A SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT TO REOPEN GROUND ACCESS BY LOCAL ACTION

CONCEPT

1. Objectives. The use of force in this situation has the following objectives:

a. To make a substantial effort to reopen ground access to Berlin.

b. If the effort is contested, to demonstrate to the world that the GDR, backed by the Soviets, is using violence to deprive the Three Powers of their established rights regarding Berlin.

c. To impress upon the Soviets that the Three Powers will risk general war to maintain their legal rights of access to Berlin.

2. Force Requirements. The force to be used in this course of action should be of a tripartite nature and should be large enough to accomplish the objectives outlined above. The size and composition of specific forces to be used should be determined in consideration of the existing politico-military situation. While a reinforced battalion appears to be of sufficient size to constitute a substantial effort, plans should encompass the use of forces of varying size up to a reinforced division with tactical air support, if required, and should provide for the extrication of any forces which may be trapped in carrying out the mission. USCINCEUR is charged with over-all planning and command responsibility with respect to the concept outlined above.

Although a military force could be launched from Berlin, it appears far preferable to start it from Helmstedt. The force, properly documented, will approach the roadblock, identify itself according to agreed tripartite procedures, and request passage. If there is no opposition, this force will proceed to the opposite end of the autobahn. It may be expected that, if military conflict should take place, it would be preferable to have such action at Helmstedt, in order that our force would not be isolated on the autobahn. In any event, our force will proceed toward the opposite end of the autobahn taking over control points as required and overcoming such resistance as feasible without recourse to atomic weapons. The force will not fire unless fired upon but will deploy off the autobahn if necessary to meet the situation. If overwhelming armed resistance is encountered or if physical barriers beyond its capacity to negotiate are placed across the road, the force will disengage and await orders of higher authority. At this point a decision must be made with respect to withdrawal, the acceptance of a tactical stalemate, or the reinforcement of our force if necessary to accomplish the objectives stated in paragraph 1 above.

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

1. The use of military force in any degree directly against the Soviets in this situation introduces the risk of general war with little warning; therefore, prior to the implementation of this action the Allies should take preparatory measures required to wage general war.

2. The possible consequences of this action render tripartite approval or participation highly desirable.

3. Prior to taking this action, a decision should have been made as to the compensatory replacement of NATO forces which are used in this action.
4. The tactical deployment of Tripartite forces off the autobahn in response to resistance will result in a violation of the ground corridor.

5. The use of tactical air forces to support deployed ground forces in this situation will probably result in a violation of air space restrictions.

6. The Communists in East Germany have the capability to stop small forces by obstructionist means short of active combat. They have the combat capability of stopping larger forces of the size envisaged under this course of action. The latest SNIE, 100--2--59, "Probable Soviet Courses of Action Regarding Berlin and Germany" stated "If a heavily armed and sizeable task force had entered the GDR, the East Germans and Soviets would probably first demand the immediate withdrawal of the force and a peaceful settlement. But if this demand were not complied with, we believe the Soviets would commit the forces they considered necessary to defeat and drive out the Allied units in a minimum of time... They /The Soviet leaders/ would recognize that engagement of a Western task force would involve substantial risk of widened hostilities, but they would probably not have allowed the situation to get to this point if they had been convinced that it would result in general war."
ALTERNATIVE TWO

A SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT TO REOPEN AIR ACCESS, IF BLOCKED

CONCEPT

1. This effort would involve graduated reactions by the Three Powers up to and including immediate and positive employment of a limited number of combat aircraft to re-establish and maintain unrestricted air access to Berlin.

2. The measures of harassment which might be taken by the USSR or the GDR could range from actions such as interference with communications and navigational facilities, erection of physical barriers such as barrage balloons and wire screens on approach lanes, and unannounced flights through the air corridors, to more active measures such as interception of and actual firing at Western aircraft.

3. In response to such measures the United States would initially employ counter-jamming techniques, and restrict air access operations to periods when visual flying conditions prevailed. When it is determined that, because of harassment, U.S. flights to Berlin cannot be accomplished within the desired degree of safe operation, fighter aircraft will be airborne outside the Western entrance to the Berlin air corridors to render assistance if required. Harassment or positive hostile action, which endangers the safety of Western aircraft peaceably transiting the corridor, will be considered sufficient provocation for U.S. combat aircraft to come to their assistance.

