MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OFF SEC OF DEFENSE

Subject: Temporary Reinforcement as a Berlin Deterrent (S)

1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, subject as above, dated 29 May 1961, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Assistant Secretaries of Defense, International Security Affairs, Controller, Manpower, and Installations and Logistics, were requested to provide their views and recommendations regarding the capability for, approximate costs of, and main implications of:

   a. An air mobility exercise of about two battle groups to Germany in June and return within two or three weeks.

   b. Movement (air, sea or both) of one STRAC division to Germany or Italy in July for one or two-month period.

   c. Calling one reserve component division to active service in July for a 30 or 60-day period.

   d. Other similar scale activity of ground, naval and air units which would contribute significantly to the objective of deterring the USSR from initiating a Berlin crisis.

2. Separate studies on each of the above subjects are contained in Appendices A, B, C and D hereto. In general, each of these studies concludes that the Services and the unified commands are capable of conducting the operations listed in Appendices A, B and C. Also, in regard to these three Appendices, the implications of their implementation go far beyond the pure military aspects.

3. No judgment is made in this paper as to the desirability of undertaking any measure considered herein. It is assumed the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be requested to forward their
views on implementation and timing of any course of action proposed by higher authority. In this connection the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to emphasize that these operations, alone, will not contribute significantly to the desired objective; they must be utilized in conjunction with other non-military measures, such as those contained in the Berlin "Checklist."

4. The primary implications of Appendices A and B are concerned with NATO consultations and country-to-country negotiations which would be required if these exercises were to be conducted. This would be necessary in order to obtain the utmost advantage to the United States and our Allies and at the same time deter the USSR from precipitating a crisis over Berlin.

5. The primary implication of Appendix C is the need for the President to declare an emergency within the meaning of Section 673, Title 10, US Code, before he can order reserve units or fillers for extended active duty.

6. Appendix D refers primarily to the Checklist of Possible Military and Non-Military Measures, Berlin Contingency Planning, which was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 12 August 1960. This Checklist provides a wide range of actions both military and non-military which are responsive to this particular problem. The Checklist is discussed extensively by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, subject: "The Status of Berlin Contingency Plans (U)", dated 13 April 1961 and in their memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, subject: "Berlin (U)", dated 28 April 1961. Included in Appendix D are examples of actions comparable to those contained in Appendices A and B. The development of costs and implications for the implementation of other checklist items could be accomplished readily when necessary. In addition, non-military measures should be considered for implementation concurrently with military measures.

7. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated that this study was for planning purposes only; should not prompt any preparatory activity;
implementation would be a matter for decision at the highest level; and that it would be assumed that these operations would be funded above present budgetary levels.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

THOMAS D. WHITE
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Attachment
APPENDIX A

AN AIR MOBILITY EXERCISE OF ABOUT TWO BATTLE GROUPS TO GERMANY IN JUNE, AND RETURN WITHIN TWO OR THREE WEEKS, ON THE ORDER OF LONG THRUST (C)

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the capability for, approximate costs of, and main implications of conducting a two battle group mobility exercise of two or three weeks duration in Germany during June 1961.

DISCUSSION

2. Two STRAC airborne battle groups could be deployed by air to Germany and conduct training and field exercises in major training areas. This force would have a strength of 4,216 and would require 224 aircraft sorties to airlift 3,465 short tons of personnel, equipment and supplies.

3. The estimated cost to include foreign duty pay, maintenance, facilities and transportation is:
   a. Army $650,000
   b. Air Force $12,100,000
   Total $12,750,000

4. The STRAC force is prepared to commence movement on one hour's notice. Airlift aircraft deploying to Army assembly points from airborne or ground positions can be in position for onloads at the time initial units of STRAC are prepared to move out.

5. On a "crash" basis and using only one point of departure and one point for delivery similar to planning for Exercise LONG THRUST (disregarding peacetime flight restrictions) and from "O" alert, the two battle group force could be airlifted and closed in Germany in 4.5 days. With 24 hours alert this could be reduced to three days maximum.

