MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Clandestine Action in Support of the U.S. Berlin Policy

1. Attached is a memorandum written in response to Dr. Kissinger's request for a survey of clandestine actions which might possibly be undertaken in support of the U.S. position on Berlin. It is requested that you make clear to him, in forwarding this, that the memorandum is informal and does not represent a recommendation by the Agency that those actions be undertaken.

2. I presume you will brief the Director on this paper. We have coordinated the memorandum with the CA Staff and sent a copy to the Deputy Director (Plans).

GORDON M. STEWART
Chief, Eastern European Division

Attachments:
Memorandum
Study of the Berlin Situation

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Date: 4/1/1944

HFP 4Y-1
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1. In discussing clandestine action possibilities for influencing the Berlin situation, we assume that the Soviet Union intends to continue its efforts to complete the integration of East Berlin into East Germany and to make the Western position in West Berlin so tenuous that the West will eventually see no alternative to withdrawal from Berlin and recognition, de facto if not de jure, of East Germany as a sovereign state.

2. The clandestine actions to be considered in planning an effective response to Communist pressure on Berlin fall into six broad categories:
   a. actions designed to increase East German instability;
   b. actions designed to symbolize Western determination to remain in Berlin;
   c. actions designed to inhibit Communist moves by encouraging the resolve of the non-Soviet world to preserve a free Berlin and achieve the reunification of Germany;
   d. actions designed to counteract Communist propaganda;
   e. actions designed to place the Communists under economic pressure;
   f. what about insurrection?

3. It will be immediately apparent that a good number of quite overt actions could be subsumed under these headings. We will deal only with the clandestine and non-U.S. attributable actions. These, however, must be associated with a broad program of action at the diplomatic level to be in any way effective.

Actions Designed to Increase East German Instability:

4. Despite the firm hold over the internal populace of East Germany which has been achieved by the East German security forces closely supported by the Soviet troops in East Germany, the existing mood of discontent is a source of continuing concern to the Communist leaders. It appears at this time to have reached its highest point since 1953 and to be at least one reason for the recent indications of adoption of a milder course
by the East German regime. This popular discontent can be fostered by clandestine actions not involving incitement of the populace to insurrection, but designed to keep up and increase pressure upon the regime. The level and quality of this pressure must be gauged accurately because it is our intent to stimulate a train of measures that begin with further concessions to the populace (the milder course) and include at later stages a more pragmatic, less doctrinaire and less militant program both internally and externally. Large-scale propaganda action can only be undertaken with the knowledge and agreement of the Federal Republic since such actions, to be effective, must affect the welfare of a portion (at least) of the East German populace, and in most cases involve "German-to-German" appeals. More limited activities with individual East German leaders and deception operations can be carried out on a unilateral basis. The principal actions of this sort which could be undertaken are:

a. encouraging an increase in the flow of refugees from East Germany, even above the current high rate, particularly inducing the flight of those categories of persons possessing skills of critical importance to the regime, such as medical doctors, dentists, engineers and other technical specialists, and skilled labor. Such a program, contingent upon rapid and effective integration of the refugees into the West German economy, manifestly requires the active support of the Federal Republic;

b. encouraging selected West German political leaders to develop contacts with East German politicians to establish high level communication channels for the transmittal of ideas and plans. As an adjunct to this, special effort can be made to achieve contact with anti-Ulbricht elements (largely purged from government positions) of the East German Communist party. (Experience has shown that dissident Communist officials must be given West German assurances of asylum and support in the event they are compelled to flee from East Germany. While such programs have not in the past been particularly effective, largely because of the unwavering and emphatic support given Ulbricht by Khrushchev, current indications of a shift of policy in East Germany to a milder course suggest that it may be possible to influence selected East German officials and contribute to the apprehensions of Soviets and top East German Communists alike regarding the loyalty and reliability of the East German functionaries beneath them.)
c. supporting increased activity by the major West German political parties, the Evangelical and Roman Catholic Churches, and the press of both West Berlin and West Germany, to propagate mass appeals to the East German populace to provide the minimum possible support to the Communist regime, and otherwise encourage these Western entities to act as divisive forces in East Germany. In this connection, we must recognize that financial support for the activities of one political party is likely to meet opposition from the others. It is, therefore, essential that we provide support for at least the two major parties and more than one publishing firm.

