13 September 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Special Group

SUBJECT: CIA Covert Action in Support of U.S. Policy on Berlin

1. PURPOSE

To obtain funds required by CIA to pursue the covert action programs which have been approved by the Special Group in support of United States policy relative to the Berlin emergency.

2. FACTS

On 17 August 1961 the Special Group approved a memorandum from the Special Working Group on Berlin which recommended approval of the CIA Covert Action, Berlin Contingency Plan. This plan set forth a broad range of proposals for covert action by CIA to support U.S. action relating to Berlin and East Germany and was accepted by the Special Group as a basis for CIA planning.

Subsequently, policy approval by the Special Group and by the Special Working Group for covert action by CIA has initiated action programs in the following categories: (a) utilization of covert assets on a worldwide basis to stimulate support for U.S. policy on Berlin; (b) creation of black and gray radio facilities capable of effective access to East Germany and the Satellites; (c) development of an effective paramilitary
capability for action, when approved, against East Germany and the
European Satellites; (a) utilization of West German groups and individuals
to mount propaganda programs against East Germany; (b) support of West
German radio and television activities directed towards East Germany.

The Special Working Group is presently considering the following
proposals for additional covert action by CIA: (a) preparation for short
and long range balloon operations against East Germany, Eastern Europe
and the USSR; and (b)

Appropriate guidance and instructions have been sent to CIA field
stations in accordance with the above approvals.

3. DISCUSSION

With few exceptions, the scope and nature of the covert action approved
or proposed for CIA is substantially beyond the financial planning of the
Clandestine Services at the beginning of the current fiscal year. Few
of these activities were anticipated and few contingency arrangements
were made to provide for them. Similarly, there are few established
activities upon which a program can be built to meet the needs engendered
by the Berlin situation. This will account for the considerable lead-time
required to go into action and will account, in part, for the high initial
expenses.
It is important to note that estimates of cost contained in this paper are illustrative. Upward revisions will be necessary if a new and more intense phase of the emergency is encountered or if additional covert action by CIA is desired.

4. **CONCLUSION**

That CIA contingency funds not presently available to the clandestine services should be made available to permit implementation of established policy directives and contingency planning for covert action in support of U.S. Government policy relative to the Berlin emergency.

5. **COORDINATION**

Channels for close coordination with the Special Group on the implementation of covert action policy have been established through the Special Working Group of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group (Berlin Task Force) on Berlin. This channel has been and will continue to be used to obtain policy approval for action not previously authorized. Similarly, instructions will be passed where appropriate to require coordination in the field with local ambassadors and military commanders.

6. **RECOMMENDATION**

It is recommended that the Special Group approve expenditure by CIA in accordance with the attached budget estimate and in pursuit of approved covert action programs.