TOP SECRET—EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM TO: The President /
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, United States Information Agency
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Maxwell D. Taylor

The President intends to adjourn the meeting of the National Security Council after general discussion of the papers which have been presented, and then to hold a smaller session in his own office. He asks that you attend this smaller session, at which he plans to hold a discussion of the problem of choice which is outlined in the attached memorandum.

McGeorge Bundy

TOP SECRET—EYES ONLY ATTACHMENT

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Military Choices in Berlin Planning

There are four broad choices available:

1. Proceed at once with all possible speed with a substantial reinforcement of U. S. ground, air and naval forces. This course would require a prompt declaration of a national emergency and an immediate request for legislation giving stand-by controls over the economy.

2. Proceed at once with all measures not requiring declaration of a national emergency; in effect, this means everything but the call-up of units and specialists from the National Guard and Reserves. At a later date, related to the development of the crisis, declare a national emergency, with the understanding that there will be a delay of up to four months in the combat availability of units called to active service after the declaration of emergency. This course would also require stand-by controls, but the time of this need is not clear.

3. Proceed at once with a declaration of national emergency and with all preparations except a large-scale call-up of Reserves or Guard units. In this course the declaration would be put in as low a key as possible, and described as a means of freeing the President's hands for later action in an emergency. In this course, stand-by controls might be requested in the same tone of voice.

All three of these courses imply a prompt request for a substantial add-on to the military budget for FY '62. The firm recommendation of the Department of Defense is for an additional 5 billion dollars, with the understanding that about 1 billion 5 would definitely be spent on hard items, and the rest mainly on troops, only if the crisis required it.

4. Avoid any significant military build-up at this time, on the ground that the crisis is one of political unity and firmness of will, and on the further ground that substantial military preparations at this stage would divide the alliance, stiffen the Russians, frighten our own people, and operate against an effective stand in Berlin under the fundamental shield of the nuclear deterrent.