1. A solution of the Berlin question in the sense of the Soviet endeavours would have directly and in a relatively short time the following valuable consequences for the East Bloc:

   a) Removal of the occupation right for the eastern part of the city, which would necessarily be followed sooner or later by the repeal of the "little" occupation statute in West Berlin. In this way, the Western occupation powers would lose the possibility of exercising their executive authority and acting on their own discretion in West Berlin in case of a declared state of emergency.

   b) By means of the administrative and organizational separation of West Berlin from the Federal Republic and from the sphere of NATO activity, West Berlin will no longer serve as a "bridgehead" of the West against the SZ. In the long run the condition might also be developed in which military forces belonging to antagonist military blocs would no longer directly confront each other in the territory of Berlin. It could thus be avoided that every incident of local significance can lead to a major conflict.

   c) Inasmuch as neutrality for all of Germany is unattainable, it could at least be carried out in West Berlin. The operation of this form of neutrality would enhance the concept of neutrality in the minds of the German public during the next decade. Moreover, the respect of the Federal Republic and of the NATO powers for a neutral West Berlin in the center of the Eastern domain would prevent an intensification of tensions in Central Europe.

   d) The enforcement of a Berlin settlement and of a peace treaty would deal a severe blow to the standing of the Federal Republic and would remove its political and propaganda influence in West Berlin with all of its effects on the SZ and on the other socialistic countries. This would result in a political and economic consolidation of the SZ.
e) A definite Berlin settlement would also militate against the announced aim of Western policy in eastern Europe, because West Berlin is regarded as a test case by the people of eastern Europe. All hopes that there could still be a change in the power relationships in Eastern Europe would be dashed.

f) Furthermore, the Hallstein Doctrine would be undermined, and the gradual equalization of the SZ as well as its recognition in many neutral - and later also in many Western - countries could be set in motion. This would also represent the first step preparatory to the admission of the two German states in the UN. In addition to this, the Soviet Union would sympathetically examine the possibility of admitting a neutral West Berlin to the UN.

g) The Oder-Neisse boundary would be safeguarded, because subsequent to a conclusion of even a unilateral peace treaty and a special Berlin settlement, a revision of this boundary would no longer be possible. Such a settlement would also result in a better protection for the territory of Czechoslovak Peoples' Republic.

h) The uncertainties which result from the unsolved German question are disadvantageous also to long-range economic planning in the East. A definite settlement would well rule out German reunification and thus would have a quieting effect on the smaller East European countries.

i) In the course of time the neutralization of West Berlin would influence the composition of the political leadership of the Free City, because with a weakening of the Western position the strongly pro-Western forces would not continue to stay in West Berlin, and thus the "moderate" forces would be given a chance to determine the political line. In any case the atmosphere of a "political outpost" would be eliminated.

k) West Berlin's economic potential could be used to a greater degree for the economic development of the East Bloc countries. East Berlin, on the other hand, which until now
b) All of the Soviet Union's reserved rights pertaining to the lines of communication to and from West Berlin, including air sovereignty, would be turned over to the SZ government which, thus, could not be regarded as an "agent of the Soviet Union". Allied agreements on traffic to and from Berlin would become invalid after a certain time and would have to be replaced with bilateral agreements with the SZ.

c) All official political and military representatives of the Soviet Union in Germany, including the personnel of the Soviet Embassy, would be obliged to suspend their contacts with representatives of the three Western powers insofar as those contacts are connected with the occupation of Berlin and Germany.

d) All military commissions in both parts of Berlin and in both parts of Germany would be dissolved.

c) Soviet representatives in the Allied Office for Air Security would be withdrawn; all flights of the Western allies in the future would have to be announced to an agency of the SZ in East Berlin. Air traffic rights in and out of Berlin of the three Western airlines and of the Western charter companies would cease completely for the future, inasmuch as the air traffic agreements for the Allies were designed originally only "for the needs of the occupation troops". The Western airlines could, of course, obtain a concession for continued air traffic to Berlin by mutual agreements with the SZ; but the concessions would have certain conditions, e.g., a prohibition on the transportation of refugees from West Berlin.

