MEMORANDUM

TO:

B        - Mr. Ball
INR      - Mr. Evans
D        - Mr. Foster
G/PL     - Mr. Garthoff
S/O      - Mr. Hillenbrand
EUR      - Mr. Kohler
EUR:RA   - Mr. Kranich
S/P      - Mr. Lindley
L        - Mr. Meeker
S/P      - Mr. Owen
S/O      - Mr. Thurston
SOV      - Mr. Valdes

FROM:    S/O        - Gerard C. Smith

Attached is a copy of the memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff requesting their study of certain proposals in connection with security and surprise attack. This study was requested by the Secretary of State in his letter of October 6, 1961.

Attachment as stated.

S/CGCSmith:ti
SECRET

October 6, 1961

Dear Bob:

In connection with the preparatory work looking to the possibility of negotiations with the USSR over Berlin and related problems, I believe it is important to have a comprehensive review of U.S. Government thinking in connection with possible European security measures. I have directed such a review in the Department of State and it would be most helpful to have the views of your Department at an early date.

I understand that representatives of our two Departments have had this matter under discussion for some time and the general dimensions of the problem areas to be considered have been tentatively agreed upon.

I consider that a better understanding of the possibilities and dangers of various European security moves to be of first importance in the critical negotiations which may lie ahead. The Department of State will be glad to render any assistance you may request.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

/\ Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

S/S - RO
OCT 7 1961

A true copy of signed original

The Honorable
Robert S. McNamara,
Secretary of Defense.

Concurrences:
EUR - Mr. Kohler
RA - Mr. Kranich

10/4/61
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Negotiations on European Security

By a letter to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State has indicated that certain proposals for European security arrangements may arise in connection with prospective negotiations on the Berlin and related problems, and has requested the views of the Department of Defense with respect to the proposals most likely to be discussed.

In preparatory discussions between representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, and of the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, it was the consensus that seven types of proposals might be anticipated. The first five are:

1. Demilitarized zone. A proposal for limitations on nuclear components of weapons systems and/or delivery vehicles in an area or areas of Europe, particularly in Central Europe. This type of plan would embody so-called "deployment" demilitarization (a ban on the production, stockpiling and stationing of nuclear weapons in the zone), and might embody "sanctuary" demilitarization (a ban on use of nuclear weapons against the territory of, or targets in, the zone). The demilitarization might vary from partial measures, such as limitations on, or reductions in, the nuclear weapons in the zone, to a complete prohibition. The area of the zone might vary from a small strip in Germany only, to the addition of other countries to the Poland-Czechoslovakia-Germany area, e.g., Hungary, Denmark and the Benelux countries. One proposal might be that the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers agree that there be no ballistic missiles with a range of over one thousand miles deployed in a zone which would be defined in terms of geographical coordinates, but which would include Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

2. Limitations on forces. A proposal for limitations on, or reductions of, either indigenous or foreign forces, or both, in a European zone or zones. The measures might extend to the complete withdrawal of foreign forces from the zone. This, in practice, could involve "deployment" demilitarization of the zone if the nuclear powers were unwilling to leave nuclear weapons in the zone, either for their own use if the agreement broke down or for use by indigenous forces.
3. Inspection zone. An inspection zone proposal in which no demilitarization or demilitarization measures are included. This could involve exchange of information on military forces and installations in the zone, mobile and fixed-post ground inspection, aerial inspection, and overlapping radar installations. The area might vary from a small strip in Germany, to a coverage of Europe from the Atlantic to the Uralis. The inspections would be independent of any inspection arrangements for 1 and 2 above.

4. Advance notification. A proposal that the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations, or certain of them in a European zone, shall agree to give advance notification to the other nations participating in the agreement of major military movements and maneuvers, on a scale as may be agreed, which might give rise to misinterpretation or cause alarm and induce countermeasures. The notification would include the geographical areas to be used and the nature, scale and time span of the event. (Compare U.S. Program for CCD, Stage I, paragraph F(a).)

