November 16, 1961

Dear Mr. President:

You will recall that at our last meeting, at which we discussed the actions which might be taken in connection with the access to Berlin, I informed you that I was working on instructions to my planners which would carry out the intent of your letter of October 20, 1961, and of the NATO directive to me on the same general subject (PO/61/808, approved by the NAC 25 Oct 61). I am forwarding to you herewith a draft of this paper, which up to this time has not been considered outside of my own office and which will not be circulated until I am advised of your reaction.

I have tried to develop a rather specific line of action which would meet your requirements and at the same time have a chance of being accepted by our Allies. Although the ground would have to be prepared before presenting this proposal, and the tactics carefully worked out to meet or bypass the sensitivities of some of our Allies, I am convinced that the position I suggest in the attached paper would receive serious and sympathetic consideration. It should, for instance, meet most of the current fears of the Germans.

As you know, I believe that we will weather this particular round of crises without becoming involved in a shooting war. However, a well established and, if possible, agreed position on the part of the Alliance will enhance this possibility by permitting us to show, to the Soviets and to the world, firmness, good order and strength.

Faithfully yours,

Lauris Norstad

Incl:

SACEUR's Instructions to SHAPE Planners

Lauris Norstad
General USAF

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
GENERAL

1. Planning for military action in connection with air or ground access to Berlin will be guided by the following general principles:

a. We must prepare a broad catalog of plans to meet the situation at ascending levels of political and military involvement, but we must do so with full awareness that the choice of timing and action rests at least as much with the Soviets as with us. We must plan for many contingencies on various levels, but cannot with complete assurance plan on any particular pattern or sequence.

b. Whatever action is taken, political or military, should if possible improve our overall military position, but under no circumstances can it be permitted to detract therefrom.

c. No military operation, even the smallest probe, should be conducted except on the basis of a strong defensive posture and general readiness to defend along the entire NATO front. We cannot afford to exchange ground meter by meter with the Soviets. There is no way in which Satellite territory can be equated with that of NATO countries we are charged with defending.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. If Western access to Berlin is effectively blocked, there will be a prompt reaction by the Tripartite Powers, with the general support of NATO, in a manner and place directly related to Berlin or the access thereeto.

3. The initial Western reaction will be selected at the time from the catalog of plans prepared by LIVE OAK, but in any event it will involve the use of some degree of armed force.
4. The use of armed force, even in limited quantity, risks the danger of explosive expansion to higher levels of conflict, including the highest level. This risk is accepted, and therefore we stand ready to use all forces and weapons available, including nuclear weapons, if necessary, to protect the territory and people of the NATO nations and to defend our other vital interests.

5. The timing of military actions initiated by us in response to a Berlin crisis will be regulated primarily by the critical points on the curve of the developing political situation.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

Ground Access

6. In the event that access to Berlin via the autobahn is blocked:

   a. NATO will adopt a reinforced alert, the forces moving to their established defensive positions, and the Strategic Air Command, United Kingdom Bomber Command, and other national strategic forces will be placed on an appropriate alert status.

   b. Other means of access to Berlin will continue to be used, if available.

   c. The Soviet Government will be notified that the Tripartite nations, with the support of NATO, will move a military convoy, including armed guards and combat vehicles, along the autobahn to Berlin, and that any restrictions or obstacles to the movement of this convoy must be immediately removed.

   d. The Tripartite Powers will promptly launch a probe on the autobahn. The most likely choice would be the battalion-level TRADE WIND or the smaller FREE STYLE C, both of which are joint British, French and American efforts. FREE STYLE C consists of a total of 120 men and 27 vehicles, including one bulldozer, two APC's, and two armored cars. The purpose of this initial probe is to confront the Soviet/East German forces with a convoy to which wide
publicity would have been given, thereby forcing them to allow the convoy free passage or to use force, preferably military, to prevent the passage of an Allied movement. The convoy commander will be instructed to take all necessary action within the capabilities of his force, short of offensive firing of his weapons, to overcome, breach or bypass within the confines of the autobahn and its verges, any obstruction or interference with free passage of the convoy under his command. If his force is fired upon he will be instructed to take whatever defensive action, including returning fire, as may be necessary to extricate and withdraw his force. The probe commander will be directed to establish beyond doubt that the Tripartite Powers are being denied access to Berlin and, if possible, to establish that the denial of access is being accomplished by use of Communist military force. The probe commander will be instructed to so conduct his action as to create the best foundation on which the Western Powers may take political initiatives or, if that proves impossible, further military action.

