1. The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, after consultation with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, have, in the exercise of their special responsibility for Germany, including Berlin, approved the issue of the following directive for the future work of the LIVE OAK Planning team under your supervision. You will continue, until further notice, to act upon this directive and on such further instructions as may be agreed jointly by the Three Governments. This directive supersedes the relevant sections of the tripartite directive of 4th April, 1959.

2. The decisions on the implementation of any course of action arising from this directive, whether political, military, economic or other, must remain the responsibility of the three Governments after due consultation with the Federal Government and other Government members of NATO.

Political Aim

3. Subject to the foregoing paragraph, these Governments are agreed upon the following general principles:

(a) Their essential requirements in regard to Berlin are:

(i) The maintenance of the presence and security of their forces in West Berlin.

(ii) The maintenance of the freedom and viability of West Berlin.

(iii) The maintenance of freedom of physical access to West Berlin.

All plans will be directed to securing these requirements.

(b) Although every reasonable effort will be made to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the Berlin question with the Soviet Government, pending such a settlement they will take all necessary and appropriate steps to demonstrate their determination to secure their requirements, at the risk of war if necessary.

(c) These steps will be designed to render them, and the NATO alliance, better able to deal with a conflict if the Soviet Government is not deterred from action which threatens the essential requirements set out above.
The Principles Governing Berlin Contingency Planning in the Military Field

4. In the event of substantial and continuing Soviet or East German interference with access to and from West Berlin, Allied and/or civilian, Allied counter-action will have the following objects:

(a) To place on the other side the onus of being the first to take aggressive action.

(b) To avoid a situation arising in which the West has the choice only between humiliation and all-out nuclear war.

(c) To retain as great a range of choice as possible both as regards the type of counter-action taken and its timing.

(d) To leave the Soviet Government as many opportunities as possible to pause and reassess the desirability of continuing on a dangerous course of action.

(e) To leave the Soviet Government under no illusion that it can expect to restrict hostilities which may break out to a limited conventional engagement in which East German forces alone, or Soviet conventional forces in limited numbers, can deal successfully with Western military operations, and without risk of escalation.

(f) To avoid prejudicing the ability of NATO forces to undertake their assigned tasks if more general hostilities occur.

(g) To avoid any infringement of East German territory or air space (i.e. leaving the air corridors or the autobahn) until enemy action leaves no alternative.

(h) Until hostilities become general, to use only forces of the Three Powers in operations.

The Outline of Planning

5. Planning should take account of the following factors:

(a) An initial probe of Soviet intentions may be required to establish deliberate physical obstruction of Allied access.

(b) The establishment of adequate stockpiles in West Berlin, and the possible use of garrison/civil airlifts, would provide the West with the time required to consider further moves.

(c) An airlift would be accompanied by significant economic counter-measures and intensified military preparations.
(d) In the event of threats to flight safety or interference with flight in the air corridors, suitable action should be taken to provide air support.

(e) As wide a variety as possible of more elaborate military measures on the ground to restore access should be planned but their implementation would be delayed until all other reasonable alternative courses had failed. They could not, of themselves, re-open access to Berlin in the face of Soviet determination to prevent it, and must be planned so as not to prejudice wider NATO operations should the need for these occur.

The Tasks and Planning Responsibilities of LIVE OAK

6. The LIVE OAK Group is responsible to you for plans to cover the following contingencies:

(a) Initial probes of Soviet intentions.

(b) More elaborate military measures.

(c) Measures in support of air access.

7. Plans for precautionary and preparatory measures previously the responsibility of LIVE OAK will henceforth become the responsibility of SACEUR who will also assume responsibility for planning counter-measures in Allied Command Europe which are outside the Central Region.

8. LIVE OAK should remain a separate planning group within SHAPE, with direct access to yourself and to CINCBAOR and CINCUSAFE for planning purposes.

9. The conduct of any operations that may arise from these plans will be under the command and control of SACEUR through his operations staff at SHAPE.

10. You are requested to:

(a) Re-examine existing plans in the light of this directive and to make such recommendations to the Three Governments as you consider necessary, and inform the Federal Government through the German Liaison Officer at LIVE OAK.

(b) Prepare and submit plans for the integration of the LIVE OAK staff into NATO Headquarters at the appropriate level and time and to ensure the continuity of military control during the handover to SACEUR.

(c) Establish appropriate arrangements for liaison with the Ambassadorial Steering Group in Washington.