5. No nuclear transfers. A proposal for a treaty or a group of reciprocal unilateral declarations that states owning nuclear weapons shall not relinquish control of such weapons to any nation not owning them and shall not transmit to any such nation information or material necessary for their manufacture; that states not owning nuclear weapons shall not manufacture such weapons, attempt to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states, or seek or receive information or materials necessary for their manufacture. This might be considered for NATO-Warsaw Pact nations as a specific case, as well as for wider application. (Compare U.S. Program for CCD, Stage I, paragraph G(e).)

To assist the Defense Department in formulating its views as to these five types of proposals, it is hereby requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff analyze them for their implications in the light of the following, suggested by the State Department as guidance appropriate for this study:

(a) "Policy Directive Regarding NATO and The Atlantic Nations," which the President approved on 21 April 1951;

(b) The attached excerpt, entitled "Arms Control," from the so-called "Acheson Report"; and
(c) The assumption that no steps should be taken which will create obstacles to reunification of Germany, which remains an objective of this Government. However, it should be assumed that it is not the policy of this Government to achieve such reunification by military means and that Germany, in fact, will remain divided for the foreseeable future.

In the requested analyses of zonal arrangements, variants (even large variants) of the specified zones, and the substitution of terrain features or mile-measured strips for political boundaries in delimiting a zone, should be considered to the extent that such variants are credible and especially to the extent that they might lead to a significant change in the implications of a proposal. Similar consideration should be given to variations in the measures to be applied within a zone. Proposals or combinations of proposals which might achieve a "balance" in the European area should be highlighted.

In each case, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are requested to indicate what other measures, if any, in combination with the proposal being analyzed, would make a particular proposal more or less acceptable, and especially which might achieve a "balance" in the European area.

The specific arguments for and against each proposal are desired in sufficient detail to be readily understandable to and usable by the U.S. negotiators. To the extent that it can be done, the military implications should be treated separately.

A list of some possible considerations in approaching the analyses of some of the proposals is attached for information and for such use as may be desired.

It is recognized that, in the absence of specific proposals having been made, there is an almost infinite variety of schemes which might be considered. Admittedly, this complicates the accomplishment of the analyses being requested. It is considered essential, however, that an evaluation of the implications of the most probable proposals be initiated without delay, in order that the Department of Defense may make a timely contribution to the negotiating process.

The Secretary of State solicits Defense Department views on two other possible proposals:

6. East-West Commission. A proposal that a commission be established immediately (a) to examine and make recommendations on the
possibility of further measures to reduce the risks of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communications (compare U. S. Program for CDM, Stage I, paragraph F(a)); and (b) to discuss and negotiate about European security.

7. Non-aggression pact. A proposal that there be a non-aggression pact of some type as provided in the Western Peace Plan, with particular consideration of the NATO-Warsaw Pact nations.

Your analyses of these two possibilities also are requested.

Attached, in addition to the papers already mentioned, is an informal paper prepared by a Western Four-Power European Security Special Group. This paper indicates the scope of the inquiry into the subject now being made by the Four Governments. It should be noted that some proposals were made by the Soviet Foreign Minister in the United Nations on 25 September 1961.

Completion of the analyses by 10 December 1961 would be appreciated. Your preliminary views on items numbered 3, 5, 6 and 7 above are requested by 15 October, for use in the Western Four-Power Special Group discussions which are scheduled to resume on 17 October.

4 Attachments:
1. Letter from Sec of State
2. Excerpt from "Acheson Report"
3. Some Possible Considerations in the JCS Analyses
4. Informal paper prepared by Western 4-Power European Security Special Group
"2. Arms Control. NATO strategy should enhance, not reduce, the chances of arms control arrangements designed to increase the security of the NATO countries. A strategy which is excessively dependent upon nuclear initiative, or which will increase the chances of proliferation of nuclear capabilities, or which is not strongly based on conventional strength would make arms control negotiations more difficult. On the other hand, a NATO strategy which is designed to create a stable military environment, and which can tolerate a fairly high level of tension and violence without automatically dissolving into general nuclear war, should make it easier to direct arms control measures to the same goal. These considerations should not, of course, preclude measures which are otherwise essential to the military and political strength of NATO."
A. Considerations applicable in general to all proposals

1. What would be the effect on the military strategy to support US and NATO objectives? Are there acceptable alternatives of the military strategy which could be adapted to the new situation(s) which might be created?

