SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM  Department of State

FROM: BONN
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 286, AUGUST 7, 7 PM

ACTION DEPARTMENT 286, INFORMATION BERLIN 82,
RE DEPARTMENT'S INSTRUCTION CW-631.

EMB SUBMITS FOLLOWING RESPONSE TO DEPT INSTRUCTION. IT IS
NO DIFFERENCES OF OPINION AROSE.

RECENT EVENTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED GROWING CRISIS IN EAST GERMANY
IN WHICH POPULAR DISAFFECTION -- LONG CONSTANT -- HAS BEGUN
ASSUME OPEN FORMS. ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT ONLY IRRITANT PLAGUING
GOVT, INCREASED REFUGEE FLIGHTS DURING JULY POSE MOST URGENT
PROBLEM. INCREASED STEPS TO HALT THIS FLOW WHICH AUTHORITIES
HAVE BEEN FORCED TO INSTITUTE APPEARED TO HAVE REACHED ALMOST
UNPRECEDENTED LEVELS BY AUG 1. THEY CAN ONLY BE VIEWED AS
V DRASTIC MEASURE WHICH REGIME WOULD PREFER TO HAVE POSTPONED.
PRESENT RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL CONFIRM THAT REFUGEE FLIGHT
V IS SERIOUS MATTER, TESTIFY TO REGIME'S INABILITY TO WIN OVER
POPULATION, AND POINT UP POPULAR REFUSAL ACCEPT COMMUNIST
V FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES ON BERLIN. FURTHERMORE, NEW
MEASURES COME CLOSE TO TAMPERING WITH MOVEMENT WITHIN BERLIN
AND WITH ACCESS TO AND FROM CITY WITH ALL ITS SERIOUS IMPLI-
CATIONS. THUS, DANGER EXISTS THAT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE
GREATER EFFECTIVENESS, RESTRICTIONS MIGHT HAVE TO BE SO TIGHTENED
AND APPLIED TO SUCH AREAS AS TO PRECIPITATE CRISIS AND
SHARPEN TENSION BEFORE THE SOVIETS WOULD WISH OR EXPECT IT.

NONETHELESS, REFUGEE FLIGHT IS ONLY SYMPTOMATIC. EXCEPT FOR

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ITS IMMEDIATE DISRUPTIVE IMPACT ON EAST GERMAN ECONOMIC AND FOREIGN POLICY ("PEACE TREATY") AIMS, IT IS PROBABLY NOT VIEWED AS SERIOUSLY AS ACCOMPANYING BROAD-BASED POPULAR DISCONTENT WHICH IS NOW BEGINNING TO MANIFEST ITSELF.

IMMEDIATE REASON FOR THIS SHARPENING DISCONTENT APPEARS TO BE UNPOPULAR SOVIET BERLIN POLICY WITH IMPLICATION THAT THE ESCAPE HATCH WILL SOON BE CLOSED OFF. POPULAR MOOD WILL PRESUMABLY CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE UNTIL PRESENT BERLIN CRISIS HAS BEEN RESOLVED OR AT LEAST SOME DECISION ON NEGOTIATIONS IS ANNOUNCED. PROLONGED NEGOTIATIONS WOULD PROBABLY ALLAY, BUT NOT DISSIPATE, PRESENT DISCONTENT.

FROM FOREGOING, EMB WOULD JUDGE THAT REGIME BELIEVES ITS POLITICAL (SED) CONTROL APPARATUS IS IN DISORDER AND MUST THEREFORE RESORT TO USING POLICE AND OTHER ARMED FORCES IN DISPROPORTIONATE AMOUNT AND IN RESTRICTED LOCALITY AROUND BERLIN. PRESENT DISPOSITIONS AROUND BERLIN REFLECT DEFENSIVE ACTION WHICH IMPLIES ALREADY DETERIORATING SITUATION. IMPLICATIONS AND EXPENSE ATTENDANT TO THIS ACTION WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR REGIME TO KEEP IT AT PRESENT INTENSITY AND SCOPE FOR INDEFINITE PERIOD. CURRENT DISCONTENT IS LIKELY TO INTENSIFY, MOREOVER, THE LONGER SPECIAL POLICE ACTIONS AGAINST REFUGEES AND BORDER CROSSERS CONTINUES. REGIME THUS FACES SERIOUS DILEMMA SINCE PRESENT COURSE WILL PROBABLY ENSURE CONTINUOUS COMPLICATED CONTROL PROBLEMS.