4. Planning and Command Responsibilities

USCINCEUR is charged with over-all planning and command responsibility with respect to the concept outlined above.
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

This alternative has the same military implications as those listed in paragraphs 1, 2, and 6 MILITARY IMPLICATIONS, Appendix "A". In addition, the use of combat aircraft to shoot down barrage balloons, to destroy anti-aircraft positions, or to drive off harassing aircraft would entail violation of airspace restrictions.
APPENDIX "C"

ALTERNATIVE THREE

REPRISALS AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS IN OTHER AREAS, e.g., WESTERN NAVAL CONTROLS ON BLOC SHIPPING

CONCEPT

1. Legal considerations of reprisal actions. From the standpoint of international law, the charter of the United Nations and the basic doctrine of self-preservation, the Three Powers are justified in taking certain reprisals against Soviet Bloc shipping as a result of Soviet actions regarding the status of Three Power occupation of Berlin.

2. Possible courses of action

   a. The degree of harassment which can be applied to Soviet merchant shipping interests covers a wide spectrum from passive observation to full control. While the spectrum can be developed into an almost infinite number of possibilities the following actions provide an adequate survey to permit evaluation:

   (1) Actions which can be carried out unilaterally by the forces of the United States.

      (a) Passive surveillance and photographic documentation of the passage of Soviet merchant shipping through selected restricted waters and narrow focal passages.

      (b) Delay of passage of Soviet merchant shipping on the high seas for a wide range of reasons such as inspection of documents, cargo and health conditions or search for illegally carried personnel. Lengthy delays can be interposed while documentation is carried out and approval of higher authority is being obtained.

      (c) Full control on the high seas and return of Soviet shipping to ports of departure. Soviet ships subsequently apprehended attempting to evade the blockade would be subject to detention.
(2) Additional actions which can be carried out if assistance or forces are made available by other friendly nations.

(a) Passive surveillance and photographic documentation of the passage of Soviet merchant shipping through selected restricted waters and narrow focal passages. A friendly nation could assist by netting the passage so as to require transiting ships to close the beach for better photographic coverage as well as enhanced nuisance value.

(b) Delay of passage of Soviet merchant shipping in national waters for a wide range of reasons such as inspection of documents, cargo and health conditions or search for illegally carried personnel. Lengthy delays can be interposed while documentation is carried out and approval of higher authority is being obtained.

(c) Denial of passage to Soviet merchant shipping where certain cargos are carried or certain destinations are declared.

(d) Denial or refusal to grant sovereign immunity to Soviet merchant shipping. Currently all Soviet merchant shipping is state-owned and claim is made that this shipping has rights similar to military shipping, such as non-payment of fees, employment of pilots and port of entry privileges.

(e) Denial of port services such as bunkering, provisioning and repairs.

b. While harassment can be carried out in many areas as well as on the high seas, the following geographical locations, listed in ascending order of potential for provocation of the Soviets, merit consideration:
(1) Gulf of Aden
(2) Straits of Gibraltar
(3) Danish Belts and Kiel Canal
(4) Aegean approaches to Greek and Turkish ports
(5) Turkish Straits
(6) Tsushima, Tsugaru and La Perouse Straits
(7) Bering Straits

c. The following types of possible reprisal actions, implementation of which would be primarily non-military and which would in practically all cases require allied collaboration, have not been considered:

(1) Denial of overflight rights, landing privileges or honoring of Soviet airline issued tickets and travel documents.
(2) Interference with Soviet air travel by statements of inadequate flight safety based on inoperative navigational and communication aids.
(3) Selected cancellation of Soviet Bloc rail communication privileges in West European countries.
(4) Imposition, by two or more nations acting under the United Nations Charter, of a variety of delaying actions in fields of the World Health Organization and plague control.

3. Considerations of implementing reprisal actions at sea
   a. Facility of implementation would generally be enhanced by allied collaboration in such matters as providing ports for detention of shipping, support of U.S. and allied naval forces, and joint participation.
   b. Forces available for effecting reprisals would consist of U.S. forces already deployed in the general areas mentioned and such forces and facilities as countries friendly to the United States might make available.

Appendix "C"
g. It is necessary that clear, specific and thorough guidance be provided to military officers at all echelons who may be expected to execute acts of harassment or reprisal. When the acts to be consummated are established, specific instructions must be promulgated by appropriate authority. All officers must act under explicit orders and be authorized to use force, to specified degree, where necessary to carry out instructions.

d. Preceding implementation, it is considered that the following preliminary political preparations should be made:

(1) Advise appropriate allies of our intentions.
(2) Consult with Western Bloc nations on the best courses of action to be followed preliminary to possible introduction of our intentions into the forum of the United Nations.