f) The transference to the SZ of traffic control over the military forces of the Western powers stationed in West Berlin would mean that the SZ would reserve the right to control or to hold up any shipment designated as "traffic of personnel or material", therefore including the shipment of weapons, because in the future the only valid legal regulations concerning these shipments would be the laws of the Soviet Zone. Moreover, one day, the question of special trains
and of special telephone lines for the Western Allies would also be corrected. Efforts will be made, of course, during the initial period not to place too many difficulties in the way of the traffic of the Western Allies.

g) Traffic for the supply of military personnel of the Western powers shall not continue according to previous practice. The Western Allies' communications to Berlin are based purely on a kind of common law, since there are no written agreements whatever between the four Allies concerning the communication lines to and from Berlin. In contrast to civilian traffic, the Western Allies for the future would be permitted to use only the Autobahn Berlin-Marieburg and the railroad Berlin-Helmstedt, or Oebisfelde, respectively.

h) Very close check would be kept to make certain that Allied trains were used actually only by allied personnel and only for the purpose of transporting supplies for this personnel to Berlin. The stipulation that German citizens and supplies for German agencies shall not be conveyed by allied trains or allied planes shall be a part of a later transportation agreement with the Western allies. This would prevent the possibility of the Federal Government's sending printed matter and other propaganda material to Berlin in this way and also would prevent allied trains from being used in part for transporting the mail.

i) Freedom of movement of the Western Allies would be restricted to the territory of West Berlin, and while visiting East Berlin would not be proclued, each case, however, would be made dependent upon special approval of SZ authorities. This approval shall be given, as it is for all West German and foreign visitors to East Berlin, directly at the sector border. All of these measures, the majority of which have been proposed by the SZ government, are agreed to by the Soviet Union, because it is convinced that to seal off East Berlin completely against West Berlin would be practically impossible and for reasons of propaganda not even desirable.
Protection for the stability of the SZ, which has been sought for years, can only be achieved, however, by a strict neutralization of West Berlin.

4. The following considerations concerning the Soviet plans for Berlin come to mind:

a) Soviet experts are convinced that all these measures can be carried out after the conclusion of a separate peace treaty without their having serious consequences for the Allies' Berlin guaranty, because all Western counter-measures are tied to the following suppositions:

- the threat to the freedom and political independence of West Berlin;
- the direct attack on West Berlin in the sense of an entry of Eastern troops and fighting units;
- an attempted communist putsch in West Berlin aimed at the overthrow of the Senate;
- the denial of the right of domicile to the Western Allies in West Berlin;
- the obstruction of traffic routes to Berlin in the sense of a blockade.

b) Civilian traffic would continue undisturbed after the conclusion of a peace treaty, because this traffic always has been under the direct control of SZ authorities. Here, there would even be technical improvements as a result of the opening of supplementary traffic routes and by means of the simplification of procedures. Thus a situation could indeed arise in which West Berlin would be accessible to the entire world from without, while nevertheless there might be difficulties for the traffic of the Western Allies insofar as they opposed the new legal status.

c) All of the five above mentioned eventualities which could be occasions for NATO intervention, will not ensue, because the Soviet Union does not intend to create a cause for war in West Berlin. In the past two years, the Western Allies, from the very beginning, have committed themselves only to the minimal political demand for the support and independence
to a certain extent has been cut off from its hinterland by the necessary control-mechanism, could then be fully incorporated into the SZ. The SZ government could save many expenditures which at present arise from the precautionary measures against enemy activities in West Berlin.

1) A definite settlement would also render the churches in both parts of Germany and in West Berlin independent and thus end the clerical "agitation" against the East.