Actions Designed to Symbolize Western Determination to Remain in Berlin:

5. Since the beginning of the cold war the population of Berlin has received many assurances of our continuing support, but none have meant as much as the presence in the city of American, British and French troops and their dependents. As will be seen in the attached analysis of Communist tactics, there is a limit to the effectiveness of the Western military "presence" in counteracting the continuing and, we anticipate, mounting Communist attacks on the morale of the city's population. We have, therefore, currently under study a proposal for the expansion and internationalization largely by private endowments of educational and cultural institutions in West Berlin on a scale which would require the presence of a substantial number of U.S., French and British citizens beyond the garrison forces and which would represent a significant additional commitment on our part to the freedom of West Berlin. Such cultural institutions, moreover, are proposed to be oriented toward the developing nations, to provide training both for citizens of those nations, and for citizens of Western nations who will proceed to the developing countries to provide technical assistance to those nations. As an example, American and other Westerners preparing to work in underdeveloped areas could be trained at the Berlin institution in the language and culture of the country where they will work, and engage in such study side by side with citizens of that country who would come to the Berlin institution to study Western languages and technical or administrative subjects which will contribute to their development as Western-oriented leaders of their native lands.

Actions Designed to Inhibit Communist Moves by Aligning World Opinion Against the Division of Germany and the Surrender of Berlin:

6. The dissemination of overt and covert propaganda to gain support for our position in Germany and Berlin has been and will continue to be one
of the most important actions we can take. The most compelling theme that has been devised for this purpose is that of insisting on the right of self-determination of the German people. The proposition is so undeniable right that Soviet and East German attempts to twist it to their own devices have been ludicrous. The theme can and should be insistently repeated, thereby placing the Soviets so squarely on the spot that even their "peace" offensive is overshadowed by it. Clandestinely supported propaganda and political action has and can continue to play significant supporting roles in developing this theme.

7. High-level covert action operations and such information activities as "planting" of news and feature articles in a variety of media appropriate to the target audience, encouragement and distribution of statements by various world leaders, and deliberate "leaks" to significant Soviet or other Communist officials can also be used to underscore the following related themes:

a. convincing the Soviets of U.S. (and Western Allied) intention to meet force with force, particularly with respect to the issue of free Western access to Berlin;

b. emphasizing on a world-wide basis the continuing joint responsibility borne by the Soviet Union with the three Western Allies for the maintenance of all Berlin under Four Power status until a settlement is reached on the whole German question;

c. highlighting the contrast between free West Berlin and Communist East Berlin, particularly in those developing and uncommitted areas where ideological and legal arguments respecting the Berlin question are not likely to be effective;

d. countering East German efforts to gain international recognition as a sovereign state (particularly in the developing and uncommitted areas of the world) by campaigns stressing:

(1) the illegitimacy of the East German regime and the police-state mechanism which maintains and controls it;

(2) espionage and subversion activities conducted by East Germany as an integral part of its economic and political offensive in the uncommitted world.
Actions Designed to Counteract Communist Propaganda:

8. The Western position in Germany is undoubtedly weakened by the continuing drumbeat of Communist propaganda charging Fascism and militarism on the part of the Western powers in general and pointing particularly at the survival of Nazism and anti-Semitism in the Federal Republic. These destructive charges, tied sensationally to the moment of the impending trial of Adolf Eichmann, interfere with the legitimate efforts of the West Germans to review the Nazi past objectively and to imbue German youth with responsible attitudes toward representative government. In this field clandestine propaganda has as its aim the development and maintenance of a balanced image of the new Germany. Idealization of the Bonn regime can serve no useful purpose, but a wide acknowledgement of the essentially constructive nature of the West German government and its vital role in the Western community is the very foundation stone upon which our German policy is based.

9. Closely related to counteraction of Eastern vilification of the Federal Republic is clandestine action to counteract Soviet proposals, should they be forthcoming, for a combination of the German question with the disarmament question, the Soviet aim in this case being to obtain agreement to a neutralized and disarmed Germany. Clandestine action would target propaganda especially toward the uncommitted members of the UN and would seek to expose the true intentions of such a proposal in terms intelligible to the various target audiences.