6. Logistical support for the deployed forces would be provided by EUCOM service components.
IMPLICATIONS

7. EUCOM major training area schedule would require changes.

8. Overflight clearances would have to be obtained.

9. The posture of deployed forces would degrade the US capability to execute wartime or contingency commitments in other areas.

10. Major changes would be required in the June programmed airlift support of DOD requirements.

11. Commercial air augmentation would be necessary to replace aircraft withdrawn from scheduled MATS operations.

12. State Department would have to clear this exercise to include clearance from the Federal Republic of Germany.

13. The North Atlantic Council should be consulted on this exercise.
APPENDIX B

MOVEMENT (AIR, SEA, OR BOTH) FOR ONE STRAC DIVISION TO GERMANY OR ITALY IN JULY FOR A ONE OR TWO-MONTH PERIOD (C)

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the capability for, approximate costs of, and main implications of deploying by air, sea or both, one STRAC division to Germany in July 1961, for a 30-60 day period.

DISCUSSION

2. Deployment to Italy is not considered in this discussion because of the lack of adequate facilities, training areas, and logistics support under US control in Italy. If applied to Italy, the statistics concerning Germany are considered to be adequate for planning purposes.

3. One STRAC airborne division, could be deployed to Germany in July 1961. The division would have a strength of 11,555 and require lift for approximately 8,213 short tons of personnel, equipment and supplies. The force could be deployed by air or by a combination of air and sea as follows:

   a. On a "crash" basis, assuming multiple on and off load bases with no simultaneous deployment of other forces, the division utilizing 560 aircraft sorties could be closed in Germany in nine days.

   b. Estimated cost to include foreign duty pay, maintenance, facilities, transportation and support for 30-60 days is:

      (1) Army  
              $ 4,000,000

      (2) Air Force  
              $ 30,500,000

              Total  
              $ 34,600,000

4. To deploy two battle groups by air and the remainder of the division by sea would require 224 aircraft sorties to air lift 4,216 personnel and 3,465 short tons, and three troop transports and three cargo ships to sealift 7,339 personnel and 4,964 short tons (20,314 measurement tons).

   a. The above force could close in Germany as follows:
(1) Two airlifted battle groups: 4.5 days with zero alert and on a "crash" basis.

(2) Sealifted Division (-)  

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<td>Steaming Time</td>
<td>9 days</td>
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b. Estimated cost to include foreign duty pay, maintenance, facilities, transportation and support for 30-60 days, considering air movement for two battle groups and sea movement for the division minus is:

(1) Army $4,000,000
(2) Navy $428,500
(3) Air Force $12,600,000
Total $17,028,500

5. Logistical support for the deployed forces would be provided by EUCOM service components with replenishment supplies from CONUS. If the forces were to remain in Germany indefinitely, additional logistical support units would be required.

6. Other possible combinations of air and sea movement of airborne or infantry divisions could be accomplished; however, they are not discussed in this paper.

**IMPLICATIONS**

7. The posture of deployed forces would degrade the US capability to execute wartime or contingency commitments in other areas.

8. Major changes in training schedules of CONUS and EUCOM units would be required. This would have a serious effect on those units in Europe which would be displaced at the major training areas.

9. There would be a temporary reduction in lift capability to support remaining CONUS based forces which might be required to execute contingency operations.

10. Overflight clearances would have to be obtained.

11. Major changes would be required in the July programmed airlift support of Department of Defense requirements.
12. Commercial air augmentation would be necessary to replace aircraft withdrawn from scheduled MATS operations.

13. To move the division minus by sealift with less than 30 days advance notice would require obtaining commercial transportation for scheduled passengers.

14. State Department would have to clear this exercise to include clearance from the Federal Republic of Germany.

15. It would be desirable to obtain prior approval from the North Atlantic Council. However, if this could not be accomplished, the Council should be informed in advance.