2) It is emphasized on the Soviet side that the desired Berlin solution in a broader sense would also be operative in East Berlin. If the previous official Soviet notes were concerned only with a solution for West Berlin, this was because Moscow was prepared to make only the question of West Berlin the object of negotiations and agreements with the Western powers. That so-called All-Berlin solution, however, which would necessitate a reunification of both parts of the city, was rejected with reference to the function of East Berlin as the capital of the SZ. If there should be a separate peace treaty, however, the principle of the separation of both regions of the city will indeed not be abandoned; but, at the same time, occupation rights would cease even in East Berlin and the Soviet Union would relinquish its military controls around the periphery of Berlin. Then the Soviet Union will no longer have a veto in the administration of East Berlin, of which it has occasionally made use even recently out of regard for its occupation rights. The deputies of the Berlin Peoples' Parliament will have complete voting rights and in the future will be elected directly in East Berlin. In addition, it is Moscow's intention to withdraw its troops entirely from East Berlin, which it would not be obliged to do in view of the continuation of its troop-stationing treaty with the SZ.

3) For the Western powers, a separate solution of the German question would have the following results:

a) With the conclusion of a peace treaty the interim solution for Berlin, which the Soviet Union has offered on the level of mutual agreements, would be dropped, unless the Western powers should previously indicate a readiness for the neutralization of West Berlin following a specified transitional period.
of West Berlin in the belief that the Soviets, as it is, would not be prepared to fulfill even this minimal demand. This does not take into account, however, that the Soviet Union, even though in principle it may have no interest in the political independence of West Berlin, in fact must have an objective interest in safeguarding real independence for West Berlin, because any intention of destroying this independence would precipitate the use of force:

d) Soviet experts take the view that it is impossible to incorporate West Berlin into the SZ, even if the danger of the Western allies' intervention in support of the city's independence did not exist. Two million West Berliners, made citizens of the SZ, would constitute an explosive material which could shake the foundations of the SZ.

5. The Warsaw Pact countries, then, would be drawn into a Berlin conflict only if the Western powers ventured to use force to gain entry into West Berlin. In this single case of the forcible entry of the Western powers into the territory of the SZ, subsequent to the conclusion of a peace treaty, all the signatory powers of the Warsaw Pact stipulated in Moscow in April, 1961, that they would use all military means to come to the aid of the SZ, but initially would use only the threat of intervention.

6. The Soviet Union, after the conclusion of a separate peace treaty, would also be prepared to act as a diplomatic intermediary for an agreement with the SZ, but would not, however, go so far as to conduct direct negotiations with the Western allies without the participation of the SZ. Diplomatic recognition of the SZ by the Western allies should not be forced through an agreement on access routes, because diplomatic recognition is the sovereign act of a single government, and the establishment of diplomatic relations would be pointless if they were to result in smouldering hostility. Moreover, the Western powers should not be able to say that an agreement on routes to Berlin is being used as a form of diplomatic blackmail.
7. The Western powers cannot force the Soviet Union to continue to exercise occupation rights on German soil and to station troops in Berlin. In this question, the Western powers have no possibility of undertaking anything against Soviet measures. After the Soviet withdrawal from the field of occupation, the Western powers would no longer have a Soviet partner in Germany. Following the conclusion of a peace treaty, the Soviet Embassy could reject all Western notes and demands pertaining to the German question, just as would the government of the Soviet Union in Moscow. In this case, the Western powers would have no treaty partner for all the legal rights which they claim to possess, and they would also have no possibility of forcing the GZ government to step into the treaty role formerly held by the Soviet Union. If, nevertheless, the GZ government does not wish to make any discernible changes in certain areas, this can be attributed to a desire to avoid an intensification of the situation in Berlin. There would be no basis for any quarrel over the interpretation of previous four-power agreements, because all of these agreements including the Jessup-Malik Agreement on the lifting of the blockade, are valid only for the duration of the occupation in Germany.