CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

20 October 1961
Khrushchev's report to the 22nd party congress on 17 October was a generally moderate and routine restatement of established Soviet foreign and domest-
ic policies. While covering both immediate international issues and long-term theoretical and ideological questions, the report was highlighted by Khrushchev's formal withdrawal of a deadline for a German peace treaty, his announcement that the USSR's present nuclear test series "probably" would end by 31 October with a 50-megaton explosion, his over-all emphasis on the prospects for achieving peaceful coexistence and preven-
ting a world war, and his unprecedented indictment of the Albanian leadership.

Khrushchev contended that events had confirmed the correctness of the policy lines adopted by the 20th party congress in 1956, and claimed that the main result of the party's policy had been the prevention of war. He saw a "prospect of achieving peaceful coexistence for the entire period in which the social and political problems now dividing the world will have to be solved." In addition, he reaffirmed the point laid down by the 21st congress in 1959, which has drawn strong Chinese objections, that "it may actually be feasible to banish world war from the life of society even before the complete triumph of socialism on earth, with capitalism surviving in part of the world." Khrushchev also listed continued adherence to the "principles of peaceful coexistence" as the primary task confronting the Soviet party, with the maintenance of bloc unity listed second.

Berlin

On the questions of Germany and Berlin, Khrushchev gave a positive assessment of Gromyko's talks with American and British leaders and drew the conclusion from these talks that the Western powers had displayed an understanding of the situation and were inclined to seek a settlement on a "mutually acceptable basis." While warning that a German treaty could not be postponed "to infinity" and repeating that it would be signed with or without the Western powers, Khrushchev stated if the West showed readiness to settle the "German problem" then the "date of signing will have no significance." "In that case," he added, "we shall not insist on the peace treaty being signed necessarily before 31 December 1961."

His withdrawal of the deadline and favorable view of Western attitudes were probably intended to meet Western objections to negotiating under pressure of threats of unilateral action and to open the way for formal negotiations. However, Khrushchev's claim that the "forces of socialism" are stronger than the "aggressive imperialist forces," and his warning against the dangers of a "position of strength" policy reflect his confidence that the West can be induced to grant concessions which the USSR could represent as marking a fundamental change in the status of West Berlin.

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20 Oct 61
WEEKLY REVIEW
Page 1 of 29
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