16. Domestic repercussions to this exercise could be adverse unless a carefully planned public affairs program were executed prior to or concurrently with the exercise.
APPENDIX C

CALLING ONE RESERVE COMPONENT DIVISION TO ACTIVE SERVICE IN JULY FOR A THIRTY OR SIXTY-DAY PERIOD (U)

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the capability for, approximate costs of, and main implications of calling one reserve component division to active service in July for a thirty or sixty-day period.

DISCUSSION

2. There are 27 National Guard Divisions and 10 USAR Divisions which are scheduled for 15 days of annual active duty for training (ANACDUTRA) during the period from June through September. One of those scheduled for training in July could be retained on active duty for a thirty-day or a sixty-day period if directed.

3. As these divisions are at an authorized strength which is considerably below their TOE strength, they should be brought up to full strength if they are to be kept on extended active duty. This would permit realization of maximum training and combat readiness benefits. Approximately 4,900 individual fillers from the USAR mobilization reinforcement pool would be required to bring the division which was investigated to full strength. These are available from within the Army area concerned. In order to effect call up of USAR fillers, Active Army Corps Headquarters concerned will need a minimum of 30 days to comply.

4. Cost for Thirty-Day Period. Overall cost would be approximately $5,142,827. This includes $1,439,350 for 15 days ANACDUTRA already budgeted but does not include displacement cost for two reserve component divisions which would have to take ANACDUTRA elsewhere. Estimated net additional cost, including displacement cost, is $3,763,477.
5. **Cost for Sixty-Day Period.** Overall cost would be approximately $9,068,305. This includes $1,439,350. For 15 days ANACDUTRA already budgeted but does not include displacement cost for three reserve component divisions, which would have to take ANACDUTRA elsewhere. Estimated net additional cost, including displacement cost, is $7,750,955.

**IMPLICATIONS**

6. With regard to the reserve components, the President (or Congress) must declare an emergency within the meaning of Section 673, Title 10, US Code, before he can order reserve units or fillers for extended active duty, or new authorizing legislation must be enacted.

7. The problems of disruption of civilian occupations for a 30-60 day period to include loss of pay and removal from local areas for both National Guard and USAR personnel concerned should be considered.

8. In the selection of a particular division, the following factors need to be considered—strength, present training status, equipment levels, training areas, equipment pool at training site, morale, etc.

9. As a related matter, the improved readiness desired for two reserve component divisions could be assisted through action taken in calling reserve component divisions to duty. Through the device of calling two divisions to duty, each for 30 days, providing necessary fillers from the USAR mobilization reinforcement pool, and providing intensive training for 30 days, the combat readiness of these units would be greatly improved. The costs, although not computed in detail, will approximate twice the overall cost of calling one division.
for 30 days, or approximately $10,300,000. The net cost, after deducting the amount already budgeted for these divisions, would be approximately $7,500,000.
APPENDIX D

OTHER GROUND, NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITY WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO DETERRING THE USSR FROM INITIATING A BERLIN CRISIS (S)

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the capability for, the approximate costs of, and the main implications of other similar scale activity of ground, naval and air units which would contribute significantly to the objective of deterring the USSR from initiating a Berlin crisis.

DISCUSSION

2. In this study it is assumed that:
   a. The actions indicated would be of such a nature that they could be executed rapidly either singly, or in conjunction with the actions previously discussed.
   b. These operations would be funded above present budgetary levels.

3. The "Checklist of Possible Military and Non-Military Measures, Berlin Contingency Planning," which was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 12 August 1960, provides a wide range of actions which are responsive to this problem. In their memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, subject: "The Status of Berlin Contingency Plans (U)," dated 13 April 1961, and in their memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, subject: "Berlin (U)," dated 28 April 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated that the "Checklist," together with the premise of accepting the risk of general war, continues to be a satisfactory initial framework for the development of plans for US and Free World response to any Soviet attempt to take over Berlin or deny Free World access thereto.