Actions Designed to Place the Communists Under Economic Pressure:

10. At the present time economic factors (East German requirements for procuring a number of commodities in the West) appear to be at least one factor deterring the Soviets from attempting to force an immediate change in the Berlin situation. The cancellation and renegotiation of the Interzonal Trade Agreement by the Federal Republic has apparently at least slowed the Eastern timetable on Berlin. Action at the diplomatic level to expand the current quadrupartite planning in the field of economic countermeasures to include participation by all NATO States, and the achievement of NATO-wide agreement to an effective embargo upon trade with East Germany, is probably the most effective countermeasure, and possibly the strongest non-military deterrent, to renewed Soviet pressure. Clandestine action can possibly place some further pressure upon the Soviet Union and the East German regime by threatening world-wide campaigns to boycott East German firms. Further clandestine actions may be possible with the objective of discrediting and harassing East
German trade and diplomatic officials abroad, in furtherance of the aim of disrupting East German trade, which actions would have the additional benefit of supporting U.S. policy of negating East German efforts to gain international recognition and status.

11. With respect to measures taken to obstruct East German activities outside the Soviet Bloc, it must be recognized as a virtual certainty that the Soviet Union will provide truly critical items to the East Germans if they cannot obtain them elsewhere. It may nonetheless be possible to increase the cost to the Soviets of maintaining East Germany and impede the economic development of East Germany by Western embargo or preemptive buying. Without the firm determination of at least NATO governments, and preferably of an even broader spectrum of states, to prevent trade with East Germany, however, clandestine action to deny certain commodities to East Germany would almost certainly be ineffective.

What About Insurrection?

12. It is our view that incitement of the populace of East Germany (or of other Soviet Satellites) to insurrection is not a feasible clandestine action operation except in a situation in which open military action between the Soviet Union and the West is actually imminent; the civilian populace of the Eastern European states, after the lessons learned from 17 June 1953 in East Germany and from the October 1956 revolution in Hungary, would respond to a call for open resistance only if it saw real assurance that the West would provide major military support. Furthermore, Soviet control of the civil populations of the Eastern European countries is now extremely effective. The Soviets can accurately judge the internal stability and capabilities of such a populace as that of East Germany. Thus, Soviet attention is directed toward Western military and diplomatic moves for signs of true intentions of supporting active insurrection, or for evidences of Western willingness to let a crisis develop to a point so close to military hostilities that the civil populace of East Germany may spontaneously seek to provoke open clash in order to commit Western military forces to action against the Soviets. Clandestine actions suggesting the possibility of popular uprising in East Germany, therefore, should only be considered under circumstances in which such an uprising is genuinely considered to be desirable as an adjunct to actual Western military operations. (It is recognized that clandestine action weakening the stability of the GDR may in fact contribute to popular unrest which can mount to an incendiary point. Therefore, it is necessary to keep in mind the probable effect of each regime-weakening measure upon the attitude of the population. This line of reasoning also suggests that consideration be given in advance to the U.S. reaction should major outbreaks of violence occur spontaneously in East Germany.)
An Analysis of the Berlin Problem:

13. Attached for your consideration is a study of the Berlin situation prepared in October 1960 by a senior officer of this organization who has been stationed in Berlin for a number of years. It is submitted as much for the flavor of the views presented as for the actual prognosis and proposals the paper contains. While some of the specific Soviet actions which the paper predicts appear to have been shelved or delayed, we believe the basic analysis of Soviet intentions is sound and that the description of Soviet and East German tactics is plausible. The paper perhaps underestimates the degree to which economic prosperity in West Berlin conditions the populace against the Communist system, but the possibility cannot be ignored of a shift of loyalties over the long term of the remaining West Berlin population in face of a successful Eastern campaign to cripple the West Berlin economy, a campaign which might succeed unless the Western allies take bold measures to ensure the free flow of goods and people between West Berlin and West Germany.

23 March 1961

Attachment:
Study of the Berlin Situation