EAST GERMAN MILITARY ARE CONSIDERED RELIABLE ON OFFICER LEVEL BUT NOT AMONG ENLISTED RANKS. NONETHELESS, SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY NOT COMPLETELY DEPEND UPON THE GERMAN OFFICER CORPS. SO FAR AS CAN BE DETERMINED, RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMAN AND SOVIET FORCES ARE GOOD. GDR FORCES ARE THOROUGHLY CONTROLLED BY SED AND SSD THROUGH POLITICAL COMMISSAR SYSTEM AND COMPLETE SECURITY POLICE INFILTRATION. AVERAGE SOLDIER IS APOLITICAL, THOUGH HE MAY AT TIMES BE IMPATIENT WITH EXCESSIVE
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EXCESSIVE INDOCTRINATION TO WHICH HE IS SUBJECTED. MATERIAL BENEFITS PROVIDE CERTAIN INCENTIVE TO REMAIN IN UNIFORM. VARIOUS POLICE FORCES, EXCEPTING SSD AND CERTAIN OTHER SPECIAL UNITS, INCLUDE SOME DISCONTENTS, AS IS EVIDENT FROM DEFLECTIONS TO WEST.

REGIME ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL DISAFFECTION BY COMBINING CAREFUL POLICE VIGILANCE WITH VARIOUS EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE POPULATION TO SUPPORT SED, E.G., PROPAGANDA EXHORTING THEM TO BE MORE ON GUARD AGAINST "AGENTS, SLAVE TRADERS," ETC., AND RELAXATIONS IN COMMUNICATION. SECURITY ORGANS HAVE EFFECTIVE AND EXTENSIVE INFORMER NETWORK. SO FAR AS IS KNOWN, SSD POLICE CORPS COMPRIS RELIABLE INDIVIDUALS.

IN SHARP CRISIS POPULATION MIGHT WELL ENGAGE IN ISOLATED SPONTANEOUS ANTI-REGIME OUTBREAKS. MAJOR CONCERTED EFFORT SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, HOWEVER, SINCE THERE IS NEITHER POPULAR LEADERSHIP NOR COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE VARIOUS SECTORS OF POPULATION. MOST PEOPLE WOULD PROBABLY REACT WITH SOME CYNICISM TO ANY WESTERN EXHORTATIONS TO REVOLT, REMEMBERING WEST'S FAILURE TO SUPPORT EITHER 1953 UPRISING OR HUNGARIANS IN 1956. AN APPEAL FROM WEST COUPLED WITH CLEAR IMPLICATION THAT WESTERN MILITARY ASSISTANCE WOULD BE FORTHCOMING, HOWEVER, MIGHT RESULT IN EXTENSIVE OUTBREAKS, ESPECIALLY ALONG EAST-WEST GERMAN FRONTIER. APPEALS FOR ANTI-REGIME ACTION WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE HEALED BECAUSE IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ORGANIZE CONCERTED EFFORT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. IN EVENT THAT SIZEABLE DISTURBANCES OCCURRED ALONG EAST-WEST GERMAN BORDER, SOVIET FORCES WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE REQUIRED TO ENSURE THAT FRONTIER WAS EFFECTIVELY SEALED OFF. EAST GERMAN BORDER GUARDS AND ARMY UNITS WOULD PROBABLY NOT PROVE RELIABLE UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. ANY OTHER POSSIBLE OUTBREAKS, WHICH ARE LIKELY TO BE MINOR, COULD PROBABLY BE EFFECTIVELY HANDLED BY GDR SECURITY FORCES.

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IN MEETING ANY DISTURBANCES, THE GDR CAN BE EXPECTED TO CALL UP ITS KAMPFGRUPPEN UNITS BUT IS NOT LIKELY WHOLLY TO RELY UPON THEM. SPECIAL ALERT POLICE (BEREITSCHAFTSPOLIZEI) AND SSD FORCES WOULD BE QUICKLY MOVED TO TROUBLE AREAS TO ENSURE FIRM CONTROL.

UNQUOTE

COMMENT: FOREGOING DOES NOT INCLUDE ANY MILITARY COMMENTS. SINCE ALL AGENCIES WILL PARTICIPATE IN FORMULATING ESTIMATE, EMB ASSUMES DOD HAS ISSUED PARALLEL INSTRUCTIONS, AND ACCORDINGLY DID NOT APPROACH USAREUR FOR COMMENTS ON PARAS D, E, F, AND G.

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