4. The following points with regard to the Checklist are particularly pertinent to the problem:
   a. The "Checklist" contains 127 items divided into six groups corresponding with possible developments of a
Berlin situation. These items in the "Checklist" are listed in an ascending order of severity but they may be implemented in any order desired.

b. Since the items in this "Checklist" are associated directly with the Berlin problem, their implementation as exercises could contribute significantly to deterring the USSR from initiating a Berlin crisis.

c. Many of the measures listed should be taken prior to or concurrent with the actions outlined in Appendices A, B, and C and the actions which will be discussed in this Appendix.

d. Non-military measures as well as military measures are listed and coordinated action should be undertaken on both as appropriate.

e. A complete discussion of the "Checklist" and current Berlin Contingency Planning is contained in the 13 April and 26 April 1961 memorandums referred to in paragraph 3 above.

5. Since one of the primary instruments for the selection and timing of counter-reactions is the "Checklist of Military and Non-Military Measures in the Berlin Crisis," it follows that items selected from this "Checklist" are also appropriate for implementation to deter the USSR from initiating a Berlin crisis.

6. Two items from the "Checklist" have been selected as possible military actions which would satisfy the requirements of the problem. While they should be considered as examples only, the cost and implications of other items from the "Checklist" deemed appropriate for execution could be determined readily. It should also be emphasized that many items in the "Checklist" are not military but could have a real deterring effect on the Soviets in context with the Berlin problem.
7. First Item - Section C, Item 12. Move the following military forces under cover of rotation, and/or scheduled exercises.

"e. Tactical fighter force of no more than 5 squadrons to Europe."

a. Costs. In addition to 5 squadrons of F-100 aircraft, communications and electronic elements, and air base augmentation units would be required in Europe. This would require the following airlift--32 C-130 and 50 MATS aircraft. The cost for this operation based on a deployment phase of 21 days is as follows:

(1) Per diem $ 253,000
(2) MATS airlift 1,825,000*

$2,078,000

(*Computed on basis of 100 percent dead-head of MATS aircraft. In the event MATS aircraft remain in the theater on a demurrage basis during the employment phase (21 days), total costs would increase to $2,216,000.)

b. Implications.

(1) Prior to execution of this movement there should be consultation with NAC and nation-to-nation agreements to include overflight clearances in order that two of these squadrons could be based at Chambley, France, two at Chaumont, France, and one at Incirlik, Turkey.

(2) This force, known as TACK HAMMER, has already been earmarked for USCONTUM in a Berlin crisis. A training exercise for this force would be most beneficial.

(3) A majority of MATS capability applied to this task would have to be replaced by commercial augmentation. Availability and costs of commercial augmentation cannot be determined at this time; consequently, these additional costs are not reflected above.

(4) Exercises scheduled by Tactical Air Command would be cancelled or rescheduled for June or July.
(5) With prior alert the first aircraft would arrive at Chambly at H plus 17:19 hours and all four squadrons would be in France at H plus 27:32 hours. The squadron for Incirlik would completely arrive by H plus 43:24 hours. Without prior notice the first aircraft would land at H plus 23:16 hours and four squadrons would be in France by H plus 49:19 hours. The squadron for Incirlik would be in place by H plus 66:34 hours.

8. Second Item - Section C, Item 12. Move the following military forces under cover of rotation and/or scheduled exercise:

"b. Elements of 2nd Fleet to war stations, exercising from UK ports and in the Norwegian Sea."

a. Costs. If this movement were carried out during June or July when 2nd Fleet ships are assembled off the East Coast, no significant additional costs are foreseen. Similarly, in August, if relieved units of the Sixth Fleet are routed to the East Coast by way of the UK and Norwegian Sea, no significant additional costs are foreseen.

b. Implications.

(1) A movement of this magnitude should be presented to the NAC prior to implementation.

(2) Crisis in the Caribbean may preclude the use of either of the concepts stated above.

(3) Country consultations with the UK and other nations would be required to effect visits by US ships to foreign ports. If carrier based aircraft are to be exercised, it may be necessary to obtain overflight rights dependent on nature of exercise.