1. (S) SOVIET FORCES:
   
   a. (NOFORN) Sightings of equipment in vicinity of Berlin indicate presence of an estimated two battalions of 122mm Howitzers. Whether these elements came from within GSFG or are reinforcements from elsewhere is unknown.
   
   b. Observations of Soviet armor stationed in courtyard west of August Bebel Platz on 301600 Oct showed no apparent change in number personnel or vehicles. Several one-story prefabricated barracks being constructed in area.
   
   COMMENT: Construction of semi-permanent buildings indicates Soviet intention to remain in this installation at least until solution of sector border control dispute.
   
   c. (NOFORN) Allied agency reports movement of Soviet dependents back to USSR cannot be confirmed. On the contrary, new arrivals of dependents have been reported.
   
   d. (NOFORN) There were indications the past week that GSFG training has possibly progressed to division-level. However, training at this time of year would normally be well advanced into Division and Army maneuvers.

2. (C) EAST GERMAN ARMY FORCES:
   
   a. Major elements of the East German Army remained at home stations conducting low-level training.
   
   b. (NOFORN) Elements 1st Mtz Rifle Regt, Oranienburg (UU 8147) and 26th Mtz Rifle Regt, Rostock (UU 1297) moved from home stations to unknown field location on 25 Oct. Unknown if units engaged in regimental-level exercises or division or higher level maneuvers.
3. (C) GARRISON SECURITY FORCES:

a. Subordination of 2d Border Bde (formerly 5th Border Security Police Brigade) Gross-Glienike (UU 7215) to Security Alert Police (SAP) confirmed. Sale of "GRENZOLDAT" (weekly newspaper of Border Command) discontinued in the 2d Border Bde; only "KAMPFRUF" (weekly newspaper of SAP) now available. 19 Oct issue of "KAMPFRUF" referred to former 13th BSP Regt, Blankenfelde (UU 9131) as "BEREITSCHAFT DUSCHEK". Lieutenant Colonel DUSCHEK is Commanding Officer of regiment, and "BEREITSCHAFT" is name used in SAP paper to refer to SAP Regiment. Estimated strength 1st Border Bde, SAP, 5,000; and 2d Border Bde, SAP, 4,000.

b. SAP defector reports that border guards are instructed not to fire at Western Allies under any circumstances, even if fired upon. Some source reported statement of unit political officer that "SAP's will have to take West Berlin and clear it out" if provocations and propaganda in West Berlin does not cease. Defector further reported that air corridors would be closed if the West continues to use the corridors for carrying Western Allied troops and members of West German Government.

COMMENT: Possible SAP's instructed not to engage in fire fight with Western Allies. VOPO behavior at Friedrichstrasse lends credence to report. Statements of Political Officer, however, must be dismissed as pure propaganda without basis.

4. (C) ACCESS SITUATION:

a. (C) Railways:

1) Construction was started in late September on new S-Bahn and road links between East Berlin and Schoenfeld (UU 9805) Airport. In East Berlin, 4.8 kilometer double-tracks S-Bahn will branch off existing Adlershof-Gruenau line in vicinity of Adler Gestell, pass Alt Glienike and Gruenberg Allee and terminate immediately west of airport. This portion of new line planned to open March 1962. Connecting curve to East Berlin - Wuhlheide will be built in 1962. Four kilometer road with two lanes of 7.5 meters each is being built parallel to this S-Bahn line and is scheduled for completion late 1961. Express train service between Berlin and Goerlitz (VS 9967), interrupted as result of this construction, will resume 15 Nov. Six combined S-Bahn and road bridges are required
for project. One will be located on Falkenberger Strasse in Bohnsdorf (VU 8206) and one at Adler Gestell. Planned location of others not reported. (Press-2)

COMMENT: Construction, approximate route, bridge requirements, and scheduled completion date of S-Bahn line reported in earlier East Berlin Press item. First information on road construction and rerouting of Berlin-Goerlitz trains. Such expansion of service not justified by current light air traffic volume at Schoenefeld Airport. However, this air field recently expanded to accommodate jet traffic and East Germans may want to be in position to offer adequate facilities as part of campaign to force air traffic now terminating in West Berlin to use Schoenefeld.

(2) On 28 Oct, at approximately 0715 hours, as the Frankfurt-Berlin Duty Train was slowing down during the approach to the Potsdam railyard, 4 refugees entered the train by smashing door windows and climbing on the coach. The train commander placed the refugees under guard out of sight. Although the East German conductor was aware of the incident, on his departure from duty at Potsdam he walked away without talking to anyone. The train stayed in the area until 0814 hours without incident.

b. (U) Autobahn:

(1) The Soviet checkpoint at Babelsburg was reinforced on 29 Oct by a complement of approximately five (5) Field Grade Officers, one of whom speaks English. The Soviets continue to deny entry through Babelsburg Checkpoint for US Military Assistance Teams.