2. Could any of the proposals offer to the West any compensating gains, in return for the apparent disadvantages?

3. What would be the implications on an increased NATO conventional capability in Europe, and what degree of increase in what period of time would have a significant effect?

4. What would be the effect of concurrent implementation of selected Stage I measures from the September 1961 US Declaration on Disarmament? In this context, which of the selected measures would contribute the most to stability in Europe?

5. What would be the effect on US and NATO military capabilities to implement the military strategy? What are the alternatives?

6. What would be the comparative advantages and disadvantages to NATO and to the Warsaw Pact countries, with respect to the time-space factors? With respect to "thinning out" versus withdrawal?

7. What would be the effects of the timing of any zonal arrangements, e.g., 1962? In 5 years? In 10 years?

3. Some geographical area variations which might be considered are:

   a. A narrow strip which might straddle the NATO-Warsaw Pact dividing line, and covering parts of West and East Germany as a minimum. The limits of the strip might or might not at all points be equidistant from the dividing line.
b. Germany only.

c. Germany - Poland - Czechoslovakia.

d. Germany - Poland - Czechoslovakia, plus additional areas which might include the following:

(1) More of Eastern Europe (e.g., Hungary) and more of Western Europe (e.g., Benelux and Denmark).

(2) Some or all of the Adriatic-Balkan area (e.g., Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria).

(3) Scandinavia and the Baltic.

(4) Some of Western USSR.

e. Variations of the above based on terrain rather than political boundaries, e.g., from the Rhine to the Vistula, or to the Bug; from the Atlantic to the Ural.

9. What would be the "moving-out" problems for the US? For other NATO forces? For the USSR? What would be the "relocation" problems for both sides?

10. What would be the "moving-back" problems for the US? For other NATO forces? For the USSR?

11. What would be the problems of instability in the zone? Would these problems be of greater significance to the US and NATO than to the USSR, or vice versa?

12. What are the implications of East-West asymmetries with respect to space; population and ally control; logistics; reliability of people and forces; aggressive tendencies; vulnerability to non-military harassment; the role of quasi-military forces; the proximity of strategic power to Central Europe?

B. Considerations especially applicable to demobilization measures

1. There are significant problems in verification. Can an adequate inspection plan be devised for a "deployment" demobilization, either partial or
complete? Would it be possible to account for nuclear warheads? How could dual-capable delivery vehicles be handled?

2. What are the "moving-out" problems for both sides?
   a. Present location and inventory of nuclear weapons in the area?
   b. Range of nuclear weapons?
   c. Relocation and timing problems?
   d. What would have to be left in the area, to facilitate timely redeployment back into the zone if necessary?

3. Distinctive "moving-back" problems, both sides.
   a. Can some nuclear weapons be redeployed back into the area rapidly?
   To the right unit, at the right place, at the right time? Risks?
   b. What weapons could not be redeployed back into the area in time to be effective?

4. Variations of demilitarization measures within a zone.
   a. Ban on production.
   b. Ban on stockpiling.
   c. Ban on stationing nuclear weapons, and means of delivery:
      (1) With foreign forces
      (2) With indigenous forces
   d. Ban on location of equipment and installations for servicing nuclear weapons.
   e. Ban on use of nuclear weapons against territory of, or targets in, the zone.
      (1) No use under any conditions.
      (2) No first use.
      (3) No use unless they use against our cities.
(4) No use unless they violate "no stationing."

1. Ban on transfer of nuclear weapons, and equipment for servicing, to governments or organizations in the zone.

5. The relationship, if any, between the fact that the West Germans might have the physical power to take over nuclear weapons in West Germany, and the Soviet "year" of, or "respect" for, the West. Does this relationship serve as a deterrent to the Soviet Union?

