated by: Martin J. Hillenbrand