MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Mobilization Plans on Berlin

It might be of some interest to consider certain political ramifications of partial mobilization with reference to the Berlin crisis. I would assume that someone is preparing a paper with regard to the internal political ramifications of such a move as they would affect the 1962 elections and general flexibility of the Administration's domestic program. Effective argument can be made that the U.S. mobilizing and sending to Europe a few divisions, the Soviets will do nothing but mobilize at least double the number. This was made clear, of course, by Khrushchev at the Vienna talks. Of course, such a situation would neutralize the sending of such troops and would probably put us at an even greater military disadvantage there.

One important effect of mobilizing in the present situation is to create a greater unity in the Soviet Bloc; a unity which is not in the interests of the U.S., at least as it applies to the Warsaw Pact nations. Czechoslovak and Polish leaders, although they may be in rebellion against the Soviet Union, consider West Germany, and ultimately all of Germany itself to be a far greater threat than that of the Soviet Union. Thus, our policy of trying to create distinctions and differences within the Warsaw Pact will suffer serious damage.

Suggestions have been made for sending back to the U.S. American families of American soldiers. The effect may on first impression appear to be a good one, since we are showing our "national resolve" and seriousness of purpose. On the other hand, Europeans generally will look at such a move in quite a different light. They will see this as an attempt to make a battlefield of all of Europe where Europeans must stay and where non-fighting Americans no longer care to be. This, of course, would have a debilitating effect on European morale. One possible result of such a situation would be a fall off of popular support for present European leadership if the U.S. pulled its dependents out of Europe.
The relationship of West German industrial export to East Germany and East Europe suggests that West Germany has strong and profitable economic ties to that area. Pressure could be brought on both West Germany and East Germany, which is dependent on West German export, by pointing out the inconsistency between the hard line politically and the soft line economically. At the very least, we should be able to demand of the West Germans that they be consistent and that they enforce an embargo on the West German industrialists in order to back up any "firm" position of the West on Berlin. I suspect that we will find the West Germans much more amenable to a discussion of negotiation on the issue of Berlin and the more basic issue of the recognition of the Oder-Neisse if it is put to them in terms of their pocketbook.

I am putting together an analysis of the relationship between West German export to East Germany and East Europe.

I would assume that the method of operating by everyone in this case is in terms of the national interest of the U.S., not in terms of some chimerical interest of a sagging alliance.

Marcus G. Raskin