6. Do nuclear weapons now in the area constitute a direct threat to the Soviet homeland? Are ranges such that a zone would appreciably affect the threat? Conversely, what is the equivalent analysis with respect to the UK and France?

7. Would the elimination of nuclear weapons from a zone serve in any way to reduce, or to increase, the risk of "escalation" in case of armed conflict?

8. Could a "sanctuary" or "no first use" demuclearized zone offer credible boundaries for the conduct of war with conventional forces only?

9. What are the relative merits of establishing the boundaries of a zone by political boundaries, as compared to natural geographical features (rivers, mountain ranges, oceans)?

10. Would a "no deployment" zone have any merit without a "sanctuary" agreement? Vice versa?

11. How much would zonal demuclearization improve the Soviet's first strike (counterforce) capability, by reducing the number of targets or by concentrating them?

12. Would zonal demuclearization reduce pressures within the Soviet Union to preempt?

13. In terms of damage, what effect would a "no deployment" demuclearized zone have on the US, on Europe, on the USSR, assuming different kinds of war? E.g., if a war were with conventional forces only and confined to Europe? Would it perhaps reduce the chance of the use of nuclear weapons in Europe, but increase
the chance of their use on the US and USSR?

14. Relationship between yield and range of nuclear weapons in the zone, and the advisability of, and size of, a zone?

15. Would demuclearization of a zone "invite" limited or "small" wars by implying that retaliation would be non-nuclear?

16. Would zonal demuclearization require an increase in strategic nuclear back-up?

17. What would be the implications of a "no transfer" agreement on any plans to create a NATO nuclear capability?
Considerations Involved in Studying Problems of Security and Surprise Attack

I. Introduction

A. The Four Western powers are conducting the study for the purpose of responding to possible Soviet proposals or framing proposals of their own.

B. This paper contains a broad listing of possible matters for study. It does not in any way reflect the views of governments, nor of the representatives of governments, participating in the study. To the contrary, the measures and issues outlined herein are wholly without prejudice to existing or subsequently developed views of such governments and representatives.

II. Security Measures might serve, among others, the following objectives, which it is recognized are not confined to Europe:

A. Reduce danger of "accidental war".

B. Reduce danger of surprise attack.

C. Reduce danger of escalation, in event local conflict developed.

D. Create more acceptable East-West military equilibrium.

E. Reduce East-West tension.

F. Start on disarmament.

III. Security arrangements will have military, political, and psychological effects and should avoid the following undesirable consequences:

A. Perpetuate by agreement the present East-West military imbalance.

B. Weaken will of Alliance to fulfill necessary military goals.

C. Result
C. Result in Western reliance on inadequate control and inspection techniques.

D. Withdrawal of foreign forces to areas where their effective commitment becomes questionable.

E. Create divisive tendencies within NATO.

F. Lead to political instability in Western Europe.

IV. Security measures could be considered in relation to circumstances under which applied:

A. Standing on own merit alone.

B. In conjunction with a Berlin settlement.

C. In conjunction with a solution of the problems of Germany.

D. In relation to broader disarmament measures.

V. Security measures might be usefully catalogued and considered in the following groupings:

A. Those concerning inspection and control alone without restrictions on personnel or arms.

B. Those measures relating to types of weapons, their deployment and use.

C. Those measures relating to the number and deployment of troops, either indigenous or foreign.

D. The application in possible designated geographical areas of the measures in A, B, and C above.

E. Those declaratory measures relating to security which could not necessarily be verified.

F. Procedural or administrative: i.e., Four Power Commission.

VI. All security measures should be considered in terms of probable impact on world public opinion.

VII. The
VII. The Soviet memorandum of September 25 sets forth the following security measures, which could be analyzed in the course of the above study.

A. Freezing of military budgets.
B. Renunciation of use of nuclear weapons.
C. Prohibition of war propaganda.
D. Non-aggression Pact between NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries.
E. Withdrawal of troops from foreign territory.
F. Agreement to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.
G. Establishment of nuclear-free zones.
H. Steps to decrease the danger of surprise attack.