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

1. Reprisals at sea directed toward Soviet Bloc shipping have an advantage psychologically in that it can be persuasively maintained that the action is not directed toward the territorial integrity or political independence of the Soviet Union or its satellites.

2. The first Soviet reaction would probably be exploitation in world forums of alleged U.S. violations of international law.

3. U.S. effort applied in reprisals against Soviet merchant shipping could become disproportionate to the real effects obtainable. A considerable portion of our sea forces could become involved, thus adversely affecting over-all U.S. defense posture unless additional forces were mobilized, whereas the Soviets could evade or avoid the reprisal activity to large degree with negligible effect on their own economy.
4. Dependent on the degree of harassment, it is likely that the Soviet interpretation of U.S. reprisals would include justification for counter-reprisals. Such counter-actions could take various forms, from enlistment of neutralist collaboration in imposing restrictions on U.S. shipping to response with force against U.S. merchant or war ships.

5. If the Soviets did respond with force, the United States would be confronted with an extreme test of its willingness to extend measures for predominance in the Berlin situation to that of general war.
APPENDIX "b"

ALTERNATIVE FOUR

GENERAL WAR MEASURES

CONCEPT

1. As it becomes apparent that political negotiations are failing to resolve the Berlin Situation, certain measures should be undertaken to insure U.S. preparedness to meet a general war. They should serve to convince the Soviets that the United States is willing to accept the risk of general war and yet they should not demonstrate belligerency on its part to the extent of needlessly provoking general war. They should include, on a progressive basis, an appropriate degree of mobilization, unit deployments, increased emphasis on readiness of units, and establishment of an increased alert posture.

2. The character of these general war measures is such as to preclude implementation without general public awareness. Although they are geared primarily to the European area, it is recognized that preparedness for general war must be considered from a global aspect and plans and preparations should be in accordance. In the face of increased tensions, these measures would be implemented to the degree necessary to insure an adequate military posture for general war.

3. NATO "Sword and Shield" Forces should maintain a sufficient capability to contain a Soviet attack until our retaliatory forces can respond. Thus, Shield Force elements in Central Europe which are actually displaced in support of any Berlin operation, should be replaced with units in kind or the risk of mal-deployment accepted.

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

1. Anticipated Enemy Reactions. Faced with the failure of political negotiations and growing evidence of U.S. military preparations, the USSR might evince interest in reopening
negotiations but would nevertheless feel compelled to take some positive actions if only for prestige purposes. Under these circumstances it is probable that:

a. Soviet propaganda efforts directed towards the West will continue with intensified attempts to lessen the cohesiveness of the Free World and weaken the determination of the West to stand on its rights in Germany.

b. Soviet propaganda efforts directed within the bloc countries will be intensified. Police and military security measures in these countries may also be tightened to improve Communist control over local populations. Western efforts to disassociate bloc populations from their communist governments will become less effective.

c. Communist directed threats and rebellious acts against Western oriented governments can be expected throughout the world. Such provocative communist tactics would be most probable in areas where Western interests are strong.

2. Advantages

a. The military advantages which would result from preparations for general war lie in the improved effectiveness with which our armed forces could engage in any type of warfare.

b. Increased alert measures would permit more rapid reaction to attack and enhance the deterrent value of our military forces. Such measures would also increase the degree of survival of our forces in the event of enemy nuclear attack.

c. Certain preliminary deployments would increase the effectiveness of the NATO shield, improve our world-wide capability to respond to local aggressions, contribute to a reduction in reaction time towards any hostile act and further increase the degree of survival of our forces in the event of nuclear attack.
d. Partial mobilization and the activation of certain reserve units and ships would permit an increase in the manning levels of existing units, would improve the general mobility of our armed forces by increasing the transportation available, and would expand our defensive capabilities.

e. Insofar as the measures envisaged under this course of action tend to convince the Soviets that the United States is willing to go to war over Berlin, the measures probably would influence the Soviets toward actions aimed at reopening negotiations.

3. Disadvantages

a. The major disadvantages in making preparations for general war are to be found in the costs of such preparations and in the disruptions caused by partial mobilization, and the deployment of forces.

b. In addition, it is virtually impossible to maintain a high degree of alert in the armed forces over prolonged periods of time without loss of effectiveness.