Afternoon meeting, Senior Officials on December 7 devoted to discussion substantive paper. After brief review paper by Kohler Caratans stated paper raised question wide versus narrow negotiations. Although Germans favored wide negotiations based on 59 peace plan they recognized obstacles thereto and agreed negotiations possible on narrow basis but in so doing necessary avoid German giving away opportunities eventual solution all/German problem. Consequently negotiations must concentrate on Berlin and access and removal of wall. Caratans stated while doubtful we could persuade Soviets remove wall question must be raised in negotiations for German political reasons. In exchange for clear arrangements on access could accept certain dealings with authorities East German functionaries, respect for East German tradition, both on basis discussed in paper and one or two other points.

however
However such matters as renunciation use of force and non-aggression statements and the like should be divorced from access arrangements because no such connection therewith. Instead suggested line that proposals this nature be advanced as exchange for Soviets not repeat not sign peace treaty with East Germany.

After Shuckburgh commented that paper im1 needed some revision to indicate negotiations might broaden out so that certain objectives in addition to those specified in Section One might be considered. Kohler remarked that prevention of separate peace treaty had been abandoned as negotiating objective because no way to prevent signing of such treaty and even if we paid price to avoid signature there would be no real obstacle to Soviets blackmailing blackmailing us again on same basis in six months time. Important objective was to improve access arrangements. This objective worth substantial price and therefore non-aggression declarations and like had been tied into a narrow Berlin negotiations. Kohler as part initial all-Berlin proposal at least agreed we should seek removal of wall/meridian line but could not realistically expect this would be supported achieved.

Lacy emphasizing, after sustaining pressure that all his remarks preceded were to be considered as proceeded by phrase "if there should be any negotiations" developed thesis that three kinds of negotiations.
involved: (a) wide which appeared to have no chance of success; (b) narrow which Germans viewed as lesser evil but which appeared unlikely to succeed; and (c) mixed negotiations, narrow in aim but wide in means employed to achieve aim. Such mixed negotiations as contemplated Ambassadorial Group paper could involve giving up substantial positions for limited results because we could be envisaging some change in status of Berlin plus some GDR control of access plus some Western acceptance of East German peace treaty as well as statements on nonaggression plus acceptance of currently existing frontiers as well as a Four-Power Commission having some security aspects. Number of these concessions would underwrite various aspects of Soviet policy so that mixed negotiations of this character obviously present greater danger than either narrow or wide negotiations. Example of danger is that statements regarding frontiers and like could result in making our advocacy of reunification and abstraction. Danger would be lessened by avoidance Soviet-East German peace treaty. If there are mixed negotiations acquiescence in peace treaty would be desirable only if no, or extremely limited statements regarding frontiers and like made by Allies. Carstens supported position of Lally.

Kohler stated
Kohler stated that we were confronted with determining price we would be willing to pay to improve or maintain our position in Berlin in preliminary understanding against alternative of probable interference with access leading up to implementation contingency plans and possible armed conflict. Necessary to decide whether more desirable to obtain advance arrangements and to pay necessary price therefor or let matter go to military showdown.

Shulzurngh remarked that there are reasons for Soviets not to sign a peace treaty with East Germans. If we wished to stop Soviets we might offer additional concessions such as wider dealings with East Germans. Caretens answered that Federal Republic would not pay anything new to avoid signing of a peace treaty.

General discussion followed as to extent of concessions contained in substantive paper. Kohler pointed out that as far as statements on non-aggression, atomic warheads and like nothing included that we were not already bound to under existing commitments, legislation, and national policy.

After general agreement that report to Ministers should be revised to take account
take account of remarks which had been made particularly with respect to mixed nature of negotiations envisaged, there was detailed discussion of Sections one and two of paper. This lead to more discussion of status of Berlin in which Kohler explained that approach used was that for negotiating purposes Soviets must be told that Berlin must be kept free of Soviet forces. Berlin must be free to make agreements with Federal Republic on all subjects except military matters and political incorporation into Federal Republic.

Carstens indicated considerable opposition to presence of any UN troops on grounds that such presence could cause difficulties and evidence instability instead of stability. It could also afford General Assembly avenue to interfere in Berlin Affairs as result of troop activities. Also afford means for Soviets to bring in Soviet troops as UN troops. Carstens also stated Federal Republic did not wish to make declaration regarding production of nuclear weapons in context of agreement with Soviets because Germans would consider such agreement much more binding than their existing agreement with their NATO partners. Discussion sections substantive paper will continue tomorrow. Next meeting morning December 8.

GAVIN