SOVIET TACTICS ON BERLIN

25X1C has received the latest Soviet statements regarding Berlin and has deduced the following:

1) Although there has been no shift in Soviet tactics on Berlin, there are signs that the Soviet government is reacting to the two-pronged line the West is taking of increased military preparedness and emphasis on readiness to negotiate. Thus Khrushchev is no longer saying that he does not believe that the West will be prepared in the last resort to fight for Berlin.

2) There is no reason to suppose that his tactics of piling on the pressure will be modified in the immediate future since he must know that there can be no negotiation, at any rate, until after the German elections.

3) He would prefer a negotiation with the West which would give him his minimum requirements over Berlin, rather than have to proceed unilaterally: and he would prefer this to be sooner rather than later, largely because of the deteriorating situation in East Germany. The great emphasis on the danger arising from West German militarism may reflect the Soviet fear that an uprising may occur in East Germany in which West Germany will be increasingly tempted to interfere as they develop their military strength.
4) The Russians seem to recognize their vulnerability on the score of self-determination, and will continue to protest overmuch against Western arguments on this point.

5) Khrushchev seems to have decided that some special effort is needed to awaken his own public to the risks inherent in the Berlin situation, and to play Soviet preparations defensively by suggesting, as he did in his broadcast, that they are all responses to Western initiative. Khrushchev may also have in mind the need to carry neutral opinion with him, particularly with the Neutral Conference opening in Belgrade on 1 September. There are signs of an intensified campaign directed at the neutrals.