(2) On 5 Nov, a US Army M/Sgt enroute to Helmstedt arrived at the Soviet Checkpoint at Babelsburg and found the crossing gate opened and no VOPO's or Soviets in sight. He proceeded through without stopping. When he arrived at the Soviet Checkpoint at Marienborn, a Soviet Officer put two stamps on his flag order. The Soviet Officer wrote Babelsburg on one and let the Sgt proceed without incident.

(3) On 5 Nov, a West Berliner raced through the East German Checkpoint at Drewitz, (Babelsburg), after he had picked up his girl friend in East Germany. The VOPO's fired at the vehicle, and upon inspection at the US Checkpoint, six bullet holes were found in the vehicle. The occupants escaped unharmed and were taken to West Berlin by West Berlin Police without incident.
(4) On 7 Nov, a US Army Specialist was stopped by a VOPO at the first East German barrier at Babelsburg while enroute to Berlin. He was dressed in civilian attire and driving his American manufactured POV. He was directed to pull over to the side of the road. Upon doing so, the East German official approached the vehicle and asked the US Army Specialist if he wanted to show his identification, to which he replied he did not. The officials who had gathered around the car then proceeded to ask him questions, such as, "What did he think about the tanks on the border?" and "What he thought of the situation as a whole?" To these questions the specialist replied he thought it was a shame, and wanted to be processed. At this time he was released after being detained approximately 5 minutes. This is the 12th incident of VOPO's or East Germans asking for identification of US travelers in VOV's this year.

c. (U) Air Corridors:

During this reporting period, there were no attempts made by Soviet or East German Forces to interfere with Allied military or commercial air traffic in the air corridors or the 20-mile ring of Berlin except to protest and attempt to avoid responsibility for flights over East Berlin.

d. (U) East Berlin:

(1) Since 1 Nov, West Berlin Police were authorized by Allies to increase control over vehicular traffic from East to West Berlin. Military personnel in uniform and civilians traveling in military type vehicles or accompanied by military personnel are not affected. Significant that Soviet personnel have willingly shown identification to West Berlin Police. Communists probably interpret new measure as Western admission that four-power status of Berlin is no longer valid and that their willingness to identify themselves should result in similar Allied action.

(2) On 1 Nov, there were 2 incidents involving detentions of US Forces vehicles in East Berlin. One was held approximately 25 minutes and released without further incident. The second was held approximately one and one-half hours, and prior to their release, the words "Ami go home" were written in chalk on the vehicle by an East Berlin civilian.

COMMENT: Since 2 Nov, it appears harassment of US patrols has sharply decreased indicating a possible relaxation of former policies. Part of the relaxation could stem from fact that Communists were celebrating the 7 November Anniversary of the Russian Revolution.
c. (U) Crossing Sites:

For status of crossing sites into West Berlin from Soviet Zone of East Germany, see Inclosure 1.

5. (C) HOSTILE RECONNAISSANCE:

Hostile reconnaissance patrols continue to maintain surveillance of installations in West Berlin. The approximate average is 4 vehicles per day. A number of these patrols escape detection by entering West Berlin via Glienecke Bruecke from Potsdam.

6. (C) REFUGEES:

a. During this period, an approximate average of 30 refugees per day were processed at the Marienfelde Refugee Center.

b. On 5 Nov, 9 refugees came into West Berlin across the S-Bahn tracks at Schoenholz. They were part of a group of 30. The other 21 did not succeed in their attempt to cross the border due to detection by East German border guards.

7. (C) POPULATION ATTITUDES:

East Berlin Party functionaries now regard last week's Friedrichstrasse crisis as Eastern victory and express jubilation over US recommendation that US civilians refrain from visiting East Berlin.

8. (C) (NOFORN) PROPAGANDA:

East German propaganda book on Berlin situation will be published in German, English, French, Spanish and Swedish editions in late Nov. Book to include material on "Western espionage centers" in West Berlin, with addresses and main activities.

COMMENT: Possible this publication contains details promised in press conference of former Gehlen employee. More likely, however, material will be re-hash of old information since new revelations would probably be used in a more spectacular manner, such as "show" trials. For clarification, "Gehlen" is West German equivalent of FBI, known as BFV at national level and LFV at state level.