e. It is recognized that the Tripartite probe can be met and overwhelmed by a superior enemy force. Depending on its purpose and momentum, the enemy action could result in:

(1) The annihilation of the probe.

(2) The dispatch of larger forces to rescue the probe, thus enlarging the battle.

(3) Immediate action on the part of the Soviets to carry the battle into NATO territory.

(4) An attack against West Berlin.

In any one of these cases, the development of the conflict could be explosive.

f. If, as may be probable, the Tripartite probe is halted without resort to the extreme measures cited in par e above, the West would take immediate political initiatives. These actions could include:
(1) Referral of the problem to the United Nations or to another world body. It would not be expected that the U.N. would resolve the Berlin problem or even make any substantial contribution to a solution, but, rather, that referral to that body would provide a dignified intermediate step as a result of which time would be available to prepare for subsequent actions, political or military, and to mobilize further public opinion in support of the position of the West.

(2) Announcement by the President of the United States that he would arrive in West Berlin within, say, 12 hours for the purpose of talking face to face with Mr. Khrushchev. He might be joined for this purpose by the President of France and the Prime Minister of Great Britain. This action might be taken in addition to the U.N. referral, or independently thereof.

(3) Application of political pressure, worldwide, wherever possible, for the purpose of confusing and distracting the Soviet leadership.

(4) In addition to those actions which may already have been taken in these fields, initiation of a naval blockade and economic measures designed to emphasize the seriousness of the Western attitude.

g. Should all the measures taken up to this point fail to improve the situation, there is then no acceptable alternative to direct military action. This action might be general war, initiated by the West. If, however, there is reason to believe that the Soviets doubt the seriousness of the West, or if the Western public is not yet prepared for such large-scale military action, NATO forces will launch one or more limited offensive operations, as indicated below:

(1) An operation to establish a salient along the Helmstedt-Berlin axis, but not to attempt a penetration beyond the Elbe.

(2) An operation to seize and occupy the high ground in the Thuringer Wald area.

(3) An operation to reduce the Kassel salient.
(4) Air operations, using conventional weapons, which may be in support of the ground operations indicated above, but which alternatively could operate beyond the support role, primarily for the purpose of gaining and maintaining air superiority.

(5) Action involving the limited and selective use of nuclear weapons, independently or in connection with the foregoing military actions, in order to demonstrate the will and the ability of the Alliance to use these weapons.

h. The selected, limited-objective offensive operations discussed above are short-term actions which will have served their purpose soon after initiation, probably within hours. By initiating any operation in this category, the commitment of the West will become complete. Whether this step will lead to general war will be determined by the Soviet reaction, which may be prompt and total.

Air Access

7. In case of interference with air access to Berlin, the Tripartite Powers will act in accordance with the plans prepared and approved under LIVE OAK procedures, the broad nature of which is known to the North Atlantic Council. In this connection, two points should be noted:

a. The principles governing Western reaction to the problem of ground access are generally applicable to the problem of air access.

b. The question of reaction to Communist military force interfering with air access may involve wide-scale air-superiority operations, outside as well as inside the air corridors. Even if initially such action were limited to the use of conventional weapons, our involvement would be raised quickly to a very high level. The situation would be further aggravated by Soviet attacks against Western air installations, a development which NATO can tolerate only briefly if we are to maintain our over-all defense posture, particularly the full power of our nuclear capability.
8. Should both ground and air access be blocked, appropriate action will be taken in both areas. However, where a choice must be made, requirements of the ground access problem should determine the timing and the nature of our efforts.