9. (C) OBSTACLES AND BARRIERS:

a. On 1 Nov, approximately 250 concrete slabs were unloaded at Krausen Str and Zimmer Str; however, no construction has started in the vicinity.
Para 9. (C) (cont)

COMMENT: This may tie in with the rumors that the Friedrichstrasse crossing point may be closed. Concrete evidence of Communist intentions is missing at this time.

b. West Berlin Police reported on 4 Nov that the sewers of East Berlin were being barricaded to prevent refugees escaping. Police said they had observed workers on the East side of the border climbing into manholes to fit steel bars in the tunnel-like drainage pipes.

10. (C) NEW MATERIAL IDENTIFICATIONS:

a. See paragraph la reference 122mm Howitzers.

b. Although few technical details are available, there is conclusive evidence that East German paramilitary forces are being equipped with the Kalashnikov Assault Rifle.

11. (C) NEW UNIT IDENTIFICATIONS:

No new units have been identified with the exception of the identification contained in paragraph #3 above.

12. (C) STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS:

During this reporting period, there were 25 ground reconnaissance patrols dispatched to East Berlin; 58 Staff Tours were made in East Berlin; 8 helicopter flights were made over the sector/sector and sector/zonal borders; 18 ground reconnaissance patrols were made of the sector/sector border from the American side; and 18 ground reconnaissance patrols were made along the sector/zonal border.

13. (C) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

No new significant developments occurred in the field of counterintelligence.

14. (C) MISCELLANEOUS:

a. Steinstrucken Exclave:

(1) Patrol reliefs of the US Army 3-man patrols were conducted on the 1st and 6th of Nov without incident.
Para 14. (C) (cont)

(2) One refugee was air lifted out of the area on the 6th of November.

(3) Approximately 11 BSp's (Border Security Police) continue to maintain surveillance of the area.

b. East Berlin:

(1) A thriving black market appears to have developed in such Western produced items as: cigarettes, tobacco, women's seamless stockings, elastic ribbon, soap powder and detergents. Current DMW sales prices for such items on the East Berlin black market are about ten times their original DMW purchase price, i.e., one package of Western manufactured cigarettes costing 2 DMW would cost 20 DMW in East Berlin.

(2) Although no overt action had been instituted in East Berlin as of early October to prevent TV set owners from receiving Western programs (through alterations of TV antennas) TV repair shops have been ordered to make changes in those sets turned into them for repair which will make it impossible for them to receive Western programs. It is believed that this measure will be very effective since EC produced TV sets are poor in quality and require continued repair. East Berlin TV set owners, in order to prevent such tampering with their sets, are beginning to employ retired electrical repairmen at black market rates to repair their sets.

15. (C) SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS:

The question of whether the Soviets are relinquishing some of their authority to the East Germans is a subject of considerable discussion and a question needing clarification.

G-2 COMMENT: It is the opinion of G-2, Berlin Command, that the Soviets are not relinquishing any authority to the East Germans. Rather, they are utilizing the East Germans to the maximum degree possible, thus freeing maximum numbers of Soviet troops to conduct training and perform the necessary administrative details in their own units. Policies and procedures followed by the East Germans are dictated by the Soviets. This fixes the Soviets as being the sole controlling force. So long as the Soviets occupy East Germany and East Berlin, it is inconceivable that the East Germans could ever really be in control. At the present time, it is very
Para 15, (C) (cont)

doubtful that the Ulbricht regime would be able to control its own people should the Soviets depart.

Many opinions have been expressed that the closing of the sector/sector and sector/zonal borders by the East Germans represented proof that control was being passed to Pankow. Actually, it was the only reasonable course of action available to the Soviets. Having the East Germans do it solved a political consideration and a manpower problem. It would have required the utilization of 4 or 5 Soviet divisions as labor forces to do the same job in a similar period of time. The factor of control was not a consideration.

The question of control appears then not to be the point of argument. Rather, it is Soviet utilization of East Germans, whom the US does not recognize, that represents the point of objection.

Signature:

LOUIS A. WAPLE
Lt Colonel, GS
G2, Berlin Command

DISTRIBUTION:

1 CG, BC
1 IO/USCOCB
1 USMIL

1 2d BG, 6th Inf
1 3d BG, 6th Inf
1 Sp Tps, USAGAR
1 1st BG, 18th Inf
1 Co F, 40th Armor
1 IO, BC
1 G-1, BC
1 G-3, BC
1 G-4, BC
4 G-2, BC

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**Legend:**
- Red = Yes
- Blue = No

**Notes:**
- Stripes should be wide enough to be visible from a distance.
- Stripes should be placed at least 50 feet apart.
- Stripes should be made of durable material.
- Stripes should be clearly visible in all weather conditions.

**Caption:**
- Stripes being used to mark off a crosswalk area.